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The U.S.-Pakistan F-16 fiasco

sparklingway

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I think I should mention this before uninformed readers jump the gun. Fair is perhaps the most pro-Pakistan academic in Washington and a true friend of the country. Hence, no need for ad hominem attacks or large statements on personal allegiances. Let's keep the thread clean and debate the merits of her arguments.


The U.S.-Pakistan F-16 fiasco
BY C. CHRISTINE FAIR, FEBRUARY 3, 2011

At a recent event on Pakistan co-sponsored by Brookings and the U.S. Institute of Peace, several panelists cogently stressed the need for greater transparency on the parts of Washington and Islamabad as a necessary step in forging better relations.

Inevitably, the sad story of Pakistan's F-16s emerged during a panel discussion. In the early 1980s, the United States agreed to sell Pakistan F-16 fighter jets. This decision was taken when the United States worked closely with Pakistan to repel the Soviets from Afghanistan. The F-16 was the most important air platform in Pakistan's air force and it was the most likely delivery vehicle of a nuclear weapon. When nuclear proliferation-related sanctions (under the Pressler Amendment) came into force in 1990, the U.S. government cancelled the sales of several F-16s. Pakistanis routinely cite this as hard evidence of American perfidy to underscore the point that Washington is not a trustworthy ally.

With the lapse of time, many American and Pakistani interlocutors alike rehearse redacted variants of this sordid affair for various purposes. But I was dismayed when a U.S. official (speaking in his personal capacity) did so at the U.S. Institute of Peace event. He stressed, with suitable outrage, that the United States unfairly deprived Pakistan of the F-16s it purchased, demurred from reimbursing Pakistan when sanctions precluded delivery, and even charged Pakistan for the storage fees while the United States sought a third-party buyer for the planes. This particular individual has a long-standing relationship with South Asia and extensive experience in the region, which made the stylized telling all the more troublesome.

This narrative likely appealed to recreational critics of Washington and its serially failed engagements with Islamabad. But it is a disturbing and incomplete re-telling at the F-16 fiasco, the rehearsal of which does little to advance U.S.-Pakistan relations.

Better relations will require both Washington and Pakistan to confront the edifice of ossified fictions that surround and ultimately undermine this complex and strained relationship. Washington needs to aggressively combat the historical untruths that have become legendary fact as vigorously as it needs to understand the Pakistan that is, not the Pakistan it might want to be.

The trust deficit and its deceits

Pakistanis are wont to complain that the United States is a disloyal ally, using Pakistan for its purposes, then abandoning it when expedient. They lament that the United States absconded from the region when the Soviets left Afghanistan, leaving Pakistan to contend with legions of dangerous mujahideen and proliferating narcotics and small arms traffic with its own meager resources. This gives rise to a current chorus of Pakistanis who opine woefully that the United States will abandon Pakistan again when Washington's security interests change. In turn, this motivates proponents of U.S.-Pakistan relations to promise ever-more allurements to demonstrate that "this time," America will not abandon Pakistan.

Of course, Pakistan's complaints are not entirely unfounded: the United States did abandon the region once the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. Pakistanis, however, never acknowledge the enormous benefits that the country derived from its partnership with the Americans during the 1980s. Between 1979 and 1989 Pakistan received $5.6 billion (in constant 2009 dollars) in total aid, of which $3.5 billion was military assistance.) During this period, Pakistan developed its nuclear weapons program without penalty until 1990 while receiving enormous financial and military support from the U.S., which allowed Pakistan to improve its capabilities to fight India.

Most frustrating is Pakistan's refusal to acknowledge its own role in undermining its security by backing various Islamist militant groups in Afghanistan throughout the 1990s, including the Taliban. (Pakistanis often claim erroneously that the CIA created the Taliban.)

Pakistan also complains that it has been punished disproportionately relative to India for its nuclear weapons program. Pakistan correctly notes that India was the first to proliferate in South Asia with its first explosion of a nuclear device in May 1974 (Pokhran I). As the revisionist and weaker state, Pakistan could hardly resist the compulsion to acquire nuclear weapons. The bitterest invective is reserved for the 1985 Pressler Amendment, which many Pakistanis wrongfully claim was written to punish Islamabad for its nuclear program.

