US - Pakistan Air Engagement

[fatman17]

Check out @Natsecjeff’s Tweet:

https://twitter.com/x/status/981799290786922497

 

[monitor]

Research Questions

1. Why, despite billions of dollars in U.S. security assistance and development aid, does Pakistan frequently opt for policies directly at odds with core American interests?
2. Is there anything the United States can do to exert greater influence over Pakistani security decisions?
3. What is the nature of the long-term relationship between the U.S. Air Force and the Pakistan Air Force as the resizing of U.S. troops in Afghanistan continues and eventually stabilizes at levels well below their Operation Enduring Freedom peak?

As U.S. military action in Afghanistan stabilizes at levels well below the Operation Enduring Freedom peak, the security relationship between the United States and Pakistan will enter a new phase. Formulating a strategy for future engagement requires a deep understanding of Pakistan's own security imperatives — i.e., the factors that determine what types of partnership are realistic, and the geopolitical and historical forces that shape Pakistan's cooperation with the United States. This report examines such factors from a variety of angles: It discusses the historical context of U.S.-Pakistan engagement, highlighting the two prior cycles of deep partnership and precipitous downgrade; it outlines Pakistan's strategic calculus with five nations (India, China, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran), which inform most important security decisions, and highlights Pakistan's overarching focus on potential conflict with India; and it looks at future trends for partnering, while examining several potential scenarios. A key finding presented is that U.S. leverage over Pakistan's security choices is limited, and that the U.S. Air Force effectively serves as the "loss leader" in the relationship. A key recommendation is for U.S. planners to be mindful of the cyclical pattern of the relationship. Given the growing security relationship between the United States and India, any future partnership with Pakistan may face a new set of challenges. If history is a guide, however, the United States would be well advised to maintain its engagement in the interim rather than ramping up next time from a standing start.

Key Findings
Engagement

• The U.S. Air Force (USAF) would be wise to maintain a steady level of engagement with Pakistan Air Force (PAF), rather than trying to scramble for a rapid engagement when the next cycle begins. The USAF should prepare for the next cycle — now. This can and should be done in a manner which does not jeopardize the growing security engagement between the United States and India. But if past is prologue to the future, there will likely be another such turn of the wheel with Pakistan, and it may well arrive (as it has the past two times) quite literally overnight.

Future Trends

• The USAF should understand and accept its role as "loss leader" of U.S.-Pakistan relations. The USAF should not expect its relationship with PAF to be one of institutional parity: PAF has less to offer the USAF than vice versa, while the benefits provided by Pakistan (human intelligence for counterterrorism, facilitation of Taliban reconciliation, nonproliferation cooperation, and policy guarantees of regional stability) will accrue to other parts of the U.S. security establishment.

Recommendations

• The U.S. Air Force (USAF) should prepare now for the next cycle of overnight engagement.
• The USAF should recognize that it has been, and is likely to be in the future, the "loss leader" of U.S.-Pakistan relations.
• The USAF and U.S. policymakers should understand the limits of U.S., and particularly USAF, leverage over Pakistan's choices.
• The USAF and U.S. interlocutors should calibrate Pakistan's expectations about what is politically feasible in the United States. They should also recognize the impact of the tone of rhetoric by members of the U.S. policy community.
• Subject always to changing geopolitical circumstances, the United States should continue to approve maintenance, training, and support for existing Pakistan Air Force (PAF) F-16s, and be wary of calls to forgo (or accelerate) future transfers.
• In cooperation with the Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan, the USAF should request an increase in nonlethal Pakistan-focused International Education and Training for PAF students.
• The USAF should offer the opportunity for PAF to send a select officer to serve as an instructor at a USAF school.
• The USAF should focus USAF-PAF exercises and training on existing technical capabilities, especially those that support or enable humanitarian aid/disaster relief capabilities.
• The United States should — to the extent possible without jeopardizing its relationship with India — consider sales of technical systems that support improved collaboration in areas of shared interests, such as counterterrorism or counterinsurgency missions.
• The USAF should discuss the possibility of sharing service lessons learned and best practices through subject-matter expert exchanges.

