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Terror Spirals From Pakistan to Iraq
February 3, 2010 by Muqaawama
Pakistan has come to another critical point in its war against extremism with the unconfirmed reports that the Pakistani Taliban leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, has succumbed to wounds he sustained in a U.S. drone attack in January. If the reports prove true, that would be two Taliban leaders, as well as numerous mid-level operatives, lost to targeted attacks in less than 6 months. The CIAs unmanned drone campaign in Pakistans Tribal Areas seems to have decimated Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership and severely disrupted their command and control structures.
But the true true test will come in the days and weeks ahead. If the Taliban have truly lost their leader once again, there will be considerable pressure to prove to the world that they are still strong, that they can hit back. If this retribution comes in the form of further jihadist attacks with civilian casualties in the Pakistani heartlands further south, this will elicit a further deterioration of the Talibans image in the eyes of average Pakistanis. As Pakistani public opinion hardens against indiscriminate Taliban violence, the Pakistani state and military will have more space and support to exploit, divide and defeat the extremist threat. This is the downward spiral the Pakistani Taliban has experienced over the last year. It is an important lesson in waging the broader, global war against extremism.
In the long war, reactions are often more telling than actions. How each side responds to provocation, or concession, by the other side can mean the difference between a surge or a spiral. The turning point for the Pakistani Taliban came in the early months of 2009 when they began to creep into the Swat Valley, calling for full implementation of Shariah law. For Swat Valley residents tired of government corruption, discrimination, neo-feudalism and non-existent public services, the Taliban represented a new possibility. Perhaps they would govern with less naked greed and provide the kind of law, order and justice that the government in Islamabad could not.The Pakistani government did not have the public backing for a military campaign against the Taliban at this stage. The extremists were widely viewed as misunderstood warriors of the faith who served their purpose: protecting Pakistans northern frontier from Indian encroachment and continuing the fight against occupation in Kashmir. The government caved. They signed a peace agreement and let Shariah law rule in Swat in exchange for the Taliban laying down their arms.
What happened next was a critical miscalculation by the Taliban leadership. Sensing government weakness, Taliban militants began to expand into neighboring Buner district. Far from putting down their weapons, the signal from the extremists in response to a major government concession was that they would still not be satisfied. At the same time, disturbing videos and news reports of Taliban style justice- including one in particular of a woman being beaten- began to circulate across the Pakistani media and on the Internet. The shift in public opinion was palpable and immediate. While broad swaths of Pakistani society are clearly devout, this brand of dishonesty and harsh justice was not compatible with their idea of governance or faith. The militarys campaign to oust the Taliban from Swat and Buner began in earnest shortly thereafter. The response to this from Taliban leadership was to expand its terror campaign into NWFP and the Punjabi heartland, further alienating large portions of the general population. And the Taliban spiral downward accelerated What does this teach us?
1. The downward spiral of the Taliban began with a concession, an invitation to rule, not a military campaign or a smart-bomb strike. These tactics have their place, but often it is better to let militants hang themselves, to show their colors instead of remaining in the shadows and quoting some vague Koranic injunction. At the end of the day, governance matters to people more than the afterlife. It is much easier to rail against the system than propose viable solutions, as the mullahs of Iran are finding out daily. Islam has not saved them.
2. Because governance matters, building military and security capability in Pakistani and Afghanistan is only part of the solution. How these governments govern, whether they can provide basic services, is critical. This will anger proponents of a narrower war on terror that does not include nation building. But we must remember how extremism began and gained momentum across the Muslim world, from Egypt to Iran to South Asia- as a critique of poor governance by secular dictatorships. This does not mean the U.S. should forever prop up weak partner governments across the Muslim world with treasure and troops. On the contrary, U.S. support often only further delays the day when these states will learn to govern themselves.
3. How WE react to our adversaries is important too and can save or cost lives. Many moderate Muslims felt the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 was justified. The Taliban had harbored vicious extremists and represented a perverted form of Islam. Muslim public opinion began to swing with the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo scandals. There was a sense that America was lashing out, straying from the main perpetrators of 9/11, that a just war had become about other objectives: deterring Iran, capturing oil resources, and punishing Saddam. America had entered its own vicious spiral.
4. Who cares about broader Muslim public opinion? We should. It is a powerful weapon in the long war and a potential achilles heal for our local allies. It was the broader Iraqi publics turn away from extremist violence in 2006-7 that allowed us to stabilize the country with the birth of the Awakening movement. Conversely, it was the Afghan publics disgust with poor government services and corruption from Kabul that paved the way for a Taliban resurgence in the years of drift after the U.S. invasion. Our adversaries have proven stupid enough to be coaxed into their own downward spirals. But we must also be mindful of stepping into our own
Terror Spirals From Pakistan to Iraq Muqaawama
February 3, 2010 by Muqaawama
Pakistan has come to another critical point in its war against extremism with the unconfirmed reports that the Pakistani Taliban leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, has succumbed to wounds he sustained in a U.S. drone attack in January. If the reports prove true, that would be two Taliban leaders, as well as numerous mid-level operatives, lost to targeted attacks in less than 6 months. The CIAs unmanned drone campaign in Pakistans Tribal Areas seems to have decimated Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership and severely disrupted their command and control structures.
