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The Risks of Pakistan's Sea-Based Nuclear Weapons

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https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-risks-of-pakistans-sea-based-nuclear-weapons/

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Nine days into 2017, Pakistan carried out the first-ever flight test of the Babur-3, it’s new nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM). A variant of the Babur-3 ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), this SLCM will see Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent head to sea—probably initially aboard its Agosta 90B and Agosta 70 submarines, but eventually, perhaps even on board new Type 041 Yuan-class submarines Pakistan is expected to procure from China.

In a new article in the Fall 2017 issue of the Washington Quarterly, Christopher Clary and I examine some of the novel security challenges Pakistan may experience with its sea-based deterrent. It is already well known that Pakistan has outpaced it’s primary rival, India, in terms of its nuclear stockpile growth.

On land, low-yield systems, like the Nasr, have also raised concerns of a lower nuclear-use threshold in South Asia. The move to sea can have some positive effects on overall strategic stability; indeed, the perceived survivability of a sea-based deterrent can abate so-called “use-it-or-lose-it” pressures for Pakistan’s land-based forces. But the story doesn’t stop there.


Sea-based weapons can aggravate crisis stability concerns in the India-Pakistan dyad and present unique command-and-control challenges for Pakistan, which may be required to place these weapons at a higher level of readiness during peacetime. Finally, Pakistan’s internal security environment will remain a concern with a submarine-based deterrent. The threat of theft and sabotage may be greater in the case of Pakistan’s sea-based weapons than it is for its land-based forces. In aggregate, we argue that the sea-based deterrent may, on balance, prove detrimental to Pakistan’s security.

Pakistan, like other nuclear states, employs a range of physical and procedural safeguards to ensure that its nuclear weapons are only used in a crisis and a with a valid order from the country’s National Command Authority (NCA). The introduction of a nuclear-capable SLCM aboard its Agosta submarines would necessitate the erosion of some of these safeguards.

For instance, some physical safeguards that Pakistan is known to use for its land-based weapons — including partially dissembled storage, separation of triggers and pits, and de-mated storage — would be impractical at sea. Meanwhile, the experience of other nuclear states, like the United Kingdom, with sea-based deterrents suggests that sea-based nuclear weapons generally see fewer use impediments. Pakistan has long asserted that its nuclear command-and-control is highly centralized, but it remains doubtful that this would remain true for its small nuclear-capable submarine force in wartime or a crisis. The temptation to pre-delegate use authorization may be too great.

Leaving aside the command-and-control and safeguard concerns, sea-based weapons may seriously aggravate crisis stability, in other words, the temptation for India to attack first as a crisis begins. The theory behind a survivable sea-based second-strike capability is more compelling assuming a large submarine force capable of maintaining a continuous at-sea deterrent presence. Pakistan’s submarine force, by contrast, would likely employ a bastion model — meaning that their peacetime locations would be known and hence the submarines would be vulnerable to Indian conventional attack.

Similarly, Indian forces, unable to discriminate whether a detected Pakistani submarine in a crisis was fielding nuclear or conventional capabilities, would have to presume nuclear capability should the Babur-3 see deployment. All of this in turn not only would make Pakistan’s submarine force a prime early-crisis target for Indian forces, but also aggravate use-or-lose pressures for land-based forces.

Ultimately, even if India resisted attacking Pakistani submarines to avoid unintended escalatory pressures, it would at least see value in targeting the Very Low Frequency (VLF) radar facility established at Karachi in November 2016 that would allow Pakistan’s NCA to communicate with its at-sea deterrent in a crisis. This would require some confidence in New Delhi that Pakistan had not pre-delegated use authorization and that Islamabad’s sea-based weapons would still require the transmission of a use-authorization code from the NCA.

