The myth of the Precision bombing

[Manticore]

The myth of the precision bombing
picard578 / January 19, 2013
Many people believe that modern guided (dubbed “smart”) weapons allow for pinpoint precision from very large distance, such as allowing fast high-flying aircraft to carry out Close Air Support, or to engage targets in urban environments.

Baloney.

In NATO missions in Libya, carried out to “support” anti-Gadaffi rebels, have killed or wounded multiple civilians and rebel troops. It is nothing new – as noted in the article, up to 25 – 80 % of casualties in wars have been caused by friendly fire (this also shows why BVR combat is unlikely to become prevalent form of air combat, as potential for misidentification is far greater). Visual ID has time and again proven itself as only somewhat reliable type of identifying targets, and even it is not perfect. As such, fast jets are completely incapable of identifying targets. WW2 Stuka pilot, Colonel Hans Rudel, has stated that “high speeds are a poison for finding tanks” – and that was in flat Ukraine, flying an aircraft far slower than modern jets. Army Sgt. First Class Frank Antenori has stated same thing.

In fact, due to lack of A-10s, F-15Es have on multiple occasions found themselves using their guns to strafe targets in Afghanistan. While they were mostly successfull, end result was longer time required and less successfull mission than what would have been with A-10s. A-10 also has very long loiter time, which means that – unlike “multirole” jets – it can be on station hour after hour, providing permanent presence and near-immediate answer to any CAS request.

Furthermore, units are equipped with limited number of radios, making identification difficult. While low-flying UAV’s can be used to identify targets, such usage is dependant on lack of any serious air defenses as well as presence of secure uplinks.

But even when targets are identified, precision weapons’ performance is nothing stellar – unless killing civilians is considered, where casualties have increased from WW2-standard of 9 tons of bombs per civilian killed to 200 civillians per one bomb, and drones’ effectiveness of 6 civillians per attack. This shows that, for precision weapons to be used correctly, either aircraft must be slow enough and low enough for pilot to use binoculars for identification, or identification must be done by troops on the ground.

Precision weapons have to have their points of impact calculated. Result was that, even with fast jets in the air, it took anywhere from 26 minutes to several hours for munitions to be finally delivered.

Guided munitions are also only effective against fixed targets. But against mobile targets, low-speed low-altitude attacks with cannon or unguided munitions are required to achieve any kind of effect, rendering DAS (Distant Air Support) ineffective. As such, laser designators have to be complemented with smoke grenades and marker baloons. JDAMs are not terminally guided, and as such are very likely to go astray.

While satellite surveillance is avaliable, it is very-long-distance, and as result it does not offer good target-recognition capabilities – to satellites and high-flying aircraft, cardboard decoys are indiscernible from actual targets, and it takes 18 hours for strike to arrive. UAV surveillance, on the other hand, is insufficient, whereas UCAVs can only attack fixed targets.

And problem sometimes isn’t too few data – it is too much data displayed to the pilot, overloading him and distracting him from the mission, as well as increasing time required for “observation” in OODA loop.

There are problems with munitions themselves too – further away bomb is dropped from, greater error becomes. On release, bombs often bump into each other – and sometimes aircraft too – causing fins to get bended and thus reducing accuracy. This is problem that only increases with increasing speeds, due to stronger turbulences. GPS weapons’ guidance systems also often malfunction, with bombs hitting miles off the target. A laser-guided bomb, meanwhile, can be thrown off course by a laser beam guding it being disturbed by a debris or simply by smoke, dust, clouds or highly humid environment, thus causing bomb to go ballistic.

During Operation Desert Storm, at most 60% of bombs have achieved hits on targets, and many misses were off by hundreds of meters. In fact, success rate could have been as low as 41%. While officials have said that strategic targets will be destroyed in 10 days, it took two weeks to destroy nuclear weapons factories – and all other targets have only been damaged, not destroyed. Out of 15 SAM batteries attacked by low-flying F-117s in Baghdad at first night, 13 continued to operate. All Coalition aircraft hitonly 21 of 37 “crucial” targets. It also took between 4 and 10 laser-guided bombs to destroy targets such as bridges – similar to success rate of dive bombers against aircraft carriers during Pacific war.

In Kosovo War, only 58 successfull strikes have been made by USAF out of 750 attacks, destroying 14 tanks, 18 APCs and 20 artillery pieces. Out of 80 SAM batteries, 3 were destroyed. That can be compared to USAF claims of 120 tanks, 220 APCs and 450 artillery pieces destroyed. Chinese Embassy was also bombed, which was a repetition of President Reagan’s raid on Libya, when French embassy was bombed by “precision” weapons. Civilian casualties were one for every 10 tons of bombs, very close to WW2 rates. In Vietnam, casualties were one for every 12,5 tons of bombs. UK’s bombing accuracy with smart bombs was 40%.

In Afganistan, 2001, B-52 dropped precision ordnance around 100 meters from US Special Forces team, killing three US soldiers and five Afghan government soldiers. Other than several such incidents, however, war has been a positive example of USAF integrating more with the Army. Still, errors cannot be done away with, and problem gets worse faster the jet flies.

During 2003 invasion, US “precision” weapons have managed to miss Iraq entirely, falling into Turkey and Iran (at least US heavy bombers in WW2 never missed the country, though they did occasionally miss the city in entirety). Civilian objects, including hospitals, were consistently hit, and 2003 precision bombing has been more deadly than 1991 bombing which was done mostly by “dumb” bombs – killing 1350 civilians per 10 000 tons of bombs, as opposed to 400 civilians per 10 000 tons. This can in part be attributed to pilots dropping bombs from greater altitude due to the belief that part of targeting can be taken over by the projectile itself. Ballistic missiles did not fare much better, with only one-third hitting targets, one-third failling to detonate and one-third missing alltogether. It also happened on Balkans, when NATO bomb intended for Serbia fell in Sofia, Bulgaria. Accuracy of bombs against radar sites was 32%.

