Chanakyaa
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When you Dont have Real issues, You Cry Religion and faith...
The Pakistani people must Ask, Why in India the Most Pro-Israeli key people Like Dr. Kalam , Mr. A Hussain and Others Have Done Brilliant work to Build the Indo-Israeli Relation..... A Classic example of the Fact that in India What really matters is "INDIAN" and not Religion.
The Article give a classic insight of the deep Indo-Israeli relations.
Enter the one agent that has disproportionately clouded India’s overall foreign policy calculations since 1947.
Barely a week after PV Narsimha Rao became the Prime Minister in 1991, Pakistan-backed Kashmiri militants kidnapped a group of Israeli tourists, killing one. This compelled co-ordination with Israeli diplomats. Rao waived all restrictions on the Mumbai-based Israeli Consul, offering full co-operation in resolving the crisis. This event marked the beginning of many efforts on his part to bring the process to its logical conclusion, namely, the establishment of formal ties with the Jewish state in January 1992.
Instrumental in that outcome was India’s Ambassador to the US, a Muslim gentleman named Abid Hussein, a staunch defender of Israel and the Jewish people, who actively sought to convince Rao that Israel would give the country a superior edge over Pakistan, and that an alliance with the Jewish state was indispensable to India’s long-term interests.
As the Iron Curtain had fallen, the world’s attention was now focused on other, smaller conflicts. All eyes were on Kashmir.
Fearing international repercussions, Pakistan could not resort to conventional warfare, nor could it give up on the dream of acquiring Kashmir. The White House’s approach to Pakistan didn’t deviate from that of the Cold War. It continued to expend huge amounts of financial aid, weaponry, and training to Pakistan, which passed on these generous gifts to radical Jihadist groups to launch in Kashmir the campaign its army could not.
The paper trail to Islamabad’s involvement in terror was difficult to establish, and being religious zealots, these Mujahideen groups had little to no financial interests, rendering terrorism the perfect weapon.
These Pakistan-backed militants, driven by messianic zeal, viciously terrorized the people of Kashmir (especially the Hindu population), and launched major attacks in India’s metropolitan cities, crippling the nation.
(Example – The 1993 multiple bomb blasts in Mumbai, that led to the massacre of 257 people and the grave injury of over 1400, masterminded by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in collaboration with Mumbai-based Muslim mafia figures Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, Ibrahim “Tiger” Memon, and many others, all of whom now live under Pakistani protection.)
Furthermore, Islamabad had full diplomatic immunity thanks to the unquestioning support from the OIC, and American imperviousness to its activities.
Because of this, India’s heavy dependence on Moscow for military and diplomatic support transcended the Cold War. Furthermore, India was far from being in the US’s or Israel’s good books and couldn’t risk jeopardizing existing relations while transitioning to new ones. She did not adopt an “either/or” strategy with regards to Israel and the Arab world; but rather, played a careful balancing act.
Although Islamabad didn’t hope to annex Kashmir using terror-by-proxy, it hoped to create the right circumstances to facilitate an easy acquisition. Chief among the long list of its objectives are the following:
• The ethnic cleansing of Hindus – This would help Pakistan should the fate of Kashmir be decided via plebiscite.
• Weakening the Indian armed forces’ grip on the state – Mass deaths of civilians and military/law enforcement personnel would lead to lawlessness and a weakened/decreased/demoralized military presence – ensuring an easy grab for the Pakistanis via the steady infiltration of its troops.
• Radicalizing the state’s Muslim population via mosques – Pakistan used the heavy funding from its Arab and American benefactors to radicalize the state’s Muslim population by preaching religious fundamentalism and anti-Indian sentiment.
• Disrupting India’s, specifically, Kashmir’s economy – Self-explanatory.
Although Pakistan failed miserably in achieving these goals, it inflicted (and continues to inflict) severe damage. The number of Indian civilian and military deaths were immense as was the economic loss.
This situation was not unlike the one Israel faced in ALL parts of the country since the very beginning, reaffirming the rationale behind India’s natural brotherhood with Israel. Israel thrived in spite of these circumstances. It had mastered counter-terrorism and intelligence-gathering strategies and was a military superpower, providing further impetus to the popular support for a strong India-Israel bond in Indian political and civilian circles all throughout the 1990s.
