Md Akmal
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Brig (Retd) MUHAMMAD HAYAT recounts an epic saga of bravery by his isolated force in KHULNA, then EAST PAKISTAN
The brave and gallant deeds of the officers and men of the Pakistan Force who defended Khulna from 10 to 17 December 1971 are briefly recounted below. My primary object is to pay homage to those Shaheeds who are now lying in unmarked graves in and around Khulna (now a foreign land) and hope it will provide some solace and satisfaction to the relations of those Shaheeds. This article is also meant to salute the living veteran officers and men whose valour and sacrifices have given me pride as their commander at the time. The secondary purpose is explained in the following paragraph. "Kill two birds with one stone" so the dictum goes! Some of my friends have been imploring me for a long time, that I should pass on my accounts of 1971 war for the benefit of the coming generation. So my friends, here is the first instalment.
I have chosen to narrate the battle of Khulna first. Though this was the last battle, yet it is the most epoch-making battle of my Brigade operations in the erstwhile East Pakistan. Secondly, being the last battle even the Indian commanders and historians have only published brief accounts of it. For they were carried away by the events of mass surrenders taking place elsewhere at the time. The foreign war correspondents who were accompanying the Indian Forces around Khulna had mostly rushed to Dacca to cover the big event of surrender, while this battle was raging with great intensity on 16 and night of 16/17 December. There were no Pakistani war correspondents nor has any Pakistani officer who participated in the battle has narrated or published his accounts. Hence detailed and authentic Pakistani version of this battle has not come on record. I hope this brief account of mine will fill in the void to some extent. These are some of the reasons that I have undertaken to narrate the battle of Khulna first, while, the other operations of the Brigade will be narrated in due course of time, Insha Allah.
The formations and units of both sides who took part in this battle are listed below. This will make it easy for the reader to follow the battle.
Indian Forces
9 Indian Infantry Division with under command;
a. 32 Brigade=4 Battalions
b. 42 Brigade=3 Battalions
c. 350 Brigades=4 Battalions
d. 45 Para Brigade less Battalion in reserves
e. Divisional Artillery Brigade
f. Corps medium artillery regiment (130 mm guns)
g. 63 Cavalry Regiment (T-55 tanks)
h. Two squadrons 45 Cavalry (PT 76 amphibian tanks
I. Two Eng: battalions equipped with light alloy bridging equipment
j. One mechanized armoured battalion (7 Punjab)
k. Five border security force (BSF) battalions
Normal Divisional complements of services and administrative units.
IAF air Sorties, ground support and intense interdiction Daylight movement impossible
a. A brigade of Mukti Bhaini
b. Bulk of the Bengali population was hostile to us
Pak Forces
107 Brigades with under command;
a. 6 Punjab Regiment
b. 12 Punjab Regiment
c. 15 FFR
d. 22 FFR
e. 21 Punjab, (R & S) two companies only
f. Two M 24 Chafee Tanks
g. 55 Field Regiment Artillery (Only 15 field guns)
h. No. 7 Engineer company of 10 Engineer Battalion.
I. One wing East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces (EPCAF) and Raza Kars
j. 150 Bengali Volunteers of Al-Shams (Students Organization of Jamate Islami)
No air support
No intelligence about enemy plans or operations. Local sources no longer reliable.
Deployment of troops (see sketch)
On the afternoon of 10 December 1971 the above Forces came face to face outside Phultala, a town 17 K.M. north of Khulna. The Indians were poised for attack while we were deployed for defence. The main deployment of 107 Pak. Brigade and attached troops were as under:- (see sketch).
a. Two companies of 15 FFR and a company of 21 Punjab with Recoilless Rifles (R & S) under overall command of Major Nazar. He was an experienced and veteran officer of 21 Punjab. These troops were deployed at Phultala astride the main road.
b. 12 Punjab Regiment was deployed in the vicinity of Miksimil facing due west.
c. 15 FFR was holding position left of road at Daulatpur just north of Khulna.
d. 6 Punjab Regiment was holding position right of Road at Daulatpur.
e. 22 FFR was covering south with the major task to launch a deliberate counter attack on 6 Punjab and 15 FFR position.
f. 55 field Artillery Regiment was deployed in the middle so that it can cover all positions.
g. A wing of EPCF and Al-Shams were holding the river line in the south to prevent any river crafts coming up the river. This force was under command Major Nasibullah (Shaheed).
h. An Engineers Platoon was at the jetty with some Al-Shams personnel to patrol the river. The remaining company was laying mines and making obstacles on roads and tracks in front of main defence.
i. All the civilian inland water transport vessels were impounded.
The position occupied at Phultala was a screen position. The screen position is meant to impose delay on the enemy for specific time thus allowing time for the main force to prepare its defenses. Major Nazar had deployed his force in a sound tactical manner. All the likely approaches were mined and enemy assembly area were mined and booby trapped. These places were also registered as artillery and 3" mortars targets. Extensive and aggressive patrolling at night were carried out. The enemy tried to rush the screen position after midnight 10/11 December with support of heavy artillery fire but was effectively repulsed. We suffered a few causalities. Captain Bilal (Shaheed) of 15 FFR was adjusting his forward most position and was killed in action. Night 10/11 December was, thereafter mostly used by the enemy to probe the flanks of our screen position in order to make flanking manoeuvre. The right flank of this position was resting on river Bhairab in the east whereas its left flank on the West, was effectively covering a track leading out of Phultala towards the south-west. The enemy therefore perforce had to launch frontal attack along the Phultala-Khulna road so as to effect an opening.
A powerful infantry attack support by heavy tanks of 63 Cavalry and a mechanized company of 7 Punjab was launched at dawn on 11 December. The enemy had wrongly appreciated the Phultala screen position as our main brigade position, he therefore in addition to artillery, tanks and mechanized elements also employed considerable air support. The entire screen position was subjected to heavy artillery and air bombardment from 7 a.m. to 8 a.m. When assaulting troops supported by tanks appeared, our recoilless rifles came into action. They knocked out two enemy tanks within minutes. Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) of the enemy 7 Punjab Regiment which were following closely behind the tanks quickly withdrew towards the rear. The infantry assault automatically petered out with heavy losses. Captain Mehboob of R & S company was seriously wounded. A Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO) and 12 men were also wounded. Maj. Nazar was confident of holding the enemy at bay. The enemy became quite cautious. This little breathing time that we gained was a God sent opportunity and we fully utilized it to our advantage in developing and strengthening our defence at Daulatpur and Khulna.
During the afternoon enemy tried to take a mechanized column from behind Phultala towards the South-West on a track leading to village Pipral. Our gunners and strong standing patrols from 15 FFR stopped this column. By evening, 11 December, this enemy column was back in Phultala.
During night 11/12 December there was intense activity in the rear area of the enemy which we appreciated to be preparation for a major attack on Phultala screen position. Enemy was also reported to be making a crossing on the Bhairab river toward the east. This was later confirmed to be 42 Indian Brigade and some PT 76 tanks, but this did not unduly disturb our screen position. The officers and troops in this position deserve the highest compliments for their tenacity and spirit in continuing to occupy their trenches. At midnight, the enemy mounted a strong infantry raid on the positions along the road. This raid was beaten back. At 10 AM. on 12th December the enemy mounted his third attack on the center of the screen position. We unfortunately suffered heavy casualties. Two of our officers were wounded (Major Eizaz and Lieut. Tariq Ahmad Hussain of 15 FFR). We were left with Major Nazar and an artillery officer who showed no anxiety about the situation. The two wounded officers and 12 men could not be evacuated because of the enemy strafing and shelling on the road. The screen position had achieved its purpose by this time. No re-adjustments were therefore required.