What is important to realize is that many of described attacks have taken place at low altitude – inly in Serbia did bombardment come, as a rule, from high altitude due to altitude limits placed, which means that it could be considered most indicative for high-altitude bombardment success rate. But even when bomb or missile does hit the target, debris from 1-ton bomb can cause casualties hundreds of meters from the impact point; radius for a 2-ton bomb can extend to a thousand meters. In fact, while 450-kg GPS bombhas CEP of 12 meters, blast damage extends to 30 meters and fragmentation damage extends to 900 meters. Area of effect is calculated by cube root of yield, so 227 kg weapon would still cause blast damage to 24 meters and fragmentation damage to 716 meters. As such, precision munitions are completely unsuited for CAS roles as well as operations in urban areas or areas where there might be civilians present. Furthermore, due to the expensive guidance systems, trend is for precision munitions to have higher yield than “dumb” counterparts, increasing the problem.

UCAVs used for assassinating terrorist leaders are especially problematic. Of 700 people killed by UCAVs in Pakistan, only 14 have been Taliban, which is mostly connected to unreliable intelligence and careless approach.

While some say that low-and-slow-flying CAS aircraft are vulnerable to being shot down, aircraft is just as safe from SAMs and MANPADS below 30 meters as it is above 3 000 meters. It is in-between these two values that trouble occurs. While average infantry division has large number of automatic weapons, most of these are small-calibre and thus only suited for engaging typical fighters (F-15, F-35) and not armored ground attack aircraft such as A-10 or Su-25 which can survive even direct hits by full-sized SAMs in good portion of cases – 50% in case of the A-10. In reality, real threat for CAS aircraft are enemy fighter aircraft, although the mere fact that CAS aircraft fly very low might make job difficult for radar-guided missiles. On the other hand, large aircraft such as AC-130 Spectre are vulnerable, can only be used at night. and have more limited capability for providing effective CAS. In Gulf War, only the tough A-10 and very fast Tornado operated at low altitudes due to persistent threat from optically-aimed AAA and IR MANPADS. Unlike other aircraft, both these types proved survivable in the environment.

Since precision weapons are tested in deserts, in fair weather (without anything that might impede bombs) and against static targets, official claims about their actual precision can be disregarded – they are equally faulty and based on equally flawed assumptions as pre-Vietnam claims of 90% accuracy for BVR missiles, which has turned out to be around 8% in combat.

Precision bombing myth is also nothing new. Norden sight for B-17 was claimed to be able to “put bomb into a pickle-barrell from 20.000 feet”. In the end, entire city blocks were levelled when bombers attacked specific targets, with bombs falling hundreds of meters off the target.

Conclusion? While guided munitions can be and are helpful, they are not magic, and aircraft still have to go very low and very slow – until pilots can see target through the canopy – in order to reliably hit tactical targets. Old-fashioned cannons are still most precise weapons in arsenal, when used well; and while precision munitions certainly can be useful, their main usefulness is not so much in increasing range from which attacks are made as in allowing pilot to spend least time possible “on target” and concentrate on evading enemy AA fire.

The myth of the precision bombing « Defense Issues

 

[Zarvan]

Many people believe that modern guided (dubbed “smart”) weapons allow for pinpoint precision from very large distance, such as allowing fast high-flying aircraft to carry out Close Air Support, or to engage targets in urban environments.

Baloney.

In NATO missions in Libya, carried out to “support” anti-Gadaffi rebels, have killed or wounded multiple civilians and rebel troops. It is nothing new – as noted in the article, up to 25 – 80 % of casualties in wars have been caused by friendly fire (this also shows why BVR combat is unlikely to become prevalent form of air combat, as potential for misidentification is far greater). Visual ID has time and again proven itself as only somewhat reliable type of identifying targets, and even it is not perfect. As such, fast jets are completely incapable of identifying targets. WW2 Stuka pilot, Colonel Hans Rudel, has stated that “high speeds are a poison for finding tanks” – and that was in flat Ukraine, flying an aircraft far slower than modern jets. Army Sgt. First Class Frank Antenori has stated same thing.

In fact, due to lack of A-10s, F-15Es have on multiple occasions found themselves using their guns to strafe targets in Afghanistan. While they were mostly successfull, end result was longer time required and less successfull mission than what would have been with A-10s. A-10 also has very long loiter time, which means that – unlike “multirole” jets – it can be on station hour after hour, providing permanent presence and near-immediate answer to any CAS request.

Furthermore, units are equipped with limited number of radios, making identification difficult. While low-flying UAV’s can be used to identify targets, such usage is dependant on lack of any serious air defenses as well as presence of secure uplinks.

But even when targets are identified, precision weapons’ performance is nothing stellar – unless killing civilians is considered, where casualties have increased from WW2-standard of 9 tons of bombs per civilian killed to 200 civillians per one bomb, and drones’ effectiveness of 6 civillians per attack. This shows that, for precision weapons to be used correctly, either aircraft must be slow enough and low enough for pilot to use binoculars for identification, or identification must be done by troops on the ground.

Precision weapons have to have their points of impact calculated. Result was that, even with fast jets in the air, it took anywhere from 26 minutes to several hours for munitions to be finally delivered.

Guided munitions are also only effective against fixed targets. But against mobile targets, low-speed low-altitude attacks with cannon or unguided munitions are required to achieve any kind of effect, rendering DAS (Distant Air Support) ineffective. As such, laser designators have to be complemented with smoke grenades and marker baloons. JDAMs are not terminally guided, and as such are very likely to go astray.