Finally, a major cause for concern with Pakistan’s move to the sea with its nuclear forces comes from its ongoing struggle with various radical Islamic militant groups. Here, Pakistan is somewhat unique among nuclear possessor states. While militants have mostly targeted soft targets in urban centers, the Pakistani military has endured major attacks as well. In particular, Pakistan has endured attacks and infiltration attempts at sensitive military and naval sites, some associated with its nuclear program. Then-Defense Minister Khawaja Asif acknowledged that Pakistan Navy insiders even abetted Al Qaeda attackers in the 2014 PNS Zulfiquarattack. (Similar reports surfaced around the time of the 2011 PNS Mehran attacks, too.)

Militants with an eye on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons may find no better targets than sea-based systems with fewer physical safeguards. Moreover, the locations of these weapons would be well-known in peacetime, unlike Pakistan’s land-based weapons. The Pakistan Naval Dockyard in Karachi or the Jinnah Naval Base in Ormara — the two known sites capable of hosting Pakistani submarines — are thus prime for attack, infiltration, and even insider risks. While many of the above risks raised by the Babur-3 are far from unique to Pakistan, no other nuclear state faces a similar level of internal militancy.

The Babur-3‘s introduction presents a classic at-sea deterrent dilemma for Pakistan. It can choose to have its presumed second-strike capability either totally secure or readily usable in wartime. For a range of reasons, Pakistan can be expected to opt for the latter option. This will require real compromises on nuclear weapons security that expose Pakistan’s sea-based deterrent to theft and unauthorized use. Combined with the crisis stability implications and the more mundane concerns rising from costs, a sea-based leg to Pakistan’s nuclear forces appears to be, on balance, a net negative for its overall security.
 
Balance......this region will only survive if balance is maintained.
things go out of control when one feels inferior and other has the advantage, our boomer is on the roll......:-)
 
The threat of theft and sabotage may be greater in the case of Pakistan’s sea-based weapons than it is for its land-based forces. In aggregate, we argue that the sea-based deterrent may, on balance, prove detrimental to Pakistan’s security.
This part is enough to understand the thinking of the author as to what his goals are...... Yes, the theft in submarines are very common, the darned thieves with the submarine infiltration and teleportation abilities.
 
This part is enough to understand the thinking of the author as to what his goals are...... Yes, the theft in submarines are very common, the darned thieves with the submarine infiltration and teleportation abilities.
The last time I checked the solitary Indian nuclear sub is out due to a damn bad accident!!!! Another sub simply got blown up!!! The Indian navy is so much prone to blowing, flipping or swapping that even a journalist was thrashing their Naval chief to ground!!!!
 
Similarly, Indian forces, unable to discriminate whether a detected Pakistani submarine in a crisis was fielding nuclear or conventional capabilities, would have to presume nuclear capability should the Babur-3 see deployment. All of this in turn not only would make Pakistan’s submarine force a prime early-crisis target for Indian forces, but also aggravate use-or-lose pressures for land-based forces.
That is true for any platform not just the ones at sea. Submarines have more crevices where they would be safe then ballistic missiles in the short term.
Pakistan, like other nuclear states, employs a range of physical and procedural safeguards to ensure that its nuclear weapons are only used in a crisis and a with a valid order from the country’s National Command Authority (NCA). The introduction of a nuclear-capable SLCM aboard its Agosta submarines would necessitate the erosion of some of these safeguards.
True for all countries and their nuclear arsenals on board submarines. Nuclear weapons are not left inside areas where normal movement is allowed. The threat to nuclear weapons are obvious and safe guards are in place. Unlike the author's delusional belief the NCA knows what is is doing.

The last time I checked the solitary Indian nuclear sub is out due to a damn bad accident!!!! Another sub simply got blown up!!! The Indian navy is so much prone to blowing, flipping or swapping that even a journalist was thrashing their Naval chief to ground!!!!
Stealing nuclear weapons is impossible off submarines has more to it then pushing a big red button with boom boom written on it.
The author presumes too much in his report which is wishful thinking believing that the Pakistani armed forces are unaware as to the targets Indian air force and navy will target in the state of war. Submarine hunting, especially the newer ones which will properly form the basis of the nuclear triad, will not be as easy to detect and the ability to evade satellites is understood for all those who took an interest in the cold war and soviet efforts in it.
 
well india obtained nuclear weapons in 1970's first.

if anything, india start nuclearizing south asia.

