The SC
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Executive Summary
Because of their sizeable financial resources, close relations with Washington, and privileged access to the top transatlantic defense companies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are in a unique position to explore opportunities and make important strides in the military-industrial domain that other countries can simply ill-afford to make.
Moreover,over the past decade, globalization and the information technology (IT) revolution in military naffairs (RMA) have opened up the international defense market and made it less exclusive, allowing Saudi Arabia and the UAE to overcome some of the key scientific and technological challenges that accompany the building and sustaining of indigenous defense industries.
For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the creation of modern military industries that could compete in the international defense market promotes a set of domestic and foreign policy interests. Both countries seek to develop their arms manufacturing capabilities to address a range of perceived internal and external national security threats, reduce their political dependence on the United States and other influential powers that dominate the global defense market, diversify their economies, affirm their regional status and prestige, enhance their military credibility, and finally augment their diplomatic leverage.
Self-sufficiency is not a realistic goal for Saudi Arabia and the UAE. But in some limited security and defense areas, including spare parts, ammunition, and potentially shipbuilding (for the UAE), both countries have made steps forward. In addition, they now design, manufacture, and modernize military vehicles, communication and electronic systems, and unmanned systems including drones. They have also significantly upgraded their maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) capabilities in the aerospace industry.
Because of Saudi and Emirati improvement in such capabilities, the old adage of “Arabs don’t do maintenance” no longer reflects reality.
Furthermore, both countries’ military personnel have drastically enhanced their military training and competency and can now operate some of the most sophisticated weapons systems. They have also steadily increased their defense spending as part of their gross domestic product (GDP) and successfully absorbed some technology transfers.
The development of strategic partnerships with Washington, London, and Paris and some of the leading global defense firms over the years has offered Saudi Arabia and the UAE the opportunity to aggressively pursue defense industrialization. But out of all enabling factors, it is unquestionably both countries’ large and sophisticated offset programs, which have emphasized technology transfer, that have contributed the most to
their effort to develop their indigenous defense capabilities. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are projected to be among the top twenty global military offset markets for the next decade. Through these offset programs, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been able to connect their domestic defense sectors with global defense producers and enable them to acquire basic industrial knowledge and know-how. The results are mixed but in some areas encouraging, as a number of indigenous industries have been established in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi,
and other locations in joint ventures with global defense industry giants.
Yet these accomplishments notwithstanding, embarking on a successful path to domestic military industrialization could, depending on the desired objectives, require nothing short of a total state effort and a societal transformation.
Political stability, national leadership, and relative abundance of financial capital in Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been crucial to getting military industrialization off the ground, but to develop, rationalize, and sustain the process for the long term both countries stand a better chance of succeeding if they implement the following set of recommendations:
●Clarity of Purpose and Strategy:
Saudi and Emirati military industrialization must have a more precise strategic and tactical purpose.
High-tech and small-scale is the best way forward for both countries, but Saudi Arabia and the UAE ought to think more seriously about ways to effectively integrate the process of local arms production into the broader context of national defense policy and arms acquisition.
●Defense Production Policy:
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi must formulate clear defense production policies and create overarching bodies for long-term defense planning. This is important for consistency between short-term decisions and
long-term plans.
●Organization of Defense:
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi must organize their national defense establishments by creating credible and
authoritative institutions as well as solid legal and administrative frameworks. If defense ministries in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi assume key defense-related powers and refrain from relegating them to kings or military
commanders, military industrialization would profit.
●Technology Transfer:
A diverse approach to technology transfer that addresses actual needs and realities would be most beneficial to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi should continue to adopt a deliberate policy of
training their nationals and encouraging them to learn skills on the job.
●Research & Development and Science & Technology:
Saudi Arabia and the UAE should develop a more robust local R&D capability that would have more direct interaction with the users—the armed forces and foreign clients. But advances in R&D have to correspond to
S&T levels in user organizations. Both countries should also create more dynamic linkages between science institutions (universities, parks, institutes, etc.,) and the defense industry.
●Private Sector Participation:
Saudi Arabia and the UAE need to ensure a greater role for the private sector in funding the enterprise of
military industrialization. Otherwise defense production would remain wholly state-owned, which works against the streamlining of defense industrial activity.