While satellite surveillance is avaliable, it is very-long-distance, and as result it does not offer good target-recognition capabilities – to satellites and high-flying aircraft, cardboard decoys are indiscernible from actual targets, and it takes 18 hours for strike to arrive. UAV surveillance, on the other hand, is insufficient, whereas UCAVs can only attack fixed targets.

And problem sometimes isn’t too few data – it is too much data displayed to the pilot, overloading him and distracting him from the mission, as well as increasing time required for “observation” in OODA loop.

There are problems with munitions themselves too – further away bomb is dropped from, greater error becomes. On release, bombs often bump intoeach other – and sometimes aircraft too – causing fins to get bended and thus reducing accuracy. This is problem that only increases with increasing speeds, due to stronger turbulences. GPS weapons’ guidance systems also often malfunction, with bombs hitting miles off the target. A laser-guided bomb, meanwhile, can be thrown off course by a laser beam guding it being disturbed by a debris or simply by smoke, dust, clouds or highly humid environment, thus causing bomb to go ballistic.

During Operation Desert Storm, at most 60% of bombs have achieved hits on targets, and many misses were off by hundreds of meters. In fact, success rate could have been as low as 41%. While officials have said that strategic targets will be destroyed in 10 days, it took two weeks to destroy nuclear weapons factories – and all other targets have only been damaged, not destroyed. Out of 15 SAM batteries attacked by low-flying F-117s in Baghdad at first night, 13 continued to operate. All Coalition aircraft hit only 21 of 37 “crucial” targets. It also took between 4 and 10 laser-guided bombs to destroy targets such as bridges – similar to success rate of dive bombers against aircraft carriers during Pacific war.

In Kosovo War, only 58 successfull strikes have been made by USAF out of 750 attacks, destroying 14 tanks, 18 APCs and 20 artillery pieces. Out of 80 SAM batteries, 3 were destroyed. That can be compared to USAF claims of 120 tanks, 220 APCs and 450 artillery pieces destroyed. Chinese Embassy was also bombed, which was a repetition of President Reagan’s raid on Libya, when French embassy was bombed by “precision” weapons. Civilian casualties were one for every 10 tons of bombs, very close to WW2 rates. In Vietnam, casualties were one for every 12,5 tons of bombs. UK’s bombing accuracy with smart bombs was 40%.

In Afganistan, 2001, B-52 dropped precision ordnance around 100 meters from US Special Forces team, killing three US soldiers and five Afghan government soldiers. Other than several such incidents, however, war has been a positive example of USAF integrating more with the Army. Still, errors cannot be done away with, and problem gets worse faster the jet flies.

During 2003 invasion, US “precision” weapons have managed to miss Iraq entirely, falling into Turkey and Iran (at least US heavy bombers in WW2 never missed the country, though they did occasionally miss the city in entirety). Civilian objects, including hospitals, were consistently hit, and 2003 precision bombing has been more deadly than 1991 bombing which was done mostly by “dumb” bombs – killing 1350 civilians per 10 000 tons of bombs, as opposed to 400 civilians per 10 000 tons. This can in part be attributed to pilots dropping bombs from greater altitude due to the belief that part of targeting can be taken over by the projectile itself. Ballistic missiles did not fare much better, with only one-third hitting targets, one-third failling to detonate and one-third missing alltogether. It also happened on Balkans, when NATO bomb intended for Serbia fell in Sofia, Bulgaria. Accuracy of bombs against radar sites was 32%.

What is important to realize is that many of described attacks have taken place at low altitude – inly in Serbia did bombardment come, as a rule, from high altitude due to altitude limits placed, which means that it could be considered most indicative for high-altitude bombardment success rate. But even when bomb or missile does hit the target, debris from 1-ton bomb can cause casualties hundreds of meters from the impact point; radius for a 2-ton bomb can extend to a thousand meters. In fact, while 450-kg GPS bomb has CEP of 12 meters, blast damage extends to 30 meters and fragmentation damage extends to 900 meters. Area of effect is calculated by cube root of yield, so 227 kg weapon would still cause blast damage to 24 meters and fragmentation damage to 716 meters. As such, precision munitions are completely unsuited for CAS roles as well as operations in urban areas or areas where there might be civilians present. Furthermore, due to the expensive guidance systems, trend is for precision munitions to have higher yield than “dumb” counterparts, increasing the problem.

UCAVs used for assassinating terrorist leaders are especially problematic. Of 700 people killed by UCAVs in Pakistan, only 14 have been Taliban, which is mostly connected to unreliable intelligence and careless approach.

While some say that low-and-slow-flying CAS aircraft are vulnerable to being shot down, aircraft is just as safe from SAMs and MANPADS below 30 meters as it is above 3 000 meters. It is in-between these two values that trouble occurs. While average infantry division has large number of automatic weapons, most of these are small-calibre and thus only suited for engaging typical fighters (F-15, F-35) and not armored ground attack aircraft such as A-10 or Su-25 which can survive even direct hits by full-sized SAMs in good portion of cases – 50% in case of the A-10. In reality, real threat for CAS aircraft are enemy fighter aircraft, although the mere fact that CAS aircraft fly very low might make job difficult for radar-guided missiles. On the other hand, large aircraft such as AC-130 Spectre are vulnerable, can only be used at night. and have more limited capability for providing effective CAS. In Gulf War, only the tough A-10 and very fast Tornado operated at low altitudes due to persistent threat from optically-aimed AAA and IR MANPADS. Unlike other aircraft, both these types proved survivable in the environment.

Since precision weapons are tested in deserts, in fair weather (without anything that might impede bombs) and against static targets, official claims about their actual precision can be disregarded – they are equally faulty and based on equally flawed assumptions as pre-Vietnam claims of 90% accuracy for BVR missiles, which has turned out to be around 8% in combat.

