The Ships that Scuttled Turkey-Israel Relations: A Decade since the Flotilla Incident
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Gallia Lindenstrauss, Remi Daniel
INSS Insight No. 1323, May 25, 2020
Turkey-Israel relations began to deteriorate before the flotilla incident on May 31, 2010, but this unprecedented event in the bilateral relationship significantly accelerated the decline. To be sure, the poor relations between the countries and the lack of high-level diplomatic relations in the past two years cannot be pinned only on the ramifications of the incident. Nonetheless, the ramifications of the seizure of the Marmara, the largest boat in the flotilla, remain prominent among the causes of the current deep suspicion between Ankara and Jerusalem. In recent weeks, there have been articles, mainly in the Turkish press, regarding attempts to thaw relations. It is doubtful whether these articles have a strong basis, but in any case, Ankara will likely respond harshly if there is any Israeli move toward annexing parts of the West Bank. The benefits of any effort to improve the relationship with Turkey would therefore be negligible and short-lived.
The beginning of the deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations preceded the flotilla incident on May 31, 2010, but the event was unprecedented in its seriousness for the bilateral relations. While the “One Minute” incident in Davos in 2009 – the public confrontation between then- Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Israeli then-President Shimon Peres – was a sign of what was to come, the flotilla incident had severe results. Despite the apology by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Erdogan in March 2013 over “mistakes that may have been made” during the attempt to stop the flotilla to Gaza, and despite the June 2016 signature on a normalization agreement that included the transfer of $20 million to a fund for the families of the Turks who were killed in the incident, and despite the arrival of Turkish ships bearing Turkish humanitarian aid to Gaza at the Ashdod Port, it has been two years without any high-level diplomatic relations between the countries. As such, the positive effect of the attempts to repair relations did not last long.
Over the past decade Israel and Turkey have avoided additional situations that involve violence between them, but in retrospect, the flotilla incident cannot be interpreted as an uncharacteristic, localized event. Since 2010, the level of suspicion between the sides has increased, and even reflected personal hostility between Erdogan, now the Turkish President, and Netanyahu. The mutual hostility has crossed partisan lines in both countries, and people opposed to improved relations can be found on the opposition benches in the Knesset and in the Turkish parliament. At the same time, mutual trade between the countries (about $5 billion in 2018) remains a restraining factor, a reminder that there are parties on both sides interested in maintaining the relations. Aviation links were also maintained throughout the period (even though only Turkish companies were flying the Tel Aviv-Istanbul route), and passenger traffic between the countries was recently halted only due to the aviation crisis caused by the corona pandemic.
The flotilla incident was one of a series of incidents connected with the Arab-Israeli/Palestinian-Israeli dispute that had a negative impact on Turkish-Israeli relations. Over the years, there has been a marked correlation between positive developments in Israel’s relations with the Palestinians and improvement in Turkish-Israeli relations. The flotilla incident accelerated the process whereby Turkey, and particularly Erdogan, views itself as the voice of the Palestinian cause, and does not hesitate to cooperate with extremist elements among the Palestinians. The deterioration of Turkish-Egyptian relations, which came a number of years after the start of the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations, made it more difficult for Ankara to gain access to the Gaza Strip, but the close relations between Turkey and Hamas continued. Turkey’s relations with the Palestinian Authority are also quite close. The transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem, and the Israeli attack on the March of Return demonstrations near the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip were the immediate causes that led Turkey to recall its ambassador from Israel in May 2018, and also, contrary to international diplomatic custom, to instruct Israel’s ambassador to Turkey to return to Israel for consultations.
From an internal Turkish political standpoint, the flotilla incident was significant in a number of ways. First, Erdogan’s aggressive posture and readiness to invite a serious crisis with Israel reflected the expanded authority that he assumed in the foreign policy arena. This was particularly true vis-à-vis the Turkish army, which was a main element in the warmer bilateral relations with Israel in the 90s, and even forced them upon governments that were dominated by conservative and Islamist elements. Second, the public condemnation on the part of preacher Fethullah Gulen against the organizers of the flotilla is considered one of the harbingers of the intensifying dispute between him and Erdogan – a struggle that peaked with Gulen’s indictment as one of the backers of the failed attempted coup in Turkey in July 2016.
The flotilla incident was and remains a main issue in attacks against Israel in Turkish public opinion. Turkish media outlets frequently publish content that comes from parties that support the delegitimization of Israel. A number of nongovernmental organizations that benefit from Ankara’s backing continue to play a significant role in fanning hatred between the countries. Thus, the IHH organization that was behind the flotilla to Gaza remains active, and the flotilla incident still plays a central role in the anti-Israel discourse. A replay of the incident served as the beginning of a film that drew masses in 2011; the incident is frequently mentioned in the Turkish media; it serves as the subject of many books; and every year there are demonstrations in memory of those killed on the Marmara and against Israel. The number of participants in these demonstrations has declined in recent years, for instance compared with demonstrations on behalf of Jerusalem, but the IHH has declared 2020 as the “Year of the Marmara.”
