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This article will focus on Pakistan’s approach towards the Iranian-Saudi rivalry and why a continued balancing act is imperative for the nation’s internal and economic stability and even more importantly for the success of the CPEC project. The article is driven out of fear that as tensions between the two rivals intensify some within Pakistan may want to opt choosing one side over the other. This article argues that for the sake of political and economic stability maintaining good relations with both nations is absolutely necessary for the time being. Pakistan as such needs to maintain its policy of strategic patience.
The belligerents in the Saudi-Iranian rivalry today, source: Bloomberg
Hostility with Iran a lose-lose situation for both
Iran was the first nation to recognize Pakistan and the two share a 909 km long border. However this border lying on the fringes of both nations’ centers of power has for long been a neglected region which has allowed foreign powers to exploit local dissent[1]. This coupled with the power vacuum which developed in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion in 1979 as well as Iran’s foreign policy post the Islamic Revolution provides ample space for hostile relations to develop between Iran and Pakistan. Indeed in February 2019 the now deceased General Soleimani of the Iranian Quds Force threatened Pakistan over attacks that had occurred in the border region. The Indian RAW agent Jadhav had similarly exploited Iranian territory in order to make his way into Pakistan[2].
It is clear to see that relations between Islamabad and Tehran could easily spiral out of control, yet realpolitik dictates that this is not in the interest of either nation. The Iranian economy is currently under extreme pressure as US sanctions coupled with expensive proxy conflicts in Yemen and Syria continue to take a heavy toll on Tehran’s finances. According to the World Bank the Iranian economy will contract by 8.7% in 2019/20[3]. As the economic situation worsens the Iranian regime will come under increasing pressure from domestic forces as well.
Pakistan’s economic situation is of course not particularly rosy either. Rising debt, inflation and high unemployment are all major macro-economic issues Islamabad is facing and the advent of the coronavirus pandemic has introduced a whole new economic battlefield for both Tehran and Islamabad. On top of this both Iran and Pakistan are surrounded by nations which are either hostile or indifferent to them. An escalation in tensions is a scenario in which both sides stand to lose much more than they can gain.
It is extremely important therefore for both Islamabad and Tehran to work out their political differences, yet serious hurdles remain. With Trump looking to strangle the Iranian economy Tehran will desperately look for any potential export opportunities to boost its finances. In the past India has imported large amounts of Iranian oil via bartering thereby evading sanctions. It may do so again if Iran accedes to increased Indian influence in Tehran, which more likely than not will be to the detriment of Pakistan since RAW as has been previously mentioned utilizes Iranian territory to carry out terrorist attacks in Pakistan. For Pakistan CPEC presents a rare opportunity where the nation’s infrastructure, industrial production capacity and connectivity can receive a major boost. If successful CPEC will reduce Islamabad’s economic reliance on other nations and provide a platform for sustainable economic growth. Balochistan lies at the heart of this project and as such it is little wonder that RAW has been using Iranian soil to ferment problems in this province.
A concerted diplomatic effort towards Iran therefore has to be made to ensure that the billions being invested on the CPEC project do not go to waste via RAW’s destabilizing actions. It is no surprise that Islamabad has repeatedly called for sanctions on Tehran to be lifted since the longer Iran’s economic woes continue the more vulnerable it becomes to New Delhi’s meddling and influence.
Saudi Arabia under MBS has adopted a pragmatic foreign policy
Whilst Islamabad’s relations with Iran have been heavily centered around security issues, its relationship with Saudi Arabia has been centered around financial and military assistance. Riyadh has through the decades provided Pakistan with billions of dollars in aid, exported oil at reduced prices to Pakistan and on top of this also hosts the largest Pakistani expatriate community in the world[4]. In turn Pakistan has provided military assistance to the Saudi armed forces and played an important role in safeguarding the country’s territorial integrity[5].
Yet strains are emerging in this relationship as the young and enigmatic Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) envisions Riyadh as the major power broker of the region and as a consequence aggressiveness and pragmatism have become the new norm as far as Saudi foreign policy is concerned. Qatar for example has been disowned from the Gulf family for establishing a foreign policy independent of Riyadh. MBS has also intensified military and economic ties with General Sisi of Egypt and the Egyptians in order to court Riyadh’s financial benevolence have gone so far as to hand over two strategic islands in the Red Sea to the Saudis. Finally the most defining aspect of MBS’s rule thus far has been the war in Yemen in which Pakistan is not participating. Islamabad as such increasingly does not fit into MBS’s future vision for his country which explains why Riyadh has increasingly warmed up to India in recent years. The Saudis have warmly welcomed Modi to Riyadh on two occasions now and MBS has reciprocated by visiting New Delhi and announcing large Saudi investments in India.