Precision bombing myth is also nothing new. Norden sight for B-17 was claimed to be able to “put bomb into a pickle-barrell from 20.000 feet”. In the end, entire city blocks were levelled when bombers attacked specific targets, with bombs falling hundreds of meters off the target.

Conclusion? While guided munitions can be and are helpful, they are not magic, and aircraft still have to go very low and very slow – until pilots can see target through the canopy – in order to reliably hit tactical targets. Old-fashioned cannons are still most precise weapons in arsenal, when used well; and while precision munitions certainly can be useful, their main usefulness is not so much in increasing range from which attacks are made as in allowing pilot to spend least time possible “on target” and concentrate on evading enemy AA fire.
The myth of the precision bombing | Defense Issues
@Aeronaut @Oscar @nuclearpak @jaibi @Pakistanisage @Secur @RazPaK @tarrar @mafiya @rashad Mahmood @Slav Defence

 

[Counter-Errorist]

UCAVs used for assassinating terrorist leaders are especially problematic. Of 700 people killed by UCAVs in Pakistan, only 14 have been Taliban, which is mostly connected to unreliable intelligence and careless approach.

In a Surprise, Pakistan Says Fewer Civilians Died by Drones

The Ministry of Defense released figures to lawmakers saying that 67 civilians were among 2,227 people killed in 317 drone strikes since 2008. The remainder of those killed were Islamist militants, the ministry said.

The rest of the numbers are probably made up as well

 

[Oldman1]

Myth of precision bombing my ***. Might as well go back to massive firebombings then if precision weapons don't work. Or in this case other countries developing or developed the same technology to use it if it didn't work.

I especially like the author's view that guided weapons are useful against fixed targets only. And not useful against mobile ones.

 

[SQ8]

fairly skewed article..Not sure what the author wants to push but it seems like a mouthpiece to keep the A-10 rolling. Which is already is going to.. till 2035. However, PGMs have NOTHING to do with the A-10.. and rather its ability to operate close to the troops..
Ironically the A-10 which is article seems to laud(mistakenly in many matters) is a heavy user of PGMs and regularly drops them from low alt(or fires them in the case of the AGM-65).

 

[Dillinger]

fairly skewed article..Not sure what the author wants to push but it seems like a mouthpiece to keep the A-10 rolling. Which is already is going to.. till 2035. However, PGMs have NOTHING to do with the A-10.. and rather its ability to operate close to the troops..
Ironically the A-10 which is article seems to laud(mistakenly in many matters) is a heavy user of PGMs and regularly drops them from low alt(or fires them in the case of the AGM-65).

The only thing in the article that seemed unbiased was the premise itself that PGMs are not ALL THAT accurate, albeit the author really dropped the ball when it came to furnishing said premise with cogent analysis. Furthermore it is true that when you're dealing with a fire-mission and the boots on the ground are danger close then things can get hairy quite often. The only useful note that one can make after reading the concerned article is that the fly boys and grunts need to start integrating elements of their C4I networks, promote inter-operability and joint-operability. Such initiatives will make life easier, for eg. a combat controller (acting as a JTAC) embedded into a team can make life much less bloody when air-support is called in or more frequent use of boots on the ground lasing HVTs (not always practical of course) surrounded by civvies can cut down on collateral damage.

All in all, PGMs can miss and collateral damage will still occur. But all comparisons in real life are relative in nature, employing PGMs leads to lesser collateral damage than carpet bombing an area- its the word "lesser" on which the emphasis must be placed.

@Hyperion I've been keeping Buttsy in line for so long by threatening to blast his lard belly by dropping in PGMs right through his bedroom window...and now Zarvi's just let the proverbial cat out of the bag.

 

[SQ8]

The only thing in the article that seemed unbiased was the premise itself that PGMs are not ALL THAT accurate, albeit the author really dropped the ball when it came to furnishing said premise with cogent analysis. Furthermore it is true that when you're dealing with a fire-mission and the boots on the ground are danger close then things can get hairy quite often. The only useful note that one can make after reading the concerned article is that the fly boys and grunts need to start integrating elements of their C4I networks, promote inter-operability and joint-operability. Such initiatives will make life easier, for eg. a combat controller (acting as a JTAC) embedded into a team can make life much less bloody when air-support is called in or more frequent use of boots on the ground lasing HVTs (not always practical of course) surrounded by civvies can cut down on collateral damage.

All in all, PGMs can miss and collateral damage will still occur. But all comparisons in real life are relative in nature, employing PGMs leads to lesser collateral damage than carpet bombing an area- its the word "lesser" on which the emphasis must be placed.

@Hyperion I've been keeping Buttsy in line for so long by threatening to blast his lard belly by dropping in PGMs right through his bedroom window...and now Zarvi's just let the proverbial cat out of the bag.

One also has to take into account that not much can be done about the usage of civilian human shields by opposing forces.

 

[Dillinger]

One also has to take into account that not much can be done about the usage of civilian human shields by opposing forces.

And there in lies the mother of all conundrums, who to blame...

 

[proka89]

In Kosovo War, only 58 successfull strikes have been made by USAF out of 750 attacks, destroying 14 tanks, 18 APCs and 20 artillery pieces. Out of 80 SAM batteries, 3 were destroyed. That can be compared to USAF claims of 120 tanks, 220 APCs and 450 artillery pieces destroyed. Chinese Embassy was also bombed, which was a repetition of President Reagan’s raid on Libya, when French embassy was bombed by “precision” weapons. Civilian casualties were one for every 10 tons of bombs, very close to WW2 rates. In Vietnam, casualties were one for every 12,5 tons of bombs. UK’s bombing accuracy with smart bombs was 40%.

