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BY-Sir Kaiser Tufail
Looking at the grotesque disparity between the Air Forces arrayed against each other in the Eastern wing – one PAF combat squadron versus twelve[1] of IAF – one cannot but agree that the idea of ‘defence of East lies in the West’ reflected a realistic appraisal of the grim situation by the Pakistani military strategists. With the PAF’s air element not expected to last beyond a day or two at best, and the outnumbered Pak Army hopelessly encircled by the Indian Army and Mukti Bahini, strategic compulsions demanded that a front be opened in the West at the earliest to capture Indian territory and redeem some lost honour. Occupation of Indian territory was no less important from the point of view of bargaining the release of POWs that were bound to be captured in East Pakistan, en masse. Sadly however, this line of thinking meant that Pakistani forces in the East were sacrificial lambs and, would have to submit to the inevitable sooner or later. The only challenge for the unfortunate soldiers, sailors and airmen was to delay the impending disaster as much as they could, in the dim hope of some miracle occurring on the geo-political front at the eleventh hour. If ever there was a pathetic and despondent situation at the outset of a modern day conflict, the one faced by Pakistani armed forces in East Pakistan was beyond compare.
Eleven fighter squadrons and one bomber squadron located at eight bases
were arrayed against PAF's sole F-86 squadron at Tezgaon. Places where
significant operations took place are indicated as black squares.
In the utterly distressing circumstances, PAF did well to designate one of its most accomplished officers to oversee operations in East Pakistan. Air Cdre Inam-ul-Haq Khan was appointed as the Air Officer Commanding East Pakistan with the dual hat of Base Commander Dacca, a few days after the military operation that commenced on the night of 25/26 March. He took over from Air Cdre M Zafar Masud, yet another outstanding officer who was relieved of his command due to an elemental disagreement with the military junta about the course of action to be followed. Masud had been doggedly advocating a negotiated political settlement in the prevailing civil disobedience movement and widespread insurgency in East Pakistan.
PAF’s Plight
In the wake of the military’s counter-insurgency operation, Air Cdre Inam-ul-Haq had some very pressing operational issues to attend to. The direct Islamabad-Dacca route, which involved flying over India, had been closed down following hijacking and subsequent blowing up of an Air India F-27 in February 1971. Pakistan was implicated for supporting the Kashmiri-origin hijackers and, the incident was used as a pretext by India to suspend overflights. Timely availability of logistics support for No 14 Squadron was, thus, rendered extremely difficult to manage across 3,000 miles, via the circuitous Ceylon (Sri Lanka) route. Spares and supplies had to be carefully conserved, even more so in view of the looming threat of all-out war.
Transfer of fuel from Narayanganj fuel depot to Dacca airfield in bowsers also became impractical due to the poor law and order situation. One C-130 was, therefore, permanently positioned at Dacca to bring in fuel supplies directly to the home base, via Colombo, till as late as end November.
PAF C-130
Reinforcements of men and material were, however, out of question once the war began.
A significant setback to PAF’s operational capability occurred when all its Mobile Observer Units had to discontinue operations, following the killing of as many as thirty five airmen, including a group of twenty who met a particularly tragic end in one incident in Mymensingh Sector. Noting that the MOUs were deployed in the field in hostile surroundings and, would have been sitting ducks for the insurgents, the previous AOC Air Cdre Masud, had ordered withdrawal of the vulnerable MOUs back to Dacca. During recovery of one of the flights consisting of twenty airmen led by the OC of No 246 Squadron, Flt Lt Safi Mustafa, it was ambushed by the Mukti Bahini. All personnel were arrested and consigned to an underground dungeon in Mymensingh Jail. The whole lot was then brutally massacred by the Mukti Bahini in an unsurprising retaliation following the military operation of 26 March. The Bengali Superintendent of the jail claimed to have been helpless in preventing the massacre as his staff was badly outnumbered. When confronted by Air Cdre Inam-ul-Haq later, he is said to have sheepishly muttered a rather strange mea culpa: “Hindu blood still runs in our veins!”
Following non-availability of the MOUs, PAF’s low level early warning came to rest on a single AR-1 radar located at Mirpur, about 10 miles north-west of Dacca.
AR-1 radar
With the low-looking radar constrained by an inherent line-of-sight limit of about 25 miles, the reaction time available after initial detection was barely three minutes, which was insufficient for a ground scramble. Constant patrolling by fighters was, thus, the only option for intercepting intruders before weapons release. Had the MOUs been available and deployed 50 miles out of Dacca, the reaction time could have been doubled, allowing a more economical utilisation of the limited air effort when the time came.