Pakistan only obtained nuclear weapons because india was a nuclear threat.
 
then why india started it ? it was india whom testes sea based missiles first . pakistani nukes in sea are at same risk where indian are .
I think the 1971 war was more a factir than india testing nukes

The war proved that if presented with opportunity india will attack Pakistan even if unprovoked ....yhis could be both natural or interior ...

For example had Pakistan not had nuclear weapons india would have attacked in 1998, 2002, and even 2005 earthquake
 
India is building it's military for power projection, than there is also China to consider . And in all this Pakistan is sucked into. It cannot let India build it's military unabated, but it also knows that it cannot match India's defence expenditure. So to deter India, Pakistan relies heavily on its nukes. This heavy reliance on nukes is becoming a concern for International community. So Pakistan has to also address international community concerns. And I don't know how Pakistan will tackle these two issues when the military disparity between India and Pakistan grows even more in future.
 
India is building it's military for power projection, than there is also China to consider . And in all this Pakistan is sucked into. It cannot let India build it's military unabated, but it also knows that it cannot match India's defence expenditure. So to deter India, Pakistan relies heavily on its nukes. This heavy reliance on nukes is becoming a concern for International community. So Pakistan has to also address international community concerns. And I don't know how Pakistan will tackle these two issues when the military disparity between India and Pakistan grows even more in future.
:lol:
 
I think the 1971 war was more a factir than india testing nukes

The war proved that if presented with opportunity india will attack Pakistan even if unprovoked ....yhis could be both natural or interior ...

For example had Pakistan not had nuclear weapons india would have attacked in 1998, 2002, and even 2005 earthquake

I am sure if Pakistan had no nukes, India would have attacked Pakistan in 2008 after Mumbai. I am not sure of 1998, but yes 2002, after Parliament attack,there was a possibility of a war.
 
India is building it's military for power projection, than there is also China to consider . And in all this Pakistan is sucked into. It cannot let India build it's military unabated, but it also knows that it cannot match India's defence expenditure. So to deter India, Pakistan relies heavily on its nukes. This heavy reliance on nukes is becoming a concern for International community. So Pakistan has to also address international community concerns. And I don't know how Pakistan will tackle these two issues when the military disparity between India and Pakistan grows even more in future.
Pakistan can't match Indian defense expenditure neither we have need for power projection..We just 've to made sure if ever India think of imposing war the result is MAD nothing more nothing less...Intentional community knows this and that's the reason India needs to go back in recent border stand off..Pakistan invest in Missiles and now submarine for this same purpose rather then air defense heavily..
India back off in 2008 for very same reason that gives strength to what Pakistan believe..
 
even softening of US stance that we are witnessing is due to nukes.... they would have torn us apart definitely after trumps speech...

to be honest ..... noble prize for peace should be given to nuclear weapons.... they have prevented a lot more wars than any thing else .... in history
 
Pakistan can't match Indian defense expenditure neither we have need for power projection..We just 've to made sure if ever India think of imposing war the result is MAD nothing more nothing less...Intentional community knows this and that's the reason India needs to go back in recent border stand off..Pakistan invest in Missiles and now submarine for this same purpose rather then air defense heavily..
India back off in 2008 for very same reason that gives strength to what Pakistan believe..

I am not sure about MAD. First because India is a huge country, second there is ABM system in place and is improving every year. May be the ABM can become perfect or near perfect in next 20 years. I guess in case of a Pakistani nuclear strike, most likely, India will use Pakistan's lack of dept, and capture Pakistani territory as major centers of Pakistan are just across the border as a compensation for the losses it incurred in the nuclear attack.
 
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