Normalization saw no radical departure in New Delhi’s support for a two-state solution. However, its sentimental, ideological pledge to the Palestinian cause began to erode. Voting patterns at the UN and other international forums against the US and Israel didn’t diverge much, but India learned to bifurcate the establishment of strong bilateral ties from the complexities of the peace process. “Support” for the Palestinians slowly but surely began to shift wholly into the realm of verbal posturing.
The fledgling relationship faced an incessant barrage of roadblocks, many critics voiced their opposition. One outcome of that was India’s refusal to sign a Civil Aviation Agreement with Israel in 1993. However, a slow but sure forging of ties was apparent.
Opposition by radical left-wing and Islamist factions remained. However, in mainstream parties like the INC, opponents of normalization and expanding ties with Israel were from the dying (and increasingly irrelevant) breed of old-school, Soviet Union-worshipping, anti-Western, radical socialist ideologues who refused to take off their philosophical blinders. Decades of brainwashing with anti-Western, pro-Soviet propaganda rendered it difficult for them to adjust to new realities.
Shortly after normalization, the deportation of Hamas militants in 1992 evoked nothing more than an acknowledgement from the INC government, as did the Hebron massacre by Kahanist Baruch Goldstein.
Diplomatic visits started soon. In May 1993, Shimon Peres, then Foreign Minister, visited India to discuss terrorism and India’s territorial integrity. He wholeheartedly supported India’s stand on Kashmir, stating: “We support fully and completely the territorial integrity of India and agree with the Shimla Agreement.”
Prime Minister hopeful Arjun Singh of the INC, then Minister of Human Resources Development, himself a vociferous opponent of normalization, broke taboo and visited Israel in 1994. Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, the BJP Chief Minister of Rajasthan, also visited Israel that year.
In 1995, Prime Ministerial candidates, HD Deve Gowda, Janata Dal Party Chief Minister of Karnataka, and LK Advani, leader of the BJP, visited Israel. Gowda, who was elected in 1996, hosted President Weizmann, who came with a 24-member business delegation, in December. Weizmann laid the foundation of the Israeli-Indian Research and Development Farm at the Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI) in Pusa near New Delhi.
Soon after, Gowda met PM Benjamin Netanyahu at the Davos World Economic Forum summit. After these two meetings, trade expanded into a host of sectors – especially agriculture, water management and purification, scientific R&D, hi-tech, and foreign investment.
Future President, Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam, a prominent scientist and one of the most pro-Israel voices in the country, visited the Jewish state in 1996, when he was the scientific advisor to the Defence Minister.
After 1991, Russian manufacturers were simply unable to keep up with India’s growing military needs the way the USSR had. The US wasn’t eager to forgive India’s Cold War affinity for Moscow. India looked to Israel for its military supplies.
Israel’s expertise in Russian military equipment made it India’s primary partner in modernizing and upgrading its armed forces. While high- profile visits continued, the rapidly growing defence ties were, and continue to be, kept STRICTLY secret, with the occasional disclosure.
The 1998 ascent to power of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition, with Atal Behari Vajpayee as PM, saw a further surge in ties.
In response to India’s Pokhran-II nuclear tests in 1998, as expected, with the exception of Saddam’s Iraq, the Arab world and the OIC strongly condemned India’s actions, while being virtually silent on Pakistan’s nuclear tests only a few weeks later.
There was speculation that Dr. Kalam, who played a pivotal organizational, technical, and political role in the tests, had visited Israel for technical assistance again in the months prior. This view, that India collaborated with Israel for the nuclear tests, was further cemented when, in the aftermath of these tests, the whole world came down on India like a ton of bricks, but Israel – although refusing to comment initially – stood strongly by India’s side. The US began imposing sanctions on India, which would have entailed:
On Israel’s intervention, Washington didn’t completely follow-up on these harsh sanctions. Thanks to Israel, India was spared the impending diplomatic and economic backlash, reaffirming its potential as a valuable strategic partner.