A high level P-35 radar that was earlier located near Dacca was withdrawn to Malir in October, to improve the coverage in southern West Pakistan. The assumption that most of the attacks against Dacca would be at low level, was not altogether unfounded, however, as things turned out.
Yet another setback suffered by the PAF soon after the 26 March operation was the loss of Bengali manpower, which was about 25% of its total strength. These Bengali officers, airmen and civilians had to be laid off as their loyalties were considered suspect. In East Pakistan, the situation was even graver as 52% of the 1,222 PAF personnel were Bengali and their services were dispensed with, leaving only 577 loyalists. Not only had the PAF to make do with shortage of manpower, it had to face the wrath of the laid-off airmen who promptly joined the Mukti Bahini and, took to harassment, ambush and sabotage. Most damaging for the PAF was the compromise of operational information that resulted when these Bengali airmen collaborated with the Indian authorities and, passed on vital secrets.
PAF F-86
No 14 Squadron had 16 F-86E, of which only four were modified with launchers for carriage of GAR-8 Sidewinder missiles. The Unit’s aircraft strength was barely adequate for carrying out the widespread task of counter-insurgency, and its response time was not expected to be swift, particularly near the border areas.
A dual-seat T-33 was utilised for pilots’ check-outs and for maintaining instrument flying currency, while a
PAF RT-33/T-33
photo reconnaissance RT-33 helped determine insurgents’ dispositions in the heavily camouflaged areas. The Rescue Squadron was made up of two Alouette-III helicopters.
Counter Insurgency Operations
Soon after the commencement of the military operation codenamed ‘Searchlight’, PAF was required to flush out those well-defended clusters of insurgents which could not be tackled by the Army alone. The months of March and April were particularly busy, during which period, 170 air support sorties were flown.
A significant air support operation took place on 15 April, to help the Army recapture Bhairab Bridge over Meghna River, which had fallen into the hands of Mukti Bahini with the active support of Indian troops. The major railway bridge was the only link between Dacca and the Sylhet-Comilla-Chittagong Sector east of Meghna and, its capture by the insurgents meant that 14 Division elements stood isolated. Equally worrying was the prospect of major grain stores on the outskirts of the nearby town of Bhairab Bazaar falling into the hands of the insurgents. It was planned that initially, a bi-directional assault by 50 SSG commandos transported by four helicopters would capture the bridge; subsequently, reinforcements would be airlifted by the helicopters shuttling between the makeshift forward base and the target area, for consolidating the operation. PAF was tasked to soften up the target before the operation and later, provide air cover for four to five hours. Accordingly, four F-86s led by Flt Lt Abbas Khattak arrived in the area at 0620 hrs, and began strafing and rocketing the insurgents’ known strongholds in Bhairab Bazaar area for about ten minutes. Under cover of the aerial onslaught, both commando teams were able to disembark close to the bridge. They assaulted it with such speed and fury that the enemy did not get any time to organise a meaningful retaliation. Bhairab Bridge was captured intact and the insurgents were completely neutralised. For the better part of the day, Army Aviation helicopters kept bringing in reinforcements, with the F-86s at hand to suppress any pockets of resistance. By dusk, the operation had culminated in resounding success.
PAF provided vital support in yet another operation on 26 April in Patuakhali, where the insurgent elements defeated two days earlier in nearby Barisal were known to have regrouped. The PAF was called upon to pound the rebels’ sanctuaries, before a company of SSG commandos and other troops landed to take control. At 0800 hrs, four F-86s, led again by the seasoned Flt Lt Abbas Khattak, pulled up for a precise rocket attack in the area. With enemy fire completely suppressed, the four troop-carrying Mi-8 helicopters were able to land and disembark the troops without a hitch. Such was the suddenness and accuracy of firepower delivered by the F-86s that Pakistani assault forces remained totally unharmed, while the insurgents were thoroughly routed in the joint operation.
No significant air support operation took place in the subsequent months, other than routine counter-insurgency missions. The advent of monsoons in June, with the dreary low clouds in intimidating attendance, curtailed flying activity for the next couple of months. As the soil started to dry out from end-September onwards, insurgent activity also started to pick up menacingly, as before. Intelligence reports also indicated movement of Indian Army formations to forward locations in what could clearly be seen as a ‘tightening of the noose’ around East Pakistan. By November, air support operations had once again spiked up considerably, with as many as 100 sorties flown during the month.
