South China Sea Forum
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Yes. We don't violate DOC as this is just a submerge islets.
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South China Sea: Who Occupies What in the Spratlys?
A closer look at a basic yet poorly understood question.
By Alexander L. Vuving
May 06, 2016
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The discourse on the South China Sea disputes is understandably laden with emotion. That is arguably a reason why debate on the subject should be based on facts. And yet, as Bill Hayton has noted, “Unreliable evidence is clouding the international discourse on the South China Sea disputes.” Indeed, it sometimes feels like a thick veil is hiding the truth about the South China Sea.
Consider, for instance, the argument that China, far from being the aggressor in the South China Sea, is in fact merely reacting to unilateral provocations by others such as Vietnam. That conclusion is based on some rather questionable evidence, including the suggestion that Vietnam has “doubled its holdings” in the South China Sea in the past 20 years. Even if one assumes that Vietnam occupied 24 features in 1996 (the actual data from which the map often drawn for this line of argument actually specifies 22), the idea that there has been some sort of doubling is misleading. The source for this claim – a 2015 congressional testimony by a senior U.S. defense official – in fact specified 48 outposts amongst the features occupied by Vietnam in the Spratly Islands, rather than 48 features. Using a 20-year timeline is also equally misleading because it leaves out China’s seizure of Mischief Reed 21 years ago.
But more broadly, the issue is that there is still no real clarity about who occupies what in the Spratly Islands. It is not uncommon to find articles – and sometimes even publicly available documents, maps and data – that contain inaccurate, conflicting and sometimes unreliable information. This piece attempts to address that issue by looking at who actually occupies what in the Spratlys. In investigating these questions, I have consulted multiple sources, many of which are primary, and interviewed several people knowledgeable about the subject matters. The information obtained has also been carefully checked.
Vietnam
Vietnam currently occupies 21 features in the Spratly Islands, with the latest taken a few days after a bloody clash on March 14, 1988 with China at Johnson South Reef. A full list of these features with their names and coordinates was publicized in the April 22, 1988 issue of Nhan Dan, the Vietnamese government’s mouthpiece. They are:
Vietnam also has a similar counting system, but it identifies only 33 outposts (diem dong quan or diem dao in Vietnamese). Why the discrepancy? The extra outpost counted by DoD is a lighthouse on Tennent Reef. Vietnam does not view it as an outpost because no troops are stationed there – it is operated by a civilian company that belongs to the Transportation Ministry. It is unclear when this lighthouse was built, but all the other 33 Vietnamese outposts were established prior to 1989.
The APMSS map also indicates that Vietnam has 14 more outposts in the Spratly Islands. Comparing the map with what exists on the ground – or, if you prefer, the water – we can see that they are the 14 lookout structures (nha gian in Vietnamese) that Vietnam is operating on six underwater banks located southwest of the Spratly Islands. Vietnam started to set up permanent structures on Vanguard Bank (Vietnamese: Bai Tu Chinh), Rifleman Bank (Bai Vung May), and Prince of Wales Bank (Bai Phuc Tan) in 1989, on Prince Consort Bank (Bai Phuc Nguyen) in 1990, and on Grainger Bank (Bai Que Duong) and Alexandra Bank (Bai Huyen Tran) in 1991. These platforms measure between 100 and 250 square meters each, and stand on shallow elevations lying between seven and 25 meters below the sea surface.
Whether these shoals form part of the Spratly Islands is a matter of debate. China’s maps group them together with the Spratlys proper while treating them as if they were landforms above water. As a result, the Chinese numbers of the Vietnamese-occupied features in the Spratly Islands range typically between 27 and 30. Vietnam argues that as the shoals lie deep under water and within 200 nautical miles (nm) from the Vietnamese baselines, they belong to Vietnam’s continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as stipulated in Article 76 of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). According to UNCLOS, submarine features cannot be appropriated by occupation or otherwise.