Contrary to Pakistanis' popular perceptions, U.S. and international nonproliferation efforts in South Asia were precipitated by India's 1974 nuclear test as well as misgivings about the Ford administration's response to India's abuse of Canadian- and U.S.-supplied civilian nuclear assistance. And, of course, the U.S. Congress was increasingly discomfited about Pakistan's acquisitions of nuclear items abroad.

In response to these varied concerns, the U.S. Congress passed two nonproliferation amendments to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (FAA): the 1976 Symington Amendment and the 1977 Glenn Amendment. Together, they prohibit U.S. military and economic assistance to countries that reject full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for all nuclear facilities and materials; transfer, acquire, deliver, or receive nuclear reprocessing or enrichment technology; or explode or transfer a nuclear device. Congress, wary of Indian and Pakistani intentions, passed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978 that prohibited the sale of U.S. uranium fuel to countries that refuse "full-scope" IAEA safeguards and inspections.

"Our security policy cannot be dictated by our nonproliferation policy.''

After the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Washington chose to subordinate its nonproliferation policies to other regional interests. According to Steve Coll, then-national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski told American president Jimmy Carter that Washington needs to secure Pakistan's support to oust the Soviets and that this will "require... more guarantees to [Pakistan], more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy cannot be dictated by our nonproliferation policy."

Despite full knowledge of Pakistan's nuclear program, Congress added Section 620E to the FAA, which granted the president a qualified authority to waive sanctions for six years, allowing the United States to fund and equip Pakistan for the anti-Soviet jihad. Congress next appropriated annual funds for a six-year program of economic and military aid that totaled $3.2 billion. Despite continued warnings from the U.S. about its nuclear program, Pakistan continued developing a weapons capability. Pakistan's military dictator, Zia ul Haq, asserted that it was Pakistan's right to do so.

In 1985, the Pressler Amendment was passed, making U.S. assistance to Pakistan conditional on an annual presidential assessment and certification that Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons.

But this legislation was not punitive as Pakistanis claim and as some historically ill-informed American commentators lament. Rather, the amendment allowed the United States to continue providing assistance to Pakistan even though other parts of the U.S. government increasingly believed that Pakistan had crossed the nuclear threshold, meriting sanctions under various U.S. laws.

Nor was Pakistan a passive observer of this congressional activity. Husain Haqqani, now Pakistan's ambassador to the United States, explained in 2007 that the Pressler Amendment was passed with the active involvement of Pakistan's foreign office, which was keen to resolve the emergent strategic impasse over competing U.S. nonproliferation and regional objectives on one hand and Pakistan's resolute intentions to acquire nuclear weapons on the other. He described it as a victory for Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was.

In 1990, when U.S. interests in the region lapsed after the Soviet Union left Afghanistan, President George H. Bush declined to certify Pakistan, and the sanctions came into force.

However this was not a bolt out of the blue. The U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Ambassador Robert Oakley repeatedly made Pakistani leadership aware of the inevitable consequences of proliferation. Pakistan's leadership made a calculated gamble.

This brings us back to the F-16s debacle. When the Pressler sanctions came into force, Pakistan was precluded from taking possession of 28 F-16s for which it had made payments until 1993, some three years after the sanctions commenced. Pakistan paid the Lockheed Corp. $658 million for the planes, and some reports suggest that Pakistan continued making payments based on Pentagon assurances that continued payments would ensure eventual delivery.

Pakistan did not get the planes and was assessed storage and maintenance costs of $50,000 per month for the planes that sat, becoming ever more obsolete, in the Arizona desert. This account is telling: Pakistan preferred to heed the roseate advice of the Pentagon over the clear lines of U.S. law.

Under threat of a Pakistani lawsuit, U.S. president Bill Clinton resolved the issue in late 1998. Pakistan received $464 million, mostly in cash, which was the remaining amount of the claim. Clinton also agreed to send Pakistan an additional $60 million worth of wheat. (New Zealand ultimately purchased the F-16s on a 10-year lease-purchase deal that totaled $105 million.)

Long before President George W. Bush promised to resume sales to Pakistan in 2005 as a good faith effort to restore confidence in the United States, the F-16 issue had been resolved.