PIA Fokker F-27
These included escort missions for PIA Fokker F-27s transporting troops to the Jessore Sector, where the first Indian intrusion had taken place.
An Unlucky Strike
On 19 November, the PAF swung into action against troops and gun positions that were part of Indian 9 Division, which had brazenly violated the international border and penetrated several miles deep in Jessore Sector. Several sorties were flown against them till the afternoon of the next day. Well camouflaged tanks were spotted by an RT-33 on a recce sortie near Chaugacha, and action against them was again initiated by F-86s starting from the morning of 22 November.
In the third mission of the day, around 1530 hrs (all times EPST), three F-86s led by the Squadron Commander, Wg Cdr Afzal Choudhry, with Flg Off Khalil Ahmad as No 2 and Flt Lt Parvaiz Mehdi Qureshi as No 3, attacked a couple of tanks that had been reported in the area. Subsequent to the attack, ground control asked the leader to look for more tanks that were suspected to be concealed around. Loitering in the battlefield amounted to inviting trouble, especially when flying without radar cover. Trouble came swiftly when four ground-scrambled Gnats, of Dum Dum based No 22 Squadron, were able to sneak in and bounce the F-86 formation. At that time, the leader, Wg Cdr Choudhry, was attacking a AAA battery that was noticed to be firing at them. Pulling out of the dive, Choudhry broke into the Gnat pair flown by Flt Lt R A Massey and Flg Off S F Suarez, and managed to ward off the attack. Choudhry then reversed to take a pot shot at one of the Gnats. During a brief scrap, both Massey and Choudhry claimed firing at the other, but their aircraft remained unscathed. Massey later stated that gun stoppage prevented further firing and he had to give up the chase. Scattered, and without visual cross cover, Khalil and Mehdi fell prey to another pair of Gnats flown by Flt Lt M A Ganapathy and Flg Off D Lazarus, who picked off the two wingmen with professional ease.[3] Both F-86 pilots ejected and were captured by the insurgents, who handed them over to the Indian Army, eventually ending up as POWs. For No 14 Squadron, it was like losing the opening batsmen in the first over. Not withstanding Chaudhry’s misperception of having been outnumbered by as many as ten Gnats, the reality is that his formation was simply surprised by the nimble interceptors. It might have been instructive if Choudhry had somehow known that the two previous missions of the day had survived interception, only because they had not lingered around and, each time the Gnats had arrived in the area just a little too late.
IAF Gnats
Determined Fightback
Vacillating for a full twelve days after the Indian intrusion into East Pakistan, General Yahya and his junta reluctantly responded on the evening of 3 December by opening a front in West Pakistan. In the East, the outcome was dismally clear, but No 14 Squadron was determined to put up a fight to the last. Next morning, everyone was in high spirits, eagerly awaiting the drama that was to unfold as the curtain of fog gradually started to lift from the runway.
The first Combat Air Patrol (CAP) of the day led by Wg Cdr Afzal Choudhry took-off at first light. Perhaps the weather at IAF bases was not yet clear, so Choudhry returned without encountering any intruders. The next mission led by the much-respected Flight Commander, Sqn Ldr Dilawar Hussain, also returned without having seen any action.
Sooner the third CAP took off at 0730 hrs, a flight of three Hunters of No 37 Squadron based at Hashimara, was reported to be heading towards Tezgaon airfield from the North. Sqn Ldr Javed Afzaal, along with his wingman, Flt Lt Saeed Afzal, picked up visual contact with a pair of Hunters approaching at their 2 o’clock position. Turning in a wide arc, Afzaal easily settled behind the lead Hunter which had not yet reacted. Just as Afzaal jettisoned his drop tanks, both the Hunters broke towards the right and, after completing a 180-degree turn, rolled out on a northerly heading for home. At that moment, Afzaal came upon another unwary Hunter and promptly manoeuvred behind its tail. Like many other observers excitedly watching the dogfight from the ground, stand-by pilot Flt Lt Ata-ur-Rehman was also riveted to the fighters turning and twisting in the sky. He recalls, “I saw the lead F-86 behind two Hunters over the airfield, in line with the runway. Next, I could see leader’s bullets hitting a Hunter and it started to trail heavy smoke, though it didn’t go down as far as I could see.”[4] Afzaal too, recalls, “I saw the bullets hitting the aircraft and the last I remember is that it was still flying, trailing smoke.”[5]
Saeed, who was separated from his leader and may have been looking out for him, was oblivious of what was going on in his rear quarters. A third member of the Hunter formation, Flg Off Harish Masand, who had been straggling behind due to an earlier malfunction, emerged from nowhere and latched on to Saeed’s F-86. Firing a short, well-aimed burst from very close range, Masand was able to hit his target before it could react. Saeed ejected from the stricken aircraft but sadly, was lynched by Mukti Bahini insurgents soon after coming down by parachute.