During NATO bombing of Yugoslavia they first claimed that they have destroyed: 181 tanks, 317 APC's, 857 artillery pieces and 600 military vehicles. Then soon after that they changed that claim to: 120 tanks, 220 APC's, 449 artillery pieces. At the same time Yugoslavian army claimed losses of 13 tanks, 8 APC's, 27 artillery pieces.

Soon after the end of war NATO sent a special team on Kosovo to determine the real losses of the Yugoslav army during the war. After their work on the field, they concluded that bombing was successful against bridges, barracks... but not against the mobile units of the Yugoslav army. From the 1025 attacks that were believed to be successful they confirmed only 58 to be ssccessful. After that NATO was not happy with the results, so they decided to make a study.

http://www.nato.int/kosovo/slides/m990916a.htm

After that they claimed that they have destroyed: 93 tanks, 153 APC's, 389 artillery pieces and 339 military vehicles. They simply concluded that we evacuated practically all of our destroyed equipment from Kosovo, which is clearly a complete bullshit, because we didn't have neither the time, or the means to evacuate that much of destroyed equipment from Kosovo, while the NATO jets controlled the sky above us.

Numbers close to truth should be around: 14 tanks, 12 self propelled artillery pieces (2S1 Gvozdika), 20 APC's... Approximately the same number of damaged equipment was evacuated.

In 2013 Serbian defense minister Aleksandar Vucic gave a final number of dead and missing soldiers during NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. And final nuber is 631 dead and 28 missing in action. And around 50% of those soldiers died in ground battles against KLA, such as Battle of Košare ...

Death Toll From NATO Yugoslavia Bombing Still Unknown :: Balkan Insight

So even if all 300 soldiers that died from NATO bombs were in tanks, what about all those APC's, artillery pieces....

The first detailed admissions that NATO’s extensive bombing campaign had a negligible damaging effect on the Yugoslav Army came in late April, five weeks into the war. According to senior military and intelligence officials in Washington, the Yugoslav Army was able to escape serious damage for a number of reasons. First, while NATO’s initial stage of the bombing campaign focused almost exclusively on air defenses, the Serbs were able to clear out barracks, headquarters, and staging areas, thus leaving major military targets empty. Second, many Yugoslav troops dug into defensive positions along the Kosovo border with Albania and Macedonia.7 As long as the KLA remained too weak to mount substantial raids within Kosovo as well as from Albania, and as long as there was no serious threat of a NATO land invasion, the Serbs could remain in their positions and wait. Also, most Serb troops dispersed into small mobile units that were very difficult for NATO pilots to pinpoint from 20,000 feet in the air.

Another important factor in the war was terrain. Unlike Iraq where American, British, and French forces were dealing with an extremely flat and open terrain, Kosovo is very mountainous. This condition is extremely conducive to a defensive war where the enemy is trying to destroy you from the air. In addition, after the Yugoslav-Soviet split in 1947, Yugoslav President Josip Broz (Tito) seriously built up the defense capability of Yugoslavia. The whole country is fortified with a web of underground bunkers and shelters. A former soldier in the Yugoslav Army who served in Kosovo told this reporter that the mountains in Kosovo were heavily fortified with airplane hangars that were impenetrable.

When it came time to withdraw the troops after the end of the bombing, NATO estimated that nearly 50,000 Yugoslav troops left - 10,000 more than were thought to be there in the first place and seriously putting into question the NATO claims that between 5,000 to 10,000 troops were killed.13 The Yugoslav Government, on the other hand, claimed that only 462 soldiers and 114 police officers were killed during the war.14

NATO commanders and western journalists were very surprised at the high morale exhibited by the retreating Yugoslav troops. ITAR-TASS, the Russian news agency, reported that according to sources from London, NATO military officials that witnessed the withdrawal concluded that the Yugoslav Army had left Kosovo "fully combat ready and with a high moral spirit." Further, they were "close to shock" when they saw the multi-kilometer columns of tanks and military technology brought out of the province.15 Steven Lee Myers of The New York Times wrote on June 28th:

"The Yugoslav Army that completed its withdrawal from Kosovo a week ago—tired and battered, to be sure, but defiant, orderly, and clearly not as weak as NATO officials believed."16

Stratfor.com, a private intelligence company that provides news on the internet, wrote that the Yugoslav soldiers appeared to observers "in good shape and in high spirits."17 Peter Goodspeed of the National Post characterized the Yugoslav retreat as "robust" and the Serb soldiers "defiant."18 The Times ran an AFP (Agency France Presse) story on June 16th that stated:

"The soldiers seemed calm and their vehicles and equipment well maintained, with no signs that they had suffered from air attacks which NATO claimed had severely reduced the army’s effectiveness."19

In the same edition, interviews with Yugoslav soldiers did not convey the impression of a defeated army. In fact, the feeling was that they were prepared to continue fighting against NATO/KLA aggression. One soldier said "I did my job honourably but the politicians spoiled everything. No one likes war, but we had no choice." Another soldier, a junior officer added that the retreat "was not a good thing." When asked about the damage to the Yugoslav Army, another junior officer replied, "I’m not sure but I don’t think we lost very much material."20

Two weeks after the war commenced, NATO’s Supreme Commander, Gen. Wesley K. Clark said that the alliance had destroyed 110 of the approximately 300 tanks that the Yugoslav Army had deployed in Kosovo. That number was down from the 150 that NATO believed it had destroyed in the last days of the war, according to a senior NATO official.22 A higher figure of 122 destroyed tanks and 220 troop transporters was rejected by a military expert in Paris. "I do not believe these figures at all. I think that in strictly military terms, the effects of the strikes were limited. Very disappointing."23 Overall, NATO claimed that it damaged or destroyed 40% of the Yugoslav Army’s main battle tanks and 60% of its artillery and mortars. As of June 24, KFOR troops found only three damaged and outdated T-55 tanks left behind in Kosovo. The Yugoslav Army acknowledged an additional ten damaged tanks.24 With dozens of western monitors observing, the Yugoslav forces evacuated at least 220 tanks and more than 300 armored vehicles as reported by a major French press agency.25 If these numbers are correct then the Serbs lost around 80 tanks, not the 110 figure that NATO believes. In any event, according to the observations of David Rudd, executive director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, "There were a lot of tanks that looked as though they were in very good condition."26

Is it possible that the Yugoslav Army was able to effectively conceal the true extent of the damage done to its military equipment by hiding or taking destroyed material back with them into central Serbia before KFOR moved in to Kosovo? According to a French military expert, no.