Accepting responsibility

While Pakistanis prefer to characterize the F-16 fiasco as inherently unfair, the simple fact is that Pakistan's leadership made a strategic choice to develop nuclear weapons at the expense of taking ownership of the fleet of F-16s. Pakistan's leadership understood the U.S. law and its likely consequences. Pakistanis need to hold their leadership to account rather than blithely blaming Washington.

Americans also have to take responsibility. When U.S. officials rehearse only part of this story, it undermines all efforts to achieve a working bilateral relationship that is based on facts rather than fiction.

If the United States and Washington can ever re-optimize their bilateral relationship, both will have to make a concerted effort to resist rehearsing past fictions and creating new ones. Sensationalized half-truths percolate through our respective societies, foster outrage and misunderstanding, and create popular resistance to a relationship that is critical to the security interests of both states.

C. Christine Fair is an assistant professor at Georgetown University and is the author of The Cuisines of the Axis of Evil and Other Irritating States.

The U.S.-Pakistan F-16 Fiasco: The Half You Don't Hear About -- By C. Christine Fair | The AfPak Channel
 
the simple fact is that Pakistan's leadership made a strategic choice to develop nuclear weapons at the expense of taking ownership of the fleet of F-16s.
The nuclear explosion was the need of the hour,at that time neither f-16's nor any other equipment would have sent such strong message to enemies like the nuclear weapons did
 
But friends, US recently delivered F-16 (Block 52) jets to PAF

What a beauty......


 
Last edited by a moderator:
(New Zealand ultimately purchased the F-16s on a 10-year lease-purchase deal that totaled $105 million.)

oops! - 1st error!
 
(New Zealand ultimately purchased the F-16s on a 10-year lease-purchase deal that totaled $105 million.)

oops! - 1st error!

Yes they were not purchased by them,first they thought of it but later the deal was cancelled and NZ never purchased them

On December 1st, 1998, the New Zealand Government announced that it would lease-buy the 28 Pakistani F-16s stored at the AMARC.

In 1999 a new New Zealand government was elected who started a major reorganisation of the armed forces. One major element in this was the cancellation of the F-16 contract and the disbandment of its fighter force. The planes stayed in the boneyard for just a little longer.

And finally In 2002, the US finally stopped trying to sell the aircraft and decided to assign them to the USAF and US Navy to fill the Aggressor role
 
Hi,

Sparklingway---thanks for the post---but I don't see any mention of this poster aka MASTANKHAN who has been saying this for the last many years----why---just because he doesnot have an american name and a refernce from brookings institute doesnot mean that he cannot be acknowledged----.



Mani---the nuclear path was the need of the hour---and that was fine---but the purchase of any futrther F 16's was not---they could have easily picked the M2K---.

It wa spure fatalism on part of pak air force.
 
Hi,

Sparklingway---thanks for the post---but I don't see any mention of this poster aka MASTANKHAN who has been saying this for the last many years----why---just because he doesnot have an american name and a refernce from brookings institute doesnot mean that he cannot be acknowledged----.



Mani---the nuclear path was the need of the hour---and that was fine---but the purchase of any futrther F 16's was not---they could have easily picked the M2K---.

It wa spure fatalism on part of pak air force.


Ahan, gone the M2K way and would be still paying the french for every thing ?

If at all, I would say PAF was so deep in F-16's love that we missed the chance for Sukhoi / Mig tech.

Apart from that, I do not see how this was a mistake ?
 
Hi,

Sparklingway---thanks for the post---but I don't see any mention of this poster aka MASTANKHAN who has been saying this for the last many years----why---just because he doesnot have an american name and a refernce from brookings institute doesnot mean that he cannot be acknowledged----.

Sorry. I venture very rarely into the aviation forums. You must have said the same thing here many times. All credit to you then for raising this point. This was posted at a prominent place and I thought I'd post it.
 
I beg to disagree with the assertion that Christine Fair is pro-Pakistan. She is pro-American and pursues a pro-American position, and that typically includes excuses for American policy decisions with respect to Pakistan while bashing Pakistan. The tone of a majority of her articles is anti-Pakistan.

Note in this article the focus on what Pakistan received from the US during the Afghan Jihad - certainly Pakistan received significant military aid from the US, but it wasn't without reason or cost or something in exchange - just as the current aid after 2001 is not without the US extracting something in exchange. So on that count the US and Pakistan are equal - the US gave Pakistan military aid to bolster its conventional capabilities vis a vis India, and Pakistan served as base for 'liberating' Afghanistan from Soviet hands, and provided men and materials to accomplish that.