Afzaal had, by this time, switched to a MiG-21 that he had spotted in the vicinity; it was part of a pair escorting yet another raid, this time by MiG-21s from Gauhati-based No 28 Squadron. A brief turning fight with one of the escorts ensued, while the strike aircraft went through with a successful attack on hangars and other airfield infrastructure.
IAF MIG-21
The MiG-21 escort then hastily disengaged to rejoin the strike aircraft on their way back.
With three different IAF formations totalling 13 aircraft having converged over Tezgaon in a matter of a few minutes, it is virtually impossible to retrace their tracks in the air.[6] What is known is that the first two formations of five Hunters, along with two MiG-21 escorts, were unable to carry out the attack in the face of determined opposition from the F-86s. It also transpires that the Hunter Afzaal had been firing at was actually from the second formation belonging to No 17 Squadron, which had reached its target somewhat early. Its pilot, Flg Off Bains, was lucky to escape with 42 bullet hits that were counted on his aircraft after landing. All the IAF aircraft were reported to have landed back. The PAF had put up a gallant fight in the first encounter of the war. An undaunted Afzaal had audaciously shown that a even a vastly large aggressor could be looked in the eye, when it was a matter of honour.
As Afzaal was being swamped by the MiGs, he had asked for immediate relief. The Staff Operations Officer, Wg Cdr S M Ahmed, who was visiting No 14 Squadron to cheer up the pilots, thought that he could lend a helping hand in the grave situation. At the spur of the moment, he decided to fly and, took along young Flg Off Salman Rasheedi as his wingman. The Squadron Commander and Flight Commander were not yet back after flying; otherwise, they might have had a different opinion about sending Ahmed up in the air, as he was not a regular flier in the squadron and had mostly been performing staff duties with the Base. Nonetheless, Ahmed’s eagerness saw the pair in the thick of action in no time. Getting airborne at about 0745 hrs, Ahmed was vectored towards a strike approaching Kurmitola airfield that lies about five miles north of Tezgaon. A Hunter flown by the Squadron Commander of No 17 Squadron, Wg Cdr N Chatrath, broke off and engaged Ahmed’s F-86. After a brief dogfight, Ahmed disengaged, but was chased right up to Tezgaon, where the pursuing Hunter finished him off. Ahmed ejected, but like Saeed Afzal in the previous mission, was hauled up by Mukti Bahini on landing. His fate was never known but it was presumed that he too met an unfortunate end at the hands of a furious mob.[7] Rasheedi, in the meantime, managed to extricate himself and landed back safely. No 14 Squadron had suffered yet another casualty but, driven by an indefatigable determination, its pilots seemed unstoppable.
The next mission of consequence was flown by Flt Lt Iqbal Zaidi and Flt Lt Ata-ur-Rahman who took off at about 0820 hrs.[8] Incidentally, Ata was a Bengali pilot who had opted to stay on with the PAF and had been cleared to fly only a week earlier, after many months of pleading with the authorities to quash his grounding. Zaidi and Ata had barely picked the gears up when four Hunters were spotted pulling up for an attack on the airfield. On leader’s instruction to split and take on a pair each, Ata was quick to position behind one of the Hunters. Closing in to a textbook range of 2,000 feet and ready to open fire, he was abruptly warned by Killer Control about two Hunters perched on his tail. Breaking viciously to ward off their attack, Ata was horrified to see tracers from the guns of both Hunters whizzing past his aircraft. He continued a hard turn till the Hunters overshot, tempting him to reverse his turn and pursue them. The Hunters, however, outran Ata’s F-86 and managed to escape at treetop height. Low on fuel and barely able to keep their wits in the prevailing confusion, Zaidi and Ata hastily recovered before yet another reported raid arrived. Reflecting on the dicey mission flown four decades ago, retired Air Vice Marshal Ata-ur-Rehman credits the Killer Control, manned by Sqn Ldr Aurangzeb Ahmed, for having saved his life. He thinks that Aurangzeb played a pivotal role in many a dogfight over Dacca.