"If we had smashed as many tanks as NATO said, we would see them. They did not have the time or the means to evacuate them. Transporting a damaged armored vehicle is a logistical nightmare, which takes time and effort."28

The rest is on the link:

19. Damage to the Yugoslav Army

The Serbs were reluctant to "lock-on" their missiles to Nato aircraft since this would make them vulnerable to counter-attack by Nato pilots. However, allied pilots throughout the 78-day bombing campaign reported attacks from surface-to-air missiles, fired, it seems, without their base being identified.

The first phase of the Nato campaign did not include targets over Kosovo - indeed, it was assumed that Slobodan Milosevic would put up his hands before new targeting plans would need to be agreed.

It was known that Yugoslavia had built an extensive system of underground shelters for its troops, guns and aircraft - a relic of President Tito's era, in preparation for a possible invasion by the Soviet Union. Many of its camouflage techniques, including the use of dummy weapons emplacements, the Serbs had learned from the Russians.

General Nebojsa Pavkovic, commander of the Yugoslav army in Kosovo, tells the BBC's Moral Combat programme this Sunday: "We used other measures, too: camouflage, decoys, and it was mainly these that Nato aircraft destroyed."

Nato pilots found small mobile targets so hard to find that on some days they dropped half their bombs on so-called "dump sites" known to be empty.

General Mike Short, commander of the allied air forces, said: "The Serbs dictated the pace of events, they dictated the battle rhythm. They came out to burn villages when they wanted to, they hid when the weather was good."

How the Serb army escaped Nato | World news | The Guardian

And yes we did have the spy:

Pierre-Henri Bunel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In Embarrassing Episode, French Officer Is Guilty of Aiding Serbs - NYTimes.com

Gen. Clark identified several ways in which Yugoslav experience could prove valuable to the Iraqis.

The most significant, he said, was the ability of Yugoslavia's air defences to foil NATO electronics by using different radar frequencies and profiles, and by using "passive tracking" systems that do not give off radiation.

Despite NATO's air supremacy, it never succeeded in knocking out the air defences. They remained a potent threat throughout the conflict, forcing attacking warplanes to altitudes above 15,000 feet, where they were safe from surface-to-air missiles but far less effective in a ground-attack role.

"We were always aware we were being tracked and monitored by them," Gen. Clark said.

NATO won the war in June, 1999, following Mr. Milosevic's decision to withdraw his largely intact army from Kosovo, and after the extensive destruction of bridges, government buildings and other infrastructure targets throughout Yugoslavia.

In contrast, the effects of heavy bombing on the Yugoslav forces in Kosovo were minimal. British ordnance experts who inspected the battlefields after the war determined that only 14 tanks and a handful of armoured vehicles were destroyed in nearly three months of bombing.

NATO attack on Yugoslavia gave Iraq good lessons (MUST READ!)

 

[Mighty Caty]

Many people believe that modern guided (dubbed “smart”) weapons allow for pinpoint precision from very large distance, such as allowing fast high-flying aircraft to carry out Close Air Support, or to engage targets in urban environments.

Baloney.

In NATO missions in Libya, carried out to “support” anti-Gadaffi rebels, have killed or wounded multiple civilians and rebel troops. It is nothing new – as noted in the article, up to 25 – 80 % of casualties in wars have been caused by friendly fire (this also shows why BVR combat is unlikely to become prevalent form of air combat, as potential for misidentification is far greater). Visual ID has time and again proven itself as only somewhat reliable type of identifying targets, and even it is not perfect. As such, fast jets are completely incapable of identifying targets. WW2 Stuka pilot, Colonel Hans Rudel, has stated that “high speeds are a poison for finding tanks” – and that was in flat Ukraine, flying an aircraft far slower than modern jets. Army Sgt. First Class Frank Antenori has stated same thing.

In fact, due to lack of A-10s, F-15Es have on multiple occasions found themselves using their guns to strafe targets in Afghanistan. While they were mostly successfull, end result was longer time required and less successfull mission than what would have been with A-10s. A-10 also has very long loiter time, which means that – unlike “multirole” jets – it can be on station hour after hour, providing permanent presence and near-immediate answer to any CAS request.

Furthermore, units are equipped with limited number of radios, making identification difficult. While low-flying UAV’s can be used to identify targets, such usage is dependant on lack of any serious air defenses as well as presence of secure uplinks.

But even when targets are identified, precision weapons’ performance is nothing stellar – unless killing civilians is considered, where casualties have increased from WW2-standard of 9 tons of bombs per civilian killed to 200 civillians per one bomb, and drones’ effectiveness of 6 civillians per attack. This shows that, for precision weapons to be used correctly, either aircraft must be slow enough and low enough for pilot to use binoculars for identification, or identification must be done by troops on the ground.

Precision weapons have to have their points of impact calculated. Result was that, even with fast jets in the air, it took anywhere from 26 minutes to several hours for munitions to be finally delivered.

