sudhir007
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The Week | New horizons
It was after a long selection process that the French Rafale emerged as the aircraft that will be inducted into the Indian Air Force from 2015. The 052,000-crore Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft deal involves the induction of 126 fighter aircraft, with an option to induct 63 more, if required, at a later stage. Apart from the huge money and the leap of technology involved, what does the deal mean from a fighter pilot's point of view?
The Indian Air Force conducted the initial selection in a meticulous and professional manner. More than 600 technical parameters were compared during the process, before arriving at the shortlist comprising the Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon. The final selection was done by the government, based on costing norms, including life cycle costs.
The air force is more technology oriented than the army or the navy. In a combat scenario, all other factors being the same, the air force with better technology will come out ahead. With two nuclear-armed neighbours, and given India's political relationship with them, it is imperative that the IAF has the best technology that the country can afford. The MMRCA deal is about induction of such technology.
When I joined my first operational squadron in 1974, it was equipped with the MiG-21 FL, an early variant. The MiG-21 is a much maligned aircraft because of the number of accidents it has been involved in. I personally found it a wonderful aircraft to fly. Like all things mechanical, it had its quirks. If you are aware of these quirks, you could get away with a lot, and still come back to talk about it. ‘Supersonic sports plane' was a very apt tag for the MiG-21 FL, and in retrospect, that was precisely what was wrong with the aircraft. It had very limited radius of action (the distance you could go out, fire your weapons, and return safely), its weapon carrying capability was negligible, and it had no avionics worth the name. The later variants of the MiG-21 overcame many of these limitations, and had much better operational capability.
In 1974, the IAF was trying to inculcate cost consciousness among its personnel. One step taken was to mark each item of equipment, including the aircraft, with its cost. Every time you came near the MiG-21 FL, you were reminded that the aircraft cost 076 lakh. Today, you will not get a high-end car for that money! This aspect of the low cost of Soviet/Russian aircraft became a kind of mantra in the IAF.
As the IAF progressed professionally, the flaw in this logic came out. The IAF had started the process of ‘life cycle cost' studies of the aircraft in its inventory. By then it had inducted a number of MiG variants (MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-25, MiG-27 and MiG-29) and the Mirage-2000. The study brought out that, when the life cycle costs are worked out, aircraft like the MiG-29 are not really cheap.
In 1985, I joined the newly inducted Mirage-2000 fleet. The aircraft was a technological marvel. What surprised me the most was the ease with which you could adapt to and assimilate these new technologies. I think it was the way in which it was presented to the pilot in the cockpit. It all seemed so natural and logical, and left you wondering how you managed without these technologies so far. While the aircraft performance was in a different league, mainly because of the innovative fly-by-wire system, basic flying was extremely simple. It was the management of the onboard systems that required skill. The availability of onboard systems like the multimode radar and the navigation and weapon-aiming systems made it possible to exploit the aircraft operationally for tasks limited only by your imagination. Also, the Mirage-2000 has an exceptionally good flight safety record.
As I went up in the hierarchy of the IAF, I got to see these aircraft from a different perspective. As the chief operations officer of a flying base, and thereafter as a base commander, I realised that the MiG-21 and other Soviet/Russian aircraft were not really maintenance friendly. Keeping these aircraft fly-worthy was a challenge. Compared with them, the Mirage-2000 was in a totally different league.
The Mirage-2000 is built on a modular concept. Most modules had built-in test equipment. If the test showed ‘no-go', the faulty module just had to be pulled out and replaced with a functional module, and you were good to go. Even the engine was a module. Replacing an engine, which is required at times, took a little more than an hour. In the case of the MiG-21, an engine change was a major job which took significantly longer time and more effort to accomplish.
In 1993, I was part of the team bringing in more Mirage-2000 aircraft from France. Dassault, the manufacturer of the aircraft, made it a point to show us the Rafale, which was in the process of being operationalised for induction into the French air force and navy. The aircraft embodied an extension of the Mirage-2000 philosophy, but was more than a generation ahead in technology.
My association with the Mirage-2000 fleet included a fair amount of interaction with the French representatives, especially from Dassault. They are hard-nosed businessmen. If you have the money, and are willing to pay, they will deliver the required service. They did not seem too concerned with matters like foreign policy. However, like any businessmen, they will not waste an opportunity to exploit the customer if the opportunity arises.
In 2006, I was part of a delegation to the Farnborough Air Show. The Indian delegation was in demand because of the MMRCA deal. We were given briefings by all vendors in the fray. One common point about the two American vendors, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, was that, when queried about specific equipment or weapon options for the F-18 and the F-16, the standard reply was “We will have to check with the State Department”. I do not think Dassault does business under such constraints.
The induction of the Rafale will pose challenges to the IAF. In my opinion, the main challenges will be training and infrastructure creation. The assimilation of these new technologies will not pose much of a problem, but the volume of personnel to be trained, especially for maintenance, will be a challenge. Induction of such high technology will also require the creation of dedicated equipment servicing and repair bays, and other allied infrastructure. This is a mammoth task.