Looking at the grotesque disparity between the Air Forces arrayed against each other in the Eastern wing – one PAF combat squadron versus twelve[1] of IAF – one cannot but agree that the idea of ‘defence of East lies in the West’ reflected a realistic appraisal of the grim situation by the Pakistani military strategists. With the PAF’s air element not expected to last beyond a day or two at best, and the outnumbered Pak Army hopelessly encircled by the Indian Army and Mukti Bahini, strategic compulsions demanded that a front be opened in the West at the earliest to capture Indian territory and redeem some lost honour. Occupation of Indian territory was no less important from the point of view of bargaining the release of POWs that were bound to be captured in East Pakistan, en masse. Sadly however, this line of thinking meant that Pakistani forces in the East were sacrificial lambs and, would have to submit to the inevitable sooner or later. The only challenge for the unfortunate soldiers, sailors and airmen was to delay the impending disaster as much as they could, in the dim hope of some miracle occurring on the geo-political front at the eleventh hour. If ever there was a pathetic and despondent situation at the outset of a modern day conflict, the one faced by Pakistani armed forces in East Pakistan was beyond compare.
Eleven fighter squadrons and one bomber squadron located at eight bases
were arrayed against PAF's sole F-86 squadron at Tezgaon. Places where
significant operations took place are indicated as black squares.
In the utterly distressing circumstances, PAF did well to designate one of its most accomplished officers to oversee operations in East Pakistan. Air Cdre Inam-ul-Haq Khan was appointed as the Air Officer Commanding East Pakistan with the dual hat of Base Commander Dacca, a few days after the military operation that commenced on the night of 25/26 March. He took over from Air Cdre M Zafar Masud, yet another outstanding officer who was relieved of his command due to an elemental disagreement with the military junta about the course of action to be followed. Masud had been doggedly advocating a negotiated political settlement in the prevailing civil disobedience movement and widespread insurgency in East Pakistan.
PAF’s Plight
In the wake of the military’s counter-insurgency operation, Air Cdre Inam-ul-Haq had some very pressing operational issues to attend to. The direct Islamabad-Dacca route, which involved flying over India, had been closed down following hijacking and subsequent blowing up of an Air India F-27 in February 1971. Pakistan was implicated for supporting the Kashmiri-origin hijackers and, the incident was used as a pretext by India to suspend overflights. Timely availability of logistics support for No 14 Squadron was, thus, rendered extremely difficult to manage across 3,000 miles, via the circuitous Ceylon (Sri Lanka) route. Spares and supplies had to be carefully conserved, even more so in view of the looming threat of all-out war.
Transfer of fuel from Narayanganj fuel depot to Dacca airfield in bowsers also became impractical due to the poor law and order situation. One C-130 was, therefore, permanently positioned at Dacca to bring in fuel supplies directly to the home base, via Colombo, till as late as end November.
Reinforcements of men and material were, however, out of question once the war began.
A significant setback to PAF’s operational capability occurred when all its Mobile Observer Units had to discontinue operations, following the killing of as many as thirty five airmen, including a group of twenty who met a particularly tragic end in one incident in Mymensingh Sector. Noting that the MOUs were deployed in the field in hostile surroundings and, would have been sitting ducks for the insurgents, the previous AOC Air Cdre Masud, had ordered withdrawal of the vulnerable MOUs back to Dacca. During recovery of one of the flights consisting of twenty airmen led by the OC of No 246 Squadron, Flt Lt Safi Mustafa, it was ambushed by the Mukti Bahini. All personnel were arrested and consigned to an underground dungeon in Mymensingh Jail. The whole lot was then brutally massacred by the Mukti Bahini in an unsurprising retaliation following the military operation of 26 March. The Bengali Superintendent of the jail claimed to have been helpless in preventing the massacre as his staff was badly outnumbered. When confronted by Air Cdre Inam-ul-Haq later, he is said to have sheepishly muttered a rather strange mea culpa: “Hindu blood still runs in our veins!”
Following non-availability of the MOUs, PAF’s low level early warning came to rest on a single AR-1 radar located at Mirpur, about 10 miles north-west of Dacca.
With the low-looking radar constrained by an inherent line-of-sight limit of about 25 miles, the reaction time available after initial detection was barely three minutes, which was insufficient for a ground scramble. Constant patrolling by fighters was, thus, the only option for intercepting intruders before weapons release. Had the MOUs been available and deployed 50 miles out of Dacca, the reaction time could have been doubled, allowing a more economical utilisation of the limited air effort when the time came.
