U.S. asks Vietnam to stop helping Russian bomber flights

[BoQ77]

I agree with you brother. Just yesterday, a VCP Politburo member even said he welcomes US involvement in Asia-Pacific.



He wasn't just talking about trade and investment. He said the US has " much to offer to enhance Vietnam's security in theshort, medium and long term."



But Russia is poor right now and they have other things to worry about. Furthermore, they need to rely on China to recover.



I think those "interesting activities" means visiting some arts museums and trying out a pottery class.

Brother you need to wake up. Russia is now poor and have more important issues to deal with.

I remember, he added Russian stuffs are very modern, implies there are new items from stockpile.

 

[BoQ77]

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What Should the United States Do about Cam Ranh Bay and Russia’s Place in Vietnam?
by cogitASIA Staff • March 16, 2015 • 0 Comments
By Phuong Nguyen


Cam Ranh Bay, 1969. Source: JeriSisco’s flickr photostream, used under a creative commons license.

The revelation on March 11 that Washington expressed concern to Hanoi about Russia’s use of Cam Ranh Bay to assist its bomber flights in the Asia Pacific has again prompted a debate on the role of the port in quickly-warming U.S.-Vietnam defense ties. It became clear that Washington feels uncomfortable about the role Russia still occupies in Vietnam, an increasingly important U.S. partner in Southeast Asia, when Commander of the U.S. Army Pacific General Vincent Brooks confirmed that Russian planes circling Guam recently were refueled by tankers at Cam Ranh Bay.

Realistically, it makes the most sense for the United States to focus on forging its own well-established security ties with Vietnam rather than taking on Russia’s position in Vietnam at this time.

Cam Ranh Bay is a deep-water harbor in central Vietnam alongside the South China Sea and home to a massive U.S. base during the Vietnam War. Former secretary of defense Leon Panetta said during his visit to the port in 2012 that, “access for United States naval ships into this facility is a key component,” of U.S.-Vietnam relations.

Following Russia’s departure from Cam Ranh Bay in 2002, Hanoi announced that the military section of the base would not be opened for foreign use again. The then-Soviet Union had leased Cam Ranh Bay after Hanoi’s war with the United States ended in 1975, and turned it into the largest Soviet naval base abroad.

Yet since 2010, U.S. officials have watched as Russia has been accorded increasingly special treatment at Cam Ranh Bay. Russia is in the process of building a submarine fleet for Vietnam’s fast-expanding navy, with Russian experts reportedly stationed at the base to help train the Vietnamese submarine crew. Russian personnel and ships have been upgrading the naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and building a new submarine facility there.

In November 2014, the two countries signed an agreement that would facilitate the docking of Russian warships at Cam Ranh Bay. According to the agreement, Russian ships would simply need to give prior notice to Vietnamese authorities before calling on Cam Ranh Bay, while other foreign navies, including that of United States, would be limited to only one annual ship visit to Vietnamese ports.

The United States dispatches naval ships to the port of Danang, north of Cam Ranh Bay, annually for joint exchanges with the Vietnamese navy, Talks on increased U.S. port calls or limited U.S. access to Cam Ranh Bay, which holds a central role in Vietnam’s South China Sea strategy, have not gone forward because Vietnam says it lacks the capacity to take on greater naval engagement with the United States or handle large numbers of foreign ships visiting its ports.

This has led some U.S. officials to lament that Russia seems to get carte blanche at a facility as crucial as Cam Ranh Bay even though the United States has recently become Vietnam’s most important security partner, a trend that will likely carry forward in coming decades. Coupled with the fact that Russia’s air force activities have increased in the Asia-Pacific region amid U.S.-Russia tension over Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, U.S. anxiety over Russian use of Cam Ranh Bay seems justified.

However, U.S. pressure on this issue puts Vietnam in a bind, and has the potential to stall or reverse the significant progress that has been made in normalizing ties between the two militaries.

From Hanoi’s perspective, Russia remains Vietnam’s largest arms supplier and its largest source of military technological transfer thanks to ties dating back to the Cold War. The United States, meanwhile, only partially lifted its arms embargo on Vietnam last year. From the perspective of many Vietnamese officials who fought against the United States during the war, Moscow helped train generations of Vietnamese leaders and supported Hanoi during its decades of international isolation.