●Offset Programs:
Saudi Arabia and the UAE should further integrate their offset programs into national strategies for industrial
development. In order to reduce their dependency on external technology suppliers, both countries must maximize the effect of job creation.
●Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul:
Because Saudi and Emirati technicians and engineers, as few as they are, are still unable to maintain
modern US and other Western weapons systems without the help of foreign workers, further focus on and investment in MRO capabilities is needed in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
●Bilateral or GCC-wide Military Industrial Cooperation:
Saudi Arabia and the UAE would benefit from developing a joint MRO base and an integrated or complementary services and production infrastructure. This would be hugely profitable economically, as it would allow for maximal exchange of experience and skills, as well as fuller, more prolonged use of facilities
and qualified manpower. Implications for US Policy Efforts by Saudi Arabia and the UAE over the past decade to upgrade their national defense capabilities by purchasing arms and pursuing domestic military industrialization contribute to US strategic plans and interests in the Middle East and are generally consistent with the broader US commitment to expanding its global partnerships and strengthening its friends and allies’ defense capabilities. However, should current political uncertainties in US-Gulf relations persist and, more dramatically, a strategic rift between Washington and Riyadh develop in the future due to major policy differences, intensified defense industrialization in the Gulf could carry risks to US strategic interests in the Middle East.
One of the motivations of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pursue military industrialization is to reduce their political dependence on the United States. Unilateralism on the part of US friends and allies can sometimes undermine security interests, as evidenced by Israel’s unilateral military actions in Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian Territories.
The United States has often favored and called for regional solutions to many of the Middle East’s security problems, and Washington would be relieved if Saudi Arabia and/or the UAE could step up and use their own defense and diplomatic resources to defuse a potential crisis in the future.
However, if another major crisis, a la 1990-91 Gulf War, occurs and the Saudis and/or the Emiratis decide to act on their own to protect their interests outside the confines of the US-Gulf partnership, US strategic interests might be at risk.
While Saudi Arabia’s current capacity to act more independently from the United States is lower, its
willingness will only increase should relations with Washington fail to improve and its defense industrialization effort develop at a more rapid pace. This equation is almost reversed with the UAE. Abu Dhabi’s capacity to act more independently from the United States is higher (its armed forces are more technically proficient and
combat-ready than the Saudi military) and will only strengthen with time, but its willingness to do so is decreased because it has a stable relationship with Washington and much prefers to work with US-led, international coalitions. This explains why Abu Dhabi is interested in strengthening its partnership with NATO and vice versa. Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE has regional leadership ambitions, but it seeks to lead by example, and its foreign policy outlook tends to be more global and cosmopolitan than Saudi Arabia’s.
The sustainability of the US-Gulf partnership is a joint responsibility, despite Washington’s senior status. The Arab Gulf countries, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular, have obligations too.
Building closer security relationships and integrating national defense capabilities (most importantly in air and missile defense, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) should be more pressing priorities for Arab Gulf leaders. Interoperability is also not a one-way street. Washington has been adamant about
its Gulf partners maintaining compatibility with US defense systems. However, often times, when these partners request the purchase of US items that would uphold US-GCC and inter-GCC interoperability, their requests are denied by The sustainability of the US-Gulf partnership is a joint responsibility, despite
Washington’s senior status.
The Arab Gulf countries, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular, have obligations too. Building closer security relationships and integrating national defense capabilities (most importantly in air and missile defense, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) should be more pressing priorities for Arab Gulf
leaders. Interoperability is also not a one-way street. Washington has been adamant about its Gulf partners maintaining compatibility with US defense systems. However, often times, when these partners request the purchase of US items that would uphold US-GCC and inter-GCC interoperability, their requests are denied by
Washington. The two major reasons for this are strict export controls and a US Israel policy of Qualitative Military Edge (QME), which is designed to maintain Israel’s regional military supremacy and uphold its deterrence posture. In the Gulf partners’ view, the problem is not limited to US rejection but also to Washington’s slow or lacking response. Sometimes it takes years to get an answer from Washington for a specific military purchase, and by the time a response is provided the price as well as the needs and circumstances of the Gulf partners would have changed.