Guided munitions are also only effective against fixed targets. But against mobile targets, low-speed low-altitude attacks with cannon or unguided munitions are required to achieve any kind of effect, rendering DAS (Distant Air Support) ineffective. As such, laser designators have to be complemented with smoke grenades and marker baloons. JDAMs are not terminally guided, and as such are very likely to go astray.

While satellite surveillance is avaliable, it is very-long-distance, and as result it does not offer good target-recognition capabilities – to satellites and high-flying aircraft, cardboard decoys are indiscernible from actual targets, and it takes 18 hours for strike to arrive. UAV surveillance, on the other hand, is insufficient, whereas UCAVs can only attack fixed targets.

And problem sometimes isn’t too few data – it is too much data displayed to the pilot, overloading him and distracting him from the mission, as well as increasing time required for “observation” in OODA loop.

There are problems with munitions themselves too – further away bomb is dropped from, greater error becomes. On release, bombs often bump intoeach other – and sometimes aircraft too – causing fins to get bended and thus reducing accuracy. This is problem that only increases with increasing speeds, due to stronger turbulences. GPS weapons’ guidance systems also often malfunction, with bombs hitting miles off the target. A laser-guided bomb, meanwhile, can be thrown off course by a laser beam guding it being disturbed by a debris or simply by smoke, dust, clouds or highly humid environment, thus causing bomb to go ballistic.

During Operation Desert Storm, at most 60% of bombs have achieved hits on targets, and many misses were off by hundreds of meters. In fact, success rate could have been as low as 41%. While officials have said that strategic targets will be destroyed in 10 days, it took two weeks to destroy nuclear weapons factories – and all other targets have only been damaged, not destroyed. Out of 15 SAM batteries attacked by low-flying F-117s in Baghdad at first night, 13 continued to operate. All Coalition aircraft hit only 21 of 37 “crucial” targets. It also took between 4 and 10 laser-guided bombs to destroy targets such as bridges – similar to success rate of dive bombers against aircraft carriers during Pacific war.

In Kosovo War, only 58 successfull strikes have been made by USAF out of 750 attacks, destroying 14 tanks, 18 APCs and 20 artillery pieces. Out of 80 SAM batteries, 3 were destroyed. That can be compared to USAF claims of 120 tanks, 220 APCs and 450 artillery pieces destroyed. Chinese Embassy was also bombed, which was a repetition of President Reagan’s raid on Libya, when French embassy was bombed by “precision” weapons. Civilian casualties were one for every 10 tons of bombs, very close to WW2 rates. In Vietnam, casualties were one for every 12,5 tons of bombs. UK’s bombing accuracy with smart bombs was 40%.

In Afganistan, 2001, B-52 dropped precision ordnance around 100 meters from US Special Forces team, killing three US soldiers and five Afghan government soldiers. Other than several such incidents, however, war has been a positive example of USAF integrating more with the Army. Still, errors cannot be done away with, and problem gets worse faster the jet flies.

During 2003 invasion, US “precision” weapons have managed to miss Iraq entirely, falling into Turkey and Iran (at least US heavy bombers in WW2 never missed the country, though they did occasionally miss the city in entirety). Civilian objects, including hospitals, were consistently hit, and 2003 precision bombing has been more deadly than 1991 bombing which was done mostly by “dumb” bombs – killing 1350 civilians per 10 000 tons of bombs, as opposed to 400 civilians per 10 000 tons. This can in part be attributed to pilots dropping bombs from greater altitude due to the belief that part of targeting can be taken over by the projectile itself. Ballistic missiles did not fare much better, with only one-third hitting targets, one-third failling to detonate and one-third missing alltogether. It also happened on Balkans, when NATO bomb intended for Serbia fell in Sofia, Bulgaria. Accuracy of bombs against radar sites was 32%.

What is important to realize is that many of described attacks have taken place at low altitude – inly in Serbia did bombardment come, as a rule, from high altitude due to altitude limits placed, which means that it could be considered most indicative for high-altitude bombardment success rate. But even when bomb or missile does hit the target, debris from 1-ton bomb can cause casualties hundreds of meters from the impact point; radius for a 2-ton bomb can extend to a thousand meters. In fact, while 450-kg GPS bomb has CEP of 12 meters, blast damage extends to 30 meters and fragmentation damage extends to 900 meters. Area of effect is calculated by cube root of yield, so 227 kg weapon would still cause blast damage to 24 meters and fragmentation damage to 716 meters. As such, precision munitions are completely unsuited for CAS roles as well as operations in urban areas or areas where there might be civilians present. Furthermore, due to the expensive guidance systems, trend is for precision munitions to have higher yield than “dumb” counterparts, increasing the problem.

UCAVs used for assassinating terrorist leaders are especially problematic. Of 700 people killed by UCAVs in Pakistan, only 14 have been Taliban, which is mostly connected to unreliable intelligence and careless approach.

While some say that low-and-slow-flying CAS aircraft are vulnerable to being shot down, aircraft is just as safe from SAMs and MANPADS below 30 meters as it is above 3 000 meters. It is in-between these two values that trouble occurs. While average infantry division has large number of automatic weapons, most of these are small-calibre and thus only suited for engaging typical fighters (F-15, F-35) and not armored ground attack aircraft such as A-10 or Su-25 which can survive even direct hits by full-sized SAMs in good portion of cases – 50% in case of the A-10. In reality, real threat for CAS aircraft are enemy fighter aircraft, although the mere fact that CAS aircraft fly very low might make job difficult for radar-guided missiles. On the other hand, large aircraft such as AC-130 Spectre are vulnerable, can only be used at night. and have more limited capability for providing effective CAS. In Gulf War, only the tough A-10 and very fast Tornado operated at low altitudes due to persistent threat from optically-aimed AAA and IR MANPADS. Unlike other aircraft, both these types proved survivable in the environment.

