Su 30MKI Fighter Jets to be Stationed at Assam

[Contrarian]

Air Force Su 30 MKI Fighter Jets to be Stationed at Assam


Within the next four months, a first batch of eight Su-30MKI multi-role fighters will be positioned at the Tezpur Air Base in the Indian state of Assam, near the border with China, Kanwa Online reported Friday. This is almost six months ahead of the time line earlier reported in the mainstream media.

This will be the first time for Su-30MKI fighters to be deployed in the north eastern sector near the disputed India-China border also known as the McMahon Line. The deployment of two squadrons of Su-30MKI fighters at the Tezpur Air Base in the eastern part of the country will greatly enhance India's capability to launch aerial precision attacks on China.

Not taking into consideration the aerial refueling capability of the fighters, the Su-30MKI's 1,500-kilometer (932-mile) combat radius is enough to cover all the major cities in southwest China, including Kunming, Chengdu and Chongqing. India plans to outfit the fighters with the latest BrahMos air-to-ground supersonic missiles, which have a 290-kilometer (180-mile) range.

Along the India-China border air power has been shifting in favor of India. First of all, India has quite a number of airports in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, making troop maneuvers easier. In the Tibet region, China has only the Kang-ko Airport in eastern Tibet, the Gongka Airport in Lhasa and one more known as the Hidden Airport. Fighter aircraft are not normally stationed at any of these airports.

China already has a massive troop presence in the border regions neighboring India including Sichuan and the occupied nation of Tibet and has sent Su-27SK fighters to this area for airport transfer training on the plateau. Troops that took part in this training reportedly faced difficulties in logistic support and supply.

In the nearby Chengdu Military Region, the only air force units with decent combat strength are one J-10A regiment under the PLA Air Force's No. 44 Division and one Su-27 regiment under the No. 33 Division. The Diqing and Zhongdian airports in Yunnan province could be used for operations against India, but these are small civilian airports.

India has built a number of airports in the state of Arunachal Pradesh, including seven military airports. The small Teju New Airport located close to the border with China has only one runway and is mainly used for rapid transport by helicopter. It could be used as a runway for MiG-21 fighters to take off and land. There is another similar airport in Machuka, again close to the border. A small airport at Sookerating has one runway, while the Along Airport is also available for fast landing and takeoff of helicopters, indicating that the Indian Air Force attaches great importance to fast reaction capability.

Other small frontline airport facilities include the Jorhat Airport and Lilabari Airport. The Chabua Airport can field not only An-32 light transport aircraft but also Mi-8/17 helicopters, and is the pivotal airport for the Indian Air Force to quickly deliver troops in the region. Two runways have been built at this airport.

To the south of Arunachal Pradesh is Assam, where Tezpur is the largest military airport. Tezpur Airport, now preparing to receive the Su-30MKI fighters, is no more than 500 kilometers (310 miles) from the practical line of control at the China-India border. The Indian Air Defense Force No. 30 Squadron is stationed there, armed with 16 MiG-21FL fighters, all of which are now anchored in mound-structured hangars.

Two other small airports have been built in Assam, the Dimapir and Kumbhirgram dual-use airports. The Indian Air Force also has the Lengpui, Barapani and Guwahati airports in the area.

In the strategic direction of Bhutan and central Nepal, the Indian Air Force has built three major military airports, sufficient to provide deterrence over the central part of Tibet. These airports include the Baghdogra (Avantipur) Air Base, where at least 16 MiG-21FL fighters and An-32 transport aircraft are based. The airport is equipped with mound-structured hangars, each accommodating two MiG-21 fighters. The Baghdogra Airport is also only 500 kilometers (310 miles) from the border with China, and is the home base of the Indian Air Force No. 8 Squadron.

In this region, the Hashimara Air Base is one of the better-equipped military airports with large, full-fledged facilities. There are 18 MiG-27ML attackers based here, and during a confrontation with China, these could hit targets deep in Tibet through the Bhutan-Nepal corridor. The No. 22 Squadron of the Indian Air Force Is stationed at this airport. In addition, a simple runway has also been built at Cooch Behar. India and China have been following very similar paths in the construction of airport facilities and SAM-2 ground-to-air missile positions.

