Fighter488
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- Dec 5, 2009
- Messages
- 1,050
- Reaction score
- 0
US seeks to turn China over Iran sanctions
A flurry of recent diplomacy has centered on the United States' drive to have a further round of United Nations sanctions slapped on Iran over its nuclear program on concern that it might not be solely for peaceful purposes; something Tehran consistently denies.
The most magnificent gesture, according to a report in the UK's Telegraph newspaper on February 28 [1], was made by Tehran:
Seeking to undermine [sanctions] efforts, Iran on Sunday presented Russia with two rare Persian leopards - a gift personally solicited by Vladimir Putin, the Russian prime minister.
However, it will take more than exotic livestock to derail the US-led drive to sanction Iran. In recent days, the focus has shifted toAsia as Iran has lobbied Japan and the United States has finally turned its attention to China. However, the risks to China of the Iran sanctions campaign are clear, and the case for how it benefits Beijing have been made poorly and unpersuasively.
After the Barack Obama administration's two top China hands, James Steinberg and Jeffrey Bader, visit Beijing this week, the world may learn if the US has been able to crack the China puzzle.
If Steinberg and Bader fail, there is the danger that China will play the spoiler, both on Iran sanctions and at a conference in New York in May on reforms to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that the Obama administration sees as a set piece of its anti-proliferation-centered foreign policy.
Iran last week sent a high-level delegation to Japan, headed by the speaker of the Iranian parliament, Ali Larijani, previously Iran's top nuclear negotiator, in search of a potential crack in the West's united front. Instead of leopards, it offered discussions on enrichment and cooperation in civilian nuclear energy.
The Iranians may have thought Japan would be interested in proactive nuclear diplomacy in light of its history as a victim of atomic attacks, and because a Japanese citizen, Yukiya Amano, is now head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
However, according a Japanese report, the Iranian delegation received little comfort as Japan didn't seem interested in undercutting Amano's position at the IAEA. Note that Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada called on Iran to "end'' - not "suspend" - its enrichment activities:
Okada told Larijani on Wednesday that he hopes Tehran will take steps to regain the trust of the international community and end its nuclear enrichment activities.
"If a resolution against Iran is passed in the UN Security council, there is little that Japan can do but to abide by it," local media reported Okada telling Larijani. "And there is little time left to prevent this from happening." [2]
Little time, indeed. "If a resolution against Iran is passed in the UN Security council, there is little that Japan can do but to abide by it," local media reported Okada telling Larijani. "And there is little time left to prevent this from happening." [2]
Despite a conspicuous lack of enthusiasm by China, Brazil, and even Russia for "crippling" sanctions, and a widespread attitude that more "jaw-jaw" inside the IAEA is preferable to a destabilizing combination of UN Security Council and bilateral and multilateral sanctions, the campaign for sanctions gained momentum with the leaking of a critical IAEA report on Iran's nuclear program in mid-February.
The Obama administration hopes the sanctions campaign will rush ahead at a speed designed to confound and confuse Tehran and Beijing.
The second stage of the campaign - whisking the Iran nuclear debate out of the IAEA and back to the Security Council - may have already happened.
The IAEA is in the hands of the new, reliably pro-Western director general Amano. Members of the skeptical IAEA Safeguards Department who felt marginalized under the previous head, Mohamed ElBaradei, now drive reporting on Iran, and Iran-friendly nations are a dwindling minority on the board of governors, which is at present meeting in Vienna.
Amano has removed the IAEA from the sanctions line of fire by writing his report and kicking the Iran question up to the Security Council, thereby sidestepping contentious debate by its board and avoiding (or at least papering over) the rifts and angry arguments that characterized the ElBaradei years. This is an approach that the West - eager to eliminate the inconvenience of the IAEA filter - is apparently very happy to endorse.
Western diplomats served notice that Amano's critical report on Iran, already leaked, would probably be sufficient grounds for UN Security Council discussions, without any enabling decision by IAEA governors.
From Agence France-Presse:
Diplomats close to the UN watchdog say the IAEA's 35-member board is unlikely to censure the Islamic republic over its contested nuclear work, despite some blunt words by Amano in his first report on the matter.
But the four-day meeting, also the first since Amano took over the reins on December 1, could well pave the way for a new round of sanctions by the Security Council, the diplomats say. "Fundamentally speaking, the issue is currently more one for New York rather than here," one western diplomat told AFP, speaking on condition of anonymity. [3]
If the West is successful in sidelining the IAEA, it will wrong-foot Iran and China, which have consistently pursued a strategy of bottling up the argument inside the IAEA. But the four-day meeting, also the first since Amano took over the reins on December 1, could well pave the way for a new round of sanctions by the Security Council, the diplomats say. "Fundamentally speaking, the issue is currently more one for New York rather than here," one western diplomat told AFP, speaking on condition of anonymity. [3]
Iran, in particular, had gone to some lengths in its efforts to frame the issue as a debate best handled by the IAEA mechanisms. In preparation for the March 1 board of governors meeting, it obtained a strong statement [4] from the Non-Aligned Movement that explicitly criticized Amano's approach and urged that the IAEA continue to serve as the venue for resolving the dispute:
In a formal letter to the IAEA, Iran also resurrected the idea of a swap through the IAEA's good offices of Iran's low-enriched uranium (LEU) for foreign-fabricated fuel plates for the Tehran research reactor.