This poses a dilemma for Pakistani policymakers as the façade of close Pakistan-Saudi Arabia relations based on Islamic solidarity and brotherhood increasingly come under scrutiny due to MBS’s pragmatic foreign policy. As far as Riyadh is concerned both India and Pakistan today are equal partners of the Saudis. This point was in fact emphasized by MBS when he chose to include both India and Pakistan in his itinerary during his visit to the region in February 2019, visiting one directly after the other. The GCC states have as a consequence of this diplomatic shift increasingly assumed silence over Indian human rights abuses in Kashmir and even awarded their highest civilian honors to President Modi[6].There is little that Pakistan can do at the moment to alter this Saudi realignment other than joining the Saudi led Middle Eastern faction completely and in turn becoming outright hostile towards Iran.
Strategic Patience: Fighting the temptation to join the Saudi camp
It may be tempting for some Pakistani policymakers in this situation to consider completely joining the Saudi camp like Egypt and thereby extracting the maximum financial gains possible from such a relationship and at the same time negating Indian influence in Riyadh. After all what has Iran offered Pakistan one may legitimately ask?
Yet I would argue that this is the wrong question to ask as the nature of Pakistan’s relationship with Iran is different from the one it shares with Saudi Arabia. As previously mentioned Iranian-Pakistani ties have been centered around security issues and that is quite simply because Iran and its soil pose a serious security threat to Pakistan. RAW has already utilized Iranian territory against Pakistan but were Iranian-Pakistani relations to turn outright hostile as a consequence of Pakistan joining the Saudi camp Iran would actively and openly encourage destabilizing activities in Balochistan and Pakistan in general.
Some may ask what can Iran do which India and Afghanistan have not already tried but the fact of the matter is that Tehran poses an altogether different threat. Iranian influence after all runs deep in certain segments of Pakistani society. For example when General Soleimani died thousands of Pakistanis came out onto the streets to mourn his death[7]. This is the same man who just a few months ago had threatened Pakistan! Further thousands of Pakistanis have been recruited by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to fight for their cause in the Syrian civil war[8].
Pakistan’s options in this scenario are limited as stigmatizing the general Shia populace of Pakistan as pro-Iran will serve no purpose other than alienating a large segment of Pakistani society against the state which would amount to playing right into Tehran’s hands. After all Iran has effectively utilized sectarian tensions in regional nations for its own geo-political gains and the likes of Hezbollah (Lebanon) and Kata'ib Hezbollah (Iraq) are prime examples of this successful strategy.
Is open hostility with Iran as such a risk Pakistan is willing to take? CPEC is a rare moment for Pakistan where billions of dollars are being invested in the country and the onus is on Pakistan to provide the right environment in which said investments can be made. A further deterioration in Balochistan’s security situation would start raising eyebrows in Beijing, the country responsible for the bulk of foreign investment in Pakistan in recent years (see below).
The more correct question therefore I would pose in relation to the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is, how much damage can Iran do to Pakistan and CPEC if Pakistan joins the Saudi camp? The answer based on the experiences of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and others is fairly significant. With hostile governments sitting in Kabul and New Delhi, Islamabad cannot at the moment afford to transform Tehran’s stance towards Pakistan from indifference to outright hostile. The Pakistani armed forces have paid a heavy price fighting Kabul and New Delhi supported terrorists over the past decade and that sacrifice has finally started creating a domestic environment where foreign investments can be made. Pakistan therefore needs to maintain its policy of strategic patience. This is the strategy of
”waiting in order to achieve particular goals. It is strategic in the sense that the performance of patience is a product of weighing the options available given severe limitations in context and deciding that waiting is the best way forward. Contrary to pejorative depictions of waiting as helplessness, strategic patience involves an assertion of what little control is left in shaping one's own destiny”[9].
Staying neutral in this Iranian-Saudi rivalry requires patience but it is a policy which will pay off long term dividends. The economic situation in Pakistan has deteriorated drastically over the past decade and a further worsening of this situation will leave the country’s future increasingly in the hands of foreign powers. The country therefore needs to grab what control it has left and use it to provide the environment in which CPEC related investments can be made. This will provide the base for sustainable economic growth instead of short term gains which will come about due to joining the Saudi faction.