At 4 p.m. on 12 December orders to Major Nazar were issued to withdraw to the main position starting after last light. They were to make a clean break with enemy by midnight 12/13 December. Withdrawl operation when in close contact with the enemy is a most difficult operation. There is every likelihood of this operation turning into a running battle resulting into great confusion. Major Nazar was a seasoned officer and he saw to it that withdrawl was meticulously regulated. Soon after last light the wounded were dispatched to the Main Dressing Station established by our Field Ambulance at Khulna. Here surgical operations could be carried out under field conditions. After the wounded were cleared. Thinning out of heavy weapons followed by infantry was started. During the dark hours, the enemy usually kept on bringing heavy concentration of artillery prediction fire on to the road to harass our troops and prevent smooth replenishment and evacuation of wounded. Fortunately very little damage was done to our vehicles and the troops on the road. Soon after midnight the screen position had stealthily withdrawn out to the main position. An observation patrol of one section was left with wireless set and an artillery observer till dawn 13 December so as to pass on information about any follow up by the enemy.
The memorable screen position battle at Phultala from 10-12 December was over. This temporary position withstood three major attacks and in process suffered 100 casualties with most of the officers either killed or seriously wounded. It provided the badly needed time for the main defence at Khulna. A few minutes before the first light the enemy launched a full scale Brigade attack on the vacant screen position. This showed how stealthily we had vacated the screen position. The enemy must have been disappointed to discover that our stratagem was successful. This screen position battle was fought by a composite force of less than a battalion. It should therefore be recorded and recognized as a celebrated operation.
At 8 a.m. 13 December a standing patrol of 15 FFR in the vicinity of Pipral Village south west of Phultala sighted a mechanized column coming down the track. The patrol had two RR jeeps hiding in the foliage. One infantry platoon with a machine gun detachment had also been in position as a Standing Patrol. As soon as the column came within the range of recoilless rifles two of the leading APCs were shot thus blocking further progress of the column on the narrow track. The enemy called an air sortie and two infantry company that were riding the APCs were to assault the standing patrol position. In the encounter we lost one jeep and its crew due to air action. The rest of the patrol safely rejoined 15 FFR. The damaged and burnt out APCs were recovered by the enemy to clear the track for further operations. By this time the enemy had realized that Phultala position was only delaying position. Main defence of Daulatpur and Khulna were still to be tackled.
On the morning of 14 December the enemy tried to probe towards south-west where they came up against 12 Punjab and found themselves marooned on the track leading to village Maksimil. This was because on either side of the track was permanent marshy ground. 12 Punjab found the enemy easy prey and hence knocked out two enemy APCs as they were sitting ducks on that narrow track. The remaining column hastily retreated and got out of 12 Punjab RRs range. The operations of Phultala, Pipral and Maksimil were carried out by 32 Indian Brigade.
At midday 14 December some kind of panic at Maksimil was reported. I with my dashing G-3 Capt. Mehboob Qadir now (a Brigadier) rushed to 12 Punjab. The battalion was being treated to an unprecedented artillery bombardment. When we arrived at the Battalion HQ we found it in deathly silence. The only living things we saw on the surface were few dogs who had taken cover against a well. When they saw us they started weeping and literally started crawling towards us. The panic that was created was due to some misunderstanding in reading the battle. 12 Punjab was again in its usual cool and aggressive mood.
On return to Head quarter I was informed by my Brigade Major (now Lt. colonel) Fakher-e-Alam that Al-shams boys have brought the information that a strong column of enemy was coming down south along the eastern bank of Bhairab River and will be reaching the right flank of 6 Punjab Regiment any time. This force was later recognized to be 42 Indian Brigade supported by squadron of PT76 amphibian tanks and an engineer battalion with assault boats and bridging equipment. Their task was to cross the river at the ferry close to Daulatpur and attack 6 Punjab right flank. This they thought would unhinge our defencs and will pave the way for a frontal attack along the road at the junction of 6 Punjab and 15 FFR. 42 Brigade crossing attempt was detected by the depth company of 6 Punjab at 3 p.m. Our artillery regiment defensive fire was brought down onto this old ferry site. 6 Punjab company with quick adjustment in its position started dominating the far bank of the river with anti tank and small arms fire against the enemy concentration. The enemy assault attempt across the river was effectively foiled and the enemy suffered almost 70 casualties as reported by him to his H.Q.
In the meanwhile one company each from 12 Punjab and 22 FFR under Majors Gulzar Jadoon and Samin Jan Babar respectively were ordered to take up position behind 6 Punjab. I had chosen these two company commanders, for they had shown promise and courage of a very high degree during earlier operations. This forces position was so adjusted that the bias of defence was towards the river side. They were initially placed as immediate counter attack force. Having coordinated that I made a quick visit to 6 Punjab and then to 15 FFR, where I expected a frontal attack any time. I found the officers and men of these battalions in good spirit. Having given few essential instructions about the impending enemy attack I returned to my H.Q.
I was quite satisfied and very keen to settle some scores with commander 9 Indian Division. In the past our faulty policy and other peculiar operational environment in East Pakistan had prevented me to face him with more than a battalion at a time. For the battle of Khulna I not only had my whole Brigade but in addition an extra battalion had also come under my command.
We had reached a most precarious stage of operational situation at this juncture. Nevertheless my officers and men were full of fighting spirit and Allah had helped us to deny the enemy the triumph of capturing Khulna. This was amply demonstrated by the number of officers and men of 107 Brigade who gloriously perished on the afternoon of 16 December 1971 when elsewhere surrender had already taken place.
Late in the afternoon on 14 December enemy 42 Brigade East of Bhairab river put up a smoke screen. Smoke shells were fired on to west bank of the river further south of Daulatpur. This was meant to confuse us as to the actual site of the crossing. We knew exactly through Al-Shams boys as to where the enemys actual concentration for crossing was taking place. We brought all our defensive fire effort on to crossing site. The enemy suffered casualties and lost a few assault boats. He abandoned further efforts of crossing. We were happy to see him digging his position east of the river.
350 Brigade which was waiting for the 42 Brigade crossing operation with which it had to synchronize its attack against 6 Punjab could not mount this attack. Air strafing and artillery bombardment continued throughout the day. Two companies attack supported by tanks was however mounted against 15 FFR right flank in the afternoon. Two M 24 Chafee tanks were employed in static anti tank role close to the road. These tanks were under command of Lieut. Salar from Hunza. They knocked out one enemy T55 Tank at close range. Enemy infantry attack soon petered out. His tanks also quickly withdrew out of Chafees range. Taking advantage of their long range capability they brought down concentrated fire against our Chafee tanks and destroyed both our antiques. The commander (Lt. Salar) and the crew were all killed. Lt. Salar was a very brave young officer who was also wounded in early November 71. He was lucky to have got a proper burial.