India joined the UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in November 1998.
National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra made regular trips to Israel starting 1998, laying the groundwork for expanded cooperation in the military and intelligence spheres. Attorney-General Soli Sorabjee also visited Israel the same year. Continuing its commitment to the Palestinians, India hosted Arafat in April 1999.
A major catalyst to the India-Israel alliance was the 1999 Kargil War. India’s plea for assistance was heeded almost immediately only by Israel, which supplied ordnance, laser-guided bombs, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), etc., thus altering the course of the conflict in India’s favour and firmly forging Israel’s credibility and reliability as an ally. The Arab world’s unquestioning support for Pakistan was hardly surprising.
LK Advani, now the Home Minister, visited Israel again in 2000, as did Defence Minister Jaswant Singh. Both men continued on the path of traditional support for the Palestinian cause by meeting with Arafat on the same trip. Najma Heptullah, a Muslim INC member of the Rajya Sabha (the upper house of Parliament) also visited Israel. A Knesset delegation led by Amnon Rubenstein visited India.
The rapidly solidifying consensus on Israel became clear when Jyoti Basu, Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) Chief Minister of West Bengal, visited Israel with a 25-member delegation. He met with PM Ehud Barak and Shimon Peres.
Soon after, West Bengal CPI-M leader, Somnath Chatterjee, went along with a huge business delegation to promote a host of research and investment opportunities. In turn, Shimon Peres, then the Minister for Regional Cooperation, visited India both in 2000 and 2001.
With the outbreak of the Second Intifada, government officials issued very balanced public statements of criticism of both sides – supplying USD 50,000 worth of medical aid to the PLO. Ten years ago, any Israeli-Arab conflict would have led to harsh condemnations of the Jewish state and vociferous support for the Arabs. In addition, Arab insistence to re-establish Zionism as racism at the shameful Durban World Conference against Racism in 2001 was simply brushed aside by Indian leaders.
During the Intifada, the hard left’s bonhomie with Israel ended but ONLY on the diplomatic front. Example — The hypocritical CPI-M reverted to its pre-1992 rhetorical harshness — grounded in conspiracy theories – but refused to break its economic collaboration with Israel in West Bengal, the state it ruled.
[C] CONCLUSION
With the USSR gone, India faced very unfamiliar and uncertain circumstances. It began weighing its West-Asia approach purely in terms of concrete national interests. The non-beneficial, emotional attachment to the Palestinians, steeped in idealism, began disintegrating. In short, principle began to yield some place to pragmatism.
By 2000, the ideological commitment had drastically softened, reduced to a few symbolic gestures, minuscule financial donations, minimal collaboration in a few sectors with the PA, and strong lip service in the international arena. This provided a facade of “support” for the Arab/Palestinian cause, while the juicy deals took place behind the scenes. Under the INC, the Janata Dal and the BJP, criticism of Israel became very muted and balanced.
Furthermore, India’s support for the Palestinian issue waned as it became inexorably clear that, aside from Saddam’s Iraq, the Arab world would not cease its steadfast support for Pakistan on Kashmir, despite India’s history of championing Palestinian/Arab causes.
The expanding ties with Israel did not harm India’s standing in the Gulf, or with Iran. In fact, the Arab world, realizing what India had to offer, strengthened bilateral trade relations with New Delhi from 1992 onwards, even as it continued to aid Pakistan on many fronts. Iran, seeking to end its regional isolation, looked to New Delhi as a potential partner, saying nothing about India’s growing fondness for Israel.
Although the hard left’s romance with Israel was short lived in diplomatic terms, a broad consensus was reached in India, both on the left (even the hard left) and on the right, that Israel was an indispensable ally to India.
The President of India (INC), KR Narayanan, in his 2000 speech in New Delhi to Israeli Ambassador David Aphek, spoke proudly about the burgeoning alliance with Israel, the tremendous potential of that relationship, and assured his full cooperation in further expansion of ties.
The Pakistani people must Ask, Why in India the Most Pro-Israeli key people Like Dr. Kalam , Mr. A Hussain and Others Have Done Brilliant work to Build the Indo-Israeli Relation..... A Classic example of the Fact that in India What really matters is "INDIAN" and not Religion.