That is what allies are expected to do - cooperate. Of course the true test of an 'ally' or 'friend' comes when 'need for the other' no longer exists. And what is the US's track record on that front? As soon as the 'need' for Pakistan against the Soviets was no longer felt, the US abandoned Pakistan and abandoned Afghanistan, and going a step further, sanctioned Pakistan. That would be an almost classic definition of 'betrayal' by an ostensible 'friend and ally'.

Fair chooses to hide behind the argument that 'Pakistan was aware of what the Pressler Amendment would do', and she paints the fact that US Presidents provided a waiver to Pakistan, while they 'needed' Pakistan against the Soviets, and pretended to be Pakistan's 'friends and allies', as some sort of 'magnanimous gesture' to Pakistan. If the part about Pakistan's foreign office being involved in the Pressler Amendment is correct, it is because they were functioning under the assumption that the US would continue to be a 'friend and ally' even when 'need for Pakistan' no longer existed, and provide the necessary certification.

Israel after all has seen no consequences of its own nuclear weapons program that has also been well known to the US, and indeed the world. Instead of 'Pressler Amendments' against Israel and sanctions, we have seen aid and support boosted for a country that has long possessed a nuclear arsenal that significantly outnumbers that possessed by Pakistan, along with the missile systems to deliver it.

So no, hiding behind Pressler does not exonerate US duplicity and betrayal when it comes to Pakistan. Pakistan's knowledge of Pressler, and its pursuit of US weapons systems, only indicates that Pakistan was naive in believing the US to be a 'friend and ally'. Instead of blaming Pakistan for pursuing the F-16's despite knowledge of Pressler, one could ask why the US even entertained the request and signed the agreement if it was planning to sanction Pakistan? If the nuclear weapons program of Pakistan was such a significant issue for the US, why were the negotiations for the F-16's themselves not contingent upon a cessation of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program?

Signing the contract for the F-16's, issuing waiver after waiver from the Pressler Amendment, accepting payments of hundreds of millions of dollars from Pakistan for the jets, completing the manufacture of dozens of jets, and then suddenly discovering 'US non-proliferation principles and values', coincidentally after 'need for Pakistan' ended, is duplicitous and deceitful behavior on the part of the US, and the fault of Pakistan only in that it trusted the US to be a 'friend and ally'.
 
But friends, US recently delivered F-16 (Block 52) jets to PAF

What a beauty......


YouTube - =HD= 1st Flight PAF F-16 Block 52+ (Pakistan)

Off topic, but I must put forth something that caught my eye.

1) The starting of the clip, the title says JF1. A mistake.

Second, the F16s here, are pre-shipment to Pakistan.

How?


1) If we pause the video at 1:02, then we see the F16, from which the video is being made. The fin flash is of USAF.
2) The base it took off and landed at, doesnt look familiar to me, neither did the aerial view at 0:35, 0:46 and 0:57.

This would also mean, the pilots are of USAF, and all the flip-flops done isint by PAF pilot. Correct me if I am wrong.

Regards.
 
An interesting comment by user IMRAN2U on Foreignpolicy.com in response to Christine Fair's article:

The opening line of last para is an error unless we presume "United States and Washington" to be 2 different countries. The author may want to change one of the those to Pakistan. A few other minor errors also exist. Maybe FP needs an editor or two.

Unfortunately Christine Fair still does not understand Pakistan or its relationship with the US. In her haste to criticize Pakistan, she leaves out how the US got involved in Pakistan in the first place. In the Robert Oakley interview cited by Fair, he talks about how Reagan admin decided to involve Pakistan in countering the Soviets. "Okay, let's use Islam to help on this political psychological front. If we can get an amount of countries directly involved in fighting the atheist communists in Afghanistan, it will give us a great deal more political support." It is not too difficult to comprehend how this "let's use Islam" approach led to the advent of the Taliban movement in 90's and hence the criticism of the CIA. Just as a side, University of Nebraska was tasked by AID/CIA to develop syllabi which used religion as an avenue for teaching jihad.