Since precision weapons are tested in deserts, in fair weather (without anything that might impede bombs) and against static targets, official claims about their actual precision can be disregarded – they are equally faulty and based on equally flawed assumptions as pre-Vietnam claims of 90% accuracy for BVR missiles, which has turned out to be around 8% in combat.

Precision bombing myth is also nothing new. Norden sight for B-17 was claimed to be able to “put bomb into a pickle-barrell from 20.000 feet”. In the end, entire city blocks were levelled when bombers attacked specific targets, with bombs falling hundreds of meters off the target.

Conclusion? While guided munitions can be and are helpful, they are not magic, and aircraft still have to go very low and very slow – until pilots can see target through the canopy – in order to reliably hit tactical targets. Old-fashioned cannons are still most precise weapons in arsenal, when used well; and while precision munitions certainly can be useful, their main usefulness is not so much in increasing range from which attacks are made as in allowing pilot to spend least time possible “on target” and concentrate on evading enemy AA fire.
The myth of the precision bombing | Defense Issues
@Aeronaut @Oscar @nuclearpak @jaibi @Pakistanisage @Secur @RazPaK @tarrar @mafiya @rashad Mahmood @Slav Defence

It is not that simple

Precision munition only work on moving target when the bomb have a constant feed of target location, as well as a non-interrupting environment.

That involve a ground designator and a group of special force or normal soldier to hold the designator continuously on target


Back in Kosovo, when the military does not have sophisticate remote control and communication network, the effectiveness on Precision munition would cut at least half, in desert storm, about the same era as the Kosovo conflict, most target (tanks and scud) were targeted by a group special force insertion, they would need to be inserted a few days ago in a pre-arranged location I order to hunt the mobile HVT

Without those special force team, PGM would be worked basically the same as non-guided bomb

However, today is very different, we have drone and forward looking designator on any common fighter aircraft, which would take away any human error created by the ground team and today communication capability have increased a lot, an operator can VID the target by TV feed before actual attack was launched

Today Precision strike is different than the time in Kosovo

 

[Counter-Errorist]

Precision munition only work on moving target when the bomb have a constant feed of target location, as well as a non-interrupting environment.

Can it not predict the target location based on the speed and direction of the target?

 

[Mighty Caty]

Can it not predict the target location based on the speed and direction of the target?

No, both speed and direction is a constant changing variable. You need user input for these two estimation.

 

[Rain]

bearded bhalo propagating lies, He must know, as he claim to be a True Muslim, A muslim should not propagate news etc without proper verification....
Spreading something written by someone will ill-intentions or for properganda purpose is liable to declare you a liar..
Be a muslims or a Liar
Have a nice travels

 

[proka89]

Back in Kosovo, when the military does not have sophisticate remote control and communication network, the effectiveness on Precision munition would cut at least half, in desert storm, about the same era as the Kosovo conflict, most target (tanks and scud) were targeted by a group special force insertion, they would need to be inserted a few days ago in a pre-arranged location I order to hunt the mobile HVT

One more important thing is that in Desert storm NATO was looking for the Iraqi forces in desert environment. But Kosovo and southern Serbia are in large part covered in woods, a lot of hills, mountains, cities and villages.... so it was much easier to hide the heavy equipment. In such environment you cant find the enemy without the ground invasion. If you stay above fifteen thousand feets with your planes, it's hard to find enemy forces, and you are giving them opportunities to effectively use decoys, jammers... and all that without them actually having to show themselves.

However, today is very different, we have drone and forward looking designator on any common fighter aircraft, which would take away any human error created by the ground team and today communication capability have increased a lot, an operator can VID the target by TV feed before actual attack was launched

And NATO also had the same in 1999. During the ground invasion of the KLA in the region of mountain Pastrik, Maja glava and Kosare Border post. KLA had forward looking designators from NATO countries. They were guiding NATO artillery, mortars and Planes, and you also had bunch of drones, and at the end of war you were even using carpet bombing of Yugoslav army positions. NATO bombing killed 14 officers, 10 non-commissioned officer and 140 soldiers, wounded 14 officers, 9 non-commissioned officer and 363 soldiers on Kosovo during the 78 days of war.

 

[Mighty Caty]

One more important thing is that in Desert storm NATO was looking for the Iraqi forces in desert environment. But Kosovo and southern Serbia are in large part covered in woods, a lot of hills, mountains, cities and villages.... so it was much easier to hide the heavy equipment. In such environment you cant find the enemy without the ground invasion. If you stay above fifteen thousand feets with your planes, it's hard to find enemy forces, and you are giving them opportunities to effectively use decoys, jammers... and all that without them actually having to show themselves.



And NATO also had the same in 1999. During the ground invasion of the KLA in the region of mountain Pastrik, Maja glava and Kosare Border post. KLA had forward looking designators from NATO countries. They were guiding NATO artillery, mortars and Planes, and you also had bunch of drones, and at the end of war you were even using carpet bombing of Yugoslav army positions. NATO bombing killed 14 officers, 10 non-commissioned officer and 140 soldiers, wounded 14 officers, 9 non-commissioned officer and 363 soldiers on Kosovo during the 78 days of war.

I remember my time in Kosovo as a Norbat rep to KFOR, the equipment back then is very dreadful. Most of the designator are not even weather proof back then...

When soldier on the ground calling out target to pilot up there, they would have to call out the constant movement of the enemy so the pilot can fix their approach to drop bomb on target, it is supposedly for the job of professional, not anyone can hold a laser det and call out for target

That was 15 years ago, today guided bomb have come to a new age, a lot can be done on the remote end of the radio, the FLIR can even Identify the target by the infrared signature, you cannot compare what it is so new and so sophisticate 15 or 20 odd year to the mature technology now