A high level P-35 radar that was earlier located near Dacca was withdrawn to Malir in October, to improve the coverage in southern West Pakistan. The assumption that most of the attacks against Dacca would be at low level, was not altogether unfounded, however, as things turned out.
Yet another setback suffered by the PAF soon after the 26 March operation was the loss of Bengali manpower, which was about 25% of its total strength. These Bengali officers, airmen and civilians had to be laid off as their loyalties were considered suspect. In East Pakistan, the situation was even graver as 52% of the 1,222 PAF personnel were Bengali and their services were dispensed with, leaving only 577 loyalists. Not only had the PAF to make do with shortage of manpower, it had to face the wrath of the laid-off airmen who promptly joined the Mukti Bahini and, took to harassment, ambush and sabotage. Most damaging for the PAF was the compromise of operational information that resulted when these Bengali airmen collaborated with the Indian authorities and, passed on vital secrets.
No 14 Squadron had 16 F-86E, of which only four were modified with launchers for carriage of GAR-8 Sidewinder missiles. The Unit’s aircraft strength was barely adequate for carrying out the widespread task of counter-insurgency, and its response time was not expected to be swift, particularly near the border areas.
A dual-seat T-33 was utilised for pilots’ check-outs and for maintaining instrument flying currency, while a
photo reconnaissance RT-33 helped determine insurgents’ dispositions in the heavily camouflaged areas. The Rescue Squadron was made up of two Alouette-III helicopters.
Counter Insurgency Operations
Soon after the commencement of the military operation codenamed ‘Searchlight’, PAF was required to flush out those well-defended clusters of insurgents which could not be tackled by the Army alone. The months of March and April were particularly busy, during which period, 170 air support sorties were flown.
A significant air support operation took place on 15 April, to help the Army recapture Bhairab Bridge over Meghna River, which had fallen into the hands of Mukti Bahini with the active support of Indian troops. The major railway bridge was the only link between Dacca and the Sylhet-Comilla-Chittagong Sector east of Meghna and, its capture by the insurgents meant that 14 Division elements stood isolated. Equally worrying was the prospect of major grain stores on the outskirts of the nearby town of Bhairab Bazaar falling into the hands of the insurgents. It was planned that initially, a bi-directional assault by 50 SSG commandos transported by four helicopters would capture the bridge; subsequently, reinforcements would be airlifted by the helicopters shuttling between the makeshift forward base and the target area, for consolidating the operation. PAF was tasked to soften up the target before the operation and later, provide air cover for four to five hours. Accordingly, four F-86s led by Flt Lt Abbas Khattak arrived in the area at 0620 hrs, and began strafing and rocketing the insurgents’ known strongholds in Bhairab Bazaar area for about ten minutes. Under cover of the aerial onslaught, both commando teams were able to disembark close to the bridge. They assaulted it with such speed and fury that the enemy did not get any time to organise a meaningful retaliation. Bhairab Bridge was captured intact and the insurgents were completely neutralised. For the better part of the day, Army Aviation helicopters kept bringing in reinforcements, with the F-86s at hand to suppress any pockets of resistance. By dusk, the operation had culminated in resounding success.
PAF provided vital support in yet another operation on 26 April in Patuakhali, where the insurgent elements defeated two days earlier in nearby Barisal were known to have regrouped. The PAF was called upon to pound the rebels’ sanctuaries, before a company of SSG commandos and other troops landed to take control. At 0800 hrs, four F-86s, led again by the seasoned Flt Lt Abbas Khattak, pulled up for a precise rocket attack in the area. With enemy fire completely suppressed, the four troop-carrying Mi-8 helicopters were able to land and disembark the troops without a hitch. Such was the suddenness and accuracy of firepower delivered by the F-86s that Pakistani assault forces remained totally unharmed, while the insurgents were thoroughly routed in the joint operation.
No significant air support operation took place in the subsequent months, other than routine counter-insurgency missions. The advent of monsoons in June, with the dreary low clouds in intimidating attendance, curtailed flying activity for the next couple of months. As the soil started to dry out from end-September onwards, insurgent activity also started to pick up menacingly, as before. Intelligence reports also indicated movement of Indian Army formations to forward locations in what could clearly be seen as a ‘tightening of the noose’ around East Pakistan. By November, air support operations had once again spiked up considerably, with as many as 100 sorties flown during the month.