Because of this, Vietnamese officials will not dislodge Russia even as they embrace partnerships with the West and liberal free-trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Hanoi has been publicly silent since Washington privately expressed its concerns about Russian use of Cam Ranh and as the story went public a few days later.

Although the United States and Vietnam have held extensive defense talks since 2008, the two sides have yet to develop a self-sustaining level of mutual trust. The perception among some Vietnamese elites that Hanoi is but a pawn in the U.S. rebalance to Asia and Washington’s great power calculus is real.

Few things are more vital to Vietnam than an independent foreign policy. Given Vietnam’s complex history, its leaders do not want their country to be caught between major powers again. Anything that resembles U.S. interference in Vietnam’s dealings with Russia could unnecessarily aggravate this fear.

While the United States should leave Russia and Vietnam to sort out their bilateral defense cooperation, Vietnam should take actions to grant the U.S. Navy more frequent port visits, including at Cam Ranh Bay. It makes little strategic sense to deny the United States access to Cam Ranh, as a greater U.S. naval presence on the western flank of the South China Sea is in the interest of both countries.

Equally important, Vietnam should clarify soon what military hardware it plans to acquire from the United States. Now that the U.S. ban on lethal arms sale has been relaxed, establishing a defense procurement relationship is the next logical step in trust building between the two militaries.

Given the laudable progress the two countries have made in recent years, this episode over Russian use of Cam Ranh Bay should not be allowed to morph into a wider misunderstanding. To continue moving U.S.-Vietnam relations forward requires U.S. respect for Vietnam’s history and a realistic understanding of where bilateral relations currently stand.

 

[BoQ77]

Rumors said that Vietnam would give priority to American to use airspace, and it expects to see some naval joint exercises in the area.

Secretary of US Defense Dept in Cam Ranh bay in 2012. Try to guess what's he thinking about at that moment?

He later explain that
"We are rebalancing our forces to the Asia-Pacific ... so that in the future, 60 percent of our forces will be located in this region," he said.

"For that reason, it will be particularly important to be able to ... work with partners like Vietnam to be able to use harbors like this as we move our ships from our ports on the West Coast towards our stations here in the Pacific."

 

[BoQ77]

I remember, he added Russian stuffs are very modern, implies there are new items from stockpile.

Can I expect the sale of Tu22-M3 and KH-22 missiles to Vietnam ?

 

[BoQ77]

Minister Tran Dai Quang meets with senior US officials
18/03/2015 | 16:33:03

Minister of Public Security Tran Dai Quang (front, right) and Senator John McCain (front, left) (Photo: VNA)

Minister of Public Security Tran Dai Quang held bilateral talks with senior US officials in Washington D.C. on March 17 as part of his ongoing working visit to enhance the comprehensive partnership between Vietnam and the US.

During a meeting between the Minister and US Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, the two sides agreed to elevate bilateral cooperation in security and internal affairs while deepening the two countries’ comprehensive partnership and maintaining the current coordination mechanism.

They concurred to build a legal framework and hold negotiations towards the signing of cooperation agreements in convict extradition and transfer, money laundering prevention, and entrance and exit management.

They also plan to share experience in the fields and collaborate to ensure security and safety for resident agencies, businesses, and citizens in the respective countries, as well as focusing efforts on preventing non-traditional security crimes, cross-border crime, intellectual poverty crime, high-tech crime, and human trafficking.

In a separate talk between Minister Tran Dai Quang and Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of US Department of Justice Leslie Caldwell, the two sides agreed to review the outcomes of efforts by the two countries’ law enforcement and judicial agencies and map out cooperation strategies.

They were unanimous in furthering multilateral cooperation in the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) and actively coordinating at international workshops, conferences, and forums on traditional and non-traditional security issues.

Minister Tran Dai Quang also held talks with Senator John McCain, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services; Senator Ronald Johnson, Chairman of the US Homeland Security; and Congressman Peter Welch.

The Minister spoke highly of the American Congress’s contributions, propelling relations between the two countries forward, especially stipulating the permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) for Vietnam, partially remove arms embargo and financially supporting the country to address Agent Orange/Dioxin contamination and disarm bombs and mines.