The same day earlier at 12 p.m. three enemy gun boats were seen coming up the river. These were probably sent to distract us from the main operation. The EPCAF wing alongwith some engineer elements and Al-Shams under command of Major Naseebullah (Shaheed,) were ready to receive the gun boats. This force had four 6 pounder anti-tank guns. They were obsolete since World War II and were deployed to take on any river craft coming up the river. These guns made great noise, but their effective range was only 6 to 8 hundred yards. At this juncture the enemy gun boats coming up the river, were suddenly attacked by 3 enemy SU-7 aircrafts, which were strafing the jetty a little while earlier. Although the gun boats were still out of our killing range but the EPCAF, Al-Shams and 6 pounders all joined in the action. The enemy aircraft and our troops togethe2 made a short work of the gun boats. Two of the gun boats were sunk while the third one was damaged and ran aground. 40 crew members along with 4 young naval officers were rescued alive and taken prisoners. 15 of the ratings were killed. These naval officers were brought to my Head quarter. They were abusing their own pilots. Lieut Col Shams-uz-Zaman Commanding Officer 22 FFR who is known for his quick wit told them dont abuse, they were not your pilots, they were Angels sent by Allah for our help. One of the Madraasi officer said Yes sir I have heard such stories about the Angels supporting Pak troops during 1965 war. Shams gave him a pat on the back and offered him a cigarette.
The attempts to attack Daulatpur-Khulna from three sides i.e. North, East and South were badly frustrated with heavy losses. The loss of three gun boats can be measured as a loss of more than a squadron of tanks. The other losses in tanks, weapons and men were also very heavy. The events of 14 December clearly show that the enemy was desparately trying to out-manoeuvre and outwit us. He thought Khulna can be taken in a coup-de-grace. Instead he came to a bitter realisation that Daulatpur-Khulna position was being defended by invincible Pak troops whose endurance and bravery could still match to that of fresh and un-tired troops. The account that follow is ample manifestation of that.
Intensive patrolling on both sides continued during night 14/15 December. On 15 December at the crack of the dawn 350 Brigade without waiting for 42 Brigade river crossing operation launched the attack along the main road. This attack was led by a Sikh Battalion of the 350 Indian Brigade. The attack was supported by Four Regiment of artillery, Brigade Mortars grouped together and tanks of 63 Cavalry Regiment all joined in softening up our defenses. A flight of SU-7 and one Canberra aircraft also joined in strafing and bombing the depth positions. Enemy also tried to neutralize our artillery guns but no serious damage was done. The speed and concentration of fire would have totally dazed and shell shocked the best seasoned troops. Thereafter the attackers could just walk in the defenses. Daulatpur and Khulna were shook for almost 45 minutes.
When this fire was lifted towards our depth positions our troops suddenly came to life and faced the enemy infantry and tanks assault, scoring direct hits against tanks. One of the tank tracks was blown up. The enemy did not expect such dogged resistance especially after 45 minutes of artillery, tanks, mortars and air strafing treatment given to the position.
All our depth position were briefed the previous night to engage the enemy air craft with medium and light machine guns. Some heavy machine gun fire hit the vulnerable spot of an enemy Canberra bomber which was seen crashing down in the marshes west of Khulna. Capt Hafiz Ali Malik a burly and truly brave officer of Brigade Head quarter was the one who organized and controlled the anti aircraft teams of Machine Guns.
By mid-day 15 December enemy attack was effectively repulsed. He was busy pulling his knocked out tanks under the cover of smoke and artillery fire. Our casualties were also very heavy. In the afternoon I visited the wounded at the Main Dressing Station (MDS) located in the Civil Hospital Khulna. Major Qureshi our surgeon was busy doing a good job. The men and officers lying there were in good spirit while some were breathing their last. On my return to the Head quarter I was informed that an enemy helicopter had tried to throw down some papers in the South of 22 FFR position. The papers could not be retrieved from the swamps. The helicopter however was chased with small arms fire. After the cease fire we were told that a Lt. Col. of Indian artillery one of the occupant in the helicopter was wounded by our fire, the officer later died of wounds. The leaflets that were being dropped were to tell us about the impending cease fire. I am sure the message received by the enemy helicopter through our firing was loud and clear. Late in the evening our Division H.Q. and Eastern command H.Q. also passed on orders to us for surrender. 350 Indian Brigade facing 6 Punjab and 15 FFR also tried to pass on message to the two battalions about cessation of fighting. Indian radio was broadcasting news about the surrender in various sectors. We were however determined not to stop the fighting unless the Indians themselve sued for it. I issued an order at night that no unit will encourage any overture by the Indians for ceasefire. I did not want to give the pleasure and feeling of elation to the Indian commander to announce to the world that a Brigade Group of Pakistani troops at Khulna has accepted to surrender as usual on 16th December 1971. We were quite confident to defend Khulna for the next few weeks. The boastfulness of Indians during earlier operation against our thinly held position was blown sky-high at Khulna.
During the night we discussed the denial plan for destruction of important installations like Radio and microwave stations, telephone exchange, the Jetty, Pak currency in Banks (which was 14 crores and took the engineers the whole of 16 Dec. to burn currency notes) POL depot close to the Jetty was not included, for it would have set Khulna on fire. All our vehicles and heavy weapons, were either to be sunk during the high tide or destroyed. This was quite a tricky question as to what priority should be accorded to this process for, if the fighting was prolonged, what were we to do. During the night there was a strange and unexpected lull, except for some sporadic small arms fire and some loud calls in Punjabi language from 42 Indian Brigade position across the river. The messages were something like O Musliho, the war is over, stop fighting.
On the morning of 16 December 9th Indian Division was in quandary. Its commander must have been shy of informing his superiors about our refusal to surrender. He had the command of the strongest Division in the theatre of operations and yet he could not capture Khulna. General Dalbir Singh, Commander 9 Indian division therefore decided to put in a two prong attack with 350 Brigade. 32 Indian Brigade was following closely behind 350 Brigade. Preparatory bombardment on 6 Punjab and 15FFR forward positions started at 7 a.m. on 16 December. First phase of the attack was directed against 6 Punjab. A foot-hold was gained in the position of the left forward company defending the road. This company was under command of Major Nadir Pervaz. The unfortunate loss of this position took place due to some confusion which better remain unexplained.
At this time, as a precaution, I alerted the two companies who were assigned the task of immediate counter attack. 12 Punjab and 22FFR were also put on alert for a deliberate counter attack on the positions under enemy attack. As the confusion ( in military parlance it is called the fog of war) got cleared I only needed to adjust the position of the two companies (earmarked for counter attack) so as to be able to perform the task of counter penetration against the enemy. I appreciated that it was still too early to launch a counter attack. The enemy however had got into an advantageous tactical position by gaining a foot hold in the Punjab defence. The enemy used the captured ground for an attack on 15 FFR. 15 FFR was taken by surprise but their reaction was quick. D Company from the depth position was quickly sent forward to stiffen the resistance of C Company which was under heavy attack. D Company in addition to its own officers was also accompanied by Captain Shujaat Latif who was the Adjutant. This gesture on the part of Captain Shujaat Latif was rare under the circumstances and he deserves the highest praise. Due to heavy enemy fire the progress of D Company was slow, and they were losing men rapidly. Hand to hand fighting was going on between the enemy and C Company when D Company arrived. In the meanwhile enemy tank and armour infantry established a blocking position in the rear of these two companies. The enemy started exhorting them to surrender. But Lieut Arjumand Yar Khund of C Company and his platoon refused to oblige. Khund was seriously wounded but he refused to surrender (so the Indian officer told us) and at last they had to kill him. Captain Shujaat along with Major Usmani, Captain Saghir and the Artillery observer assessed the situation as hopeless. The large number of wounded who were groaning inside and outside their trenches were to be saved. So with great reluctance they ceased the resistance. One officer, 2 JCOs and 50 men were killed. Approximately 80 men were wounded. The latter were evacuated by the Indians to their hospitals. These casualties are the heaviest by any standard.
