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Quick read: under 3 minutes. A rather realistic advice to US policymakers to "forget about it". But, the problem is that it should be the Pak's diplomats making the rounds in Washington and provide incentives to the US, like the US did with us by making us a "major non-NATO ally" and other carrots without us even asking for it. For example, create special access programs to Central Asia for their corporations (ties in with CPEC very well), help with logistics of development of mineral resources. IF Pak doesn't want a transnational relationship with the US, learn from India. Trump wants to improve US economy. Help him. We will have to provide incentives for a change in US to see our side. Just as India promised to buy billions of dollars of defense equipment, signed the logistics agreement and started the "contain China" bandwagon. Pakistan too needs find smart and productive ways (as opposed to India's destructive and zero-sum approach) to continue good relations with the US and China.
Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama wanted Islamabad to be more assertive against terrorist groups too.
Daniel R. DePetris
August 30, 2017
Regardless of what Pakistani military officials say in public and Islamabad’s dismissive attitude to Trump's comments, the truth is that no nation wants to be on the other end of a tougher U.S. policy. Washington has a lot of leverage with a lot of countries around the world, and Pakistan is just as susceptible to America’s long economic reach.
The question, though, is not whether Pakistan would experience pain if the Trump administration significantly decreased military and economic assistance or sanctioned top Pakistani officials for being connected to designated terrorists. The question is whether that pain will be strong enough to push Pakistan where we would like them to go. Based on the last decade and a half of Pakistani foreign policy, Trump shouldn't be surprised in the end if even a complete break in diplomatic relations with Pakistan is insufficient to compel a change in its behavior.
As the conflict in Afghanistan wore on, a pervasive feeling hovered over both administrations—and eventually throughout Washington—that Islamabad was either a duplicitous, backstabbing partner playing us for fools or a country whose leadership wasn't willing to sacrifice the political capital required to launch a full-scale and brutal war against jihadists who had the capacity to retaliate. Pervez Musharraf and the army high command preferred to negotiate truces with these groups and warlords rather than fight them in Waziristan.
No amount of griping from the United States and no amount of cash from the wallets of the American taxpayer have been strong enough or large enough to move Pakistan in the direction of being a full-throated counterterrorism ally—one that doesn't distinguish between useful terrorists and bad terrorists. President Trump may believe he has more tricks up his sleeve and wields the stamina, boldness, and negotiating ability to force Pakistan to stop being two-faced, but forgive us all if we are skeptical. Americans have heard this all before.
Even for a country like the United States, it can be very, very hard to coerce another country to pursue policies that don't serve its interests. Americans may rightly interpret Islamabad's financial and military aid to certain terrorist groups as immoral and unconscionable acts. Indeed, the very idea that a government can label some maniacal terrorists as deserving of aid and others as deserving of death is almost beyond the capacity to understand.
But whether we accept it or not, Pakistan working by, with, and through terrorist groups to put pressure on India; prevent a strategic Indian-Afghan alliance that would encircle Pakistan and impact the region’s balance of power to its disadvantage; and ensure that it possesses influence in Afghan politics has served Islamabad’s policy of strategic depth quite well.
India has been and—pending a peace agreement that nobody seriously believes will happen in the near future—likely will always be the Pakistani security establishment’s top national security priority.
After almost sixteen years of war in Afghanistan, the United States must finally acknowledge that America’s definition of success in Afghanistan is not the same as Pakistan’s. When will Washington stop holding out the slim hope that Pakistani leaders will one day discover their inner-American, align their interests with ours, and do our bidding in a region that is far more important to them than it is to us?
Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/talking-tough-Pakistan-not-new-strategy-22118
Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama wanted Islamabad to be more assertive against terrorist groups too.
Daniel R. DePetris
August 30, 2017
Regardless of what Pakistani military officials say in public and Islamabad’s dismissive attitude to Trump's comments, the truth is that no nation wants to be on the other end of a tougher U.S. policy. Washington has a lot of leverage with a lot of countries around the world, and Pakistan is just as susceptible to America’s long economic reach.
The question, though, is not whether Pakistan would experience pain if the Trump administration significantly decreased military and economic assistance or sanctioned top Pakistani officials for being connected to designated terrorists. The question is whether that pain will be strong enough to push Pakistan where we would like them to go. Based on the last decade and a half of Pakistani foreign policy, Trump shouldn't be surprised in the end if even a complete break in diplomatic relations with Pakistan is insufficient to compel a change in its behavior.
As the conflict in Afghanistan wore on, a pervasive feeling hovered over both administrations—and eventually throughout Washington—that Islamabad was either a duplicitous, backstabbing partner playing us for fools or a country whose leadership wasn't willing to sacrifice the political capital required to launch a full-scale and brutal war against jihadists who had the capacity to retaliate. Pervez Musharraf and the army high command preferred to negotiate truces with these groups and warlords rather than fight them in Waziristan.
No amount of griping from the United States and no amount of cash from the wallets of the American taxpayer have been strong enough or large enough to move Pakistan in the direction of being a full-throated counterterrorism ally—one that doesn't distinguish between useful terrorists and bad terrorists. President Trump may believe he has more tricks up his sleeve and wields the stamina, boldness, and negotiating ability to force Pakistan to stop being two-faced, but forgive us all if we are skeptical. Americans have heard this all before.
Even for a country like the United States, it can be very, very hard to coerce another country to pursue policies that don't serve its interests. Americans may rightly interpret Islamabad's financial and military aid to certain terrorist groups as immoral and unconscionable acts. Indeed, the very idea that a government can label some maniacal terrorists as deserving of aid and others as deserving of death is almost beyond the capacity to understand.
But whether we accept it or not, Pakistan working by, with, and through terrorist groups to put pressure on India; prevent a strategic Indian-Afghan alliance that would encircle Pakistan and impact the region’s balance of power to its disadvantage; and ensure that it possesses influence in Afghan politics has served Islamabad’s policy of strategic depth quite well.
India has been and—pending a peace agreement that nobody seriously believes will happen in the near future—likely will always be the Pakistani security establishment’s top national security priority.
After almost sixteen years of war in Afghanistan, the United States must finally acknowledge that America’s definition of success in Afghanistan is not the same as Pakistan’s. When will Washington stop holding out the slim hope that Pakistani leaders will one day discover their inner-American, align their interests with ours, and do our bidding in a region that is far more important to them than it is to us?
Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/talking-tough-Pakistan-not-new-strategy-22118