The flotilla incident also reflected the process whereby the Eastern Mediterranean became a more significant arena for Israel and one with greater potential than before for a military flare-up. Cyprus and Greece viewed the incident as an indication of increased Turkish aggression; this led them to warmer relations with Israel, which for its part showed increasing interest in greater closeness with them due to the rising tension with Turkey and the desire to prevent additional flotillas to Gaza. The natural gas discoveries and the continued difficulty in solving the Cyprus problem basically created two competing blocs in the Eastern Mediterranean. The first consists of Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, and the militias led by General Khalifa Haftar in Libya. The second comprises Turkey and the Government of National Accord in Libya, led by Fayyez al-Sarraj. However, it is possible that since the corona pandemic and the decline in oil prices pose a high barrier to the realization of the ambitious project to build the East-Med pipeline, which Turkey seeks to obstruct, there may be some opening for easing tension in the Eastern Mediterranean, even though the Libyan civil war is escalating and it seems that both of the competing blocs continue resolutely to protect their respective interests.
Recent weeks have seen articles, mainly in the Turkish press, regarding attempts to thaw relations between Turkey and Israel, including a report regarding negotiations over an agreement to set maritime boundaries between them. Signs of improving relations were also that Ankara allowed Israel to buy medical equipment from it at the height of the pandemic (although there were several delays with the shipment), and that for the first time in 10 years, the Israeli air carrier El Al was allowed to resume cargo flights to and from Turkey. Yet despite these positive signs, the report of negotiations to delaminate the maritime boundaries has been denied by the Israeli embassy in Ankara, and thus there seems to be somewhat an over exaggeration of the meaning of the positive signs coming from Ankara. The very publication of the news articles does, however, raise questions about a possible Turkish desire to return to a more balanced foreign policy, in part as a response to the current challenges in its international relations and its many spheres of engagement. In contrast, if this is just a desire to throw a monkey wrench into the relations between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece, it is very doubtful whether it is worthwhile for Israel to warm relations. Furthermore, Erdogan’s spokesman has already called Netanyahu’s statements on the intention to apply sovereignty to the West Bank as “an expansion of the occupation policy that is contrary to international law.” Therefore, it is almost certain that any Israeli move toward annexing parts of the West Bank will destine any attempt at this time to improve relations between the countries to be negligible and short-lived.
https://www.inss.org.il/publication/marmara-ten-years/
עברית
Share
Gallia Lindenstrauss, Remi Daniel
INSS Insight No. 1323, May 25, 2020
Turkey-Israel relations began to deteriorate before the flotilla incident on May 31, 2010, but this unprecedented event in the bilateral relationship significantly accelerated the decline. To be sure, the poor relations between the countries and the lack of high-level diplomatic relations in the past two years cannot be pinned only on the ramifications of the incident. Nonetheless, the ramifications of the seizure of the Marmara, the largest boat in the flotilla, remain prominent among the causes of the current deep suspicion between Ankara and Jerusalem. In recent weeks, there have been articles, mainly in the Turkish press, regarding attempts to thaw relations. It is doubtful whether these articles have a strong basis, but in any case, Ankara will likely respond harshly if there is any Israeli move toward annexing parts of the West Bank. The benefits of any effort to improve the relationship with Turkey would therefore be negligible and short-lived.
The beginning of the deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations preceded the flotilla incident on May 31, 2010, but the event was unprecedented in its seriousness for the bilateral relations. While the “One Minute” incident in Davos in 2009 – the public confrontation between then- Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Israeli then-President Shimon Peres – was a sign of what was to come, the flotilla incident had severe results. Despite the apology by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Erdogan in March 2013 over “mistakes that may have been made” during the attempt to stop the flotilla to Gaza, and despite the June 2016 signature on a normalization agreement that included the transfer of $20 million to a fund for the families of the Turks who were killed in the incident, and despite the arrival of Turkish ships bearing Turkish humanitarian aid to Gaza at the Ashdod Port, it has been two years without any high-level diplomatic relations between the countries. As such, the positive effect of the attempts to repair relations did not last long.
Over the past decade Israel and Turkey have avoided additional situations that involve violence between them, but in retrospect, the flotilla incident cannot be interpreted as an uncharacteristic, localized event. Since 2010, the level of suspicion between the sides has increased, and even reflected personal hostility between Erdogan, now the Turkish President, and Netanyahu. The mutual hostility has crossed partisan lines in both countries, and people opposed to improved relations can be found on the opposition benches in the Knesset and in the Turkish parliament. At the same time, mutual trade between the countries (about $5 billion in 2018) remains a restraining factor, a reminder that there are parties on both sides interested in maintaining the relations. Aviation links were also maintained throughout the period (even though only Turkish companies were flying the Tel Aviv-Istanbul route), and passenger traffic between the countries was recently halted only due to the aviation crisis caused by the corona pandemic.