22 FFR was moved behind 15 FFR, the latter having been mauled badly. We started preparing the deliberate counter attack on 15 FFR position to be launched during the coming night i.e. 16/17 December. Late in the evening we received a message from Eastern Command informing us that, Communication between 107 brigade at Khulna and Eastern Command is being shaped by the order of Indian High Command. You should stop fighting and surrender as per terms given to you earlier. You have done your job very well. This is the last message from this Head quarter. After the receipt of this message in all honesty I could not ask my subordinates to continue fighting. It was calm and quiet except some sporadic fire and patrols clashes. We received no messages from the Indians except a call on the 6 Punjab wireless net to say that commander 350 Indian brigade will meet the Commander of Pak troops at 9:30 a.m. on 17 December outside Daulatpur. At 4 p.m. 16 December 1971 when Eastern Command was asking us to surrender, the last and heaviest attack of the enemy was being repulsed. All my units acquitted themselves very well of the tasks assigned to them. One unit that had the chance to stand out and absorb the brunt of enemy attacks was 15 FFR, commanded by Lieut Col Fateh M. Yusafzai. This battalion therefore, deserves to be awarded Khulna as a battle honour, Though we won this battle, but unfortunately lost the over-all war. So on our return from captivity no one was ready to grant this recognition to 15 FFR. 21 Punjab and 55 Field Regiment artillery commanded by Lt Cols Imtiaz Warraich and Choudhiry M. Sharif also proved their outstanding fighting qualities in this battle. 6 Punjab under Lt. Col Sharif Malik and 12 Punjab, under Lt Col Salim Malik two of the finest Punjab Regiment battalions had distinguished themselves in earlier battles as well. 22 FFR under its commander Lt Col Shams-uz-Zaman had been through the longest rigorous period of operations i.e. from March to December 1971. This unit had suffered the greatest casualties in the past and yet, the commanding officer and his battalion were itching to be allowed to launch the counter attack on the night 16/17 December, against the enemy as a parting kick. I am also proud of the Engineer Company and its commander Major Inayut-ur-Rehman. They were always so undaunted in erecting obstacles and denying the use of bridges and culverts to the enemy. All other supporting units and sub units especially the Field Ambulance Battalion performance has been most praised worthy.
I asked my Brigade major to call O group (i.e. all the commanders of units) for an immediate conference to discuss the cease fire and surrender proposal. Everyone arrived just before midnight.
The atmosphere was very serious and everyone was in a very grim mood. I said a few words as a pep talk to ease the tension, and quoted verses 5 & 6 of Sura Inshirah in which Allah has promised ease and happiness after every difficulty. I also reminded them of one of the essential aspects of an army officers character as described by Field Marshall Wavell which is mental robustness. This means the officer who possesses mental robustness remains cool and serene in defeat, while he is not unduly elated after victory. After this I told them that though we were not defeated yet we had to surrender, we had lost the war but had won the battle of Khulna and they should all be proud of it. I further emphasized on the importance of completing the action on the denial plan before the night is out. This was thoroughly implemented. The Indians felt very annoyed about it particularly the sinking of our guns.
We discussed the escape plans but gave it up due to great risk of Mukti Bahini revengeful spirit in the countryside. I and my Brigade major Fakhr-e-Alam were ready to escape, for we, as ex-commandos, had the specialized training in survival and evasion. This was vehemently opposed by the officers present especially by Colonel Saeedullah, a close friend of mine. The arguments put forward were, that apart from running a great risk of life, a Commander does not leave his subordinates in the lurch especially when the war is over. I regret having accepted the suggestion, because the treatment meted out to us on return from captivity was unfair. After finishing the business I complimented everyone on his performance. My own staff had to be patted more intimately, for they all had become very close to me.
Here is a case of humour in uniform even under worst and chaotic war conditions. On the afternoon of 16 December I came out of my Brigade Head quarters to proceed to 22 FFR for coordinating future operations. Outside the HQ I saw my batman Sepoy Mukkaram Khan walking in a bend down position close behind a well fed and plump Naik of Army Signals. Harsh arguments were going on between them when I gave them a call. They came running and the Naik was first to complain that Mukkaram was being humorous at his cost. How, I asked? the Naik said, Mukkaram is trying to take cover against the enemy fire. How? I asked the Naik again. This time Mukkaram was prompt enough to answer, Sir, his body, is too fat to be pierced by the enemy fire, hence I feel safe behind him. The signal man retorted, these bullets can go through me, you and also through your CHACHA. I was quite amused with the simple and down to earth dialogue between them.
Next morning the 17 December 1971 I met the Commander 350 Indian Brigade who took me to the Head quarters of 9 Division where I met the General Officer Commanding the Division. What happened afterwards is known to the world.
Tribute to the Heroes of Khulna will be incomplete without quoting and mentioning the compliments paid by outsiders to the troops defending Khulna. General Aurora in his articles serialized in Illustrated Weekly of India dated 16 and 23 December 1973, writes, the slow advance continued till we contacted the main defence on December 11. After this the operation for the capture of Khulna turned into a hard slogging match and progress was slow and costly.
General Sukhwant Singh, Director General of Military operations during 1971 war writes in his book Liberation of Bangladesh as follows. The Pakistan Brigade defending Khulna put up a stubborn resistance despite our heavy and repeated attacks, both sides suffered heavy losses. The Brigade commander, Malik Mohammad Hayat (I am not a Malik) spurned the surrender orders sent to him by his superiors. In fact the defence of Khulna could hold out for quite some time even after the cessation of hostilities. Whatever general Sukhwants verdict may be, one thing is amply clear, and that is we did not give up till I was convinced that the orders for surrender were final. Major Praval an Indian Historian also praised the tenacity and dogged resistance of Pak troop at Khulna.
I venture to quote a tribute paid to us by a French war correspondent who was accompanying the Indian 9 Division. President of Pakistan was holding a press conference at the governor House, Lahore during early 1972. This was also attended by Corps Commander Lahore and Brigadier G. S. Butt (now Lt. General). During the interval for questions, this French journalist congratulated the President and paid glowing tributes to the performance of 107 Brigade and its commander. In all modestly I cannot quote the exact words. The President asked the late Corps Commander Lahore the name of the Brigade Commander. This is all on record and General Butt is alive to testify. There are quite a few other sources as well who have praised the action fought by Pak troops at Khulna. I have no desire to quote them.
Though the accounts narrated by me do not need corroborative evidence of other sources, some of these have however, been quoted so as to salute my subordinates and to protect them from further scathing criticism of the armchair critics and drawing room conversationalists. My subordinates had fought for the honour of Pakistan. Victory has many fathers, while defeat is a poor orphan, no one owns it. So said Mr. J. F. Kennedy in 1962 after the fiasco of Bay of ######. We were defeated and the wounds of defeated warriors keep on speaking. We have suffered in silence for all these years and will continue to suffer, especially when the nation keeps itself on the road to self destruction and has no time to prepare itself for exacting retribution. I pray to Allah that He gives us the strength and courage to redeem our honour in the coming years. Ameen!!.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Brig (Retd) Muhammad Hayat, SJ was commissioned in 2/12 FFR(now 4FFR) on July 13, 1947. Participated in the Kashmir war 1947-48. He has been instructor at the Infantry School and the Pakistan Military Academy. Commanded 4 FFR and 2 Commando Battalion. Commanded AK Brigade and 107 brigade doing operations in East Pakistan in 19971, Retired from the Army in 1975 after returning from India as POW in 1974. He was decorated with the Sitara-i-Jurat for bravery in battle during the 1965 War. He is a graduate of Command and Staff College, Quetta as well as the Mountaineering and Rangers Course, USA.