But Saudi Arabia and the UAE shouldn’t rely solely on US cooperation. There is ample room for defense-industrial cooperation and collaboration between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi and other GCC capitals, be it in manpower, skilled expertise, manufacturing and/or MRO, that can address some deficiencies. The problem is that politics, rivalry, and prestige have stood in the way of such a goal. The United States has been pushing the GCC to think more collectively for some time, but disagreements among its members, be it on Syria,
Egypt, or Iran, are real. So long as political discord reigns in the GCC, the US-Gulf partnership, with its defense-industrial component, will never meet its true potential and remain limited to bilateral
affairs between the United States and individual GCC members.
Conclusion
Military industrialization in Saudi Arabia and the UAE is a natural consequence of both countries’ ambitions to affirm their rising regional status as well as their efforts over the years to modernize their societies and diversify their economies. The pace, scope, and effectiveness of Saudi and Emirati military industrialization efforts will continue to depend, in many respects, on broader societal change in both countries. But it would be misleading to say that the Saudi and Emirati political systems, because of their restrictive attributes—including secrecy, excessive centralization, exclusionism, corruption, and lack of accountability—totally obstruct military industrialization. What matters most when it comes to successful military industrialization
is intent, vision, resources, and a set of sound political, economic, and military industrial strategies.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE still struggle with the formulation of such strategies, but they are gradually improving and learning from the top defense companies in the world, by way of collaboration and partnership.
It bears repeating that military industrialization in Saudi Arabia and the UAE is a long-term process. Indeed, it is likely to take anywhere between five to fifteen years before either country can effectively export military items en masse and increasingly rely on its own local manpower and arms production capabilities to address national security needs. But Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are careful not to rush the process, and they have
every reason to be confident about the future.
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/182154/The_Gulf_Rising.pdf
This is a long and comprehensive paper on the subject of the thread (you can follow the link to the full pdf). It is a 2012 paper and many things have moved on since..Also bear in mind that this article concerns the Defense industrialization with the USA, there are also other paths taken by KSA and the UAE, Like China, South Korea,, Ukraine, Turkey and Pakistan, to name a few..
Any more inputs are welcome..
Because of their sizeable financial resources, close relations with Washington, and privileged access to the top transatlantic defense companies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are in a unique position to explore opportunities and make important strides in the military-industrial domain that other countries can simply ill-afford to make.
Moreover,over the past decade, globalization and the information technology (IT) revolution in military naffairs (RMA) have opened up the international defense market and made it less exclusive, allowing Saudi Arabia and the UAE to overcome some of the key scientific and technological challenges that accompany the building and sustaining of indigenous defense industries.
For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the creation of modern military industries that could compete in the international defense market promotes a set of domestic and foreign policy interests. Both countries seek to develop their arms manufacturing capabilities to address a range of perceived internal and external national security threats, reduce their political dependence on the United States and other influential powers that dominate the global defense market, diversify their economies, affirm their regional status and prestige, enhance their military credibility, and finally augment their diplomatic leverage.
Self-sufficiency is not a realistic goal for Saudi Arabia and the UAE. But in some limited security and defense areas, including spare parts, ammunition, and potentially shipbuilding (for the UAE), both countries have made steps forward. In addition, they now design, manufacture, and modernize military vehicles, communication and electronic systems, and unmanned systems including drones. They have also significantly upgraded their maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) capabilities in the aerospace industry.
Because of Saudi and Emirati improvement in such capabilities, the old adage of “Arabs don’t do maintenance” no longer reflects reality.
Furthermore, both countries’ military personnel have drastically enhanced their military training and competency and can now operate some of the most sophisticated weapons systems. They have also steadily increased their defense spending as part of their gross domestic product (GDP) and successfully absorbed some technology transfers.
The development of strategic partnerships with Washington, London, and Paris and some of the leading global defense firms over the years has offered Saudi Arabia and the UAE the opportunity to aggressively pursue defense industrialization. But out of all enabling factors, it is unquestionably both countries’ large and sophisticated offset programs, which have emphasized technology transfer, that have contributed the most to
their effort to develop their indigenous defense capabilities. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are projected to be among the top twenty global military offset markets for the next decade. Through these offset programs, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been able to connect their domestic defense sectors with global defense producers and enable them to acquire basic industrial knowledge and know-how. The results are mixed but in some areas encouraging, as a number of indigenous industries have been established in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi,
and other locations in joint ventures with global defense industry giants.