Eleven of the Vietnamese-held features in the Spratly Islands have natural portions showing more than 100 meters long above high tide. These are Southwest Cay, South Reef, Sand Cay, Namyit Island, Sin Cowe Island, Sin Cowe East Island, Lansdowne Reef, Spratly Island, Central Reef, Pearson Reef, and Amboyna Cay. Seven other features – Petley Reef, Discovery Great Reef, Collins Reef, West Reef, East Reef, Tennent Reef, and Barque Canada Reef – reportedly have portions that are naturally above water at high tide. These features may qualify as “islands” or “rocks” and may generate territorial waters in keeping with UNCLOS. Three features – Ladd Reef, Allison Reef, and Cornwallis South Reef – may be above water only at low tide. In the language of UNCLOS, they may be called “low-tide elevations,” which are not entitled to a territorial sea, EEZ, or continental shelf.
Philippines
Philippine media typically reports either nine or ten Philippine-held features in the Spratly Islands. The tenth feature is Irving Reef (Filipino: Balagtas), which lies between Loaita Bank and West York Island. There are no structures on this reef, but unverified sources report that Philippine Navy ships take turns to guard the feature. If this is true, the status of Irving is similar to that of several other features that are watched by Chinese and Vietnamese vessels but remain unoccupied.
Given this, the nine features held by the Philippines in the Spratly Islands are:
Between 1970 and 1978, the Philippine moved in to occupy seven features in the Spratlys, with troops stationed on five islands. Flat Island, which lies about 6 nm north of Nanshan Island, appeared to be controlled by a garrison based at Nanshan until 2011, when some starshell-like structures were built on Flat to house a more permanent presence. A documentary produced by a local TV network in 2004 reported that only four soldiers were guarding both features from their shelters on Nanshan. A similar method appeared to be applied to the features in Loaita Bank, with Loaita Island serving as the base for the garrison until additional facility was erected on Loaita Cay. Some sources report that Lankiam Cay had a beach of more than five hectares in the past, but strong waves brought by a typhoon washed out the sandy surface of the island, leaving behind the calcarenite foundation that can be seen at low tide.
The start date of the Philippine occupation of Commodore Reef remains uncertain. Philippine troops landed on the reef in August 1980 and removed a marker that Malaysia installed there a few months before, but it is unknown whether they stayed or left after the operation. One report states that they deserted it since 1986, but it is currently occupied by a military detachment.
In 1999, the Philippines occupied Second Thomas Shoal by running the tank landing ship BRP Sierra Madre aground and using it as a shelter for a small garrison. Of note, the Pentagon does not count the Philippine station on Second Thomas Shoal as an outpost, although the contrary view is prevalent in the Philippines. This shoal is also the only low-tide elevation among the features occupied by the Philippines. All the other eight are visible above water at high tide.
Taiwan
Itu Aba Island (Chinese: 太平島) is the only feature occupied by Taiwan in the Spratlys. It is also the largest natural land feature in the archipelago. Taiwan sometimes is said to hold two features there. This is likely to be inferred from reports of Taiwan erecting structures (in 1995 and 2004) and its officials landing (in 2003 and 2012) on Ban Than Reef. However, the best description of Ban Than’s current status is “unoccupied.” Ban Than has a beach less than 100 meters long, which lies about 2.5 nm from Itu Aba and about 4 nm from the Vietnamese-occupied Sand Cay. The Pentagon identifies no outpost on Ban Than, and no structures are visible in recent satellite images as well as photos of the reef. Sources with local knowledge told me that both Taiwanese and Vietnamese troops have occasionally planted materials on Ban Than and used them as targets for their live-fire exercises.