The Article give a classic insight of the deep Indo-Israeli relations.
The Times of Israel
The Deepening India-Israel Relations
The Deepening India-Israel Relations
Enter the one agent that has disproportionately clouded India’s overall foreign policy calculations since 1947.
Barely a week after PV Narsimha Rao became the Prime Minister in 1991, Pakistan-backed Kashmiri militants kidnapped a group of Israeli tourists, killing one. This compelled co-ordination with Israeli diplomats. Rao waived all restrictions on the Mumbai-based Israeli Consul, offering full co-operation in resolving the crisis. This event marked the beginning of many efforts on his part to bring the process to its logical conclusion, namely, the establishment of formal ties with the Jewish state in January 1992.
Instrumental in that outcome was India’s Ambassador to the US, a Muslim gentleman named Abid Hussein, a staunch defender of Israel and the Jewish people, who actively sought to convince Rao that Israel would give the country a superior edge over Pakistan, and that an alliance with the Jewish state was indispensable to India’s long-term interests.
As the Iron Curtain had fallen, the world’s attention was now focused on other, smaller conflicts. All eyes were on Kashmir.
Fearing international repercussions, Pakistan could not resort to conventional warfare, nor could it give up on the dream of acquiring Kashmir. The White House’s approach to Pakistan didn’t deviate from that of the Cold War. It continued to expend huge amounts of financial aid, weaponry, and training to Pakistan, which passed on these generous gifts to radical Jihadist groups to launch in Kashmir the campaign its army could not.
The paper trail to Islamabad’s involvement in terror was difficult to establish, and being religious zealots, these Mujahideen groups had little to no financial interests, rendering terrorism the perfect weapon.
These Pakistan-backed militants, driven by messianic zeal, viciously terrorized the people of Kashmir (especially the Hindu population), and launched major attacks in India’s metropolitan cities, crippling the nation.
(Example – The 1993 multiple bomb blasts in Mumbai, that led to the massacre of 257 people and the grave injury of over 1400, masterminded by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in collaboration with Mumbai-based Muslim mafia figures Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, Ibrahim “Tiger” Memon, and many others, all of whom now live under Pakistani protection.)
Furthermore, Islamabad had full diplomatic immunity thanks to the unquestioning support from the OIC, and American imperviousness to its activities.
Because of this, India’s heavy dependence on Moscow for military and diplomatic support transcended the Cold War. Furthermore, India was far from being in the US’s or Israel’s good books and couldn’t risk jeopardizing existing relations while transitioning to new ones. She did not adopt an “either/or” strategy with regards to Israel and the Arab world; but rather, played a careful balancing act.
Although Islamabad didn’t hope to annex Kashmir using terror-by-proxy, it hoped to create the right circumstances to facilitate an easy acquisition. Chief among the long list of its objectives are the following:
• The ethnic cleansing of Hindus – This would help Pakistan should the fate of Kashmir be decided via plebiscite.
• Weakening the Indian armed forces’ grip on the state – Mass deaths of civilians and military/law enforcement personnel would lead to lawlessness and a weakened/decreased/demoralized military presence – ensuring an easy grab for the Pakistanis via the steady infiltration of its troops.
• Radicalizing the state’s Muslim population via mosques – Pakistan used the heavy funding from its Arab and American benefactors to radicalize the state’s Muslim population by preaching religious fundamentalism and anti-Indian sentiment.
• Disrupting India’s, specifically, Kashmir’s economy – Self-explanatory.
Although Pakistan failed miserably in achieving these goals, it inflicted (and continues to inflict) severe damage. The number of Indian civilian and military deaths were immense as was the economic loss.
This situation was not unlike the one Israel faced in ALL parts of the country since the very beginning, reaffirming the rationale behind India’s natural brotherhood with Israel. Israel thrived in spite of these circumstances. It had mastered counter-terrorism and intelligence-gathering strategies and was a military superpower, providing further impetus to the popular support for a strong India-Israel bond in Indian political and civilian circles all throughout the 1990s.
