Rahul9090
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Much has been written on the economic mismanagement by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government over the last ten years. But as the country gets ready for an epic electoral battle, the gross negligence of India’s defence preparedness under its longest serving defence minister is a far more worrying trend. A defence minister is not just another minister sitting in a dandy office in Delhi. His duties are onerous: He is the chief manager of the country’s present and future preparedness to ward-off attacks from a combination of state and non-state actors. A.K. Antony has been found wanting on both counts.
Sinking ships and subs
Accidents at Indian Navy establishments is now almost a weekly occurrence. On Saturday, a civilian worker was killed in an accident in an under-construction nuclear submarine at a shipbuilding site in Visakhapatnam. The accident happened a day after a Navy commander died aboard INS Kolkata. He died because the fire suppression systems on board the warship malfunctioned and he inhaled a large amount of carbon dioxide. About ten days before this, two people were killed and seven injured aboard INS Sindhuratna after a fire in the submarine.
In August 2013, INS Sindhurakshak, another submarine, sank at Mumbai’s naval dockyard, killing all 18 crew members on board.
The Indian Navy has suffered several such incidents in the last year, raising serious questions about the safety of its ships and submarines.
From any perspective these incidents are alarming. The Indian Navy has a long tradition of building, operating and maintaining a diversity of naval craft and equipment. Is it possible that in a single year, this branch of the armed forces has become so sloppy that accidents have become routine? Or are there other reasons behind this epidemic of accidents? As defence minister, Antony should have been awake to both possibilities and taken some interest in getting to the bottom of the matter. All he did was order some enquiries and left the matter at that.
This attitude befits a bureaucrat and not a political leader responsible for India’s defence. When the Sindhuratna accident happened, the chief of Naval Staff, Admiral D.K. Joshi, resigned. The government accepted his resignation in a haste. But if the Navy chief accepted his responsibility, why couldn’t the political leadership do that?
The ministry of defence is one ministry where systems and procedures are in place for virtually everything—from accidents to the purchase of equipment. In that case, what is the role of the minister? What leadership does he provide?
The years ahead
Meanwhile, the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Army are grappling with their own problems, with major acquisition programmes being put on hold. Here Antony’s intervention, negative as it is, is more evident.
The IAF made a demand for 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) in 2001. Eleven years later, it was announced that France’s Dassault Rafale had won the bid. At more than Rs.60,000 crore, this was one of the biggest defence deals to be signed by India. However, in February, Antony announced that the ministry had no money left to sign the deal this year.
Similarly, the Army announced plans to acquire 145 M777 howitzers in 2010; the defence ministry in February deferred a decision on the purchase. India has not bought artillery guns since the Bofors deal in 1986.
There are two repercussions of these delays:
1) The costs of these deals are skyrocketing. There are reports that by January 2014, the cost of the Rafale deal had escalated by 100%. The cost of the howitzer deal has gone up by 75%.
2) The greater the delay, the more obsolete such equipment becomes even as the country’s adversaries modernize their military. Last week, China announced it is increasing military spending by 12.2%. At nearly $132 billion, the Chinese budget is $100 billion more than India’s $36 billion.
The defence ministry in any country is one of the most important departments of the government. Its decisions and policies have to be framed not only keeping current realities in mind but also keeping ever changing, long-term dynamics in the country’s neighbourhood and the world in perspective.
Countries across the world have evolved different institutions to cope with these challenges. In the US, for example, there is close coordination between military authorities, the political leadership and academia to plan future priorities. Day-to-day management of military and politico-military affairs engages the civilian leadership deeply.
As India grows economically, its military abilities have to grow hand-in-hand, if only to safeguard its economic interests.
Antony’s keenness to keep his image clean by ensuring that corrupt practices don’t creep into big tender defence purchases has come at a cost. His preferred solution has been to blacklist a large number of defence contractors. This has served no one: there will be “honesty” in the ministry now for the simple reason that there are no purchases being made.