China
In the Spratly Islands, China has occupied six features since 1988 and Mischief Reef since 1995. The seven features occupied by China in the Spratly Islands are:
In addition, some accounts have mistakenly identified some features such as Eldad Reef, Whitsun Reef, Ladd Reef, and McKennan Reef as being occupied by China. For instance, two popular maps produced in 2015 by Reuters and AFP still reflected the incorrect information about Eldad Reef and Lankiam Cay. The mistaken status of Eldad, Whitsun, and Ladd Reefs is likely to have been inferred from reports about Vietnam protesting against Chinese troops landing on Eldad Reef in 1990, Da Ba Dau in March 1992 and Da Lac in July 1992. Da Ba Dau was identified as the Vietnamese name for Whitsun Reef, but Da Lac was mistakenly thought to be Ladd Reef (Da Lat in Vietnamese), which actually was occupied by Vietnam. In fact, Da Lac is the Vietnamese name for Gaven South Reef, a low-tide elevation 2 nm from Gaven Reef.
The APMSS map shows no Chinese outposts on any other reefs except the seven listed above. Some reports citing Philippine intelligence sources in June 2015 alleged that China had reclaimed land on Eldad Reef. However, separate sources with local knowledge later confirmed that Eldad as well as Whitsun, McKennan, and Gaven South Reefs remained unoccupied.
Still, the unoccupied status of these features is fragile. Both Eldad Reef and Whitsun Reef have strategic value. They form the eastern edge of two major groups in the Spratlys – Tizard Bank and Union Bank. They have also gradually “become” islands. Sailing directions prior to the mid-1990s suggest that they were low-tide elevations. But today each reef bears a 100-meter long sand dune that has reportedly grown in area and height. A smaller sand dune has also emerged on McKennan Reef, which is often confused with Hughes Reef but actually lies 1 nm west. Several stories in the Vietnamese social media suggest that Eldad, Whitsun, and McKennan are frequently sites of quiet cat-and-mouse games between China and Vietnam, one attempting to get a foothold on these ‘new islands’ while the other tries to frustrate these efforts.
A similar situation has been going on at South Luconia Shoal (Malay: Beting Patinggi Ali) 84 nm off the coast of Malaysia’s Sarawak. Both Chinese and Malaysian officials have confirmed that China’s vessels have been continually present at the shoal since 2013. Intriguingly, one of the features in the shoal, Luconia Breakers (Malay: Beting Hempasan Bantin), appears to have changed status from a low-tide elevation to a “small island,” to use the words of Malaysia’s Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department Shahidan Kassim. Satellite images and aerial photos show a sand dune of about 70 meters in length on this feature. They also show Chinese Coast Guard vessels, shadowed by Malaysian Navy ships, anchoring near the ‘new island.’
Some scholars argue that Luconia Breakers was reclaimed into an artificial island by Malaysia sometime prior to 2009. But this argument makes little sense. As the coastal state with an EEZ over the shoal, Malaysia has a strong interest in keeping the feature submerged. A 2012 judgment by the International Court of Justice stated that “low-tide elevations cannot be appropriated.” Following from this, Luconia Breakers might be legally protected from China’s sovereignty claim if it remains a low-tide elevation.
Some have questioned whether such a rapid elevation could indeed have occurred naturally in a short period of time. But this is hardly an uncommon occurrence. The emergence of small sand dunes has been registered during the last few decades at several reefs in the Spratly Islands, with Eldad, Whitsun, McKennan, and Ban Than being some prominent examples. With the help of waves and wind, coral sediment can either form growing sand dunes or be washed away – as might be the case with Lankiam Cay – without any movements of the reef foundation.
Hydrographic evidence presented by the Philippines at the Permanent Court of Arbitration suggests that three of the seven Chinese-held features, including Fiery Cross, Cuarteron and Johnson South, have portions above water during high tide, but the other four, including Subi, Gaven, Hughes, and Mischief Reefs are low-tide elevations in their original nature before the massive land reclamation program since 2013 that turned all the seven into artificial islands.