He said he hopes more US congressmen will continue backing the development of the two countries’ relations, supporting Vietnam in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement negotiations, and recognising the country’s market economy status, and increasing assistance to address the war aftermaths.-VNA

 

[BoQ77]

(VOvworld) – Russia’s Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev will visit Vietnam from April 5 to 7 at the invitation of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung. The aim of the visit is to boost bilateral cooperation, particularly in politics, economics, and trade.

 

[BoQ77]

A very interesting and lucid statement from the US ambassador. Sounds like the US has now openly invited VietNam into its camp. The US has never been this direct before. Their previous official statements had always been along the line "we're just building our friendship, we're not forging a military alliance against anyone, etc."

The timing seems apt, especially when Russia is now struggling. It's like the US is saying, see what happen when Russia messes with the West? see how weak Russia is? We have more to offer. So who are you going to choose VietNam?

What is your opinion on this @BoQ77?

I must admit that, Vietnam should tell them "Hey, American !!! Let's see what you did support PH to defend. We never put all trust on you. No one else take care our country better than ourselves. BUT ..... we never resist any donation or good deal on US weapons. LOL "
@Thao Nguyen

Vietnam and Great Power Rivalries
Will Russian use of Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay derail improving Hanoi-Washington ties?

By Nhina Le and Koh Swee Lean Collin
March 31, 2015

It all began with apparently innocuous activity reported in both the Russian and Vietnamese press citing the Russian Defense Ministry on January 4. According to the reports, Russian Air Force Il-78 Midas tanker planes were granted access last year to Vietnam’s aerodrome facilities in Cam Ranh Bay, located in the southern Vietnamese province of Khanh Hoa. The Il-78s enabled the refueling of Russian Tu-95 “Bear” strategic bombers, which coincided with intensified Russian military flights in the Asia-Pacific, including “Bear” sorties that circled the major U.S. military redoubt in Guam.

These flights, claimed to be a show of strength and for intelligence-gathering purposes, were deemed “provocative” in the eyes of Washington. A request was made to Hanoi “to ensure that Russia is not able to use its access to Cam Ranh Bay to conduct activities that could raise tensions in the region,” according to the U.S. State Department. Moscow rejected Washington’s concerns and defended its military ties with Vietnam.

Troubled Ties?

Some commentaries in the media had associated this Cam Ranh Bay issue with troubles brewing in U.S.-Vietnam relations. But this is not really the case.

Of course, it would have appeared strange for Hanoi to have failed to anticipate that such activities would not go unnoticed by Washington. Because Vietnam does not operate Illyushin-type military planes, those planes in Cam Ranh Bay with their distinct red star markings and the standard livery of the Russian Air Force would have been hard to miss.

But there has been a recent upsurge in bilateral relations between Vietnam and the U.S., in no small part driven by resurgent tensions with Beijing over the South China Sea disputes. Washington partially lifted its decades-long arms embargo on Vietnam, with talk within the establishment that there it might be completely lifted in the future. The U.S. also agreed to supply patrol boats as part of a broader plan to aid Hanoi in maritime security capacity-building. Vietnam was also reportedly keen on purchasing second-hand P-3 Orion long-range maritime patrol aircraft.

Certainly, bilateral relations are far from perfect, given residual issues of contention, for example, persistent disquiet in Washington over Vietnam’s human rights record. Nevertheless, relations have been moving in a generally positive direction.

Vietnam’s Thinking

Hanoi does not view itself as having deviated from a long-avowed post-Cold War foreign policy that stresses certain key tenets, such as independence, no-alliances, and non-alignment.

This approach emphasizes both collaboration and struggle against domination and exclusion politics (vua hop tac, vua dau tranh). It is also premised on adapting to the post-Cold War geopolitical changes and to aid in its Renovation (doi moi) process. This means not just making new friends, but preserving traditional friendships as well. Longstanding ties with Russia count in the latter category.