It would have been an achievement if he had streamlined defence purchases without corrupt practices creeping in.
If the travails of our armed forces are any indication, Antony’s quest for probity has come at a heavy cost for India.
The crisis of India’s defence preparedness - Livemint
Sinking ships and subs
Accidents at Indian Navy establishments is now almost a weekly occurrence. On Saturday, a civilian worker was killed in an accident in an under-construction nuclear submarine at a shipbuilding site in Visakhapatnam. The accident happened a day after a Navy commander died aboard INS Kolkata. He died because the fire suppression systems on board the warship malfunctioned and he inhaled a large amount of carbon dioxide. About ten days before this, two people were killed and seven injured aboard INS Sindhuratna after a fire in the submarine.
In August 2013, INS Sindhurakshak, another submarine, sank at Mumbai’s naval dockyard, killing all 18 crew members on board.
The Indian Navy has suffered several such incidents in the last year, raising serious questions about the safety of its ships and submarines.
From any perspective these incidents are alarming. The Indian Navy has a long tradition of building, operating and maintaining a diversity of naval craft and equipment. Is it possible that in a single year, this branch of the armed forces has become so sloppy that accidents have become routine? Or are there other reasons behind this epidemic of accidents? As defence minister, Antony should have been awake to both possibilities and taken some interest in getting to the bottom of the matter. All he did was order some enquiries and left the matter at that.
This attitude befits a bureaucrat and not a political leader responsible for India’s defence. When the Sindhuratna accident happened, the chief of Naval Staff, Admiral D.K. Joshi, resigned. The government accepted his resignation in a haste. But if the Navy chief accepted his responsibility, why couldn’t the political leadership do that?
The ministry of defence is one ministry where systems and procedures are in place for virtually everything—from accidents to the purchase of equipment. In that case, what is the role of the minister? What leadership does he provide?
The years ahead
Meanwhile, the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Army are grappling with their own problems, with major acquisition programmes being put on hold. Here Antony’s intervention, negative as it is, is more evident.
The IAF made a demand for 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) in 2001. Eleven years later, it was announced that France’s Dassault Rafale had won the bid. At more than Rs.60,000 crore, this was one of the biggest defence deals to be signed by India. However, in February, Antony announced that the ministry had no money left to sign the deal this year.
Similarly, the Army announced plans to acquire 145 M777 howitzers in 2010; the defence ministry in February deferred a decision on the purchase. India has not bought artillery guns since the Bofors deal in 1986.
There are two repercussions of these delays:
1) The costs of these deals are skyrocketing. There are reports that by January 2014, the cost of the Rafale deal had escalated by 100%. The cost of the howitzer deal has gone up by 75%.
2) The greater the delay, the more obsolete such equipment becomes even as the country’s adversaries modernize their military. Last week, China announced it is increasing military spending by 12.2%. At nearly $132 billion, the Chinese budget is $100 billion more than India’s $36 billion.
The defence ministry in any country is one of the most important departments of the government. Its decisions and policies have to be framed not only keeping current realities in mind but also keeping ever changing, long-term dynamics in the country’s neighbourhood and the world in perspective.
Countries across the world have evolved different institutions to cope with these challenges. In the US, for example, there is close coordination between military authorities, the political leadership and academia to plan future priorities. Day-to-day management of military and politico-military affairs engages the civilian leadership deeply.
As India grows economically, its military abilities have to grow hand-in-hand, if only to safeguard its economic interests.
Antony’s keenness to keep his image clean by ensuring that corrupt practices don’t creep into big tender defence purchases has come at a cost. His preferred solution has been to blacklist a large number of defence contractors. This has served no one: there will be “honesty” in the ministry now for the simple reason that there are no purchases being made.
It would have been an achievement if he had streamlined defence purchases without corrupt practices creeping in.
If the travails of our armed forces are any indication, Antony’s quest for probity has come at a heavy cost for India.
The crisis of India’s defence preparedness - Livemint