Air Force Su 30 MKI Fighter Jets to be Stationed at Tezpur Air Base Assam by December 2008 | India Defence

 

[Contrarian]

I think its quite significant. The sheer range of the Su-30MKI if stationed in Assam along with the BrahMos would pose a significant threat to the Chinese as well as increase the reaction time of Indian forces.

 

[nitesh]

It should have been complemented with jags and mirage, the combination will be deadly.

 

[romell99]

CHINA SHOULD DEPLOY MORE NUMBER OF J 10 NEAR SIKKIM BORDER AND ALSO IMPROVE THEIR AIR BASES.

 

[jaison]

CHINA SHOULD DEPLOY MORE NUMBER OF J 10 NEAR SIKKIM BORDER AND ALSO IMPROVE THEIR AIR BASES.

poor kid u cant deploy just like that ,topography also counts,the terrain on the chinese side is not good for setting up many bases and the
j-10 is no match for the su so iaf has the edge...........u may say china can deploy 80 j-10 against 30mki but u cant send all j-10 at a single time because it is practically impossible and it will give away ur postion easily.........during a war it will be like 2 iaf bases with 60mki and 3-4 bases with 80 su-27 or j-10 and am sure u r mature enough to judge on who will be the winner.so in such low deployment condition on chinas side and better deployment on indian side with more modern aircraft china will be in trouble.

 

[romell99]

I think India has forgotten all sweet memories of 1962 war.

india need a fresh doze from china again !!

 

[Keysersoze]

poor kid u cant deploy just like that ,topography also counts,the terrain on the chinese side is not good for setting up many bases and the
j-10 is no match for the su so iaf has the edge...........u may say china can deploy 80 j-10 against 30mki but u cant send all j-10 at a single time because it is practically impossible and it will give away ur postion easily.........during a war it will be like 2 iaf bases with 60mki and 3-4 bases with 80 su-27 or j-10 and am sure u r mature enough to judge on who will be the winner.so in such low deployment condition on chinas side and better deployment on indian side with more modern aircraft china will be in trouble.

Right a few points here......

A) the PLAAF had 80-100 J-10aircraft delivered between 2004 and 2006 do you think they stopped at the number?
b)They have approx 100 Su-30mKK
c) Approx 95 J-11's
d)Approx 70 Su-27's
e)and about 750 other Fighter aircraft.
f)And about 60 long range bombers

Oh and importantly 10 H-6 Tankers and 4 IL-78 Tankers

Now recalculate a strike force being from other bases and refueling and THEN striking. (bear in mind the combat radius of all the su-30 aircraft)

Now I don't know where your idea's come from but it is possible to get a large strike force in Indian fairly easily.

Now the MKI's have a slight tech advantage, But it would be a 3-1 advantage (for China)) even if only half the top end Chinese fleet showed up. If India starts throwing in the various other platforms then China has a few others as well. (because I haven't counted the 750 + other fighters in the inventory) showed up. And whilst you are fighting them the 500 or so Q-5's and the JH-7's and the H-6 strategic bombers and assorted other attack aircraft would be having a field day whilst the MKI's are busy.

Frankly if the PLAAF wanted to it could decapitate the forward bases with ease.

Now put it into context on a larger map India would then be in trouble because it would have to release forces from the PAK border and other locations in order to maintain their defence. If for example Pak were to suddenly make large scale maneuvers or a Chinese carrier group shows up along the coast then what?

Suddenly it looks a lot more complicated.

Dismiss China at your peril.

 

[BATMAN]

Dismiss China at your peril.

I think Chinese are a peaceful nation. I'm sure indians know that and they are least worried about any aggression from China.
If somehow due to any confusion unexpected happens and war broke out among two than first it has to be ground defense which either side has to defeat before locking each other’s jets.
Comparison of aircrafts may be possible but comparing a scenario is impossible.
it is dangerous to have neighbor like india who always is irking war.