_________________________________________________________________________
[1] U Javaid & R Javaid, Indian Influence in Afghanistan and its Implications for Pakistan, page 8, Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, 2016
[2] “I commenced intelligence operation in 2003 and established a small business in Chabahar in Iran as I was able to achieve undetected existence and visits to Karachi in 2003 and 2004 and having done some basic assignments within India for RAW.” Transcript of RAW agent Kulbhushan’s confessional statement, March 30, 2016, Dawn News, https://www.dawn.com/news/1248786
[3] World Bank: Iran's Economic Update — October 2019,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iran/publication/economic-update-october-2019
[4] "Saudia Arabia gave Pakistan an annual grant of $1 billion to develop an Islamic (sunni) bomb, a grant that seems to have continued even after Pakistan carried out its first nuclear test in May 1998. As a result of its nuclear testing, the US imposed sanctions against Pakistan, but Riyadh came to the rescue and began supplying it with oil to overcome the economic difficulties” Arms Control Dilemmas: Focus on the Middle East, 2012, Emily B. Landau and Anat Kurz
[5] “The 1967 Pakistan-Saudi defence agreement which coincided with the oil prosperity of the latter, obliged Riyadh to involve the former's defence advisors in almost all of its defence structure ... Throughout the 1970s, the Saudis kept a Pakistani military battalion posted along the borders of Marxist South Yemen, so as to counter the latter's military incursions in the Kingdom.” Evolution of Saudi-Pakistan strategic relationship 1947-1990 : military security and economic factors, Zulfikar A. Khalid
[6] Bilal Kuchay, Why have Saudi Arabia, UAE failed to condemn India over Kashmir?, September 12, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019...ed-condemn-india-kashmir-190911112648176.html
[7] Syed Raza Hassan & Gibran Naiyyar Peshimam, Thousands protest in Pakistan over U.S. killing of Iranian commander, January 5, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...-s-killing-of-iranian-commander-idUSKBN1Z40NR
[8] Babak Dehghanpisheh, Iran recruits Pakistani Shi'ites for combat in Syria, December 10, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...tes-for-combat-in-syria-idUSKBN0TT22S20151210
[9] Nicole Curato, Democracy in a Time of Misery: From Spectacular Tragedies to Deliberative Action, Page 161, 2019, Oxford University Press
Complete List of Sources
U Javaid & R Javaid, Indian Influence in Afghanistan and its Implications for Pakistan, 2016, Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan
Emily B. Landau and Anat Kurz, Arms Control Dilemmas: Focus on the Middle East, 2012, Institute for National Security Studies
Zulfikar A. Khalid, Evolution of Saudi-Pakistan strategic relationship 1947-1990 : military security and economic factors, Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1989
J. Matthew McInnis, Iranian Deterrence Strategy and Use of Proxies, 2016, American Enterprise Institute
Hein Kiessling, Faith, Unity, Discipline: The Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, 2016, C Hurst Co Publishers Ltd
Nicole Curato, Democracy in a Time of Misery: From Spectacular Tragedies to Deliberative Action, 2019, Oxford University Press
World Bank: Iran's Economic Update — October 2019,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iran/publication/economic-update-october-2019
Pakistan Board of Investment, Foreign Investment Statistics, https://invest.gov.pk/
Transcript of RAW agent Kulbhushan’s confessional statement, March 30, 2016, Dawn News, https://www.dawn.com/news/1248786
Ahsan Butt, What the Kulbhushan Jadhav Saga Reveals About India and Pakistan’s Balochistan Problems, January 11, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/wha...out-india-and-pakistans-balochistan-problems/
Khurshid Ahmed, Saudi Arabia remains largest source of remittances to Pakistan, April 12, 2019, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1480941/business-economy
Rishi Iyengar, Saudi Aramco will build $44 billion 'mega refinery' in India, April 11, 2018, https://money.cnn.com/2018/04/11/news/india/saudi-aramco-india-refinery-deal-ratnagiri/index.html
Bilal Kuchay, Why have Saudi Arabia, UAE failed to condemn India over Kashmir?, September 12, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019...ed-condemn-india-kashmir-190911112648176.html
Syed Raza Hassan & Gibran Naiyyar Peshimam, Thousands protest in Pakistan over U.S. killing of Iranian commander, January 5, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...-s-killing-of-iranian-commander-idUSKBN1Z40NR
Babak Dehghanpisheh, Iran recruits Pakistani Shi'ites for combat in Syria, December 10, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...tes-for-combat-in-syria-idUSKBN0TT22S20151210
This article will focus on Pakistan’s approach towards the Iranian-Saudi rivalry and why a continued balancing act is imperative for the nation’s internal and economic stability and even more importantly for the success of the CPEC project. The article is driven out of fear that as tensions between the two rivals intensify some within Pakistan may want to opt choosing one side over the other. This article argues that for the sake of political and economic stability maintaining good relations with both nations is absolutely necessary for the time being. Pakistan as such needs to maintain its policy of strategic patience.
