The Wrong War

[SipahSalar]

Air Marshal Nur Khan, who led the air force, achieving complete superiority over the Indian air force

That's right.

 

[jaibi]

Actually, with the 21st century we need to, more than ever, rely on the past as a template as we cannot 'experiment'. Thus, the theoretical becomes the closest to the practical.

As long as we remember that lessons from a war fought half a century ago may have limited application in the 21st century in a post nuclear world.

 

[Zarvan]

Actually, with the 21st century we need to, more than ever, rely on the past as a template as we cannot 'experiment'. Thus, the theoretical becomes the closest to the practical.

Welcome Janab How are you ? Nuclear or no nuclear wars will be fought and they will keep happening

 

[VCheng]

Actually, with the 21st century we need to, more than ever, rely on the past as a template as we cannot 'experiment'. Thus, the theoretical becomes the closest to the practical.

Yes, history is important never to forget. But whatever lessons from the 1965 war can be learned are only historical, since actual war in the 21st century between nuclear rivals, were it ever to happen, is going to be very different, and likely not fought on the physical battlefield alone, wouldn't you agree?

 

[jaibi]

Alhamdulilah, Zarvi, how are you??

Welcome Janab How are you ? Nuclear or no nuclear wars will be fought and they will keep happening

 

[Zarvan]

Alhamdulilah, Zarvi, how are you??

I am great thanks to ALLAH

 

[jaibi]

Actually, that's the point SAH, there's a fallacy that we believe that the MAD principal or Mutually Assured Destruction, would be the end game of it all but it is not so. There would be a window of opportunity before it escalates to that. This is the reason why the Indian Army Chief stated that we need to be ready for a short war, and this is the doctrine on which all nations are basing their war programmes: a long war is no longer possible.

Either a low intensity conflict like our own or a short war maximum going to a week or maybe 10 days at most. In that time we can inflict heavy damage, imagine if we could bomb Indian air defence capabilities to the west or cripple Indian supplies to ports or inflict heavy damage to Indian armour divs or a significant blow to their personnel (even though not in large number but even a few platoons lost would be detrimental to morale) and vice versa, if they do that to us.

This would entail a 'victory', as you have a) successfully burdened the enemy with the economic burden of recuperating the lost equipment, and I can tell you even a helicopter lost has its aftershocks. b) dealt a significant blow to the enemy morale, just recall how 1971 is to us and 1962-65 is for India. c) changed the regional dynamics, as both countries are dealing with a two-front threat, for us, it's Afg and the TTP, for them it's China. A significant blow to one wing would entail a double pressure: making sure the first wing is secure enough, at no significant cost of the second one, making sure that the war-front gets its attention in post-war rehabilitation. Knowing the mentality of our militaries, I would stipulate further, both countries are still reliant on stangant manpower as opposed to mobilised tech heavy defences and would deal with the post-war situation by spreading their defences thin to cover the whole defence network. Now, this would not entail a direct hampering but it would engrain a feeling of insecurity to the nation that got more damage.

This, my friend, is why we need to be very, very well versed. As the saying goes, 'You don't have to die to be dead.' Nukes ensure survival but nothing more. The era of nation-state warfare is not over yet.

Yes, history is important never to forget. But whatever lessons from the 1965 war can be learned are only historical, since actual war in the 21st century between nuclear rivals, were it ever to happen, is going to be very different, and likely not fought on the physical battlefield alone, wouldn't you agree?

 

[[Bregs]]

No war is right specially never a war fought between developing nations and curiously enough they fight alot

 

[Zarvan]

Actually, that's the point SAH, there's a fallacy that we believe that the MAD principal or Mutually Assured Destruction, would be the end game of it all but it is not so. There would be a window of opportunity before it escalates to that. This is the reason why the Indian Army Chief stated that we need to be ready for a short war, and this is the doctrine on which all nations are basing their war programmes: a long war is no longer possible.

