A.Rafay
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TAGHAZ, Afghanistan: On the dusty southern fringe of Helmand province sits Bahram Chah, an isolated hub of narcotics trafficking, weapons smuggling and other insurgent activity.
The border town is nestled against rocky foothills and within a couple miles of an illicit crossing into Pakistan. Marines have run clearing operations in the region since a surge in U.S. forces arrived in Afghanistan in 2010, including a four-day assault in March 2011 that killed at least 50 insurgents.
More than a year later, however, Bahram Chah remains a hotbed of militant activity. Now that President Obama has ordered a withdrawal of all U.S. troops next year, the question: Are the Afghans ready to stop the Taliban without their American comrades?
"When we pull out, can the Afghan forces do what needs to be done to secure Helmand province?" said Lt. Col. David Bradney. He commanded the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, in northern Helmand until the unit rotated home to Twentynine Palms, Calif., in October.
Bradney says believes the Afghan National Security Forces are capable enough to beat the Taliban, but adds a caveat.
"It's all a question of gumption and will," he says. "Do they have the leadership to force the discipline of action, and the commitment to get their forces into the field and risk, perhaps at times, being unsuccessful, to achieve success?"
The situation hints at certain complexities as the U.S. military shifts from leading the fight to a security force assistance mission.
The strategy was widely implemented this summer, as thousands of Marines and soldiers across the country returned to the USA as part of a force drawdown. The Marine Corps' footprint in southwestern Afghanistan has shrunk from about 17,000 in the spring to 7,000
Many of the remaining forces were redistributed to assist Afghan units, rather than run independent counterinsurgency operations.
Since the shift, Afghan National Security Forces have been tested in numerous battles, particularly in Sangin, Kajaki and other districts in northern Helmand where resistance has been stiff for years.
In southern Helmand's Khanashin district, firefights are scarce and camaraderie between the Afghan Border Police and Marine advisers is good. But the Afghans deal with a variety of problems that test discipline and raise questions about their leadership of the fight.
In one recent case, a company-sized unit of border police fell into chaos after a dispute arose among the men over who should lead the unit after a well-regarded lieutenant was killed by a buried bomb, said 1st Lt. Tim Pease, a member of Marine Border Adviser Team 1, a 21-man unit advising an border police battalion.
The lieutenant's replacement was deemed selfish and ineffective by his men and so he abandoned the unit. A popular sergeant was named commander, and he led the unit in a successful clearing operation, pushing through villages southwest of Taghaz, said Maj. Max Hopkins, commander of the adviser team.
Then the discredited former commander returned, and the sergeant led a mutiny in which about 20 members of the border police left their post to protest, Pease said.
On Oct. 10, Marine advisers visited the post, Patrol Base Ghardai. They found it in disarray, with garbage strewn across the base and multiple broken-down Ford Rangers, the green trucks commonly used to shuttle the border police.
"This place is about as bad as I've ever seen it," said 1st Lt. John Behrmann, another border team adviser. "You can see that with the turmoil, there has been a negative effect."
Other units of the Afghan Border Police in Khanashin have done better, say the Marines, developing good relations with villagers and taking out many improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, hidden by the Taliban.
But problems with Afghans in higher command have threatened the effectiveness of the battalion.
In an Oct. 7 meeting, Lt. Col. Rasoul, the battalion commander who like many Afghans uses one name, told Marines that he is concerned about them leaving his force behind. Rasoul said he stands shoulder to shoulder with the Marines but he needs their help because his government won't take care of his unit.
In July, the Afghan government opened a $1 million headquarters for the Afghan Border Police in Taghaz that includes barracks space, a kitchen and a bathroom with plumbing. A septic tank has since come perilously close to overflowing, however, and Rasoul's superiors in Laskar Gah, Helmand's capital, had not responded to his pleas to have it emptied.
Insurgents also have begun targeting border police when they're traveling alone on leave to visit family. Two members of the force were recently taken prisoner in Sangin and others were beheaded, border police told Marine advisers.