Since 1991, Hanoi has been consistent with this principle of vua hop tac, vua dau tranh. This tendency stems from the fact that Vietnamese nationalists attack attempts to “sell” the country to foreign forces, and are sensitive to accusations that Vietnam is a client state of any particular Great Power. To this end, Hanoi has assiduously resisted external attempts to dictate its policymaking.

For instance, in the 1990s, then Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thanh insisted: “Cam Ranh Bay is a Vietnamese base, and has nothing to do with the Soviets,” and that other actors, including the United States, could access this base if they were willing to normalize relations with Vietnam. Nguyen’s words were meant to be a response to Moscow’s attempt to turn the bay into its military foothold in Southeast Asia.

Broader, Deeper Engagement

News about the Russian Il-78s is nothing new, although media reports tend to link it to the ongoing Ukraine crisis. But the tanker planes’ presence can be seen as part of a broader arrangement under which Moscow enjoys access to Vietnam’s military facilities in Cam Ranh Bay including arguably the most crucial of all, the naval base.

But Moscow is no stranger to that. Under a 25-year agreement signed in 1979, the Soviet Navy Pacific Fleet stationed its 922nd Logistics Center and maintained a warship flotilla in Cam Ranh Bay. Since having withdrawn its last forces from the garrison in May 2002, for almost a decade Russia’s military presence receded from the Asia-Pacific, especially as Moscow became more focused on Europe.

Now, Russia is keen to revive its access to Cam Ranh Bay, with its prized deep-water anchorages and most strategically of all, direct access into the South China Sea. The fact that it was at different times under the control of both Cold War superpowers, first the United States and then the Soviet Union, attests to Cam Ranh’s enduring geostrategic importance. The bay is certainly an ideal stopover point for Russian warships sailing to and from the Russian Far East and Gulf of Aden. It would be analogous to the Syrian port in Tartus, to which the Russian Navy Mediterranean task force has had regular access.

In fact, Russia’s interest in reviving access to the Cam Ranh Bay precedes the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis. The events in Crimea and subsequent tensions in Europe merely catalyzed Russia’s “eastward” glance into the Asia-Pacific and gave greater salience to the bay. Earlier deals with Vietnam, for example the sale of Kilo-class submarines in 2009, had a role to play. During the numerous high-level defense interactions that took place in 2012-2013, Russia and Vietnam agreed on the broad modalities regarding Cam Ranh Bay. In exchange for granting Russian warships greater access, Vietnam would receive Moscow’s assistance in developing the infrastructure in the bay, including those for Hanoi’s Kilo fleet and more significantly perhaps, a major servicing center for foreign civilian and military vessels. Subsequent bilateral agreements did not deviate from this arrangement.

In 2013-2014, as the Ukraine crisis brewed, some within the Russian establishment – including prominent lawmakers – spoke of the reopening of Russia’s naval base in Cam Ranh Bay as part of Moscow’s grand plans to enhance its global military footprint. The Russian press even reported about the possibility of opening a Russian Navy sustainment center in the bay. However, the issue of restoring a Russian base in Cam Ranh Bay was not raised by either side.

It would at any rate have been impossible to do so, given Hanoi’s avowed post-Cold War foreign policy. Apparently keen to squash any speculation about Cam Ranh Bay being reinstated as a foreign military base, Vietnamese officials repeatedly emphasized that all countries are welcome to assist in developing the bay’s infrastructure. They also reiterated that Cam Ranh Bay is not intended to be a military port, but an international ship servicing and repair hub that is open to all foreign civilian and military users.

Less than two months before the Il-78 report, on November 25 during a visit to Russia by Nguyen Phu Trong, secretary general of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party, an inter-governmental agreement was inked that allows simplified access procedures for Russian warships visiting Vietnam’s Cam Ranh naval base. Under this agreement, Russian vessels approaching the port need only notify the latter authorities for entry. Permission for entry would be granted automatically.

A ‘China-Russia Axis’ in the Asia-Pacific?

Tracing back these developments, it is evident that Cam Ranh Bay features prominently within Moscow’s new global military strategy. Russia’s interest in returning to the bay preceded the Ukraine crisis, which merely gave greater impetus to Moscow’s push for access. Without that crisis, Russia’s actions would not have generated quite the same concerns.