Either a low intensity conflict like our own or a short war maximum going to a week or maybe 10 days at most. In that time we can inflict heavy damage, imagine if we could bomb Indian air defence capabilities to the west or cripple Indian supplies to ports or inflict heavy damage to Indian armour divs or a significant blow to their personnel (even though not in large number but even a few platoons lost would be detrimental to morale) and vice versa, if they do that to us.

This would entail a 'victory', as you have a) successfully burdened the enemy with the economic burden of recuperating the lost equipment, and I can tell you even a helicopter lost has its aftershocks. b) dealt a significant blow to the enemy morale, just recall how 1971 is to us and 1962-65 is for India. c) changed the regional dynamics, as both countries are dealing with a two-front threat, for us, it's Afg and the TTP, for them it's China. A significant blow to one wing would entail a double pressure: making sure the first wing is secure enough, at no significant cost of the second one, making sure that the war-front gets its attention in post-war rehabilitation. Knowing the mentality of our militaries, I would stipulate further, both countries are still reliant on stangant manpower as opposed to mobilised tech heavy defences and would deal with the post-war situation by spreading their defences thin to cover the whole defence network. Now, this would not entail a direct hampering but it would engrain a feeling of insecurity to the nation that got more damage.

This, my friend, is why we need to be very, very well versed. As the saying goes, 'You don't have to die to be dead.' Nukes ensure survival but nothing more. The era of nation-state warfare is not over yet.

The era of bloody brutal war will never be over. It's human nature things can delayed but wars are a reality just like breathing. The more prepared and equipped you are more chances of you emerging victorious otherwise you will be in big trouble.

 

[SarthakGanguly]

3 places to attack Lahore Sialkot and Bedian simultaneously was a planned and tactical move.

Yup. Not a strategic offensive. Grand Slam was that. I pretty well planned one at that. The pinching attempt at Akhnoor was even taught in our Mil. Schools. And rightly so.

Also attacking 3 areas at the same time should have made it clear to Pakistan that India was committing forces piecemeal (an unsound move of Grand strategy) instead of concentrating them against one single sector. It is obvious that we had NO PLAN!* Our objective was much simple - to bring as many Pakistani forces from the Jammu and Kashmir front as possible. An additional objective was to take as much land as possible to negotiate better.

*This was a serious issue and there was a significant reshuffling of the Officer Corp and soon Sam Manekshaw came at the helm of affairs. He knew the importance of thinking ahead, fixing objectives and taking the initiative.

 

[jaibi]

While I disagree with you that it is innate in us to war, Zarvi, it is true, we aren't out of that phase yet.

The era of bloody brutal war will never be over. It's human nature things can delayed but wars are a reality just like breathing. The more prepared and equipped you are more chances of you emerging victorious otherwise you will be in big trouble.

 

[VCheng]

Actually, that's the point SAH, there's a fallacy that we believe that the MAD principal or Mutually Assured Destruction, would be the end game of it all but it is not so. There would be a window of opportunity before it escalates to that. This is the reason why the Indian Army Chief stated that we need to be ready for a short war, and this is the doctrine on which all nations are basing their war programmes: a long war is no longer possible.

Either a low intensity conflict like our own or a short war maximum going to a week or maybe 10 days at most. In that time we can inflict heavy damage, imagine if we could bomb Indian air defence capabilities to the west or cripple Indian supplies to ports or inflict heavy damage to Indian armour divs or a significant blow to their personnel (even though not in large number but even a few platoons lost would be detrimental to morale) and vice versa, if they do that to us.

This would entail a 'victory', as you have a) successfully burdened the enemy with the economic burden of recuperating the lost equipment, and I can tell you even a helicopter lost has its aftershocks. b) dealt a significant blow to the enemy morale, just recall how 1971 is to us and 1962-65 is for India. c) changed the regional dynamics, as both countries are dealing with a two-front threat, for us, it's Afg and the TTP, for them it's China. A significant blow to one wing would entail a double pressure: making sure the first wing is secure enough, at no significant cost of the second one, making sure that the war-front gets its attention in post-war rehabilitation. Knowing the mentality of our militaries, I would stipulate further, both countries are still reliant on stangant manpower as opposed to mobilised tech heavy defences and would deal with the post-war situation by spreading their defences thin to cover the whole defence network. Now, this would not entail a direct hampering but it would engrain a feeling of insecurity to the nation that got more damage.