Yet these accomplishments notwithstanding, embarking on a successful path to domestic military industrialization could, depending on the desired objectives, require nothing short of a total state effort and a societal transformation.
Political stability, national leadership, and relative abundance of financial capital in Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been crucial to getting military industrialization off the ground, but to develop, rationalize, and sustain the process for the long term both countries stand a better chance of succeeding if they implement the following set of recommendations:
●Clarity of Purpose and Strategy:
Saudi and Emirati military industrialization must have a more precise strategic and tactical purpose.
High-tech and small-scale is the best way forward for both countries, but Saudi Arabia and the UAE ought to think more seriously about ways to effectively integrate the process of local arms production into the broader context of national defense policy and arms acquisition.
●Defense Production Policy:
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi must formulate clear defense production policies and create overarching bodies for long-term defense planning. This is important for consistency between short-term decisions and
long-term plans.
●Organization of Defense:
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi must organize their national defense establishments by creating credible and
authoritative institutions as well as solid legal and administrative frameworks. If defense ministries in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi assume key defense-related powers and refrain from relegating them to kings or military
commanders, military industrialization would profit.
●Technology Transfer:
A diverse approach to technology transfer that addresses actual needs and realities would be most beneficial to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi should continue to adopt a deliberate policy of
training their nationals and encouraging them to learn skills on the job.
●Research & Development and Science & Technology:
Saudi Arabia and the UAE should develop a more robust local R&D capability that would have more direct interaction with the users—the armed forces and foreign clients. But advances in R&D have to correspond to
S&T levels in user organizations. Both countries should also create more dynamic linkages between science institutions (universities, parks, institutes, etc.,) and the defense industry.
●Private Sector Participation:
Saudi Arabia and the UAE need to ensure a greater role for the private sector in funding the enterprise of
military industrialization. Otherwise defense production would remain wholly state-owned, which works against the streamlining of defense industrial activity.
●Offset Programs:
Saudi Arabia and the UAE should further integrate their offset programs into national strategies for industrial
development. In order to reduce their dependency on external technology suppliers, both countries must maximize the effect of job creation.
●Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul:
Because Saudi and Emirati technicians and engineers, as few as they are, are still unable to maintain
modern US and other Western weapons systems without the help of foreign workers, further focus on and investment in MRO capabilities is needed in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
●Bilateral or GCC-wide Military Industrial Cooperation:
Saudi Arabia and the UAE would benefit from developing a joint MRO base and an integrated or complementary services and production infrastructure. This would be hugely profitable economically, as it would allow for maximal exchange of experience and skills, as well as fuller, more prolonged use of facilities
and qualified manpower. Implications for US Policy Efforts by Saudi Arabia and the UAE over the past decade to upgrade their national defense capabilities by purchasing arms and pursuing domestic military industrialization contribute to US strategic plans and interests in the Middle East and are generally consistent with the broader US commitment to expanding its global partnerships and strengthening its friends and allies’ defense capabilities. However, should current political uncertainties in US-Gulf relations persist and, more dramatically, a strategic rift between Washington and Riyadh develop in the future due to major policy differences, intensified defense industrialization in the Gulf could carry risks to US strategic interests in the Middle East.
One of the motivations of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pursue military industrialization is to reduce their political dependence on the United States. Unilateralism on the part of US friends and allies can sometimes undermine security interests, as evidenced by Israel’s unilateral military actions in Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian Territories.
The United States has often favored and called for regional solutions to many of the Middle East’s security problems, and Washington would be relieved if Saudi Arabia and/or the UAE could step up and use their own defense and diplomatic resources to defuse a potential crisis in the future.
However, if another major crisis, a la 1990-91 Gulf War, occurs and the Saudis and/or the Emiratis decide to act on their own to protect their interests outside the confines of the US-Gulf partnership, US strategic interests might be at risk.