The belligerents in the Saudi-Iranian rivalry today, source: Bloomberg
Hostility with Iran a lose-lose situation for both
Iran was the first nation to recognize Pakistan and the two share a 909 km long border. However this border lying on the fringes of both nations’ centers of power has for long been a neglected region which has allowed foreign powers to exploit local dissent[1]. This coupled with the power vacuum which developed in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion in 1979 as well as Iran’s foreign policy post the Islamic Revolution provides ample space for hostile relations to develop between Iran and Pakistan. Indeed in February 2019 the now deceased General Soleimani of the Iranian Quds Force threatened Pakistan over attacks that had occurred in the border region. The Indian RAW agent Jadhav had similarly exploited Iranian territory in order to make his way into Pakistan[2].
It is clear to see that relations between Islamabad and Tehran could easily spiral out of control, yet realpolitik dictates that this is not in the interest of either nation. The Iranian economy is currently under extreme pressure as US sanctions coupled with expensive proxy conflicts in Yemen and Syria continue to take a heavy toll on Tehran’s finances. According to the World Bank the Iranian economy will contract by 8.7% in 2019/20[3]. As the economic situation worsens the Iranian regime will come under increasing pressure from domestic forces as well.
Pakistan’s economic situation is of course not particularly rosy either. Rising debt, inflation and high unemployment are all major macro-economic issues Islamabad is facing and the advent of the coronavirus pandemic has introduced a whole new economic battlefield for both Tehran and Islamabad. On top of this both Iran and Pakistan are surrounded by nations which are either hostile or indifferent to them. An escalation in tensions is a scenario in which both sides stand to lose much more than they can gain.
It is extremely important therefore for both Islamabad and Tehran to work out their political differences, yet serious hurdles remain. With Trump looking to strangle the Iranian economy Tehran will desperately look for any potential export opportunities to boost its finances. In the past India has imported large amounts of Iranian oil via bartering thereby evading sanctions. It may do so again if Iran accedes to increased Indian influence in Tehran, which more likely than not will be to the detriment of Pakistan since RAW as has been previously mentioned utilizes Iranian territory to carry out terrorist attacks in Pakistan. For Pakistan CPEC presents a rare opportunity where the nation’s infrastructure, industrial production capacity and connectivity can receive a major boost. If successful CPEC will reduce Islamabad’s economic reliance on other nations and provide a platform for sustainable economic growth. Balochistan lies at the heart of this project and as such it is little wonder that RAW has been using Iranian soil to ferment problems in this province.
A concerted diplomatic effort towards Iran therefore has to be made to ensure that the billions being invested on the CPEC project do not go to waste via RAW’s destabilizing actions. It is no surprise that Islamabad has repeatedly called for sanctions on Tehran to be lifted since the longer Iran’s economic woes continue the more vulnerable it becomes to New Delhi’s meddling and influence.
Saudi Arabia under MBS has adopted a pragmatic foreign policy
Whilst Islamabad’s relations with Iran have been heavily centered around security issues, its relationship with Saudi Arabia has been centered around financial and military assistance. Riyadh has through the decades provided Pakistan with billions of dollars in aid, exported oil at reduced prices to Pakistan and on top of this also hosts the largest Pakistani expatriate community in the world[4]. In turn Pakistan has provided military assistance to the Saudi armed forces and played an important role in safeguarding the country’s territorial integrity[5].
Yet strains are emerging in this relationship as the young and enigmatic Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) envisions Riyadh as the major power broker of the region and as a consequence aggressiveness and pragmatism have become the new norm as far as Saudi foreign policy is concerned. Qatar for example has been disowned from the Gulf family for establishing a foreign policy independent of Riyadh. MBS has also intensified military and economic ties with General Sisi of Egypt and the Egyptians in order to court Riyadh’s financial benevolence have gone so far as to hand over two strategic islands in the Red Sea to the Saudis. Finally the most defining aspect of MBS’s rule thus far has been the war in Yemen in which Pakistan is not participating. Islamabad as such increasingly does not fit into MBS’s future vision for his country which explains why Riyadh has increasingly warmed up to India in recent years. The Saudis have warmly welcomed Modi to Riyadh on two occasions now and MBS has reciprocated by visiting New Delhi and announcing large Saudi investments in India.