Malaysia
As with the case of the Philippines, the number of Malaysian-held features in the Spratlys varies depending on how one defines occupation. Most accounts typically speak of either five or eight features. Malaysia has troops and facilities stationed on five features:
Malaysia appears to “occupy” Dallas Reef in a similar way to how the Philippines did with Flat Island. Troops from nearby Ardasier Reef, which lies about 3 nm from Dallas Reef, may watch and visit the latter on a regular basis. Royal Charlotte and Louisa Reefs, on the other hand, can hardly be classified as “occupied.” While there is a beacon on Royal Charlotte, visitors report that it was inactive and there were no others structures on the reef. Visitors have also found Louisa deserted with no other structures than an obelisk-shaped beacon, which was also not working. Among these eight features, Swallow, Mariveles, Erica, Royal Charlotte, and Louisa Reefs reportedly have some natural portions protruding above high tide, while Ardasier, Dallas, and Investigator are likely low-tide elevations. The beacons on Royal Charlotte and Louisa might have been built by Malaysia in the 1980s as a means to assert sovereignty over the two reefs.
Brunei
The only feature in the Spratly Islands that is claimed by Brunei is Louisa Reef. According to official statements by Malaysia and Brunei, an Exchange of Letters signed in 2009 has “established the final delimitation of territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone” between the two countries. The agreement unequivocally states that Brunei has sovereignty over two oil blocks within which Louisa Reef is located.
Although Malaysia has not officially dropped its territorial claims over this feature, the agreement with Brunei substantially weakens Malaysia’s claims. As both Malaysia and Brunei have grounded their sovereignty claims over Louisa on the basis of coastal state rights, Malaysia’s acknowledgement of Brunei’s territorial sea, continental shelf, and EEZ is tantamount to effectively conceding Louisa Reef to Brunei. However, this appears to be a tacit understanding rather than an official agreement of any kind. The Exchange of Letters has yet to be publicized, and even if it would be made public, there would likely be no mentioning of Louisa. This is certainly the case with Limbang District, the other territorial dispute between Brunei and Malaysia.
For all the attention that has been focused on the South China Sea disputes, there is still little clarity on some basic realities such as who owns what. As Bill Hayton has demonstrated, much of the literature relies on historical accounts that “use unreliable bases from which to write reliable histories.” It is hoped that this article is a step in the right direction towards lifting the thick veil that often conceals the truth about these disputes.
Alexander L. Vuving is Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not reflect those of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the Asia-Pacific Center.
A closer look at a basic yet poorly understood question.
By Alexander L. Vuving
May 06, 2016
1.1k
4
15
1.1k Shares
The discourse on the South China Sea disputes is understandably laden with emotion. That is arguably a reason why debate on the subject should be based on facts. And yet, as Bill Hayton has noted, “Unreliable evidence is clouding the international discourse on the South China Sea disputes.” Indeed, it sometimes feels like a thick veil is hiding the truth about the South China Sea.
Consider, for instance, the argument that China, far from being the aggressor in the South China Sea, is in fact merely reacting to unilateral provocations by others such as Vietnam. That conclusion is based on some rather questionable evidence, including the suggestion that Vietnam has “doubled its holdings” in the South China Sea in the past 20 years. Even if one assumes that Vietnam occupied 24 features in 1996 (the actual data from which the map often drawn for this line of argument actually specifies 22), the idea that there has been some sort of doubling is misleading. The source for this claim – a 2015 congressional testimony by a senior U.S. defense official – in fact specified 48 outposts amongst the features occupied by Vietnam in the Spratly Islands, rather than 48 features. Using a 20-year timeline is also equally misleading because it leaves out China’s seizure of Mischief Reed 21 years ago.
But more broadly, the issue is that there is still no real clarity about who occupies what in the Spratly Islands. It is not uncommon to find articles – and sometimes even publicly available documents, maps and data – that contain inaccurate, conflicting and sometimes unreliable information. This piece attempts to address that issue by looking at who actually occupies what in the Spratlys. In investigating these questions, I have consulted multiple sources, many of which are primary, and interviewed several people knowledgeable about the subject matters. The information obtained has also been carefully checked.