In a supporting letter designed to elicit sympathy for Iran's demand for a simultaneous swap of LEU for plates on Iranian soil, Iran's envoy to the IAEA reminded the organization that the West had reneged at least three times on promises and, in some cases involving firm contracts backed up with prepayments or investments, to provide Iran with nuclear fuel [5].
However, it appears that no appeals to equity or the dignity of the IAEA will entice Amano to re-enter negotiations with Tehran and expose his organization to the resentment of the West and anti-Iranian factions within his staff.
Barring a rebellion by the pro-Iran minority on the board, it appears clear that the that the focus of Iran activity therefore can be shifted away from the IAEA meeting in Vienna and back to where the West wants it: the anticipated UN Security Council debate in March over Iran sanctions.
The United States has been vigorously lobbying everybody - the five permanent members and the 10 non-permanent Security Council members who don't have a veto but whose help is needed to achieve the nine "yes" votes required for passage of a sanctions resolution. China has been publicly identified as the main sanctions holdout among the five permanent members.
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the scramble for China's vote - and the entire Iran sanctions process - has been the conspicuous participation of Israel. In addition to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's high-profile visit to Moscow and Defense Minister Ehud Barak's visit to Washington, Israeli diplomats are reaching into corners of the world not usually associated with Israel's sphere of influence: places like Brazil, Gabon and Nigeria - and China.
Beijing received a delegation from Israel last week led by Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Ya'alon and central bank chief Stanley Fischer. The Israeli delegation had a two-hour meeting with State Councilor Dai Bingguo and presented a dossier of Israel's secret intelligence on Iran's nuclear program.
Presumably giving the Chinese a peek at the original Israeli intelligence was meant to undercut one of Iran's objections to the IAEA process: that the United States and Israel pitch intelligence summaries over the IAEA's transom, where they are converted into unassuageable and eternal concerns over Iran's nuclear intentions without giving the IAEA or Iran a chance to examine or respond to the original documents.
Israeli sources reported to Ha'aretz that the discussions were held in a "friendly atmosphere" and the delegation had "a positive feeling". [6]
As to the intel, an official said [7] "the impression was that some of the information was revelatory for them". Quite possibly, the information was "revelatory" because it concerned China.
With suspicious serendipity, at the same time that the Israeli delegation visited Beijing, the Associated Press ran a lengthy expose on some sanctions-avoiding shenanigans that involved the purchase by a Chinese company through a Taiwan agent of some embargoed Swiss valves that ended up in Iran. As to how the story broke:
"Taiwan had contacts with a foreign intelligence agency after the transaction," the official said. "The agency provided us with intelligence that it suspected an Iranian entity could be procuring pressure transducers from a company in a third country and using them for nuclear proliferation purposes."
So it would appear that, beyond appeals to its better nature andgood global citizenship, China can look forward to a public shaming the West on sanctions violations if it displays an excessively refractory attitude.
It's another indication that the West is prepared to play hardball to get sanctions imposed on Iran.
However, somewhat belatedly, the US has turned to managing its China problem with the great power engagement that China craves, and not just the carrot-and-stick diplomacy that the Beijing leadership so deeply resents. The strategy of isolating China, and leaving it as the final holdout on sanctions, has attracted the angry and anxious notice of Beijing.
The fact that the US appears to be foreclosing the negotiated IAEA process and is instead working to isolate China and pressure it to vote for sanctions against Iran, which a Chinese observer characterized as forcing China to sanction itself, is already a topic of vociferous resentment in the Chinese media.
The feeling of being pushed in a corner has been exacerbated by threats that tougher Iran sanctions will be imposed at the national level regardless of how China votes at the UN Security Council.
US Secretary Hillary Clinton's remarkably clumsy attempt to reassure China by offering to orchestrate a supply of "low-price" Saudi oil to China to replace Iranian oil in the case of a sanctions-related disruption did two things.
First, it insulted China by characterizing it as a second-tier, vulnerable oil consumer that needed the help of the world's only superpower to navigate through the dangerous diplomatic and economic waters of the Middle East. Second, it raised the specter of crippling sanctions against the Iranian energy sector, implicitly signaling that UN sanctions (undoubtedly diluted and narrowly targeted thanks to the efforts of Russia and China) would likely serve as merely a prelude to aggressive national sanctions by the United States and the European Union.