The author has flown more than 3,500 hours on various fighter aircraft, including the MiG-21 and the Mirage-2000. written by Air Vice Marshal Mohan John (retd)
It was after a long selection process that the French Rafale emerged as the aircraft that will be inducted into the Indian Air Force from 2015. The 052,000-crore Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft deal involves the induction of 126 fighter aircraft, with an option to induct 63 more, if required, at a later stage. Apart from the huge money and the leap of technology involved, what does the deal mean from a fighter pilot's point of view?
The Indian Air Force conducted the initial selection in a meticulous and professional manner. More than 600 technical parameters were compared during the process, before arriving at the shortlist comprising the Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon. The final selection was done by the government, based on costing norms, including life cycle costs.
The air force is more technology oriented than the army or the navy. In a combat scenario, all other factors being the same, the air force with better technology will come out ahead. With two nuclear-armed neighbours, and given India's political relationship with them, it is imperative that the IAF has the best technology that the country can afford. The MMRCA deal is about induction of such technology.
When I joined my first operational squadron in 1974, it was equipped with the MiG-21 FL, an early variant. The MiG-21 is a much maligned aircraft because of the number of accidents it has been involved in. I personally found it a wonderful aircraft to fly. Like all things mechanical, it had its quirks. If you are aware of these quirks, you could get away with a lot, and still come back to talk about it. ‘Supersonic sports plane' was a very apt tag for the MiG-21 FL, and in retrospect, that was precisely what was wrong with the aircraft. It had very limited radius of action (the distance you could go out, fire your weapons, and return safely), its weapon carrying capability was negligible, and it had no avionics worth the name. The later variants of the MiG-21 overcame many of these limitations, and had much better operational capability.
In 1974, the IAF was trying to inculcate cost consciousness among its personnel. One step taken was to mark each item of equipment, including the aircraft, with its cost. Every time you came near the MiG-21 FL, you were reminded that the aircraft cost 076 lakh. Today, you will not get a high-end car for that money! This aspect of the low cost of Soviet/Russian aircraft became a kind of mantra in the IAF.
As the IAF progressed professionally, the flaw in this logic came out. The IAF had started the process of ‘life cycle cost' studies of the aircraft in its inventory. By then it had inducted a number of MiG variants (MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-25, MiG-27 and MiG-29) and the Mirage-2000. The study brought out that, when the life cycle costs are worked out, aircraft like the MiG-29 are not really cheap.
In 1985, I joined the newly inducted Mirage-2000 fleet. The aircraft was a technological marvel. What surprised me the most was the ease with which you could adapt to and assimilate these new technologies. I think it was the way in which it was presented to the pilot in the cockpit. It all seemed so natural and logical, and left you wondering how you managed without these technologies so far. While the aircraft performance was in a different league, mainly because of the innovative fly-by-wire system, basic flying was extremely simple. It was the management of the onboard systems that required skill. The availability of onboard systems like the multimode radar and the navigation and weapon-aiming systems made it possible to exploit the aircraft operationally for tasks limited only by your imagination. Also, the Mirage-2000 has an exceptionally good flight safety record.
As I went up in the hierarchy of the IAF, I got to see these aircraft from a different perspective. As the chief operations officer of a flying base, and thereafter as a base commander, I realised that the MiG-21 and other Soviet/Russian aircraft were not really maintenance friendly. Keeping these aircraft fly-worthy was a challenge. Compared with them, the Mirage-2000 was in a totally different league.
The Mirage-2000 is built on a modular concept. Most modules had built-in test equipment. If the test showed ‘no-go', the faulty module just had to be pulled out and replaced with a functional module, and you were good to go. Even the engine was a module. Replacing an engine, which is required at times, took a little more than an hour. In the case of the MiG-21, an engine change was a major job which took significantly longer time and more effort to accomplish.
In 1993, I was part of the team bringing in more Mirage-2000 aircraft from France. Dassault, the manufacturer of the aircraft, made it a point to show us the Rafale, which was in the process of being operationalised for induction into the French air force and navy. The aircraft embodied an extension of the Mirage-2000 philosophy, but was more than a generation ahead in technology.
My association with the Mirage-2000 fleet included a fair amount of interaction with the French representatives, especially from Dassault. They are hard-nosed businessmen. If you have the money, and are willing to pay, they will deliver the required service. They did not seem too concerned with matters like foreign policy. However, like any businessmen, they will not waste an opportunity to exploit the customer if the opportunity arises.
In 2006, I was part of a delegation to the Farnborough Air Show. The Indian delegation was in demand because of the MMRCA deal. We were given briefings by all vendors in the fray. One common point about the two American vendors, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, was that, when queried about specific equipment or weapon options for the F-18 and the F-16, the standard reply was “We will have to check with the State Department”. I do not think Dassault does business under such constraints.
The induction of the Rafale will pose challenges to the IAF. In my opinion, the main challenges will be training and infrastructure creation. The assimilation of these new technologies will not pose much of a problem, but the volume of personnel to be trained, especially for maintenance, will be a challenge. Induction of such high technology will also require the creation of dedicated equipment servicing and repair bays, and other allied infrastructure. This is a mammoth task.
The author has flown more than 3,500 hours on various fighter aircraft, including the MiG-21 and the Mirage-2000. written by Air Vice Marshal Mohan John (retd)