The brave and gallant deeds of the officers and men of the Pakistan Force who defended Khulna from 10 to 17 December 1971 are briefly recounted below. My primary object is to pay homage to those Shaheeds who are now lying in unmarked graves in and around Khulna (now a foreign land) and hope it will provide some solace and satisfaction to the relations of those Shaheeds. This article is also meant to salute the living veteran officers and men whose valour and sacrifices have given me pride as their commander at the time. The secondary purpose is explained in the following paragraph. "Kill two birds with one stone" so the dictum goes! Some of my friends have been imploring me for a long time, that I should pass on my accounts of 1971 war for the benefit of the coming generation. So my friends, here is the first instalment.
I have chosen to narrate the battle of Khulna first. Though this was the last battle, yet it is the most epoch-making battle of my Brigade operations in the erstwhile East Pakistan. Secondly, being the last battle even the Indian commanders and historians have only published brief accounts of it. For they were carried away by the events of mass surrenders taking place elsewhere at the time. The foreign war correspondents who were accompanying the Indian Forces around Khulna had mostly rushed to Dacca to cover the big event of surrender, while this battle was raging with great intensity on 16 and night of 16/17 December. There were no Pakistani war correspondents nor has any Pakistani officer who participated in the battle has narrated or published his accounts. Hence detailed and authentic Pakistani version of this battle has not come on record. I hope this brief account of mine will fill in the void to some extent. These are some of the reasons that I have undertaken to narrate the battle of Khulna first, while, the other operations of the Brigade will be narrated in due course of time, Insha Allah.
The formations and units of both sides who took part in this battle are listed below. This will make it easy for the reader to follow the battle.
Indian Forces
9 Indian Infantry Division with under command;
a. 32 Brigade=4 Battalions
b. 42 Brigade=3 Battalions
c. 350 Brigades=4 Battalions
d. 45 Para Brigade less Battalion in reserves
e. Divisional Artillery Brigade
f. Corps medium artillery regiment (130 mm guns)
g. 63 Cavalry Regiment (T-55 tanks)
h. Two squadrons 45 Cavalry (PT 76 amphibian tanks
I. Two Eng: battalions equipped with light alloy bridging equipment
j. One mechanized armoured battalion (7 Punjab)
k. Five border security force (BSF) battalions
Normal Divisional complements of services and administrative units.
IAF air Sorties, ground support and intense interdiction Daylight movement impossible
a. A brigade of Mukti Bhaini
b. Bulk of the Bengali population was hostile to us
Pak Forces
107 Brigades with under command;
a. 6 Punjab Regiment
b. 12 Punjab Regiment
c. 15 FFR
d. 22 FFR
e. 21 Punjab, (R & S) two companies only
f. Two M 24 Chafee Tanks
g. 55 Field Regiment Artillery (Only 15 field guns)
h. No. 7 Engineer company of 10 Engineer Battalion.
I. One wing East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces (EPCAF) and Raza Kars
j. 150 Bengali Volunteers of Al-Shams (Students Organization of Jamate Islami)
No air support
No intelligence about enemy plans or operations. Local sources no longer reliable.
Deployment of troops (see sketch)
On the afternoon of 10 December 1971 the above Forces came face to face outside Phultala, a town 17 K.M. north of Khulna. The Indians were poised for attack while we were deployed for defence. The main deployment of 107 Pak. Brigade and attached troops were as under:- (see sketch).
a. Two companies of 15 FFR and a company of 21 Punjab with Recoilless Rifles (R & S) under overall command of Major Nazar. He was an experienced and veteran officer of 21 Punjab. These troops were deployed at Phultala astride the main road.
b. 12 Punjab Regiment was deployed in the vicinity of Miksimil facing due west.
c. 15 FFR was holding position left of road at Daulatpur just north of Khulna.
d. 6 Punjab Regiment was holding position right of Road at Daulatpur.
e. 22 FFR was covering south with the major task to launch a deliberate counter attack on 6 Punjab and 15 FFR position.
f. 55 field Artillery Regiment was deployed in the middle so that it can cover all positions.
g. A wing of EPCF and Al-Shams were holding the river line in the south to prevent any river crafts coming up the river. This force was under command Major Nasibullah (Shaheed).
h. An Engineers Platoon was at the jetty with some Al-Shams personnel to patrol the river. The remaining company was laying mines and making obstacles on roads and tracks in front of main defence.
i. All the civilian inland water transport vessels were impounded.
The position occupied at Phultala was a screen position. The screen position is meant to impose delay on the enemy for specific time thus allowing time for the main force to prepare its defenses. Major Nazar had deployed his force in a sound tactical manner. All the likely approaches were mined and enemy assembly area were mined and booby trapped. These places were also registered as artillery and 3" mortars targets. Extensive and aggressive patrolling at night were carried out. The enemy tried to rush the screen position after midnight 10/11 December with support of heavy artillery fire but was effectively repulsed. We suffered a few causalities. Captain Bilal (Shaheed) of 15 FFR was adjusting his forward most position and was killed in action. Night 10/11 December was, thereafter mostly used by the enemy to probe the flanks of our screen position in order to make flanking manoeuvre. The right flank of this position was resting on river Bhairab in the east whereas its left flank on the West, was effectively covering a track leading out of Phultala towards the south-west. The enemy therefore perforce had to launch frontal attack along the Phultala-Khulna road so as to effect an opening.
A powerful infantry attack support by heavy tanks of 63 Cavalry and a mechanized company of 7 Punjab was launched at dawn on 11 December. The enemy had wrongly appreciated the Phultala screen position as our main brigade position, he therefore in addition to artillery, tanks and mechanized elements also employed considerable air support. The entire screen position was subjected to heavy artillery and air bombardment from 7 a.m. to 8 a.m. When assaulting troops supported by tanks appeared, our recoilless rifles came into action. They knocked out two enemy tanks within minutes. Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) of the enemy 7 Punjab Regiment which were following closely behind the tanks quickly withdrew towards the rear. The infantry assault automatically petered out with heavy losses. Captain Mehboob of R & S company was seriously wounded. A Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO) and 12 men were also wounded. Maj. Nazar was confident of holding the enemy at bay. The enemy became quite cautious. This little breathing time that we gained was a God sent opportunity and we fully utilized it to our advantage in developing and strengthening our defence at Daulatpur and Khulna.
During the afternoon enemy tried to take a mechanized column from behind Phultala towards the South-West on a track leading to village Pipral. Our gunners and strong standing patrols from 15 FFR stopped this column. By evening, 11 December, this enemy column was back in Phultala.
During night 11/12 December there was intense activity in the rear area of the enemy which we appreciated to be preparation for a major attack on Phultala screen position. Enemy was also reported to be making a crossing on the Bhairab river toward the east. This was later confirmed to be 42 Indian Brigade and some PT 76 tanks, but this did not unduly disturb our screen position. The officers and troops in this position deserve the highest compliments for their tenacity and spirit in continuing to occupy their trenches. At midnight, the enemy mounted a strong infantry raid on the positions along the road. This raid was beaten back. At 10 AM. on 12th December the enemy mounted his third attack on the center of the screen position. We unfortunately suffered heavy casualties. Two of our officers were wounded (Major Eizaz and Lieut. Tariq Ahmad Hussain of 15 FFR). We were left with Major Nazar and an artillery officer who showed no anxiety about the situation. The two wounded officers and 12 men could not be evacuated because of the enemy strafing and shelling on the road. The screen position had achieved its purpose by this time. No re-adjustments were therefore required.