In an effort to repair ties, Beijing is receiving a visit this week from the Obama administration's top two China hands - Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg (who coined the term "strategic reassurance" to describe America's China policy) and Senior White House Adviser for Asia Jeffrey Bader.
China was quick to frame the visit in the context of repairing US-China relations frayed by weapons sales to Taiwan and Obama's meeting with the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama:
"We urge the US to earnestly observe the principles laid down in the three Sino-US joint communiques and their joint statement, respect China's core interests and properly handle sensitive issues, so as to push the relations back to the normal track," spokesman Qin Gang said at a regular press conference. [9]
This serves as a signal that China's anxieties over America's overall diplomatic strategy, and not jawing over the concerted US campaign to sanction Iran, should be at the top of Steinberg and Bader's agenda. In fact, in the same press conference, Qin Gang made it clear that in China's opinion Iran sanctions shouldn't be on the agenda at all. Per the People's Daily: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told a regular press briefing that China believed there was still room for diplomatic efforts and the parties should work to maintain and promote the process of dialogue and negotiation for a proper resolution of the issue. [10]
China's efforts to slow-walk Iran sanctions reflect Beijing's genuine feelings on how the Iran crisis should be solved. They also act as a direct challenge to the Obama administration's plan to bring the Iran crisis to a head and achieve meaningful sanctions this time around, instead of kicking the enrichment can down the road one more time. It will be interesting to see if the US delegation of Steinberg and Bader can show China the road to win-win, especially since there is a certain suspicion that sustained collateral damage suffered by China as a result of prolonged Iran sanctions would not be unexpected or unappreciated by a US administration determined to roll back Beijing's inroads in resource-rich parts of the world.
On the eve of Steinberg and Bader's visit, China passed a message through the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference:
"There should be more cooperation, and less 'containment' in Sino-US relations," said Zhao Qizheng, spokesman of the third session of the 11th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), here Tuesday.
"The Americans need to understand that the China-US relation is like a car that has two drivers instead of one. The Chinese and Americans both have wheels and brakes, so they have to discuss with each other to drive the car forward on the right track," he said. [11]
If Beijing and Washington cannot achieve a meaningful rapprochement, the fallout will probably be seen at the Non Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May. "The Americans need to understand that the China-US relation is like a car that has two drivers instead of one. The Chinese and Americans both have wheels and brakes, so they have to discuss with each other to drive the car forward on the right track," he said. [11]
At that conference, the Obama administration intends to pursue reforms that will confirm the repurposing of the NPT regime and the IAEA as instruments of an adversarial non-proliferation policy that takes national enrichment programs - and equivocal and destabilizing programs with a weaponization taint, such as Iran's - off the table permanently.
In recent public statements, both Iran and China have publicly hung their hat on the continued validity of what one might call NPT Classic: the organization that helped the have-nots to develop the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Beijing may continue to stand up for the "old" NPT, attempting to sustain an alliance with the developing world to resist the introduction of Obama's NPT 2.0.
China is already bracing itself for a bruising battle with Washington on its exchange rate policy this autumn, in the context of the US midterm elections, and will probably feel little incentive to stand with the United States on NPT reform while alienating the Iran and its friends and followers in the developing world.
Steinberg and Bader don't have a lot of levers going into Beijing.
The Obama administration is determined to "return to Asia" - and Latin America and the Middle East - and reclaim the geopolitical and economic ground the US lost to China in these crucial regions during the George W Bush administration.
The concessions and reassurances the US can offer China on symbolic issues such as meetings with the Dalai Lama and arms sales to Taiwan pale into insignificance next to Beijing's perception that the US, India and the European Union are determined to roll back Chinese influence around the world.
If the US and China experience continued friction on the issues of Iran and the NPT, it will be because the Obama administration finds it impossible to deliver what Beijing craves - the "strategic reassurance", in James Steinberg's words, that the US will make room for China's continued rise.
Notes
1. US steps up diplomatic pressure on Russia over Iran sanctions 2. Japan urges Iran to end nuclear enrichment
3. UN watchdog holds first meeting under new chief
4. NAM says IAEA should not bow to undue pressure' on Iran
5. Iran reminds IAEA of West's broken promises
6. Israel offers 'full intelligence picture' to get China to agree on Iran sanctions
7. Israel says China attentive to Iran sanctions plea
8. AP Enterprise: How nuclear equipment reached Iran
9. China urges US to respect its core interests
10. China calls for more diplomacy on Iran nuclear issue
11. CPPCC: Less containment in Sino-US ties
Peter Lee writes on East and South Asian affairs and their intersection with US foreign policy.
(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Asia Times Online :: China News, China Business News, Taiwan and Hong Kong News and Business.
