Rahul9090
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- Feb 21, 2014
- Messages
- 966
- Reaction score
- -1
- Country
- Location
Indian Air Force (IAF) is today short of nearly 600 pilots. The figure is actually substantially more because the IAF continues to operate the SU-30 squadrons with MiG-21 manning. Also the pilot-to-cockpit ratios are much less in the IAF than its counterparts in Pakistan and China. Cases for both are awaiting government approvals. Considering the IAF’s total pilot strength of nearly3500, this shortage is very significant. There is no shortage of applicants wanting to join the IAF. Its capacity to train is the only issue. The case for expanding the Air Force Academy at Hyderabad has been pending for over three years. The only other and much bigger issue is the lack of training aircraft. There is the famous saying in military aviation that “you fight like you train”. Any country that compromises on flying training is destined to lose aircraft and crew both in peace and war.
It took us over a decade to decide and acquire the Hawk Mk 132 Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) which finally entered service in the IAF in early 2008. The Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL)-built HPT-32, used for basic training for years, had repeated engine failures and after 23 pilots died in 17 crashes, the aircraft was permanently grounded in July 2009. It forced the IAF into the not so efficient “direct-on-jets” training. Under pressure, the government of India correctly fast-tracked acquisition of the Basic Training Aircraft (BTA). Pilatus PC-7 Mk II was finally inducted early 2013; 75 aircraft were contracted. In 2009 itself, it was also decided that HAL would design and build 106 basic trainers. The defence ministry had indicated the IAF could exercise the option clause of the Pilatus contract to buy 38 more in case HAL BTA were to be delayed. The ground position today is that indigenous BTA has still to launch off. Based on past record, the IAF is of the opinion that it is too late for HAL to start the development project.
The recent spate of accidents in the Indian Navy requires that the other two services also revisit their training and maintenance practices.Since the mid-1950s, the IAF trained its young pilots on HAL-built HT-2, HPT-32 and Kiran trainers. Kirans were also used for the showcase nine-aircraft formation aerobatics team “Surya Kirans”. The IAF was finally forced to close down the team as the Kirans were required for basic training when the HPT-32 was grounded. The IAF is a military force. It has been tasked by the nation to defend the air space. It needs pilots to fly aeroplanes. It takes time to design, develop, produce or procure aircraft. The HAL Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT) has been running way behind schedule. After 14 years of design and development, the aircraft is far from ready for induction into the IAF.
The time has now come to take calls on future training aircraft. A significant part of the yet-to-develop HAL BTA will have to be procured from abroad. India does not have expertise on turboprop engine, ejection seat, and a large number of other systems. We may even require foreign design consultancy. Feedback from the Air Force Academy on Pilatus PC-7 Mk IIs is that it has excellent flying training features refined through experience of many air forces over the years. The aircraft shares 80% commonality with PC-9M and together they are flying in 20 air forces of the world. The IAF cannot afford to have two different aircraft for the basic stage. Operational, maintenance and logistical common sense suggest a single type. We cannot afford two sets of flying instructors, technical personnel, infrastructure, simulators, training aids, spare inventories, among others. It may thus be sensible to foreclose the indigenous BTA. Licence production is where significant savings accrue due to cheaper labour costs. It may be in national interest to licence produce the PC-7Mk IIs in India if numbers were to significantly go up. The delivery time frames to the IAF of course should remain non-negotiable. HAL could thus concentrate all energies on the IJT without affecting the IAF’s training requirements.
Kiran aircraft joined the IAF in 1968. Nearly 250 Kiran variants have seen the IAF through 44 years of training. It is becoming difficult to sustain the fleet due lack of spare parts. They are being extended through extra man hours and frequent repairs. The IAF may be forced to extend Kirans beyond 2015 but this may have flight safety implications. The IAF had visualised the replacement of Kiran aircraft well in time. In 1997, HAL began design work on an IJT designated HJT-36. Two prototypes were manufactured, the first of which flew on March 7, 2003, and was christened “Sitara”. Unfortunately, the basic aircraft design weight increased, therefore the initially selected French Larzac engine thrust was found inadequate. HAL decided to replace it with the Russian AL-55L. The IJT development cost was now revised to Rs 467 crore from the initial Rs 180 crore. The date for initial operational clearance earlier scheduled for March 2004, was revised to March 2007. Contract for initial 12 aircraft was signed in March 2006 at a total cost of Rs 486.82 crore. The value of the order for 73 IJT aircraft with associated spares and equipment was around Rs 6,200 crore. The heavier Russian engine has more than neutralised the additional thrust and final performance may remain in question. There is a school of thought that it may end up close to the performance of Pilatus PC7 Mk II. IJT deliveries were to be completed by March 2010. The IAF orders were to grow in the years to come. However, to date, not a single aircraft has actually been delivered to the IAF. Project has been dogged by delays due to engine selection, flight test accidents and flying control problems.
IJT delays and its impact on training have been repeatedly questioned by the defence consultative committee of the parliament. That the IAF currently flies the Kiran in stage II, with Pilatus at the basic stage having much more sophisticated avionics, is not desirable. Among the options the IAF has would be to procure additional Pilatus PC-7 MK-II trainers and use them even in stage II as Kirans fade away and until IJTs are available. The Pilatus could be modified to carry basic weapons. The second option is to opt for Pilatus-9M which essentially has the same airframe but also under-wing weapon hard points. These options would provide a little more time to salvage the IJT programme. The last option will be to explore the global market for another IJT. Having already invested heavily, a decision to close down an indigenous project will be difficult both for the IAF and the government. I hope the government is giving urgent attention to this important requirement of the IAF.