But the true true test will come in the days and weeks ahead. If the Taliban have truly lost their leader once again, there will be considerable pressure to prove to the world that they are still strong, that they can hit back. If this retribution comes in the form of further jihadist attacks with civilian casualties in the Pakistani heartlands further south, this will elicit a further deterioration of the Talibans image in the eyes of average Pakistanis. As Pakistani public opinion hardens against indiscriminate Taliban violence, the Pakistani state and military will have more space and support to exploit, divide and defeat the extremist threat. This is the downward spiral the Pakistani Taliban has experienced over the last year. It is an important lesson in waging the broader, global war against extremism.
In the long war, reactions are often more telling than actions. How each side responds to provocation, or concession, by the other side can mean the difference between a surge or a spiral. The turning point for the Pakistani Taliban came in the early months of 2009 when they began to creep into the Swat Valley, calling for full implementation of Shariah law. For Swat Valley residents tired of government corruption, discrimination, neo-feudalism and non-existent public services, the Taliban represented a new possibility. Perhaps they would govern with less naked greed and provide the kind of law, order and justice that the government in Islamabad could not.The Pakistani government did not have the public backing for a military campaign against the Taliban at this stage. The extremists were widely viewed as misunderstood warriors of the faith who served their purpose: protecting Pakistans northern frontier from Indian encroachment and continuing the fight against occupation in Kashmir. The government caved. They signed a peace agreement and let Shariah law rule in Swat in exchange for the Taliban laying down their arms.
What happened next was a critical miscalculation by the Taliban leadership. Sensing government weakness, Taliban militants began to expand into neighboring Buner district. Far from putting down their weapons, the signal from the extremists in response to a major government concession was that they would still not be satisfied. At the same time, disturbing videos and news reports of Taliban style justice- including one in particular of a woman being beaten- began to circulate across the Pakistani media and on the Internet. The shift in public opinion was palpable and immediate. While broad swaths of Pakistani society are clearly devout, this brand of dishonesty and harsh justice was not compatible with their idea of governance or faith. The militarys campaign to oust the Taliban from Swat and Buner began in earnest shortly thereafter. The response to this from Taliban leadership was to expand its terror campaign into NWFP and the Punjabi heartland, further alienating large portions of the general population. And the Taliban spiral downward accelerated What does this teach us?
1. The downward spiral of the Taliban began with a concession, an invitation to rule, not a military campaign or a smart-bomb strike. These tactics have their place, but often it is better to let militants hang themselves, to show their colors instead of remaining in the shadows and quoting some vague Koranic injunction. At the end of the day, governance matters to people more than the afterlife. It is much easier to rail against the system than propose viable solutions, as the mullahs of Iran are finding out daily. Islam has not saved them.
2. Because governance matters, building military and security capability in Pakistani and Afghanistan is only part of the solution. How these governments govern, whether they can provide basic services, is critical. This will anger proponents of a narrower war on terror that does not include nation building. But we must remember how extremism began and gained momentum across the Muslim world, from Egypt to Iran to South Asia- as a critique of poor governance by secular dictatorships. This does not mean the U.S. should forever prop up weak partner governments across the Muslim world with treasure and troops. On the contrary, U.S. support often only further delays the day when these states will learn to govern themselves.
3. How WE react to our adversaries is important too and can save or cost lives. Many moderate Muslims felt the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 was justified. The Taliban had harbored vicious extremists and represented a perverted form of Islam. Muslim public opinion began to swing with the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo scandals. There was a sense that America was lashing out, straying from the main perpetrators of 9/11, that a just war had become about other objectives: deterring Iran, capturing oil resources, and punishing Saddam. America had entered its own vicious spiral.
4. Who cares about broader Muslim public opinion? We should. It is a powerful weapon in the long war and a potential achilles heal for our local allies. It was the broader Iraqi publics turn away from extremist violence in 2006-7 that allowed us to stabilize the country with the birth of the Awakening movement. Conversely, it was the Afghan publics disgust with poor government services and corruption from Kabul that paved the way for a Taliban resurgence in the years of drift after the U.S. invasion. Our adversaries have proven stupid enough to be coaxed into their own downward spirals. But we must also be mindful of stepping into our own
Terror Spirals From Pakistan to Iraq Muqaawama