The flotilla incident was one of a series of incidents connected with the Arab-Israeli/Palestinian-Israeli dispute that had a negative impact on Turkish-Israeli relations. Over the years, there has been a marked correlation between positive developments in Israel’s relations with the Palestinians and improvement in Turkish-Israeli relations. The flotilla incident accelerated the process whereby Turkey, and particularly Erdogan, views itself as the voice of the Palestinian cause, and does not hesitate to cooperate with extremist elements among the Palestinians. The deterioration of Turkish-Egyptian relations, which came a number of years after the start of the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations, made it more difficult for Ankara to gain access to the Gaza Strip, but the close relations between Turkey and Hamas continued. Turkey’s relations with the Palestinian Authority are also quite close. The transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem, and the Israeli attack on the March of Return demonstrations near the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip were the immediate causes that led Turkey to recall its ambassador from Israel in May 2018, and also, contrary to international diplomatic custom, to instruct Israel’s ambassador to Turkey to return to Israel for consultations.
From an internal Turkish political standpoint, the flotilla incident was significant in a number of ways. First, Erdogan’s aggressive posture and readiness to invite a serious crisis with Israel reflected the expanded authority that he assumed in the foreign policy arena. This was particularly true vis-à-vis the Turkish army, which was a main element in the warmer bilateral relations with Israel in the 90s, and even forced them upon governments that were dominated by conservative and Islamist elements. Second, the public condemnation on the part of preacher Fethullah Gulen against the organizers of the flotilla is considered one of the harbingers of the intensifying dispute between him and Erdogan – a struggle that peaked with Gulen’s indictment as one of the backers of the failed attempted coup in Turkey in July 2016.
The flotilla incident was and remains a main issue in attacks against Israel in Turkish public opinion. Turkish media outlets frequently publish content that comes from parties that support the delegitimization of Israel. A number of nongovernmental organizations that benefit from Ankara’s backing continue to play a significant role in fanning hatred between the countries. Thus, the IHH organization that was behind the flotilla to Gaza remains active, and the flotilla incident still plays a central role in the anti-Israel discourse. A replay of the incident served as the beginning of a film that drew masses in 2011; the incident is frequently mentioned in the Turkish media; it serves as the subject of many books; and every year there are demonstrations in memory of those killed on the Marmara and against Israel. The number of participants in these demonstrations has declined in recent years, for instance compared with demonstrations on behalf of Jerusalem, but the IHH has declared 2020 as the “Year of the Marmara.”
The flotilla incident also reflected the process whereby the Eastern Mediterranean became a more significant arena for Israel and one with greater potential than before for a military flare-up. Cyprus and Greece viewed the incident as an indication of increased Turkish aggression; this led them to warmer relations with Israel, which for its part showed increasing interest in greater closeness with them due to the rising tension with Turkey and the desire to prevent additional flotillas to Gaza. The natural gas discoveries and the continued difficulty in solving the Cyprus problem basically created two competing blocs in the Eastern Mediterranean. The first consists of Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, and the militias led by General Khalifa Haftar in Libya. The second comprises Turkey and the Government of National Accord in Libya, led by Fayyez al-Sarraj. However, it is possible that since the corona pandemic and the decline in oil prices pose a high barrier to the realization of the ambitious project to build the East-Med pipeline, which Turkey seeks to obstruct, there may be some opening for easing tension in the Eastern Mediterranean, even though the Libyan civil war is escalating and it seems that both of the competing blocs continue resolutely to protect their respective interests.
Recent weeks have seen articles, mainly in the Turkish press, regarding attempts to thaw relations between Turkey and Israel, including a report regarding negotiations over an agreement to set maritime boundaries between them. Signs of improving relations were also that Ankara allowed Israel to buy medical equipment from it at the height of the pandemic (although there were several delays with the shipment), and that for the first time in 10 years, the Israeli air carrier El Al was allowed to resume cargo flights to and from Turkey. Yet despite these positive signs, the report of negotiations to delaminate the maritime boundaries has been denied by the Israeli embassy in Ankara, and thus there seems to be somewhat an over exaggeration of the meaning of the positive signs coming from Ankara. The very publication of the news articles does, however, raise questions about a possible Turkish desire to return to a more balanced foreign policy, in part as a response to the current challenges in its international relations and its many spheres of engagement. In contrast, if this is just a desire to throw a monkey wrench into the relations between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece, it is very doubtful whether it is worthwhile for Israel to warm relations. Furthermore, Erdogan’s spokesman has already called Netanyahu’s statements on the intention to apply sovereignty to the West Bank as “an expansion of the occupation policy that is contrary to international law.” Therefore, it is almost certain that any Israeli move toward annexing parts of the West Bank will destine any attempt at this time to improve relations between the countries to be negligible and short-lived.
https://www.inss.org.il/publication/marmara-ten-years/