Table of Contents

• Chapter One
  
  Introduction
  
  
• Chapter Two
  
  Historical Context for USAF-PAF Engagement
  
  
• Chapter Three
  
  Geostrategic Context: Pakistan's Nested Security Relationships
  
  
• Chapter Four
  
  Future Trends for USAF as the Loss Leader in the Relationship: Pathways to Success, Pitfalls to Be Avoided
  
  
• Chapter Five
  
  Recommendations
  
  
• Appendix A
  
  Pakistan Military Order of Battle: Key Elements
  
  
• Appendix B
  
  Security Cooperation Basics
  

Research conducted by

• RANDPROJECT AIR FORCE

 

[SabzShaheen]

As the full document is not available for free, I will base my thoughts on the introduction provided.

In short, the US should make Pakistan believe that they are still interested in a mutually beneficial partnership by providing limited support through the USAF to the PAF while avoiding taking any steps in building the partnership that may potentially jeopardise relations with India.

I hope that this report factors in the likely possibility that another "cycle" of this relationship may not come in view of the rapidly developing geopolitics of the South Asian and wider Asian region. As the report mentions, the US has limited leverage over Pakistan which will only decrease in the future according to the current downward trend in relations. Because of this and Pakistan's traditionally close relationship with China (who the US branded as a threat to their national interests) as developing into a more consolidated economic and strategic partnership, the two countries are unlikely to remain allies in the future.

 

[araz]

As the full document is not available for free, I will base my thoughts on the introduction provided.

In short, the US should make Pakistan believe that they are still interested in a mutually beneficial partnership by providing limited support through the USAF to the PAF while avoiding taking any steps in building the partnership that may potentially jeopardise relations with India.

I hope that this report factors in the likely possibility that another "cycle" of this relationship may not come in view of the rapidly developing geopolitics of the South Asian and wider Asian region. As the report mentions, the US has limited leverage over Pakistan which will only decrease in the future according to the current downward trend in relations. Because of this and Pakistan's traditionally close relationship with China (who the US branded as a threat to their national interests) as developing into a more consolidated economic and strategic partnership, the two countries are unlikely to remain allies in the future.

US is and remains for the next 1-2 decades a Superpower. There can be no USAF-PAF co ordination instead there will be US- Pak co ordination. I cannot say anything from US Perspective as I dont know what it wants. From the Pakistani perspective we need to have cordial but non military relations. The prospect of weapons is the proverbial carrot that has been hung in front of us repeatedly and we have repeatsdly fallen for it.Unfortunately the Pak beaurocracy and polity is really inept to deal with the US. GRANTED on both occasions in the last 50 years we have had very few options but to go along with the US, but times have changed. Pakistan needs to start saying No to the US. We also dealt really badly with the US and short sighted greediness made us blind to the long term losses which we suffered. We gave too much away for very little long term gain. I am afraid lining of a few people's pockets would ensure we do the same again. We need to have a much more professional approach in our relationship with the US rather than a bunch of Paindoos going and saying" you tell us where we will shoot ourselves". However a purely professional approach with a " couple of smartly suited accountants and Lawyers in spiffed up suits"(according to Mastan Khan) with files outlining our losses appears beyond us. However a smart and to the point approach is what is required with the US as this is what they understand and respect.
A

 

[Tipu7]

As the full document is not available for free, I will base my thoughts on the introduction provided.

In short, the US should make Pakistan believe that they are still interested in a mutually beneficial partnership by providing limited support through the USAF to the PAF while avoiding taking any steps in building the partnership that may potentially jeopardise relations with India.

I hope that this report factors in the likely possibility that another "cycle" of this relationship may not come in view of the rapidly developing geopolitics of the South Asian and wider Asian region. As the report mentions, the US has limited leverage over Pakistan which will only decrease in the future according to the current downward trend in relations. Because of this and Pakistan's traditionally close relationship with China (who the US branded as a threat to their national interests) as developing into a more consolidated economic and strategic partnership, the two countries are unlikely to remain allies in the future.

Full Document

 

[Orca]

As the full document is not available for free, I will base my thoughts on the introduction provided.

In short, the US should make Pakistan believe that they are still interested in a mutually beneficial partnership by providing limited support through the USAF to the PAF while avoiding taking any steps in building the partnership that may potentially jeopardise relations with India.