This poses a dilemma for Pakistani policymakers as the façade of close Pakistan-Saudi Arabia relations based on Islamic solidarity and brotherhood increasingly come under scrutiny due to MBS’s pragmatic foreign policy. As far as Riyadh is concerned both India and Pakistan today are equal partners of the Saudis. This point was in fact emphasized by MBS when he chose to include both India and Pakistan in his itinerary during his visit to the region in February 2019, visiting one directly after the other. The GCC states have as a consequence of this diplomatic shift increasingly assumed silence over Indian human rights abuses in Kashmir and even awarded their highest civilian honors to President Modi[6].There is little that Pakistan can do at the moment to alter this Saudi realignment other than joining the Saudi led Middle Eastern faction completely and in turn becoming outright hostile towards Iran.
Strategic Patience: Fighting the temptation to join the Saudi camp
It may be tempting for some Pakistani policymakers in this situation to consider completely joining the Saudi camp like Egypt and thereby extracting the maximum financial gains possible from such a relationship and at the same time negating Indian influence in Riyadh. After all what has Iran offered Pakistan one may legitimately ask?
Yet I would argue that this is the wrong question to ask as the nature of Pakistan’s relationship with Iran is different from the one it shares with Saudi Arabia. As previously mentioned Iranian-Pakistani ties have been centered around security issues and that is quite simply because Iran and its soil pose a serious security threat to Pakistan. RAW has already utilized Iranian territory against Pakistan but were Iranian-Pakistani relations to turn outright hostile as a consequence of Pakistan joining the Saudi camp Iran would actively and openly encourage destabilizing activities in Balochistan and Pakistan in general.
Some may ask what can Iran do which India and Afghanistan have not already tried but the fact of the matter is that Tehran poses an altogether different threat. Iranian influence after all runs deep in certain segments of Pakistani society. For example when General Soleimani died thousands of Pakistanis came out onto the streets to mourn his death[7]. This is the same man who just a few months ago had threatened Pakistan! Further thousands of Pakistanis have been recruited by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to fight for their cause in the Syrian civil war[8].
Pakistan’s options in this scenario are limited as stigmatizing the general Shia populace of Pakistan as pro-Iran will serve no purpose other than alienating a large segment of Pakistani society against the state which would amount to playing right into Tehran’s hands. After all Iran has effectively utilized sectarian tensions in regional nations for its own geo-political gains and the likes of Hezbollah (Lebanon) and Kata'ib Hezbollah (Iraq) are prime examples of this successful strategy.
Is open hostility with Iran as such a risk Pakistan is willing to take? CPEC is a rare moment for Pakistan where billions of dollars are being invested in the country and the onus is on Pakistan to provide the right environment in which said investments can be made. A further deterioration in Balochistan’s security situation would start raising eyebrows in Beijing, the country responsible for the bulk of foreign investment in Pakistan in recent years (see below).
The more correct question therefore I would pose in relation to the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is, how much damage can Iran do to Pakistan and CPEC if Pakistan joins the Saudi camp? The answer based on the experiences of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and others is fairly significant. With hostile governments sitting in Kabul and New Delhi, Islamabad cannot at the moment afford to transform Tehran’s stance towards Pakistan from indifference to outright hostile. The Pakistani armed forces have paid a heavy price fighting Kabul and New Delhi supported terrorists over the past decade and that sacrifice has finally started creating a domestic environment where foreign investments can be made. Pakistan therefore needs to maintain its policy of strategic patience. This is the strategy of
”waiting in order to achieve particular goals. It is strategic in the sense that the performance of patience is a product of weighing the options available given severe limitations in context and deciding that waiting is the best way forward. Contrary to pejorative depictions of waiting as helplessness, strategic patience involves an assertion of what little control is left in shaping one's own destiny”[9].
Staying neutral in this Iranian-Saudi rivalry requires patience but it is a policy which will pay off long term dividends. The economic situation in Pakistan has deteriorated drastically over the past decade and a further worsening of this situation will leave the country’s future increasingly in the hands of foreign powers. The country therefore needs to grab what control it has left and use it to provide the environment in which CPEC related investments can be made. This will provide the base for sustainable economic growth instead of short term gains which will come about due to joining the Saudi faction.