Vietnam
Vietnam currently occupies 21 features in the Spratly Islands, with the latest taken a few days after a bloody clash on March 14, 1988 with China at Johnson South Reef. A full list of these features with their names and coordinates was publicized in the April 22, 1988 issue of Nhan Dan, the Vietnamese government’s mouthpiece. They are:
- Southwest Cay (Vietnamese: Song Tu Tay),
- South Reef (Da Nam),
- Petley Reef (Nui Thi or Da Thi),
- Sand Cay (Son Ca),
- Namyit Island (Nam Yet),
- Discovery Great Reef (Da Lon),
- Sin Cowe Island (Sinh Ton),
- Collins Reef (Co Lin),
- Lansdowne Reef (Len Dao),
- Sin Cowe East Island (Sinh Ton Dong),
- Ladd Reef (Da Lat),
- Spratly Island (Truong Sa or Truong Sa Lon),
- West Reef (Da Tay),
- Central Reef (Truong Sa Dong),
- East Reef (Da Dong),
- Pearson Reef (Phan Vinh),
- Allison Reef (Toc Tan),
- Cornwallis South Reef (Nui Le),
- Pigeon or Tennent Reef (Tien Nu),
- Barque Canada Reef (Thuyen Chai),
- Amboyna Cay (An Bang).
Vietnam also has a similar counting system, but it identifies only 33 outposts (diem dong quan or diem dao in Vietnamese). Why the discrepancy? The extra outpost counted by DoD is a lighthouse on Tennent Reef. Vietnam does not view it as an outpost because no troops are stationed there – it is operated by a civilian company that belongs to the Transportation Ministry. It is unclear when this lighthouse was built, but all the other 33 Vietnamese outposts were established prior to 1989.
The APMSS map also indicates that Vietnam has 14 more outposts in the Spratly Islands. Comparing the map with what exists on the ground – or, if you prefer, the water – we can see that they are the 14 lookout structures (nha gian in Vietnamese) that Vietnam is operating on six underwater banks located southwest of the Spratly Islands. Vietnam started to set up permanent structures on Vanguard Bank (Vietnamese: Bai Tu Chinh), Rifleman Bank (Bai Vung May), and Prince of Wales Bank (Bai Phuc Tan) in 1989, on Prince Consort Bank (Bai Phuc Nguyen) in 1990, and on Grainger Bank (Bai Que Duong) and Alexandra Bank (Bai Huyen Tran) in 1991. These platforms measure between 100 and 250 square meters each, and stand on shallow elevations lying between seven and 25 meters below the sea surface.
Whether these shoals form part of the Spratly Islands is a matter of debate. China’s maps group them together with the Spratlys proper while treating them as if they were landforms above water. As a result, the Chinese numbers of the Vietnamese-occupied features in the Spratly Islands range typically between 27 and 30. Vietnam argues that as the shoals lie deep under water and within 200 nautical miles (nm) from the Vietnamese baselines, they belong to Vietnam’s continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as stipulated in Article 76 of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). According to UNCLOS, submarine features cannot be appropriated by occupation or otherwise.
Eleven of the Vietnamese-held features in the Spratly Islands have natural portions showing more than 100 meters long above high tide. These are Southwest Cay, South Reef, Sand Cay, Namyit Island, Sin Cowe Island, Sin Cowe East Island, Lansdowne Reef, Spratly Island, Central Reef, Pearson Reef, and Amboyna Cay. Seven other features – Petley Reef, Discovery Great Reef, Collins Reef, West Reef, East Reef, Tennent Reef, and Barque Canada Reef – reportedly have portions that are naturally above water at high tide. These features may qualify as “islands” or “rocks” and may generate territorial waters in keeping with UNCLOS. Three features – Ladd Reef, Allison Reef, and Cornwallis South Reef – may be above water only at low tide. In the language of UNCLOS, they may be called “low-tide elevations,” which are not entitled to a territorial sea, EEZ, or continental shelf.