At 4 p.m. on 12 December orders to Major Nazar were issued to withdraw to the main position starting after last light. They were to make a clean break with enemy by midnight 12/13 December. Withdrawl operation when in close contact with the enemy is a most difficult operation. There is every likelihood of this operation turning into a running battle resulting into great confusion. Major Nazar was a seasoned officer and he saw to it that withdrawl was meticulously regulated. Soon after last light the wounded were dispatched to the Main Dressing Station established by our Field Ambulance at Khulna. Here surgical operations could be carried out under field conditions. After the wounded were cleared. Thinning out of heavy weapons followed by infantry was started. During the dark hours, the enemy usually kept on bringing heavy concentration of artillery prediction fire on to the road to harass our troops and prevent smooth replenishment and evacuation of wounded. Fortunately very little damage was done to our vehicles and the troops on the road. Soon after midnight the screen position had stealthily withdrawn out to the main position. An observation patrol of one section was left with wireless set and an artillery observer till dawn 13 December so as to pass on information about any follow up by the enemy.
The memorable screen position battle at Phultala from 10-12 December was over. This temporary position withstood three major attacks and in process suffered 100 casualties with most of the officers either killed or seriously wounded. It provided the badly needed time for the main defence at Khulna. A few minutes before the first light the enemy launched a full scale Brigade attack on the vacant screen position. This showed how stealthily we had vacated the screen position. The enemy must have been disappointed to discover that our stratagem was successful. This screen position battle was fought by a composite force of less than a battalion. It should therefore be recorded and recognized as a celebrated operation.
At 8 a.m. 13 December a standing patrol of 15 FFR in the vicinity of Pipral Village south west of Phultala sighted a mechanized column coming down the track. The patrol had two RR jeeps hiding in the foliage. One infantry platoon with a machine gun detachment had also been in position as a Standing Patrol. As soon as the column came within the range of recoilless rifles two of the leading APCs were shot thus blocking further progress of the column on the narrow track. The enemy called an air sortie and two infantry company that were riding the APCs were to assault the standing patrol position. In the encounter we lost one jeep and its crew due to air action. The rest of the patrol safely rejoined 15 FFR. The damaged and burnt out APCs were recovered by the enemy to clear the track for further operations. By this time the enemy had realized that Phultala position was only delaying position. Main defence of Daulatpur and Khulna were still to be tackled.
On the morning of 14 December the enemy tried to probe towards south-west where they came up against 12 Punjab and found themselves marooned on the track leading to village Maksimil. This was because on either side of the track was permanent marshy ground. 12 Punjab found the enemy easy prey and hence knocked out two enemy APCs as they were sitting ducks on that narrow track. The remaining column hastily retreated and got out of 12 Punjab RRs range. The operations of Phultala, Pipral and Maksimil were carried out by 32 Indian Brigade.
At midday 14 December some kind of panic at Maksimil was reported. I with my dashing G-3 Capt. Mehboob Qadir now (a Brigadier) rushed to 12 Punjab. The battalion was being treated to an unprecedented artillery bombardment. When we arrived at the Battalion HQ we found it in deathly silence. The only living things we saw on the surface were few dogs who had taken cover against a well. When they saw us they started weeping and literally started crawling towards us. The panic that was created was due to some misunderstanding in reading the battle. 12 Punjab was again in its usual cool and aggressive mood.
On return to Head quarter I was informed by my Brigade Major (now Lt. colonel) Fakher-e-Alam that Al-shams boys have brought the information that a strong column of enemy was coming down south along the eastern bank of Bhairab River and will be reaching the right flank of 6 Punjab Regiment any time. This force was later recognized to be 42 Indian Brigade supported by squadron of PT76 amphibian tanks and an engineer battalion with assault boats and bridging equipment. Their task was to cross the river at the ferry close to Daulatpur and attack 6 Punjab right flank. This they thought would unhinge our defencs and will pave the way for a frontal attack along the road at the junction of 6 Punjab and 15 FFR. 42 Brigade crossing attempt was detected by the depth company of 6 Punjab at 3 p.m. Our artillery regiment defensive fire was brought down onto this old ferry site. 6 Punjab company with quick adjustment in its position started dominating the far bank of the river with anti tank and small arms fire against the enemy concentration. The enemy assault attempt across the river was effectively foiled and the enemy suffered almost 70 casualties as reported by him to his H.Q.
In the meanwhile one company each from 12 Punjab and 22 FFR under Majors Gulzar Jadoon and Samin Jan Babar respectively were ordered to take up position behind 6 Punjab. I had chosen these two company commanders, for they had shown promise and courage of a very high degree during earlier operations. This forces position was so adjusted that the bias of defence was towards the river side. They were initially placed as immediate counter attack force. Having coordinated that I made a quick visit to 6 Punjab and then to 15 FFR, where I expected a frontal attack any time. I found the officers and men of these battalions in good spirit. Having given few essential instructions about the impending enemy attack I returned to my H.Q.
I was quite satisfied and very keen to settle some scores with commander 9 Indian Division. In the past our faulty policy and other peculiar operational environment in East Pakistan had prevented me to face him with more than a battalion at a time. For the battle of Khulna I not only had my whole Brigade but in addition an extra battalion had also come under my command.
We had reached a most precarious stage of operational situation at this juncture. Nevertheless my officers and men were full of fighting spirit and Allah had helped us to deny the enemy the triumph of capturing Khulna. This was amply demonstrated by the number of officers and men of 107 Brigade who gloriously perished on the afternoon of 16 December 1971 when elsewhere surrender had already taken place.
Late in the afternoon on 14 December enemy 42 Brigade East of Bhairab river put up a smoke screen. Smoke shells were fired on to west bank of the river further south of Daulatpur. This was meant to confuse us as to the actual site of the crossing. We knew exactly through Al-Shams boys as to where the enemys actual concentration for crossing was taking place. We brought all our defensive fire effort on to crossing site. The enemy suffered casualties and lost a few assault boats. He abandoned further efforts of crossing. We were happy to see him digging his position east of the river.
350 Brigade which was waiting for the 42 Brigade crossing operation with which it had to synchronize its attack against 6 Punjab could not mount this attack. Air strafing and artillery bombardment continued throughout the day. Two companies attack supported by tanks was however mounted against 15 FFR right flank in the afternoon. Two M 24 Chafee tanks were employed in static anti tank role close to the road. These tanks were under command of Lieut. Salar from Hunza. They knocked out one enemy T55 Tank at close range. Enemy infantry attack soon petered out. His tanks also quickly withdrew out of Chafees range. Taking advantage of their long range capability they brought down concentrated fire against our Chafee tanks and destroyed both our antiques. The commander (Lt. Salar) and the crew were all killed. Lt. Salar was a very brave young officer who was also wounded in early November 71. He was lucky to have got a proper burial.