But with Russia’s growing military assertiveness in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, ostensibly targeting the U.S. and its allies, there are reasons to worry. Moreover, Russian tanker flights staged out of Cam Ranh Bay can be interpreted as a violation of Vietnam’s principle of not giving other countries permission to maintain military bases or to use its soil to carry out military activities against other countries. Because Hanoi has yet to offer any clear explanation about this, Washington must be left wondering whether Vietnam has been consistent with its policy and whether it favors Russia over other partners, including the U.S., with whom ties have strengthened in recent times.

Washington is keen to secure greater access to Cam Ranh Bay as part of its strategic rebalance to Asia, given the simmering tensions over maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. It is plausible that Washington might perceive Beijing as the beneficiary if the Cam Ranh Bay becomes a catalyst that jeopardizes U.S.-Vietnam relations and compels the U.S. to pivot away from the region. When one looks back at not just recent moves but also past developments in Sino-Russian relations, a rather interesting picture emerges.

Both China and Russia have common interests in a multi-polar world order, as exemplified in the several joint declarations they have signed since the 1990s. This strategic convergence was lent greater salience following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the U.S., and the subsequent American military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Sino-Russian vision of a multi-polar world order is obliquely referring to the perceived U.S. global hegemony.

Escalating tensions between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine provide an ideal pretext for broader and deeper Sino-Russian collaboration. The $400 billion gas deal signed in May 2014 demonstrates China’s willingness to assist Moscow at a challenging time, just as the West is trying to isolate Russia over Ukraine. In the meantime, Russia has encouraged China to play a significant role in developing the Russian Far East. Despite nagging concerns over China’s infringements of its military-technological intellectual property rights, Moscow has pushed to enhance defense-industrial cooperation with Beijing, including offering up some of its latest armaments.

Russia’s growing presence in the Asia Pacific, including the “Bear” flights off Guam, seems designed to send Washington two related messages. First, Washington should not meddle in Russia’s interests in Europe, particularly eastern Ukraine and the former Commonwealth of Independent States. Second, if the Americans continue with their actions, including intensified NATO military activities in Europe, Russia can respond by using the Asia-Pacific as a backdoor to exercise its own form of gunboat diplomacy.

Although there are no official agreement between Moscow and Beijing on Russia’s potential role in the South China Sea crisis, it may still serve the interests of both countries to target American interests in this sensitive area. The Chinese do not yet have the requisite force projection capabilities to venture this far out into the Western Pacific, and the People’s Liberation Army has only just begun preparations to develop this. Russian “Bear” flights circling Guam may well have been welcomed by Beijing, at a time of intensified U.S. military activities, including P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol flights in the South China Sea, close to China’s strategic naval base in Hainan.

Fallout

The Cam Ranh Bay saga merely exposes the complexity that Great Power rivalries bring to this volatile region. Vietnam may be in a tricky spot. Certainly, those in Washington who believe that Russia’s military use of Cam Ranh Bay constitutes a security challenge will continue to press Hanoi to cease this access. But Washington’s threat that it will not fully lift the arms embargo on Vietnam, for instance, has dubious utility and would not happen for three reasons.

First, even if Washington decides to maintain the partial arms embargo, Vietnam has alternatives. In recent years, Vietnam has been strengthening defense links with Israel and other European countries keen to sell it weapons. And Hanoi has since acquired some of their offerings. Second, more so than in the past, Washington as a whole increasingly values its relationship with Hanoi. Hence, the controversy of Russia’s tanker flights from Cam Ranh Bay, Washington has been at pains to emphasize, does not put a strain on U.S.-Vietnam relations. Finally, Hanoi can still count on the support of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which it is a member, in case of political and economic reprisals by Washington.

Vietnam certainly needs the U.S. to serve as a counterweight to a rising China. Yet at the same time, the reality is that the U.S. is not Vietnam’s only option. Today, Hanoi enjoys a firmer footing in its diplomatic, economic and security relationships with counterparts worldwide. It has at its disposal a wider range of strategic options to safeguard and promote its national interests.

Business as Usual?