Philippines
Philippine media typically reports either nine or ten Philippine-held features in the Spratly Islands. The tenth feature is Irving Reef (Filipino: Balagtas), which lies between Loaita Bank and West York Island. There are no structures on this reef, but unverified sources report that Philippine Navy ships take turns to guard the feature. If this is true, the status of Irving is similar to that of several other features that are watched by Chinese and Vietnamese vessels but remain unoccupied.
Given this, the nine features held by the Philippines in the Spratly Islands are:
- Northeast Cay (Filipino: Parola),
- Thitu Island (Pag-asa),
- Loaita Cay (Panata),
- Loaita Island (Kota),
- West York Island (Likas),
- Flat Island (Patag),
- Nanshan Island (Lawak),
- Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin),
- Commodore Reef (Rizal).
Between 1970 and 1978, the Philippine moved in to occupy seven features in the Spratlys, with troops stationed on five islands. Flat Island, which lies about 6 nm north of Nanshan Island, appeared to be controlled by a garrison based at Nanshan until 2011, when some starshell-like structures were built on Flat to house a more permanent presence. A documentary produced by a local TV network in 2004 reported that only four soldiers were guarding both features from their shelters on Nanshan. A similar method appeared to be applied to the features in Loaita Bank, with Loaita Island serving as the base for the garrison until additional facility was erected on Loaita Cay. Some sources report that Lankiam Cay had a beach of more than five hectares in the past, but strong waves brought by a typhoon washed out the sandy surface of the island, leaving behind the calcarenite foundation that can be seen at low tide.
The start date of the Philippine occupation of Commodore Reef remains uncertain. Philippine troops landed on the reef in August 1980 and removed a marker that Malaysia installed there a few months before, but it is unknown whether they stayed or left after the operation. One report states that they deserted it since 1986, but it is currently occupied by a military detachment.
In 1999, the Philippines occupied Second Thomas Shoal by running the tank landing ship BRP Sierra Madre aground and using it as a shelter for a small garrison. Of note, the Pentagon does not count the Philippine station on Second Thomas Shoal as an outpost, although the contrary view is prevalent in the Philippines. This shoal is also the only low-tide elevation among the features occupied by the Philippines. All the other eight are visible above water at high tide.
Taiwan
Itu Aba Island (Chinese: 太平島) is the only feature occupied by Taiwan in the Spratlys. It is also the largest natural land feature in the archipelago. Taiwan sometimes is said to hold two features there. This is likely to be inferred from reports of Taiwan erecting structures (in 1995 and 2004) and its officials landing (in 2003 and 2012) on Ban Than Reef. However, the best description of Ban Than’s current status is “unoccupied.” Ban Than has a beach less than 100 meters long, which lies about 2.5 nm from Itu Aba and about 4 nm from the Vietnamese-occupied Sand Cay. The Pentagon identifies no outpost on Ban Than, and no structures are visible in recent satellite images as well as photos of the reef. Sources with local knowledge told me that both Taiwanese and Vietnamese troops have occasionally planted materials on Ban Than and used them as targets for their live-fire exercises.
China
In the Spratly Islands, China has occupied six features since 1988 and Mischief Reef since 1995. The seven features occupied by China in the Spratly Islands are:
- Subi Reef (Chinese: 渚碧礁 Zhubi Jiao),
- Gaven Reef (南薰礁 Nanxun Jiao),
- Hughes Reef (东门礁 Dongmen Jiao),
- Johnson South Reef (赤瓜礁 Chigua Jiao),
- Fiery Cross Reef (永暑礁 Yongshu Jiao),
- Cuarteron Reef (华阳礁 Huayang Jiao),
- Mischief Reef (美济礁 Meiji Jiao).