These included escort missions for PIA Fokker F-27s transporting troops to the Jessore Sector, where the first Indian intrusion had taken place.
An Unlucky Strike
On 19 November, the PAF swung into action against troops and gun positions that were part of Indian 9 Division, which had brazenly violated the international border and penetrated several miles deep in Jessore Sector. Several sorties were flown against them till the afternoon of the next day. Well camouflaged tanks were spotted by an RT-33 on a recce sortie near Chaugacha, and action against them was again initiated by F-86s starting from the morning of 22 November.
In the third mission of the day, around 1530 hrs (all times EPST), three F-86s led by the Squadron Commander, Wg Cdr Afzal Choudhry, with Flg Off Khalil Ahmad as No 2 and Flt Lt Parvaiz Mehdi Qureshi as No 3, attacked a couple of tanks that had been reported in the area. Subsequent to the attack, ground control asked the leader to look for more tanks that were suspected to be concealed around. Loitering in the battlefield amounted to inviting trouble, especially when flying without radar cover. Trouble came swiftly when four ground-scrambled Gnats, of Dum Dum based No 22 Squadron, were able to sneak in and bounce the F-86 formation. At that time, the leader, Wg Cdr Choudhry, was attacking a AAA battery that was noticed to be firing at them. Pulling out of the dive, Choudhry broke into the Gnat pair flown by Flt Lt R A Massey and Flg Off S F Suarez, and managed to ward off the attack. Choudhry then reversed to take a pot shot at one of the Gnats. During a brief scrap, both Massey and Choudhry claimed firing at the other, but their aircraft remained unscathed. Massey later stated that gun stoppage prevented further firing and he had to give up the chase. Scattered, and without visual cross cover, Khalil and Mehdi fell prey to another pair of Gnats flown by Flt Lt M A Ganapathy and Flg Off D Lazarus, who picked off the two wingmen with professional ease.[3] Both F-86 pilots ejected and were captured by the insurgents, who handed them over to the Indian Army, eventually ending up as POWs. For No 14 Squadron, it was like losing the opening batsmen in the first over. Not withstanding Chaudhry’s misperception of having been outnumbered by as many as ten Gnats, the reality is that his formation was simply surprised by the nimble interceptors. It might have been instructive if Choudhry had somehow known that the two previous missions of the day had survived interception, only because they had not lingered around and, each time the Gnats had arrived in the area just a little too late.
Determined Fightback
Vacillating for a full twelve days after the Indian intrusion into East Pakistan, General Yahya and his junta reluctantly responded on the evening of 3 December by opening a front in West Pakistan. In the East, the outcome was dismally clear, but No 14 Squadron was determined to put up a fight to the last. Next morning, everyone was in high spirits, eagerly awaiting the drama that was to unfold as the curtain of fog gradually started to lift from the runway.
The first Combat Air Patrol (CAP) of the day led by Wg Cdr Afzal Choudhry took-off at first light. Perhaps the weather at IAF bases was not yet clear, so Choudhry returned without encountering any intruders. The next mission led by the much-respected Flight Commander, Sqn Ldr Dilawar Hussain, also returned without having seen any action.
Sooner the third CAP took off at 0730 hrs, a flight of three Hunters of No 37 Squadron based at Hashimara, was reported to be heading towards Tezgaon airfield from the North. Sqn Ldr Javed Afzaal, along with his wingman, Flt Lt Saeed Afzal, picked up visual contact with a pair of Hunters approaching at their 2 o’clock position. Turning in a wide arc, Afzaal easily settled behind the lead Hunter which had not yet reacted. Just as Afzaal jettisoned his drop tanks, both the Hunters broke towards the right and, after completing a 180-degree turn, rolled out on a northerly heading for home. At that moment, Afzaal came upon another unwary Hunter and promptly manoeuvred behind its tail. Like many other observers excitedly watching the dogfight from the ground, stand-by pilot Flt Lt Ata-ur-Rehman was also riveted to the fighters turning and twisting in the sky. He recalls, “I saw the lead F-86 behind two Hunters over the airfield, in line with the runway. Next, I could see leader’s bullets hitting a Hunter and it started to trail heavy smoke, though it didn’t go down as far as I could see.”[4] Afzaal too, recalls, “I saw the bullets hitting the aircraft and the last I remember is that it was still flying, trailing smoke.”[5]
Saeed, who was separated from his leader and may have been looking out for him, was oblivious of what was going on in his rear quarters. A third member of the Hunter formation, Flg Off Harish Masand, who had been straggling behind due to an earlier malfunction, emerged from nowhere and latched on to Saeed’s F-86. Firing a short, well-aimed burst from very close range, Masand was able to hit his target before it could react. Saeed ejected from the stricken aircraft but sadly, was lynched by Mukti Bahini insurgents soon after coming down by parachute.