 

[jaison]

Right a few points here......

A) the PLAAF had 80-100 J-10aircraft delivered between 2004 and 2006 do you think they stopped at the number?
b)They have approx 100 Su-30mKK
c) Approx 95 J-11's
d)Approx 70 Su-27's
e)and about 750 other Fighter aircraft.
f)And about 60 long range bombers

Oh and importantly 10 H-6 Tankers and 4 IL-78 Tankers

Now recalculate a strike force being from other bases and refueling and THEN striking. (bear in mind the combat radius of all the su-30 aircraft)

Now I don't know where your idea's come from but it is possible to get a large strike force in Indian fairly easily.

Now the MKI's have a slight tech advantage, But it would be a 3-1 advantage even if only half the top end Chinese fleet. If India starts throwing in the various other platforms then China has a few others as well. (because I haven't counted the 750 + other fighters in the inventory) showed up. And whilst you are fighting them the 500 or so Q-5's and the JH-7's and the H-6 strategic bombers and assorted other attack aircraft would be having a field day whilst the MKI's are busy.

Frankly if the PLAAF wanted to it could decapitate the forward bases with ease.

Now put it into context on a larger map India would then be in trouble because it would have to release forces from the PAK border and other locations in order to maintain their defence. If for example Pak were to suddenly make large scale maneuvers or a Chinese carrier group shows up along the coast then what?

Suddenly it looks a lot more complicated.

Dismiss China at your peril.

sorry sir am repeating the same,china may hav more jets but setting up infrastructure on the chinese side is difficult and the less no of basses can accomodate only a fraction of chinas potential,thus pla fighters can come only in smaller waves and iaf can deal with it better and 1962 was not involving air forces,these are pla bases and u can find it for yourself
http://www.ausairpower.net/PLAAF-Military-Regions-DOD.png u will find that the density of basses along the border is not tough and india will also be armed with carrier roups earlier than plan so no need to worry abt carrier groups and by tht time it would also face the threat of hypersonic brahmos which can slide thru its defences and if u say pak will support china in war then NATO and even russia will stand by us and put some pressure ,as someone else said u can compare fighters and their nos but u cant predict the scenarios of conflict so lets just put ths aside.............and abt 1962
u can read this article


What If India Had Won The 1962 War Against China?
Outlook India[Sunday, August 15, 2004 04:17]

WHAT IF....

Tibet would have been liberated; the loss of face would have made China retreat into its shell instead of becoming an aggressive imperialist....and of course India's Marxists would have been defanged.

By RAJEEV SRINIVASAN

Indians have been conditioned to believe that we had not a ghost of a chance against China in 1962; but that’s simply not true. If the Indian government had not been so blasé; if the military leadership had not been so ineffectual; if the Indian Air Force had not been grounded, ill-advisedly; well, all historic ifs, but the outcome would have been very different. China’s army is a lot less than invincible, as the battle-hardened Vietnamese proved by thrashing it in 1979.
Even the timing was propitious for India, yet we fumbled. In 1962, China had just experienced four years of decreasing foodgrain production and a major famine.

Chinese supply lines to the Indo-Tibet border were stretched thin, and could have been disrupted from the air. If only the Indian political and military leadership had not been criminally negligent—which is why the Henderson-Brooks Report on the war has been suppressed, for it would implicate too many in high places—India could have won.

The end results would have been dramatic: Tibet would have been liberated; Indians would not have been starry-eyed about China; the loss of face would have made China retreat into its shell instead of becoming an aggressive imperialist.

Tibet was an avoidable catastrophe. First is the decimation of a vibrant Indic culture, that of the Tibetan Buddhists. They have been doubly unfortunate. For, Tibetan Buddhism owes its traditions to the few monks who escaped being beheaded by Bakhtiyar Khilji in 1197 when he sacked Nalanda. And now, in a repeat, they are being exterminated once again, this time by fascist Han Chinese.