Merza Khan, the commander of the Khanashin border police unit, told Marines the Taliban use a thin wire to do the job, inflicting significant pain before death.
The Marines' transition to assistance has met with even more hurdles in northern Helmand, where Marines beat back a muscular insurgency over the last two years, only to watch the Taliban retake sections of Sangin and Kajaki late this summer.
In May, the Corps had infantry battalions based in Sangin and Kajaki, as well as a third split between Musa Qala and Now Zad. As the drawdown kicked in, however, the units dwindled in strength.
First Battalion, 8th Marines, out of Camp Lejeune, N.C., and 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, out of Camp Pendleton, Calif., have been withdrawn from Kajaki and Musa Qala respectively. The drawdown left fewer Marines distributed across a broad swath of northern Helmand, Bradney said.
By August, Marine commanders had made it clear to Afghan officers that the Afghan National Army, Afghan Uniformed Police and other native forces would be required to take charge to maintain security.
Marines told them they would remain in advisory roles and provide quick-reaction forces in emergencies but otherwise would launch only occasional operations. It did not take long before the Taliban began attacking the Afghan bases and taking back ground the militancy had lost to the Marines.
Eventually Route 611, the main highway from Sangin to Kajaki, was seeded by militants with explosive devices, and members of the Afghan National Civil Order Police abandoned a number of posts in Sangin, the Marines said.
Afghan commanders asked for help. The Marine commanders initially told them that the Afghan forces had to stand up for themselves but realized they'd better step in if the Taliban was to be halted.
Marine forces cleared the route of militants using air power, then neutralized more than 30 IEDs. During the operation, Marines took part in a heavy firefight Sept. 6 in which 17 insurgents were killed.
Bradney recalled the looks he got from the Afghans after he had initially asked them how they were going to halt the Taliban advance.
"I would look right at them and say, 'What is your response?' " he said. "They would just look at me like, 'Wait a minute. That's not how we've done it before,' and I had to reiterate that the rules have changed."
Taliban making gains as Marine presence tails off | Observer and Eccentric Newspapers and Hometown Weeklies | hometownlife.com
The border town is nestled against rocky foothills and within a couple miles of an illicit crossing into Pakistan. Marines have run clearing operations in the region since a surge in U.S. forces arrived in Afghanistan in 2010, including a four-day assault in March 2011 that killed at least 50 insurgents.
More than a year later, however, Bahram Chah remains a hotbed of militant activity. Now that President Obama has ordered a withdrawal of all U.S. troops next year, the question: Are the Afghans ready to stop the Taliban without their American comrades?
"When we pull out, can the Afghan forces do what needs to be done to secure Helmand province?" said Lt. Col. David Bradney. He commanded the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, in northern Helmand until the unit rotated home to Twentynine Palms, Calif., in October.
Bradney says believes the Afghan National Security Forces are capable enough to beat the Taliban, but adds a caveat.
"It's all a question of gumption and will," he says. "Do they have the leadership to force the discipline of action, and the commitment to get their forces into the field and risk, perhaps at times, being unsuccessful, to achieve success?"
The situation hints at certain complexities as the U.S. military shifts from leading the fight to a security force assistance mission.
The strategy was widely implemented this summer, as thousands of Marines and soldiers across the country returned to the USA as part of a force drawdown. The Marine Corps' footprint in southwestern Afghanistan has shrunk from about 17,000 in the spring to 7,000
Many of the remaining forces were redistributed to assist Afghan units, rather than run independent counterinsurgency operations.
Since the shift, Afghan National Security Forces have been tested in numerous battles, particularly in Sangin, Kajaki and other districts in northern Helmand where resistance has been stiff for years.
In southern Helmand's Khanashin district, firefights are scarce and camaraderie between the Afghan Border Police and Marine advisers is good. But the Afghans deal with a variety of problems that test discipline and raise questions about their leadership of the fight.