Afzaal had, by this time, switched to a MiG-21 that he had spotted in the vicinity; it was part of a pair escorting yet another raid, this time by MiG-21s from Gauhati-based No 28 Squadron. A brief turning fight with one of the escorts ensued, while the strike aircraft went through with a successful attack on hangars and other airfield infrastructure.
The MiG-21 escort then hastily disengaged to rejoin the strike aircraft on their way back.
With three different IAF formations totalling 13 aircraft having converged over Tezgaon in a matter of a few minutes, it is virtually impossible to retrace their tracks in the air.[6] What is known is that the first two formations of five Hunters, along with two MiG-21 escorts, were unable to carry out the attack in the face of determined opposition from the F-86s. It also transpires that the Hunter Afzaal had been firing at was actually from the second formation belonging to No 17 Squadron, which had reached its target somewhat early. Its pilot, Flg Off Bains, was lucky to escape with 42 bullet hits that were counted on his aircraft after landing. All the IAF aircraft were reported to have landed back. The PAF had put up a gallant fight in the first encounter of the war. An undaunted Afzaal had audaciously shown that a even a vastly large aggressor could be looked in the eye, when it was a matter of honour.
As Afzaal was being swamped by the MiGs, he had asked for immediate relief. The Staff Operations Officer, Wg Cdr S M Ahmed, who was visiting No 14 Squadron to cheer up the pilots, thought that he could lend a helping hand in the grave situation. At the spur of the moment, he decided to fly and, took along young Flg Off Salman Rasheedi as his wingman. The Squadron Commander and Flight Commander were not yet back after flying; otherwise, they might have had a different opinion about sending Ahmed up in the air, as he was not a regular flier in the squadron and had mostly been performing staff duties with the Base. Nonetheless, Ahmed’s eagerness saw the pair in the thick of action in no time. Getting airborne at about 0745 hrs, Ahmed was vectored towards a strike approaching Kurmitola airfield that lies about five miles north of Tezgaon. A Hunter flown by the Squadron Commander of No 17 Squadron, Wg Cdr N Chatrath, broke off and engaged Ahmed’s F-86. After a brief dogfight, Ahmed disengaged, but was chased right up to Tezgaon, where the pursuing Hunter finished him off. Ahmed ejected, but like Saeed Afzal in the previous mission, was hauled up by Mukti Bahini on landing. His fate was never known but it was presumed that he too met an unfortunate end at the hands of a furious mob.[7] Rasheedi, in the meantime, managed to extricate himself and landed back safely. No 14 Squadron had suffered yet another casualty but, driven by an indefatigable determination, its pilots seemed unstoppable.
The next mission of consequence was flown by Flt Lt Iqbal Zaidi and Flt Lt Ata-ur-Rahman who took off at about 0820 hrs.[8] Incidentally, Ata was a Bengali pilot who had opted to stay on with the PAF and had been cleared to fly only a week earlier, after many months of pleading with the authorities to quash his grounding. Zaidi and Ata had barely picked the gears up when four Hunters were spotted pulling up for an attack on the airfield. On leader’s instruction to split and take on a pair each, Ata was quick to position behind one of the Hunters. Closing in to a textbook range of 2,000 feet and ready to open fire, he was abruptly warned by Killer Control about two Hunters perched on his tail. Breaking viciously to ward off their attack, Ata was horrified to see tracers from the guns of both Hunters whizzing past his aircraft. He continued a hard turn till the Hunters overshot, tempting him to reverse his turn and pursue them. The Hunters, however, outran Ata’s F-86 and managed to escape at treetop height. Low on fuel and barely able to keep their wits in the prevailing confusion, Zaidi and Ata hastily recovered before yet another reported raid arrived. Reflecting on the dicey mission flown four decades ago, retired Air Vice Marshal Ata-ur-Rehman credits the Killer Control, manned by Sqn Ldr Aurangzeb Ahmed, for having saved his life. He thinks that Aurangzeb played a pivotal role in many a dogfight over Dacca.