In addition, some accounts have mistakenly identified some features such as Eldad Reef, Whitsun Reef, Ladd Reef, and McKennan Reef as being occupied by China. For instance, two popular maps produced in 2015 by Reuters and AFP still reflected the incorrect information about Eldad Reef and Lankiam Cay. The mistaken status of Eldad, Whitsun, and Ladd Reefs is likely to have been inferred from reports about Vietnam protesting against Chinese troops landing on Eldad Reef in 1990, Da Ba Dau in March 1992 and Da Lac in July 1992. Da Ba Dau was identified as the Vietnamese name for Whitsun Reef, but Da Lac was mistakenly thought to be Ladd Reef (Da Lat in Vietnamese), which actually was occupied by Vietnam. In fact, Da Lac is the Vietnamese name for Gaven South Reef, a low-tide elevation 2 nm from Gaven Reef.
The APMSS map shows no Chinese outposts on any other reefs except the seven listed above. Some reports citing Philippine intelligence sources in June 2015 alleged that China had reclaimed land on Eldad Reef. However, separate sources with local knowledge later confirmed that Eldad as well as Whitsun, McKennan, and Gaven South Reefs remained unoccupied.
Still, the unoccupied status of these features is fragile. Both Eldad Reef and Whitsun Reef have strategic value. They form the eastern edge of two major groups in the Spratlys – Tizard Bank and Union Bank. They have also gradually “become” islands. Sailing directions prior to the mid-1990s suggest that they were low-tide elevations. But today each reef bears a 100-meter long sand dune that has reportedly grown in area and height. A smaller sand dune has also emerged on McKennan Reef, which is often confused with Hughes Reef but actually lies 1 nm west. Several stories in the Vietnamese social media suggest that Eldad, Whitsun, and McKennan are frequently sites of quiet cat-and-mouse games between China and Vietnam, one attempting to get a foothold on these ‘new islands’ while the other tries to frustrate these efforts.
A similar situation has been going on at South Luconia Shoal (Malay: Beting Patinggi Ali) 84 nm off the coast of Malaysia’s Sarawak. Both Chinese and Malaysian officials have confirmed that China’s vessels have been continually present at the shoal since 2013. Intriguingly, one of the features in the shoal, Luconia Breakers (Malay: Beting Hempasan Bantin), appears to have changed status from a low-tide elevation to a “small island,” to use the words of Malaysia’s Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department Shahidan Kassim. Satellite images and aerial photos show a sand dune of about 70 meters in length on this feature. They also show Chinese Coast Guard vessels, shadowed by Malaysian Navy ships, anchoring near the ‘new island.’
Some scholars argue that Luconia Breakers was reclaimed into an artificial island by Malaysia sometime prior to 2009. But this argument makes little sense. As the coastal state with an EEZ over the shoal, Malaysia has a strong interest in keeping the feature submerged. A 2012 judgment by the International Court of Justice stated that “low-tide elevations cannot be appropriated.” Following from this, Luconia Breakers might be legally protected from China’s sovereignty claim if it remains a low-tide elevation.
Some have questioned whether such a rapid elevation could indeed have occurred naturally in a short period of time. But this is hardly an uncommon occurrence. The emergence of small sand dunes has been registered during the last few decades at several reefs in the Spratly Islands, with Eldad, Whitsun, McKennan, and Ban Than being some prominent examples. With the help of waves and wind, coral sediment can either form growing sand dunes or be washed away – as might be the case with Lankiam Cay – without any movements of the reef foundation.
Hydrographic evidence presented by the Philippines at the Permanent Court of Arbitration suggests that three of the seven Chinese-held features, including Fiery Cross, Cuarteron and Johnson South, have portions above water during high tide, but the other four, including Subi, Gaven, Hughes, and Mischief Reefs are low-tide elevations in their original nature before the massive land reclamation program since 2013 that turned all the seven into artificial islands.
Malaysia
As with the case of the Philippines, the number of Malaysian-held features in the Spratlys varies depending on how one defines occupation. Most accounts typically speak of either five or eight features. Malaysia has troops and facilities stationed on five features:
- Swallow Reef (Malay: Layang-Layang), since 1983,
- Ardasier Reef (Ubi), since 1986,
- Mariveles Reef (Mantanani), since 1986,
- Erica Reef (Siput), since 1999,
- Investigator Shoal (Peninjau), since 1999.