_________________________________________________________________________
[1] U Javaid & R Javaid, Indian Influence in Afghanistan and its Implications for Pakistan, page 8, Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, 2016
[2] “I commenced intelligence operation in 2003 and established a small business in Chabahar in Iran as I was able to achieve undetected existence and visits to Karachi in 2003 and 2004 and having done some basic assignments within India for RAW.” Transcript of RAW agent Kulbhushan’s confessional statement, March 30, 2016, Dawn News, https://www.dawn.com/news/1248786
[3] World Bank: Iran's Economic Update — October 2019,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iran/publication/economic-update-october-2019
[4] "Saudia Arabia gave Pakistan an annual grant of $1 billion to develop an Islamic (sunni) bomb, a grant that seems to have continued even after Pakistan carried out its first nuclear test in May 1998. As a result of its nuclear testing, the US imposed sanctions against Pakistan, but Riyadh came to the rescue and began supplying it with oil to overcome the economic difficulties” Arms Control Dilemmas: Focus on the Middle East, 2012, Emily B. Landau and Anat Kurz
[5] “The 1967 Pakistan-Saudi defence agreement which coincided with the oil prosperity of the latter, obliged Riyadh to involve the former's defence advisors in almost all of its defence structure ... Throughout the 1970s, the Saudis kept a Pakistani military battalion posted along the borders of Marxist South Yemen, so as to counter the latter's military incursions in the Kingdom.” Evolution of Saudi-Pakistan strategic relationship 1947-1990 : military security and economic factors, Zulfikar A. Khalid
[6] Bilal Kuchay, Why have Saudi Arabia, UAE failed to condemn India over Kashmir?, September 12, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019...ed-condemn-india-kashmir-190911112648176.html
[7] Syed Raza Hassan & Gibran Naiyyar Peshimam, Thousands protest in Pakistan over U.S. killing of Iranian commander, January 5, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...-s-killing-of-iranian-commander-idUSKBN1Z40NR
[8] Babak Dehghanpisheh, Iran recruits Pakistani Shi'ites for combat in Syria, December 10, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...tes-for-combat-in-syria-idUSKBN0TT22S20151210
[9] Nicole Curato, Democracy in a Time of Misery: From Spectacular Tragedies to Deliberative Action, Page 161, 2019, Oxford University Press
Complete List of Sources
U Javaid & R Javaid, Indian Influence in Afghanistan and its Implications for Pakistan, 2016, Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan
Emily B. Landau and Anat Kurz, Arms Control Dilemmas: Focus on the Middle East, 2012, Institute for National Security Studies
Zulfikar A. Khalid, Evolution of Saudi-Pakistan strategic relationship 1947-1990 : military security and economic factors, Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1989
J. Matthew McInnis, Iranian Deterrence Strategy and Use of Proxies, 2016, American Enterprise Institute
Hein Kiessling, Faith, Unity, Discipline: The Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, 2016, C Hurst Co Publishers Ltd
Nicole Curato, Democracy in a Time of Misery: From Spectacular Tragedies to Deliberative Action, 2019, Oxford University Press
World Bank: Iran's Economic Update — October 2019,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iran/publication/economic-update-october-2019
Pakistan Board of Investment, Foreign Investment Statistics, https://invest.gov.pk/
Transcript of RAW agent Kulbhushan’s confessional statement, March 30, 2016, Dawn News, https://www.dawn.com/news/1248786
Ahsan Butt, What the Kulbhushan Jadhav Saga Reveals About India and Pakistan’s Balochistan Problems, January 11, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/wha...out-india-and-pakistans-balochistan-problems/
Khurshid Ahmed, Saudi Arabia remains largest source of remittances to Pakistan, April 12, 2019, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1480941/business-economy
Rishi Iyengar, Saudi Aramco will build $44 billion 'mega refinery' in India, April 11, 2018, https://money.cnn.com/2018/04/11/news/india/saudi-aramco-india-refinery-deal-ratnagiri/index.html
Bilal Kuchay, Why have Saudi Arabia, UAE failed to condemn India over Kashmir?, September 12, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019...ed-condemn-india-kashmir-190911112648176.html
Syed Raza Hassan & Gibran Naiyyar Peshimam, Thousands protest in Pakistan over U.S. killing of Iranian commander, January 5, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...-s-killing-of-iranian-commander-idUSKBN1Z40NR
Babak Dehghanpisheh, Iran recruits Pakistani Shi'ites for combat in Syria, December 10, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...tes-for-combat-in-syria-idUSKBN0TT22S20151210
Good read.