Fair says that Pakistan gained 5.6 billion dollars (most in military aid) over a decade while the Afghan war was going on. While factually correct, these figures do not include indirect costs to Pakistan as it supported the Mujaheddin. These include but were not limited to an explosion in illegal arms and drugs coming into Pakistan from Afghanistan, terrorist bombings and rise of religious extremism. In addition Pakistan was host to over 3 million refugees. I challenge Christine Fair to put a dollar figure on these costs incurred by Pakistan and see if the 5.6 billion dollar figure still holds up as a shining pillar of American generosity. Just as a comparison, this figure is miniscule compared to the aid given to Egypt or Israel during the same period.

The Afghan war also led to the American support of a dictator whose anti democratic policies harmed Pakistan in a major way. The one window operation of General Haq may have served the US but harmed average Pakistanis immensely.

Over the past few years, the US has done a lot to make things right for average Pakistanis. The aid to Pakistani earthquake victims, the flood victims as well as help with social and educational programs is greatly appreciated. The photo of Richard Holbrooke in a helicopter hovering over flooded villages in Pakistan is iconic. But to put things in perspective, so is the photograph of Ronald Reagan holding court at the White House while surrounded by Shalwar Kameez and turban wearing Mujaheddin. President Reagan called them the "moral equivalents of our forefathers." No long after the US left it to the same individuals to look after a broken Afghanistan. For most Pakistanis, the current events in South Asia are an extension of what transpired nearly three decades back.

In the greater scheme of things, "wheat for F16s" issue is quite minor. The fact that it became a rallying cry for Pakistanis speaks to the inherent lopsidedness of this "relationship."


The U.S.-Pakistan F-16 Fiasco: The Half You Don't Hear About -- By C. Christine Fair | The AfPak Channel
 
Moved thread to Strategic and geo-political affairs section since the discussion is more about the dynamics of the Pak-US relationship than the F-16's themselves.
 
Mani---the nuclear path was the need of the hour---and that was fine---but the purchase of any futrther F 16's was not---they could have easily picked the M2K---.

It wa spure fatalism on part of pak air force.

'Fatalism' or an incorrect analysis of the extent to which the US was a 'friend and ally'.

The US after all knew of the nuclear program, chose to certify in favor of Pakistan, agreed to the F-16 deal, accepted hundreds of millions of dollars in payment, manufactured several dozen F-16's, and then out of the blue dumped and betrayed Pakistan, and in keeping both jets and money for so many years, retarded the capabilities of the PAF.

Given the extent of cooperation between the US and Pakistan during the Cold War, in particular in defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan, I think Pakistani officials could be excused for not anticipating an American betrayal of the kind that happened.
 
Fair says that Pakistan gained 5.6 billion dollars (most in military aid) over a decade while the Afghan war was going on. While factually correct, these figures do not include indirect costs to Pakistan as it supported the Mujaheddin. These include but were not limited to an explosion in illegal arms and drugs coming into Pakistan from Afghanistan, terrorist bombings and rise of religious extremism. In addition Pakistan was host to over 3 million refugees.

Except for the refugees, which was a humanitarian gesture, the rest cannot be blamed on the US. It was Pakistani government, i.e. Zia, who decided to allow the Islamization of Pakistan. It was he who allowed the drug and gun culture to infiltrate into our country.

The Afghans were ready to fight for their country, and many foreign fighters were willing to help. Why did Zia have to Islamize Pakistan?
 
Except for the refugees, which was a humanitarian gesture, the rest cannot be blamed on the US. It was Pakistani government, i.e. Zia, who decided to allow the Islamization of Pakistan. It was he who allowed the drug and gun culture to infiltrate into our country.

The Afghans were ready to fight for their country, and many foreign fighters were willing to help. Why did Zia have to Islamize Pakistan?

I am not even referring to the Islamization aspect (which I agree is the fault of Zia primarily) - but after the Afghan Jihad Afghanistan was flush with weapons, and the resulting power vacuum only helped the spread of crime and violence, especially the drug trade. Zia did not do all of that.

The larger point is that the US did Pakistan no 'favors' with the aid it provided - it got a lot in return and Pakistan suffered in addition to that in many ways, especially because of an abandonment of Afghanistan and its refugees by the West after the Soviets left.
 

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