In one recent case, a company-sized unit of border police fell into chaos after a dispute arose among the men over who should lead the unit after a well-regarded lieutenant was killed by a buried bomb, said 1st Lt. Tim Pease, a member of Marine Border Adviser Team 1, a 21-man unit advising an border police battalion.
The lieutenant's replacement was deemed selfish and ineffective by his men and so he abandoned the unit. A popular sergeant was named commander, and he led the unit in a successful clearing operation, pushing through villages southwest of Taghaz, said Maj. Max Hopkins, commander of the adviser team.
Then the discredited former commander returned, and the sergeant led a mutiny in which about 20 members of the border police left their post to protest, Pease said.
On Oct. 10, Marine advisers visited the post, Patrol Base Ghardai. They found it in disarray, with garbage strewn across the base and multiple broken-down Ford Rangers, the green trucks commonly used to shuttle the border police.
"This place is about as bad as I've ever seen it," said 1st Lt. John Behrmann, another border team adviser. "You can see that with the turmoil, there has been a negative effect."
Other units of the Afghan Border Police in Khanashin have done better, say the Marines, developing good relations with villagers and taking out many improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, hidden by the Taliban.
But problems with Afghans in higher command have threatened the effectiveness of the battalion.
In an Oct. 7 meeting, Lt. Col. Rasoul, the battalion commander who like many Afghans uses one name, told Marines that he is concerned about them leaving his force behind. Rasoul said he stands shoulder to shoulder with the Marines but he needs their help because his government won't take care of his unit.
In July, the Afghan government opened a $1 million headquarters for the Afghan Border Police in Taghaz that includes barracks space, a kitchen and a bathroom with plumbing. A septic tank has since come perilously close to overflowing, however, and Rasoul's superiors in Laskar Gah, Helmand's capital, had not responded to his pleas to have it emptied.
Insurgents also have begun targeting border police when they're traveling alone on leave to visit family. Two members of the force were recently taken prisoner in Sangin and others were beheaded, border police told Marine advisers.
Merza Khan, the commander of the Khanashin border police unit, told Marines the Taliban use a thin wire to do the job, inflicting significant pain before death.
The Marines' transition to assistance has met with even more hurdles in northern Helmand, where Marines beat back a muscular insurgency over the last two years, only to watch the Taliban retake sections of Sangin and Kajaki late this summer.
In May, the Corps had infantry battalions based in Sangin and Kajaki, as well as a third split between Musa Qala and Now Zad. As the drawdown kicked in, however, the units dwindled in strength.
First Battalion, 8th Marines, out of Camp Lejeune, N.C., and 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, out of Camp Pendleton, Calif., have been withdrawn from Kajaki and Musa Qala respectively. The drawdown left fewer Marines distributed across a broad swath of northern Helmand, Bradney said.
By August, Marine commanders had made it clear to Afghan officers that the Afghan National Army, Afghan Uniformed Police and other native forces would be required to take charge to maintain security.
Marines told them they would remain in advisory roles and provide quick-reaction forces in emergencies but otherwise would launch only occasional operations. It did not take long before the Taliban began attacking the Afghan bases and taking back ground the militancy had lost to the Marines.
Eventually Route 611, the main highway from Sangin to Kajaki, was seeded by militants with explosive devices, and members of the Afghan National Civil Order Police abandoned a number of posts in Sangin, the Marines said.
Afghan commanders asked for help. The Marine commanders initially told them that the Afghan forces had to stand up for themselves but realized they'd better step in if the Taliban was to be halted.
Marine forces cleared the route of militants using air power, then neutralized more than 30 IEDs. During the operation, Marines took part in a heavy firefight Sept. 6 in which 17 insurgents were killed.
Bradney recalled the looks he got from the Afghans after he had initially asked them how they were going to halt the Taliban advance.
"I would look right at them and say, 'What is your response?' " he said. "They would just look at me like, 'Wait a minute. That's not how we've done it before,' and I had to reiterate that the rules have changed."
Taliban making gains as Marine presence tails off | Observer and Eccentric Newspapers and Hometown Weeklies | hometownlife.com