The same day earlier at 12 p.m. three enemy gun boats were seen coming up the river. These were probably sent to distract us from the main operation. The EPCAF wing alongwith some engineer elements and Al-Shams under command of Major Naseebullah (Shaheed,) were ready to receive the gun boats. This force had four 6 pounder anti-tank guns. They were obsolete since World War II and were deployed to take on any river craft coming up the river. These guns made great noise, but their effective range was only 6 to 8 hundred yards. At this juncture the enemy gun boats coming up the river, were suddenly attacked by 3 enemy SU-7 aircrafts, which were strafing the jetty a little while earlier. Although the gun boats were still out of our killing range but the EPCAF, Al-Shams and 6 pounders all joined in the action. The enemy aircraft and our troops togethe2 made a short work of the gun boats. Two of the gun boats were sunk while the third one was damaged and ran aground. 40 crew members along with 4 young naval officers were rescued alive and taken prisoners. 15 of the ratings were killed. These naval officers were brought to my Head quarter. They were abusing their own pilots. Lieut Col Shams-uz-Zaman Commanding Officer 22 FFR who is known for his quick wit told them dont abuse, they were not your pilots, they were Angels sent by Allah for our help. One of the Madraasi officer said Yes sir I have heard such stories about the Angels supporting Pak troops during 1965 war. Shams gave him a pat on the back and offered him a cigarette.
The attempts to attack Daulatpur-Khulna from three sides i.e. North, East and South were badly frustrated with heavy losses. The loss of three gun boats can be measured as a loss of more than a squadron of tanks. The other losses in tanks, weapons and men were also very heavy. The events of 14 December clearly show that the enemy was desparately trying to out-manoeuvre and outwit us. He thought Khulna can be taken in a coup-de-grace. Instead he came to a bitter realisation that Daulatpur-Khulna position was being defended by invincible Pak troops whose endurance and bravery could still match to that of fresh and un-tired troops. The account that follow is ample manifestation of that.
Intensive patrolling on both sides continued during night 14/15 December. On 15 December at the crack of the dawn 350 Brigade without waiting for 42 Brigade river crossing operation launched the attack along the main road. This attack was led by a Sikh Battalion of the 350 Indian Brigade. The attack was supported by Four Regiment of artillery, Brigade Mortars grouped together and tanks of 63 Cavalry Regiment all joined in softening up our defenses. A flight of SU-7 and one Canberra aircraft also joined in strafing and bombing the depth positions. Enemy also tried to neutralize our artillery guns but no serious damage was done. The speed and concentration of fire would have totally dazed and shell shocked the best seasoned troops. Thereafter the attackers could just walk in the defenses. Daulatpur and Khulna were shook for almost 45 minutes.
When this fire was lifted towards our depth positions our troops suddenly came to life and faced the enemy infantry and tanks assault, scoring direct hits against tanks. One of the tank tracks was blown up. The enemy did not expect such dogged resistance especially after 45 minutes of artillery, tanks, mortars and air strafing treatment given to the position.
All our depth position were briefed the previous night to engage the enemy air craft with medium and light machine guns. Some heavy machine gun fire hit the vulnerable spot of an enemy Canberra bomber which was seen crashing down in the marshes west of Khulna. Capt Hafiz Ali Malik a burly and truly brave officer of Brigade Head quarter was the one who organized and controlled the anti aircraft teams of Machine Guns.
By mid-day 15 December enemy attack was effectively repulsed. He was busy pulling his knocked out tanks under the cover of smoke and artillery fire. Our casualties were also very heavy. In the afternoon I visited the wounded at the Main Dressing Station (MDS) located in the Civil Hospital Khulna. Major Qureshi our surgeon was busy doing a good job. The men and officers lying there were in good spirit while some were breathing their last. On my return to the Head quarter I was informed that an enemy helicopter had tried to throw down some papers in the South of 22 FFR position. The papers could not be retrieved from the swamps. The helicopter however was chased with small arms fire. After the cease fire we were told that a Lt. Col. of Indian artillery one of the occupant in the helicopter was wounded by our fire, the officer later died of wounds. The leaflets that were being dropped were to tell us about the impending cease fire. I am sure the message received by the enemy helicopter through our firing was loud and clear. Late in the evening our Division H.Q. and Eastern command H.Q. also passed on orders to us for surrender. 350 Indian Brigade facing 6 Punjab and 15 FFR also tried to pass on message to the two battalions about cessation of fighting. Indian radio was broadcasting news about the surrender in various sectors. We were however determined not to stop the fighting unless the Indians themselve sued for it. I issued an order at night that no unit will encourage any overture by the Indians for ceasefire. I did not want to give the pleasure and feeling of elation to the Indian commander to announce to the world that a Brigade Group of Pakistani troops at Khulna has accepted to surrender as usual on 16th December 1971. We were quite confident to defend Khulna for the next few weeks. The boastfulness of Indians during earlier operation against our thinly held position was blown sky-high at Khulna.
During the night we discussed the denial plan for destruction of important installations like Radio and microwave stations, telephone exchange, the Jetty, Pak currency in Banks (which was 14 crores and took the engineers the whole of 16 Dec. to burn currency notes) POL depot close to the Jetty was not included, for it would have set Khulna on fire. All our vehicles and heavy weapons, were either to be sunk during the high tide or destroyed. This was quite a tricky question as to what priority should be accorded to this process for, if the fighting was prolonged, what were we to do. During the night there was a strange and unexpected lull, except for some sporadic small arms fire and some loud calls in Punjabi language from 42 Indian Brigade position across the river. The messages were something like O Musliho, the war is over, stop fighting.
On the morning of 16 December 9th Indian Division was in quandary. Its commander must have been shy of informing his superiors about our refusal to surrender. He had the command of the strongest Division in the theatre of operations and yet he could not capture Khulna. General Dalbir Singh, Commander 9 Indian division therefore decided to put in a two prong attack with 350 Brigade. 32 Indian Brigade was following closely behind 350 Brigade. Preparatory bombardment on 6 Punjab and 15FFR forward positions started at 7 a.m. on 16 December. First phase of the attack was directed against 6 Punjab. A foot-hold was gained in the position of the left forward company defending the road. This company was under command of Major Nadir Pervaz. The unfortunate loss of this position took place due to some confusion which better remain unexplained.
At this time, as a precaution, I alerted the two companies who were assigned the task of immediate counter attack. 12 Punjab and 22FFR were also put on alert for a deliberate counter attack on the positions under enemy attack. As the confusion ( in military parlance it is called the fog of war) got cleared I only needed to adjust the position of the two companies (earmarked for counter attack) so as to be able to perform the task of counter penetration against the enemy. I appreciated that it was still too early to launch a counter attack. The enemy however had got into an advantageous tactical position by gaining a foot hold in the Punjab defence. The enemy used the captured ground for an attack on 15 FFR. 15 FFR was taken by surprise but their reaction was quick. D Company from the depth position was quickly sent forward to stiffen the resistance of C Company which was under heavy attack. D Company in addition to its own officers was also accompanied by Captain Shujaat Latif who was the Adjutant. This gesture on the part of Captain Shujaat Latif was rare under the circumstances and he deserves the highest praise. Due to heavy enemy fire the progress of D Company was slow, and they were losing men rapidly. Hand to hand fighting was going on between the enemy and C Company when D Company arrived. In the meanwhile enemy tank and armour infantry established a blocking position in the rear of these two companies. The enemy started exhorting them to surrender. But Lieut Arjumand Yar Khund of C Company and his platoon refused to oblige. Khund was seriously wounded but he refused to surrender (so the Indian officer told us) and at last they had to kill him. Captain Shujaat along with Major Usmani, Captain Saghir and the Artillery observer assessed the situation as hopeless. The large number of wounded who were groaning inside and outside their trenches were to be saved. So with great reluctance they ceased the resistance. One officer, 2 JCOs and 50 men were killed. Approximately 80 men were wounded. The latter were evacuated by the Indians to their hospitals. These casualties are the heaviest by any standard.
