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The Indian army is not a force to be deployed for civil war-like combat - The China Post
As a civilian, one writes with considerable trepidation and reluctance on a subject Maoist terror which angels fear to tread or tread with fear, if at all. All the more so when Isaac Sushil Kumar, who had served as Naval chief from Dec. 30, 1998 to Dec. 30, 2001, declared that inducting the armed forces into the fray has to be viewed as an operational imperative.
The key expressions appear to be armed forces and operational imperative. That is understandable because the admiral starts his thoughts with war, the first principle of which is selection and maintenance of the aim. The veteran top sailor makes it a case of war against the Union of India by the Naxal-Maoist rebels ... to topple the government in power.
In juxtaposition, one would like to pose a counter-question: Does the Government of India also think it to be a war against the Naxal-Maoist rebels? And secondly, is this the first-ever war the Government of India (would be) fighting in the history of 66 years of independent India against an internal foe? If the answer is no, then what should be the specific and projected selection and maintenance of the aim to fight this unprecedented war? And if the answer is yes, this is not the first war to be fought by the nation and that in similar situations of grave threat to national security, the armed forces did come into play and gave the country victory. In that event, the retired admiral deserves compliments, and his suggestions need to be taken very seriously and implemented accordingly.
However, there appears to exist several practical difficulties in the proposed war scenario of the veteran naval chief. The menace of the Naxal-Maoist rebels has existed for more than four decades.
According to the Admiral, the display of sophisticated firepower even suggests cross-border support for their cause. That, indeed, is a point. However, there is a technical snag owing to distant topography and the location of Maoist operations. The turbulent areas are quite a distance from Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar.
Hence, they appear too remote an area for a possible and effective cross-border support base and too deep inside the mainland Indian territory. Hence, the cross border support, if any, is likely to emanate more from the ideological and theoretical brass than the operational leaders of adjacent, hostile cross-border terrain.
As a civilian, one writes with considerable trepidation and reluctance on a subject Maoist terror which angels fear to tread or tread with fear, if at all. All the more so when Isaac Sushil Kumar, who had served as Naval chief from Dec. 30, 1998 to Dec. 30, 2001, declared that inducting the armed forces into the fray has to be viewed as an operational imperative.
The key expressions appear to be armed forces and operational imperative. That is understandable because the admiral starts his thoughts with war, the first principle of which is selection and maintenance of the aim. The veteran top sailor makes it a case of war against the Union of India by the Naxal-Maoist rebels ... to topple the government in power.
In juxtaposition, one would like to pose a counter-question: Does the Government of India also think it to be a war against the Naxal-Maoist rebels? And secondly, is this the first-ever war the Government of India (would be) fighting in the history of 66 years of independent India against an internal foe? If the answer is no, then what should be the specific and projected selection and maintenance of the aim to fight this unprecedented war? And if the answer is yes, this is not the first war to be fought by the nation and that in similar situations of grave threat to national security, the armed forces did come into play and gave the country victory. In that event, the retired admiral deserves compliments, and his suggestions need to be taken very seriously and implemented accordingly.
However, there appears to exist several practical difficulties in the proposed war scenario of the veteran naval chief. The menace of the Naxal-Maoist rebels has existed for more than four decades.
According to the Admiral, the display of sophisticated firepower even suggests cross-border support for their cause. That, indeed, is a point. However, there is a technical snag owing to distant topography and the location of Maoist operations. The turbulent areas are quite a distance from Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar.
Hence, they appear too remote an area for a possible and effective cross-border support base and too deep inside the mainland Indian territory. Hence, the cross border support, if any, is likely to emanate more from the ideological and theoretical brass than the operational leaders of adjacent, hostile cross-border terrain.