Training Dilemma for IAF -The New Indian Express
It took us over a decade to decide and acquire the Hawk Mk 132 Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) which finally entered service in the IAF in early 2008. The Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL)-built HPT-32, used for basic training for years, had repeated engine failures and after 23 pilots died in 17 crashes, the aircraft was permanently grounded in July 2009. It forced the IAF into the not so efficient “direct-on-jets” training. Under pressure, the government of India correctly fast-tracked acquisition of the Basic Training Aircraft (BTA). Pilatus PC-7 Mk II was finally inducted early 2013; 75 aircraft were contracted. In 2009 itself, it was also decided that HAL would design and build 106 basic trainers. The defence ministry had indicated the IAF could exercise the option clause of the Pilatus contract to buy 38 more in case HAL BTA were to be delayed. The ground position today is that indigenous BTA has still to launch off. Based on past record, the IAF is of the opinion that it is too late for HAL to start the development project.
The recent spate of accidents in the Indian Navy requires that the other two services also revisit their training and maintenance practices.Since the mid-1950s, the IAF trained its young pilots on HAL-built HT-2, HPT-32 and Kiran trainers. Kirans were also used for the showcase nine-aircraft formation aerobatics team “Surya Kirans”. The IAF was finally forced to close down the team as the Kirans were required for basic training when the HPT-32 was grounded. The IAF is a military force. It has been tasked by the nation to defend the air space. It needs pilots to fly aeroplanes. It takes time to design, develop, produce or procure aircraft. The HAL Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT) has been running way behind schedule. After 14 years of design and development, the aircraft is far from ready for induction into the IAF.
The time has now come to take calls on future training aircraft. A significant part of the yet-to-develop HAL BTA will have to be procured from abroad. India does not have expertise on turboprop engine, ejection seat, and a large number of other systems. We may even require foreign design consultancy. Feedback from the Air Force Academy on Pilatus PC-7 Mk IIs is that it has excellent flying training features refined through experience of many air forces over the years. The aircraft shares 80% commonality with PC-9M and together they are flying in 20 air forces of the world. The IAF cannot afford to have two different aircraft for the basic stage. Operational, maintenance and logistical common sense suggest a single type. We cannot afford two sets of flying instructors, technical personnel, infrastructure, simulators, training aids, spare inventories, among others. It may thus be sensible to foreclose the indigenous BTA. Licence production is where significant savings accrue due to cheaper labour costs. It may be in national interest to licence produce the PC-7Mk IIs in India if numbers were to significantly go up. The delivery time frames to the IAF of course should remain non-negotiable. HAL could thus concentrate all energies on the IJT without affecting the IAF’s training requirements.
Kiran aircraft joined the IAF in 1968. Nearly 250 Kiran variants have seen the IAF through 44 years of training. It is becoming difficult to sustain the fleet due lack of spare parts. They are being extended through extra man hours and frequent repairs. The IAF may be forced to extend Kirans beyond 2015 but this may have flight safety implications. The IAF had visualised the replacement of Kiran aircraft well in time. In 1997, HAL began design work on an IJT designated HJT-36. Two prototypes were manufactured, the first of which flew on March 7, 2003, and was christened “Sitara”. Unfortunately, the basic aircraft design weight increased, therefore the initially selected French Larzac engine thrust was found inadequate. HAL decided to replace it with the Russian AL-55L. The IJT development cost was now revised to Rs 467 crore from the initial Rs 180 crore. The date for initial operational clearance earlier scheduled for March 2004, was revised to March 2007. Contract for initial 12 aircraft was signed in March 2006 at a total cost of Rs 486.82 crore. The value of the order for 73 IJT aircraft with associated spares and equipment was around Rs 6,200 crore. The heavier Russian engine has more than neutralised the additional thrust and final performance may remain in question. There is a school of thought that it may end up close to the performance of Pilatus PC7 Mk II. IJT deliveries were to be completed by March 2010. The IAF orders were to grow in the years to come. However, to date, not a single aircraft has actually been delivered to the IAF. Project has been dogged by delays due to engine selection, flight test accidents and flying control problems.
IJT delays and its impact on training have been repeatedly questioned by the defence consultative committee of the parliament. That the IAF currently flies the Kiran in stage II, with Pilatus at the basic stage having much more sophisticated avionics, is not desirable. Among the options the IAF has would be to procure additional Pilatus PC-7 MK-II trainers and use them even in stage II as Kirans fade away and until IJTs are available. The Pilatus could be modified to carry basic weapons. The second option is to opt for Pilatus-9M which essentially has the same airframe but also under-wing weapon hard points. These options would provide a little more time to salvage the IJT programme. The last option will be to explore the global market for another IJT. Having already invested heavily, a decision to close down an indigenous project will be difficult both for the IAF and the government. I hope the government is giving urgent attention to this important requirement of the IAF.
Training Dilemma for IAF -The New Indian Express