22 FFR was moved behind 15 FFR, the latter having been mauled badly. We started preparing the deliberate counter attack on 15 FFR position to be launched during the coming night i.e. 16/17 December. Late in the evening we received a message from Eastern Command informing us that, Communication between 107 brigade at Khulna and Eastern Command is being shaped by the order of Indian High Command. You should stop fighting and surrender as per terms given to you earlier. You have done your job very well. This is the last message from this Head quarter. After the receipt of this message in all honesty I could not ask my subordinates to continue fighting. It was calm and quiet except some sporadic fire and patrols clashes. We received no messages from the Indians except a call on the 6 Punjab wireless net to say that commander 350 Indian brigade will meet the Commander of Pak troops at 9:30 a.m. on 17 December outside Daulatpur. At 4 p.m. 16 December 1971 when Eastern Command was asking us to surrender, the last and heaviest attack of the enemy was being repulsed. All my units acquitted themselves very well of the tasks assigned to them. One unit that had the chance to stand out and absorb the brunt of enemy attacks was 15 FFR, commanded by Lieut Col Fateh M. Yusafzai. This battalion therefore, deserves to be awarded Khulna as a battle honour, Though we won this battle, but unfortunately lost the over-all war. So on our return from captivity no one was ready to grant this recognition to 15 FFR. 21 Punjab and 55 Field Regiment artillery commanded by Lt Cols Imtiaz Warraich and Choudhiry M. Sharif also proved their outstanding fighting qualities in this battle. 6 Punjab under Lt. Col Sharif Malik and 12 Punjab, under Lt Col Salim Malik two of the finest Punjab Regiment battalions had distinguished themselves in earlier battles as well. 22 FFR under its commander Lt Col Shams-uz-Zaman had been through the longest rigorous period of operations i.e. from March to December 1971. This unit had suffered the greatest casualties in the past and yet, the commanding officer and his battalion were itching to be allowed to launch the counter attack on the night 16/17 December, against the enemy as a parting kick. I am also proud of the Engineer Company and its commander Major Inayut-ur-Rehman. They were always so undaunted in erecting obstacles and denying the use of bridges and culverts to the enemy. All other supporting units and sub units especially the Field Ambulance Battalion performance has been most praised worthy.
I asked my Brigade major to call O group (i.e. all the commanders of units) for an immediate conference to discuss the cease fire and surrender proposal. Everyone arrived just before midnight.
The atmosphere was very serious and everyone was in a very grim mood. I said a few words as a pep talk to ease the tension, and quoted verses 5 & 6 of Sura Inshirah in which Allah has promised ease and happiness after every difficulty. I also reminded them of one of the essential aspects of an army officers character as described by Field Marshall Wavell which is mental robustness. This means the officer who possesses mental robustness remains cool and serene in defeat, while he is not unduly elated after victory. After this I told them that though we were not defeated yet we had to surrender, we had lost the war but had won the battle of Khulna and they should all be proud of it. I further emphasized on the importance of completing the action on the denial plan before the night is out. This was thoroughly implemented. The Indians felt very annoyed about it particularly the sinking of our guns.
We discussed the escape plans but gave it up due to great risk of Mukti Bahini revengeful spirit in the countryside. I and my Brigade major Fakhr-e-Alam were ready to escape, for we, as ex-commandos, had the specialized training in survival and evasion. This was vehemently opposed by the officers present especially by Colonel Saeedullah, a close friend of mine. The arguments put forward were, that apart from running a great risk of life, a Commander does not leave his subordinates in the lurch especially when the war is over. I regret having accepted the suggestion, because the treatment meted out to us on return from captivity was unfair. After finishing the business I complimented everyone on his performance. My own staff had to be patted more intimately, for they all had become very close to me.
Here is a case of humour in uniform even under worst and chaotic war conditions. On the afternoon of 16 December I came out of my Brigade Head quarters to proceed to 22 FFR for coordinating future operations. Outside the HQ I saw my batman Sepoy Mukkaram Khan walking in a bend down position close behind a well fed and plump Naik of Army Signals. Harsh arguments were going on between them when I gave them a call. They came running and the Naik was first to complain that Mukkaram was being humorous at his cost. How, I asked? the Naik said, Mukkaram is trying to take cover against the enemy fire. How? I asked the Naik again. This time Mukkaram was prompt enough to answer, Sir, his body, is too fat to be pierced by the enemy fire, hence I feel safe behind him. The signal man retorted, these bullets can go through me, you and also through your CHACHA. I was quite amused with the simple and down to earth dialogue between them.
Next morning the 17 December 1971 I met the Commander 350 Indian Brigade who took me to the Head quarters of 9 Division where I met the General Officer Commanding the Division. What happened afterwards is known to the world.
Tribute to the Heroes of Khulna will be incomplete without quoting and mentioning the compliments paid by outsiders to the troops defending Khulna. General Aurora in his articles serialized in Illustrated Weekly of India dated 16 and 23 December 1973, writes, the slow advance continued till we contacted the main defence on December 11. After this the operation for the capture of Khulna turned into a hard slogging match and progress was slow and costly.
General Sukhwant Singh, Director General of Military operations during 1971 war writes in his book Liberation of Bangladesh as follows. The Pakistan Brigade defending Khulna put up a stubborn resistance despite our heavy and repeated attacks, both sides suffered heavy losses. The Brigade commander, Malik Mohammad Hayat (I am not a Malik) spurned the surrender orders sent to him by his superiors. In fact the defence of Khulna could hold out for quite some time even after the cessation of hostilities. Whatever general Sukhwants verdict may be, one thing is amply clear, and that is we did not give up till I was convinced that the orders for surrender were final. Major Praval an Indian Historian also praised the tenacity and dogged resistance of Pak troop at Khulna.
I venture to quote a tribute paid to us by a French war correspondent who was accompanying the Indian 9 Division. President of Pakistan was holding a press conference at the governor House, Lahore during early 1972. This was also attended by Corps Commander Lahore and Brigadier G. S. Butt (now Lt. General). During the interval for questions, this French journalist congratulated the President and paid glowing tributes to the performance of 107 Brigade and its commander. In all modestly I cannot quote the exact words. The President asked the late Corps Commander Lahore the name of the Brigade Commander. This is all on record and General Butt is alive to testify. There are quite a few other sources as well who have praised the action fought by Pak troops at Khulna. I have no desire to quote them.
Though the accounts narrated by me do not need corroborative evidence of other sources, some of these have however, been quoted so as to salute my subordinates and to protect them from further scathing criticism of the armchair critics and drawing room conversationalists. My subordinates had fought for the honour of Pakistan. Victory has many fathers, while defeat is a poor orphan, no one owns it. So said Mr. J. F. Kennedy in 1962 after the fiasco of Bay of ######. We were defeated and the wounds of defeated warriors keep on speaking. We have suffered in silence for all these years and will continue to suffer, especially when the nation keeps itself on the road to self destruction and has no time to prepare itself for exacting retribution. I pray to Allah that He gives us the strength and courage to redeem our honour in the coming years. Ameen!!.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Brig (Retd) Muhammad Hayat, SJ was commissioned in 2/12 FFR(now 4FFR) on July 13, 1947. Participated in the Kashmir war 1947-48. He has been instructor at the Infantry School and the Pakistan Military Academy. Commanded 4 FFR and 2 Commando Battalion. Commanded AK Brigade and 107 brigade doing operations in East Pakistan in 19971, Retired from the Army in 1975 after returning from India as POW in 1974. He was decorated with the Sitara-i-Jurat for bravery in battle during the 1965 War. He is a graduate of Command and Staff College, Quetta as well as the Mountaineering and Rangers Course, USA.