PERIOD OF RAPID TRANSITION (1991-2000)
Normalization saw no radical departure in New Delhi’s support for a two-state solution. However, its sentimental, ideological pledge to the Palestinian cause began to erode. Voting patterns at the UN and other international forums against the US and Israel didn’t diverge much, but India learned to bifurcate the establishment of strong bilateral ties from the complexities of the peace process. “Support” for the Palestinians slowly but surely began to shift wholly into the realm of verbal posturing.
The fledgling relationship faced an incessant barrage of roadblocks, many critics voiced their opposition. One outcome of that was India’s refusal to sign a Civil Aviation Agreement with Israel in 1993. However, a slow but sure forging of ties was apparent.
Opposition by radical left-wing and Islamist factions remained. However, in mainstream parties like the INC, opponents of normalization and expanding ties with Israel were from the dying (and increasingly irrelevant) breed of old-school, Soviet Union-worshipping, anti-Western, radical socialist ideologues who refused to take off their philosophical blinders. Decades of brainwashing with anti-Western, pro-Soviet propaganda rendered it difficult for them to adjust to new realities.
Shortly after normalization, the deportation of Hamas militants in 1992 evoked nothing more than an acknowledgement from the INC government, as did the Hebron massacre by Kahanist Baruch Goldstein.
Diplomatic visits started soon. In May 1993, Shimon Peres, then Foreign Minister, visited India to discuss terrorism and India’s territorial integrity. He wholeheartedly supported India’s stand on Kashmir, stating: “We support fully and completely the territorial integrity of India and agree with the Shimla Agreement.”
Prime Minister hopeful Arjun Singh of the INC, then Minister of Human Resources Development, himself a vociferous opponent of normalization, broke taboo and visited Israel in 1994. Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, the BJP Chief Minister of Rajasthan, also visited Israel that year.
In 1995, Prime Ministerial candidates, HD Deve Gowda, Janata Dal Party Chief Minister of Karnataka, and LK Advani, leader of the BJP, visited Israel. Gowda, who was elected in 1996, hosted President Weizmann, who came with a 24-member business delegation, in December. Weizmann laid the foundation of the Israeli-Indian Research and Development Farm at the Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI) in Pusa near New Delhi.
Soon after, Gowda met PM Benjamin Netanyahu at the Davos World Economic Forum summit. After these two meetings, trade expanded into a host of sectors – especially agriculture, water management and purification, scientific R&D, hi-tech, and foreign investment.
Future President, Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam, a prominent scientist and one of the most pro-Israel voices in the country, visited the Jewish state in 1996, when he was the scientific advisor to the Defence Minister.
After 1991, Russian manufacturers were simply unable to keep up with India’s growing military needs the way the USSR had. The US wasn’t eager to forgive India’s Cold War affinity for Moscow. India looked to Israel for its military supplies.
Israel’s expertise in Russian military equipment made it India’s primary partner in modernizing and upgrading its armed forces. While high- profile visits continued, the rapidly growing defence ties were, and continue to be, kept STRICTLY secret, with the occasional disclosure.
The 1998 ascent to power of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition, with Atal Behari Vajpayee as PM, saw a further surge in ties.
In response to India’s Pokhran-II nuclear tests in 1998, as expected, with the exception of Saddam’s Iraq, the Arab world and the OIC strongly condemned India’s actions, while being virtually silent on Pakistan’s nuclear tests only a few weeks later.
There was speculation that Dr. Kalam, who played a pivotal organizational, technical, and political role in the tests, had visited Israel for technical assistance again in the months prior. This view, that India collaborated with Israel for the nuclear tests, was further cemented when, in the aftermath of these tests, the whole world came down on India like a ton of bricks, but Israel – although refusing to comment initially – stood strongly by India’s side. The US began imposing sanctions on India, which would have entailed:
- Terminating assistance to India except for humanitarian aid. At the time, U.S. economic and humanitarian aid amounted to about $142 million a year.
- Barring sales of certain defense and technology equipment.
- Ending credit and credit guarantees to India.
- Coercing international financial institutions to cease lending to India, which had borrowed about $1.5 billion from the World Bank in 1997.