In 1962, China was quite weak militarily. If India had created a coalition with Western powers, who worried about the Soviet-China axis, the Han Chinese could have been ejected, and Tibet saved from genocide. The Americans would have cooperated; in those Domino Theory days, they even trained a group of Tibetans for a guerrilla resistance movement back home. India, instead, chose to be gullible "useful idiots", in Chou En-Lai’s dismissive phrase.

However, in addition to altruistic concern for a sister culture, India would have gained concrete things from Tibetan freedom. The plateau is the source of many of the rivers in Asia, and benign Tibetan control over them would have given much of Asia water security: the Indus, the Brahmaputra, the Mekong and the Irrawaddy all originate there.

Instead, China plans to divert the Brahmaputra northwards from Tibet. If so, the Ganga-Brahmaputra doab would dry up, and civilisation as we know it would end in North India. This is a national security issue of the highest order, and Indians ignore it at their peril.

Chinese dams across the Mekong are already causing drought in downstream riparian states like Laos and Cambodia. The Chinese deliberately created floods on the Brahmaputra in Arunachal not too long ago. There is every reason to believe China will proceed with diverting water, ignoring India’s objections.

This water war India could absolutely have avoided by routing China in 1962. Similarly, Chinese nuclear missiles in Tibet’s high plains, as well as the dumping of nuclear waste therein, both have serious security and environmental implications for India.

On a more subtle level, the ‘loss of face’ to China would have had incalculable value in geopolitics. At that time, China was viewed with disdain. They got into the UN Security Council only because Nehru, in his infinite wisdom, gave them the seat offered to India! Bizarre experiments with fundamentalist Leninism/Stalinism, including the Great Leap Forward, caused most observers to view China as a freak show.

The bonhomie with the Soviet Union was showing signs of wear; the experiments in collectivisation had not brought the expected benefits; the Great Leap Forward (1958-62), an attempt at using vast amounts of manpower to rapidly industrialise the country, was a colossal failure, and instead created a famine in which as many as forty million perished.

China was vulnerable, its self-image mauled by colonialism, as despised gwailo (foreign devils) had ruthlessly penetrated their hitherto smug, supercilious land, the allegedly impregnable Middle Kingdom. The British, through judicious use of opium, and the Japanese, through military might, had shown Chinese their imperial pretensions counted for nothing in the real world.

A stinging defeat by India would have so seriously hurt Chinese self-esteem that they would not have dared to dream of dominating Asia. They would not be bullying all their neighbours, as in irredentist adventures in Xinjiang, Tibet, Arunachal Pradesh, Spratlies, Mischief Reef, and the Senkaku Islands. Their Sino-Islamic axis, aimed at containing India, would have been stillborn. And they would not have been proliferating nuclear technology so openly to North Korea, Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, etc.

To consider the psychological effect of such a defeat, just look at India. Even though Indians are not quite so worried about ‘face’, the loss damaged the Indian psyche. The shock of betrayal, and the Macaulayite history of defeat that we imbibe through textbooks, have caused Indians to see themselves as losers. The Chinese would have been far more humiliated after a defeat by India.


There would have been more fringe benefits. Everyone respects power and the will to use it. India’s case for the Security Council would have been much stronger. The containment of China through alliances with Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan and Russia would have proceeded apace. Pax Indica in the Indian Ocean would have given India a choke-hold on critical shipping routes transporting Persian Gulf oil to China. India would have acceded to the non-proliferation treaty as a nuclear weapons state, instead of being bulled by the offensive Chinese-drafted Security Council Resolution 1172 condemning the Pokhran II blasts.

Another side-effect—and in a way, this might have been the greatest benefit to India—would have been the defanging of India’s Marxists. These evangelists for the Church of Marx would have been laughed out of court if they plugged the sayings of Chairman Mao immediately after China had been defeated by India. This would have prevented Marxist infiltration into academia, institutions and the media, which urgently need to be de-toxified from their baleful influence. Furthermore, both West Bengal and Kerala would have been spared decades of under-development and degeneration.