I hope that this report factors in the likely possibility that another "cycle" of this relationship may not come in view of the rapidly developing geopolitics of the South Asian and wider Asian region. As the report mentions, the US has limited leverage over Pakistan which will only decrease in the future according to the current downward trend in relations. Because of this and Pakistan's traditionally close relationship with China (who the US branded as a threat to their national interests) as developing into a more consolidated economic and strategic partnership, the two countries are unlikely to remain allies in the future.

sir, I downloaded the pdf version and it looks like the full version, maybe i wrong but you should give it a try, here is the link
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2100/RR2107/RAND_RR2107.pdf

 

[Dalit]

This is the same old wine in a new package.

 

[araz]

This is the same old wine in a new package.

But a wine that needs to be drunk all the same. The question is how much and under what conditions.
A

 

[SabzShaheen]

US is and remains for the next 1-2 decades a Superpower. There can be no USAF-PAF co ordination instead there will be US- Pak co ordination. I cannot say anything from US Perspective as I dont know what it wants. From the Pakistani perspective we need to have cordial but non military relations. The prospect of weapons is the proverbial carrot that has been hung in front of us repeatedly and we have repeatsdly fallen for it.Unfortunately the Pak beaurocracy and polity is really inept to deal with the US. GRANTED on both occasions in the last 50 years we have had very few options but to go along with the US, but times have changed. Pakistan needs to start saying No to the US. We also dealt really badly with the US and short sighted greediness made us blind to the long term losses which we suffered. We gave too much away for very little long term gain. I am afraid lining of a few people's pockets would ensure we do the same again. We need to have a much more professional approach in our relationship with the US rather than a bunch of Paindoos going and saying" you tell us where we will shoot ourselves". However a purely professional approach with a " couple of smartly suited accountants and Lawyers in spiffed up suits"(according to Mastan Khan) with files outlining our losses appears beyond us. However a smart and to the point approach is what is required with the US as this is what they understand and respect.
A

I think the report argues that the USAF can act as a facilitator of closer coordination between Pakistan and the US though it is best to refer to the document itself for a more accurate understanding.

I agree that from our perspective and from the statements of Pakistani officials, Pakistan would rather have an encompassing relationship with the US based on mutual benefits; I recall reading about officials that were unhappy with the US policy of engaging with Pakistan through the lens of Afghanistan over the past few decades leading up to the present.

The problem is that US-Pakistan relations were established in the form of a cold war alliance, a major component of which was military cooperation coupled with the prevention of communism seeping further across Asia. Gradually, as the threat of communism dominating Pakistan decreased and a military man (Zia-Ul-Haq) came into power, the importance of military cooperation to both nations as well as the dependence on the entire alliance on them increased dramatically. From this point forward, the US-Pakistan partnership was consolidated as strategic but inevitably limited. It could, therefore, be argued that the US began to view Pakistan through the lens of Afghanistan due to the significance put on military relations at the early onset of the alliance.

The US is frustrated that Pakistan is moving away from this de facto agreement that Pakistan would do as they would say in return for military hardware. It could be argued that it was the corruption of high ranking officials of the armed forces and Musharraf who took the "carrot" so the disproportionately large influence of the military in Pakistani affairs would be cemented; however, it can also be said that Musharraf took the US's "carrot" to lessen their use of the "stick". In other words, he was doing damage control.

From this point forward, the US-Pakistan strategic partnership will begin to evaporate. It is up to both nations to decide whether they want to form a new partnership based on a wide range of components like the economy, healthcare, culture or to allow relations to deteriorate to dangerous levels with negative implications for the entire region.

Full Document

sir, I downloaded the pdf version and it looks like the full version, maybe i wrong but you should give it a try, here is the link
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2100/RR2107/RAND_RR2107.pdf

Wow thanks so much guys. I already know this will be a valuable resource in analysing the American perception of its history and future with Pakistan. Unfortunately, I don't have time to read through the entire article at once so I hope a forum analyst might be able to dissect at least a portion of the document.

 

[Aamir Hussain]

I believe the document is available for free. I downloaded the PDF version just now.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2107.html

 

[SabzShaheen]

I believe the document is available for free. I downloaded the PDF version just now.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2107.html

Thanks, I should have checked the page more properly. It turns out that you only pay for a print copy

 

[AZADPAKISTAN2009]

Russia Zindabad