This, my friend, is why we need to be very, very well versed. As the saying goes, 'You don't have to die to be dead.' Nukes ensure survival but nothing more. The era of nation-state warfare is not over yet.

Before I reply in detail Sir, let me ask you this: what would be the point of such a short, intense war and what would it gain for either side that would endure?

The three scenarios that you enlist as types of victories would pale in comparison to the overall economic and political fallout. Case in point: Kargil. With nuclear deterrence ensuring survival, it is the economy that will win or lose wars in the 21st century. Anything else is mere child's play by comparison.

 

[jaibi]

The point of such a war would be the point in all wars, SAH, implementation of the political agendas of the belligerents. This is not about what I personally believe, mind you. I base my analysis on pure hard sociology and international theory.

Secondly, a point of clearance, I didn't cite three scenarios but three immediate outfalls for the losing belligerentf. This is lucrative for both nations as we are essentially in a zero-sum game, to simplify, if we don't lose, we win and vice versa. This can be extended to a spectrum with no ideal victory conditions. Take for example, the cold war; it was not one big push but a series of small ones. India and Pakistan are locked in a similar situation.

Regarding your last statement, this is true because as I pointed out the manner of warfare has completely changed: there is no longer a drawn out war. The actual fighting would be very short but the manner of malicious intent, if you will, or the desire to fight, to be more accurate, would spill over to and mainly be fought on the economic front. Those who can afford more would most probably out last the other.

A point to note, in the said scenario, we are basically the challenger state. Meaning, we are comparatively in a compromised position but our terms of loss and victory are much more than that of India. This is why we are more prone to adventurism and India naturally takes a more defensive position (passive aggressive?).

Before I reply in detail Sir, let me ask you this: what would be the point of such a short, intense war and what would it gain for either side that would endure?

The three scenarios that you enlist as types of victories would pale in comparison to the overall economic and political fallout. Case in point: Kargil. With nuclear deterrence ensuring survival, it is the economy that will win or lose wars in the 21st century. Anything else is mere child's play by comparison.

 

[Roybot]

Yet crossing the International border in 3 places to attack Lahore Sialkot and Bedian simultaneously was a planned and tactical move. Cannot be classified as a defensive strategy. Pakistan had not expected an attack on 3 fronts.

From then on india had the initiative & yes we were able to repulse the attack.

So like I said ifs and buts would continue as clear objects OF BOTH SIDES were not attained.

Could have should have get you no where.

Hence leaving it at a stalemate is a wise thing.

It did put Pakistan on the backfoot, and took pressure off from Kashmir. So it was a very good and clever defensive strategy. And in a war you are meant to make such surprise moves to catch the enemy off guard! If the Pakistani military planners and officers were expecting a localised war then they made a blunder!

 

[ice_man]

Yup. Not a strategic offensive. Grand Slam was that. I pretty well planned one at that. The pinching attempt at Akhnoor was even taught in our Mil. Schools. And rightly so.

Also attacking 3 areas at the same time should have made it clear to Pakistan that India was committing forces piecemeal (an unsound move of Grand strategy) instead of concentrating them against one single sector. It is obvious that we had NO PLAN!* Our objective was much simple - to bring as many Pakistani forces from the Jammu and Kashmir front as possible. An additional objective was to take as much land as possible to negotiate better.

*This was a serious issue and there was a significant reshuffling of the Officer Corp and soon Sam Manekshaw came at the helm of affairs. He knew the importance of thinking ahead, fixing objectives and taking the initiative.

yes and you crossed the border to take soil samples? what about capturing Lahore having a peg in Lahore gymkhana.

Please let's not call your failures "unplanned". 17 days you tried to capture Lahore but you couldn't.

like i said let's leave the IFs and BUTs out of the equation.

@Roybot i guess my answer is good enough for your post too.