WASHINGTON: When they ask Pakistan to sever its alleged ties with the Taliban, US officials focus on three militant leaders, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and Commander Nazir.
Diplomatic observers in Washington, however, acknowledge that while urging Pakistan to end its links to the militants, the Americans do not address the concerns and fears that force Pakistan to keep an option other than the one offered by the United States.
The observers point out that the Pakistanis feel the need to cultivate militant leaders because they fear Indias overwhelming presence in Afghanistan.
Not addressing these concerns leaves Pakistan exposed to Indian encirclement, says Aqil Shah, a US expert of Pakistani origin associated with the Columbia University.
Pakistan sees the evidence of this encirclement in New Delhis alleged support for the insurgency in Pakistans resource-rich Balochistan province and in the Indian funding for a 135-mile road connecting Afghanistans Nimroz province with the Iranian port of Chabahar, Mr Shah adds.
According to other experts, the Pakistanis have almost no influence over the current Afghan government. The traditional Taliban leadership, including Mullah Omar, too does not trust Pakistan because of its alliance with the United States.
This forces them to cultivate militant leaders like Mr Hekmatyar and Commander Haqqani, two key militant leaders fighting the American and allied forces in Afghanistan.
Commander Nazir, a Pakistani tribal militant, is useful for Islamabad because of his differences with Baitullah Mehsud who is a greater threat to Pakistan than any other militant leader.
But in Washington, Commander Nazir is seen as a greater threat to US interests than Mr Mehsud because he sits right on the Afghan border and is believed to have links with the Afghan Taliban.
For Pakistan, however, Commander Nazir is a proven asset. They have already used him once to beat Mr Mehsuds Uzbek supporters.
Recently, US experts have also begun to acknowledge that the Indian presence in Afghanistan forces Pakistan to maintain the ties it developed with the militants during the Afghan war.
I think it is unfair to dismiss the notion that Pakistans apprehensions about Afghanistan stem in part from its security competition with India, says Christine Fair, a leading US expert on South Asia.
'Anyone seeking to wean support for extremists and terrorists in the country has to address Pakistans legitimate security needs, says Shaun Gregory, a British expert and director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at the University of Bradford.
Mr Shah says that it should not be surprising that the Pakistani military continues to patronise groups it sees as useful in the regional race for influence because of what the Indians have been doing in Afghanistan.
'They seem to be saying: the Pakistanis did it to us in Kashmir, so we will pay them back in Balochistan and elsewhere.
During a recent visit to the Indian mission in Zahedan, Iran, Ms Fair found that issuing visas was not the main activity. India, she says, has also run operations from its mission in Mazar Sharif and is likely doing so from the other consulates it has reopened in Jalalabad and Kandahar along the (Pak-Afghan) border.
While Washington tries to persuade Pakistan to end its links to Mr Hekmatyar, it has not publicly objected to the Afghan governments efforts to reach a deal with him.
In Kabul, Mr Hekmatyar is seen as a useful contact. Unlike Commander Haqqani, who is not willing to join any peace talks as long as US troops are in Afghanistan, Mr Hekmatyar is not only willing to talk but also has allowed some of his lieutenants to join the government.
There are at least five governors and seven advisers in the Kabul government who are from the Hekmatyar group. But for Pakistan, the Americans have a different strategy: Regard India as a friend, not a competitor in Afghanistan. Islamabad, they argue, should focus on fighting the militants, who are the real enemy.
However, as an Indian expert of South Asian affairs, Sumit Ganguly, points out, Indian activities in Afghanistan make it difficult for Pakistan to accept India as a friend.
Mr Ganguly, a professor of Political Science at Indiana University, acknowledges that Indian objectives in Afghanistan are not purely humanitarian.
India, he says, is working on a pincer movement designed to relieve the pressure in Kashmir. Mr Ganguly says he also knows that the Indians have mucked around in Sindh in retaliation for Pakistani involvement in the Punjab crisis.
Diplomatic observers in Washington, however, acknowledge that while urging Pakistan to end its links to the militants, the Americans do not address the concerns and fears that force Pakistan to keep an option other than the one offered by the United States.
The observers point out that the Pakistanis feel the need to cultivate militant leaders because they fear Indias overwhelming presence in Afghanistan.
Not addressing these concerns leaves Pakistan exposed to Indian encirclement, says Aqil Shah, a US expert of Pakistani origin associated with the Columbia University.
Pakistan sees the evidence of this encirclement in New Delhis alleged support for the insurgency in Pakistans resource-rich Balochistan province and in the Indian funding for a 135-mile road connecting Afghanistans Nimroz province with the Iranian port of Chabahar, Mr Shah adds.
According to other experts, the Pakistanis have almost no influence over the current Afghan government. The traditional Taliban leadership, including Mullah Omar, too does not trust Pakistan because of its alliance with the United States.
This forces them to cultivate militant leaders like Mr Hekmatyar and Commander Haqqani, two key militant leaders fighting the American and allied forces in Afghanistan.
Commander Nazir, a Pakistani tribal militant, is useful for Islamabad because of his differences with Baitullah Mehsud who is a greater threat to Pakistan than any other militant leader.
But in Washington, Commander Nazir is seen as a greater threat to US interests than Mr Mehsud because he sits right on the Afghan border and is believed to have links with the Afghan Taliban.
For Pakistan, however, Commander Nazir is a proven asset. They have already used him once to beat Mr Mehsuds Uzbek supporters.
Recently, US experts have also begun to acknowledge that the Indian presence in Afghanistan forces Pakistan to maintain the ties it developed with the militants during the Afghan war.
I think it is unfair to dismiss the notion that Pakistans apprehensions about Afghanistan stem in part from its security competition with India, says Christine Fair, a leading US expert on South Asia.
'Anyone seeking to wean support for extremists and terrorists in the country has to address Pakistans legitimate security needs, says Shaun Gregory, a British expert and director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at the University of Bradford.
Mr Shah says that it should not be surprising that the Pakistani military continues to patronise groups it sees as useful in the regional race for influence because of what the Indians have been doing in Afghanistan.
'They seem to be saying: the Pakistanis did it to us in Kashmir, so we will pay them back in Balochistan and elsewhere.
During a recent visit to the Indian mission in Zahedan, Iran, Ms Fair found that issuing visas was not the main activity. India, she says, has also run operations from its mission in Mazar Sharif and is likely doing so from the other consulates it has reopened in Jalalabad and Kandahar along the (Pak-Afghan) border.
While Washington tries to persuade Pakistan to end its links to Mr Hekmatyar, it has not publicly objected to the Afghan governments efforts to reach a deal with him.
In Kabul, Mr Hekmatyar is seen as a useful contact. Unlike Commander Haqqani, who is not willing to join any peace talks as long as US troops are in Afghanistan, Mr Hekmatyar is not only willing to talk but also has allowed some of his lieutenants to join the government.
There are at least five governors and seven advisers in the Kabul government who are from the Hekmatyar group. But for Pakistan, the Americans have a different strategy: Regard India as a friend, not a competitor in Afghanistan. Islamabad, they argue, should focus on fighting the militants, who are the real enemy.
However, as an Indian expert of South Asian affairs, Sumit Ganguly, points out, Indian activities in Afghanistan make it difficult for Pakistan to accept India as a friend.
Mr Ganguly, a professor of Political Science at Indiana University, acknowledges that Indian objectives in Afghanistan are not purely humanitarian.
India, he says, is working on a pincer movement designed to relieve the pressure in Kashmir. Mr Ganguly says he also knows that the Indians have mucked around in Sindh in retaliation for Pakistani involvement in the Punjab crisis.