While Saudi Arabia’s current capacity to act more independently from the United States is lower, its
willingness will only increase should relations with Washington fail to improve and its defense industrialization effort develop at a more rapid pace. This equation is almost reversed with the UAE. Abu Dhabi’s capacity to act more independently from the United States is higher (its armed forces are more technically proficient and
combat-ready than the Saudi military) and will only strengthen with time, but its willingness to do so is decreased because it has a stable relationship with Washington and much prefers to work with US-led, international coalitions. This explains why Abu Dhabi is interested in strengthening its partnership with NATO and vice versa. Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE has regional leadership ambitions, but it seeks to lead by example, and its foreign policy outlook tends to be more global and cosmopolitan than Saudi Arabia’s.
The sustainability of the US-Gulf partnership is a joint responsibility, despite Washington’s senior status. The Arab Gulf countries, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular, have obligations too.
Building closer security relationships and integrating national defense capabilities (most importantly in air and missile defense, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) should be more pressing priorities for Arab Gulf leaders. Interoperability is also not a one-way street. Washington has been adamant about
its Gulf partners maintaining compatibility with US defense systems. However, often times, when these partners request the purchase of US items that would uphold US-GCC and inter-GCC interoperability, their requests are denied by The sustainability of the US-Gulf partnership is a joint responsibility, despite
Washington’s senior status.
The Arab Gulf countries, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular, have obligations too. Building closer security relationships and integrating national defense capabilities (most importantly in air and missile defense, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) should be more pressing priorities for Arab Gulf
leaders. Interoperability is also not a one-way street. Washington has been adamant about its Gulf partners maintaining compatibility with US defense systems. However, often times, when these partners request the purchase of US items that would uphold US-GCC and inter-GCC interoperability, their requests are denied by
Washington. The two major reasons for this are strict export controls and a US Israel policy of Qualitative Military Edge (QME), which is designed to maintain Israel’s regional military supremacy and uphold its deterrence posture. In the Gulf partners’ view, the problem is not limited to US rejection but also to Washington’s slow or lacking response. Sometimes it takes years to get an answer from Washington for a specific military purchase, and by the time a response is provided the price as well as the needs and circumstances of the Gulf partners would have changed.
But Saudi Arabia and the UAE shouldn’t rely solely on US cooperation. There is ample room for defense-industrial cooperation and collaboration between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi and other GCC capitals, be it in manpower, skilled expertise, manufacturing and/or MRO, that can address some deficiencies. The problem is that politics, rivalry, and prestige have stood in the way of such a goal. The United States has been pushing the GCC to think more collectively for some time, but disagreements among its members, be it on Syria,
Egypt, or Iran, are real. So long as political discord reigns in the GCC, the US-Gulf partnership, with its defense-industrial component, will never meet its true potential and remain limited to bilateral
affairs between the United States and individual GCC members.
Conclusion
Military industrialization in Saudi Arabia and the UAE is a natural consequence of both countries’ ambitions to affirm their rising regional status as well as their efforts over the years to modernize their societies and diversify their economies. The pace, scope, and effectiveness of Saudi and Emirati military industrialization efforts will continue to depend, in many respects, on broader societal change in both countries. But it would be misleading to say that the Saudi and Emirati political systems, because of their restrictive attributes—including secrecy, excessive centralization, exclusionism, corruption, and lack of accountability—totally obstruct military industrialization. What matters most when it comes to successful military industrialization
is intent, vision, resources, and a set of sound political, economic, and military industrial strategies.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE still struggle with the formulation of such strategies, but they are gradually improving and learning from the top defense companies in the world, by way of collaboration and partnership.
It bears repeating that military industrialization in Saudi Arabia and the UAE is a long-term process. Indeed, it is likely to take anywhere between five to fifteen years before either country can effectively export military items en masse and increasingly rely on its own local manpower and arms production capabilities to address national security needs. But Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are careful not to rush the process, and they have
every reason to be confident about the future.
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/182154/The_Gulf_Rising.pdf
This is a long and comprehensive paper on the subject of the thread (you can follow the link to the full pdf). It is a 2012 paper and many things have moved on since..Also bear in mind that this article concerns the Defense industrialization with the USA, there are also other paths taken by KSA and the UAE, Like China, South Korea,, Ukraine, Turkey and Pakistan, to name a few..
Any more inputs are welcome..
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