For a smallish country that finds itself caught up in Great Power politics, a well-conceived, principled foreign policy approach will help Vietnam look after its national interests. The foreign policy principle of vua hop tac, vua dau tranh is a pragmatic approach that instructs Hanoi not to put all its eggs into one basket. The diversification of relationships, power instruments and strategies is a requisite. A principled foreign policy stance means that not only must Vietnam not favor one external power favored over another, but there is no opportunity for any of these actors to dictate its direction. From Hanoi’s perspective, Washington is in no position to prevent Vietnam from offering Russia access to Vietnamese military facilities. This is because Russia is not the only user: The U.S. military and other external actors – particularly the Indian Navy which has been a regular visitor to Vietnam’s bases – benefit from this inclusive arrangement too.

In the long run, exercising exclusivity and partiality towards foreign access to its military bases will risk setting a dangerous precedent for Vietnam. It is already in a tenuous position amidst the ongoing Great Power rivalries and simmering tensions in the South China Sea. Moreover, back-pedaling from or doing anything antithetical to its post-Cold War foreign policy would deal a blow to Vietnam’s standing within ASEAN. This is especially true given that the regional bloc subscribes to a set of norms known as the “ASEAN Way,” one of which has been the principle of non-interference. Washington could find itself doing more harm than good if it tries to enter this minefield.

If it wants to remain being seen as an independent actor on the world stage, Vietnam will have to adhere faithfully to its post-Cold War foreign policy principles. It will be in the interest of Hanoi to re-emphasize to the international community that Cam Ranh Bay is open to diverse external users, civilian and military. U.S. grumbling notwithstanding, for Vietnam the Cam Ranh Bay situation is just business as usual.

Nhina Le is a Research Associate at George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution in the United States. Koh Swee Lean Collin is an Associate Research Fellow at the Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

 

[BoQ77]

U.S. Democratic Leader, Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) (2nd L) and Vietnam's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh (2nd R) talk at the Government Office in Hanoi March 31, 2015. A U.S. congressional delegation headed by Pelosi is in Hanoi during a visit to Vietnam from March 30 to April 1. REUTERS/Kham

 

[BoQ77]

Deputy Defense Minister of Vietnam Nguyen Chi Vinh met with the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard Admiral Paul Zunkunft. Over a friendly lunch, they discussed our two nations maritime security and maritime law enforcement cooperation as well as coordinated support for building U.S.-Vietnam military to military relations. Remember that Ambassador Osius said in his Vietnam National University speech on March 6 that “nothing is impossible!”

 

[AViet]

The US is day dreaming. Vietnam will do whatever we want for our own interest, not to satisfy a failing and drowning power like them. In addition, Russia is a strategic partner of Vietnam, I do not think the government of Vietnam will ever do such a move.

 

[BoQ77]

US Airforce , North Carolina Air guard C-130 Hercules in Da Nang.

 

[Soryu]

Can I expect the sale of Tu22-M3 and KH-22 missiles to Vietnam ?

No for sure, it's so offensive weapon. With situation recently, Russian don't want to anger China.
Licensed and tech-transfer for new warship and missiles are good enough.

 

[Oldman1]

No for sure, it's so offensive weapon. With situation recently, Russian don't want to anger China.
Licensed and tech-transfer for new warship and missiles are good enough.

Isn't giving warships and missiles already considered offensive weapons? Not to mention Russian made Su-27s and Kilo boats. This is nothing new. And I thought you guys stated Russia is a strategic partner that doesn't care what other countries say? They still deliver what you need?

 

[BoQ77]

Isn't giving warships and missiles already considered offensive weapons? Not to mention Russian made Su-27s and Kilo boats. This is nothing new. And I thought you guys stated Russia is a strategic partner that doesn't care what other countries say? They still deliver what you need?

We have no choice.

 

[Soryu]

Isn't giving warships and missiles already considered offensive weapons? Not to mention Russian made Su-27s and Kilo boats. This is nothing new. And I thought you guys stated Russia is a strategic partner that doesn't care what other countries say? They still deliver what you need?

It's rather long range maritime strategic bomber, so if Russia sold that to us, China can consider that's a signal we want take their outpost on SCS by forces, and Russia support that ideal. Situation could be dangerous.

I don't think Vietnamese leader want a war with China at now or in future.