On Israel’s intervention, Washington didn’t completely follow-up on these harsh sanctions. Thanks to Israel, India was spared the impending diplomatic and economic backlash, reaffirming its potential as a valuable strategic partner.
India joined the UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in November 1998.
National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra made regular trips to Israel starting 1998, laying the groundwork for expanded cooperation in the military and intelligence spheres. Attorney-General Soli Sorabjee also visited Israel the same year. Continuing its commitment to the Palestinians, India hosted Arafat in April 1999.
A major catalyst to the India-Israel alliance was the 1999 Kargil War. India’s plea for assistance was heeded almost immediately only by Israel, which supplied ordnance, laser-guided bombs, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), etc., thus altering the course of the conflict in India’s favour and firmly forging Israel’s credibility and reliability as an ally. The Arab world’s unquestioning support for Pakistan was hardly surprising.
LK Advani, now the Home Minister, visited Israel again in 2000, as did Defence Minister Jaswant Singh. Both men continued on the path of traditional support for the Palestinian cause by meeting with Arafat on the same trip. Najma Heptullah, a Muslim INC member of the Rajya Sabha (the upper house of Parliament) also visited Israel. A Knesset delegation led by Amnon Rubenstein visited India.
The rapidly solidifying consensus on Israel became clear when Jyoti Basu, Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) Chief Minister of West Bengal, visited Israel with a 25-member delegation. He met with PM Ehud Barak and Shimon Peres.
Soon after, West Bengal CPI-M leader, Somnath Chatterjee, went along with a huge business delegation to promote a host of research and investment opportunities. In turn, Shimon Peres, then the Minister for Regional Cooperation, visited India both in 2000 and 2001.
With the outbreak of the Second Intifada, government officials issued very balanced public statements of criticism of both sides – supplying USD 50,000 worth of medical aid to the PLO. Ten years ago, any Israeli-Arab conflict would have led to harsh condemnations of the Jewish state and vociferous support for the Arabs. In addition, Arab insistence to re-establish Zionism as racism at the shameful Durban World Conference against Racism in 2001 was simply brushed aside by Indian leaders.
During the Intifada, the hard left’s bonhomie with Israel ended but ONLY on the diplomatic front. Example — The hypocritical CPI-M reverted to its pre-1992 rhetorical harshness — grounded in conspiracy theories – but refused to break its economic collaboration with Israel in West Bengal, the state it ruled.
[C] CONCLUSION
With the USSR gone, India faced very unfamiliar and uncertain circumstances. It began weighing its West-Asia approach purely in terms of concrete national interests. The non-beneficial, emotional attachment to the Palestinians, steeped in idealism, began disintegrating. In short, principle began to yield some place to pragmatism.
By 2000, the ideological commitment had drastically softened, reduced to a few symbolic gestures, minuscule financial donations, minimal collaboration in a few sectors with the PA, and strong lip service in the international arena. This provided a facade of “support” for the Arab/Palestinian cause, while the juicy deals took place behind the scenes. Under the INC, the Janata Dal and the BJP, criticism of Israel became very muted and balanced.
Furthermore, India’s support for the Palestinian issue waned as it became inexorably clear that, aside from Saddam’s Iraq, the Arab world would not cease its steadfast support for Pakistan on Kashmir, despite India’s history of championing Palestinian/Arab causes.
The expanding ties with Israel did not harm India’s standing in the Gulf, or with Iran. In fact, the Arab world, realizing what India had to offer, strengthened bilateral trade relations with New Delhi from 1992 onwards, even as it continued to aid Pakistan on many fronts. Iran, seeking to end its regional isolation, looked to New Delhi as a potential partner, saying nothing about India’s growing fondness for Israel.
Although the hard left’s romance with Israel was short lived in diplomatic terms, a broad consensus was reached in India, both on the left (even the hard left) and on the right, that Israel was an indispensable ally to India.
The President of India (INC), KR Narayanan, in his 2000 speech in New Delhi to Israeli Ambassador David Aphek, spoke proudly about the burgeoning alliance with Israel, the tremendous potential of that relationship, and assured his full cooperation in further expansion of ties.