Thus, winning the 1962 war would have made an enormous difference to India. But there is no mistaking the civilisational conflict between India and China. In this millennia-old Grand Narrative, 1962 is a mere skirmish. India colonised Asia softly: with a few exceptions, without military conquest or migration. China colonised by demographic warfare.

Indic ideas went everywhere—West Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Tibet; even China and through it, Korea and Japan. The ideas were enormously influential, and they included religion and philosophy, martial arts, mathematics, language, architecture and mythology. China, on the other hand, depended on demographic thrusts: periodic emigration of Han Chinese took their culture and their industrial arts with them. They were looking for survival, for lebensraum: for China has poor land, and either too little or too much water. This process has continued to the present, with the large Chinese diaspora.

The last word in this monumental competition has not been written.China may be leading right now, but India is surely no pushover any more.

Rajeev Srinivasan is a columnist for rediff.com.
What If India Had Won The 1962 War Against China? - www.phayul.com

India could have won 1962 war


New Delhi : India could have defeated China in the 1962 war had its air force been used, former Air Vice-Marshal A. K. Tewary said.

He claimed that the then political-bureaucratic combine sought U.S. Air Force's help and did not even consulted the IAF chief. ``In the final analysis, the use of combat air power would have turned the tables on the Chinese and the 1962 war could well have been a debacle for China," Air Vice-Marshal Tewary said in an article in `Indian Defence Review.'

Several factors

Quoting top military and bureaucratic leadership of that time, he said the "costly and catastrophic omission" of not using the IAF was a result of several factors that ``impinged on the decision-making process at the highest level," including the "influence" on Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, of Prof. P. M. S. Blackett, the then Advisor for Defence , as well as the counsel of then U.S. Ambassador John K Galbraith who "over-estimated the capability of the Chinese air force in the absence of proper air defence infrastructure in India."

Another factor was the analysis of then Director of Intelligence Bureau (DIB) B. N. Mullick, a close confidant of Nehru, that Chinese bombers would bomb Indian cities in response to the use if IAF's combat jets, he said.

The former Air Vice-Marshal said "since IB did not have the firsthand knowledge [on Chinese air force capabilities], they sought help from `our good friends' [CIA]," which exaggerated the threat perception.

He quoted top defence analyst George Tanham and said that while the political-bureaucratic combine "pleaded to U.S. President John F Kennedy for 12 squadrons of Star fighters [F-104] and four squadrons of B-47 Bombers as an immediate USAF help to stem the Chinese advance, they did not deem it fit to even consult the Indian Air Force chief,"

The IAF officer said the then Army commander responsible for NEFA, Lt. Gen. B. M. Kaul, had conceded in his book that "we made a great mistake in not employing our air force in a close support role during these operations."

He also quoted late National Security Advisor J. N. Dixit, who was then Under Secretary in the China Division of the External Affairs Ministry, as saying that by the time Nehru was coming round to the suggestion for use of air power, the Chinese had declared a unilateral ceasefire.

Dixit, the IAF officer said, had pointed out that the Chinese logistical arrangements and supply lines were too stretched and that it did not have sufficient air power in Tibet at that point of time.

"India's air strikes would stop the Chinese advance and neutralise the military successes which they had achieved," Dixit had said, adding that this suggestion was rejected on the grounds that it had come from officers who were not military experts. ? PTI

India could have won 1962 war
we accept that we lost and hav found ways to make sure this does not repeat next time ,plus at that time india did not consider the large pla as athreat but as a friend and did not maintain good forces which could with them but things hav changed now and u cant say india has to be taught the same lesson as in 1962....u build forces on the basis of threat perceptions..

regards

 

[Contrarian]

Right a few points here......



Dismiss China at your peril.

While it would be highly foolish to dismiss China like that, there have been many studies and brainstormings over an Indo-Chinese border war in the NE. And its safe to say, the Chinese dont pose huge threats as they did in 1962. There are a lot of other factors that you have not counted.