Malaysia appears to “occupy” Dallas Reef in a similar way to how the Philippines did with Flat Island. Troops from nearby Ardasier Reef, which lies about 3 nm from Dallas Reef, may watch and visit the latter on a regular basis. Royal Charlotte and Louisa Reefs, on the other hand, can hardly be classified as “occupied.” While there is a beacon on Royal Charlotte, visitors report that it was inactive and there were no others structures on the reef. Visitors have also found Louisa deserted with no other structures than an obelisk-shaped beacon, which was also not working. Among these eight features, Swallow, Mariveles, Erica, Royal Charlotte, and Louisa Reefs reportedly have some natural portions protruding above high tide, while Ardasier, Dallas, and Investigator are likely low-tide elevations. The beacons on Royal Charlotte and Louisa might have been built by Malaysia in the 1980s as a means to assert sovereignty over the two reefs.
Brunei
The only feature in the Spratly Islands that is claimed by Brunei is Louisa Reef. According to official statements by Malaysia and Brunei, an Exchange of Letters signed in 2009 has “established the final delimitation of territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone” between the two countries. The agreement unequivocally states that Brunei has sovereignty over two oil blocks within which Louisa Reef is located.
Although Malaysia has not officially dropped its territorial claims over this feature, the agreement with Brunei substantially weakens Malaysia’s claims. As both Malaysia and Brunei have grounded their sovereignty claims over Louisa on the basis of coastal state rights, Malaysia’s acknowledgement of Brunei’s territorial sea, continental shelf, and EEZ is tantamount to effectively conceding Louisa Reef to Brunei. However, this appears to be a tacit understanding rather than an official agreement of any kind. The Exchange of Letters has yet to be publicized, and even if it would be made public, there would likely be no mentioning of Louisa. This is certainly the case with Limbang District, the other territorial dispute between Brunei and Malaysia.
For all the attention that has been focused on the South China Sea disputes, there is still little clarity on some basic realities such as who owns what. As Bill Hayton has demonstrated, much of the literature relies on historical accounts that “use unreliable bases from which to write reliable histories.” It is hoped that this article is a step in the right direction towards lifting the thick veil that often conceals the truth about these disputes.
Alexander L. Vuving is Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not reflect those of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the Asia-Pacific Center.
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How Low Oil Prices Hamstring Vietnam in the South China Sea Disputes
Falling oil prices are usually analyzed from an economic point of view; Vietnam is no exception. Myriad domestic and international articles have provided in-depth analysis of the “double-edged” effects that falling oil prices might have on Vietnam’s GDP. The Voice of Vietnam concluded that “falling oil prices’ negative effects might be offset by well-planned economic strategies, which can turn adversity into opportunities for Vietnam economy.”
However, economic impacts are not the only dangers posed by rock-bottom oil prices for Vietnam. Low oil prices also have non-negligible geopolitical implications – including on the strength of Vietnam’s position in the South China Sea.
The top geopolitical concern for the Vietnamese government is well-known to be the South China Sea dispute, and particularly China’s maneuvers in the region. As a small nation next to the great power (in terms of both population size and international influence) of China, Vietnam has little ability to balance China on its own. The ASEAN community is too fragmented and divided in its individual national interests to stay united against China. And neither the United States nor Russia is close or sincere enough for Vietnam to wholeheartedly rely upon. The old era of the Communist bloc has long since passed; the current Russian Federation greatly values its comprehensive strategic partnership with China. The United States, meanwhile, seems reluctant to take concrete steps to counter China’s rising influence. Given the reality of the current international and regional order, Vietnam’s only realistic choice is to be self-reliant and make use of the multi-polar balance in the international arena.
For the purposes of this balancing, Vietnam generally prefers a stronger Russia, a weaker China, and less anti-Russian America. That combination provides Vietnam a better negotiating position on the South China Sea disputes. The underlying logic is that the better the balance of power among the United States, Russia, and China, the less power China has, and consequently the relatively greater bargaining power Vietnam can get. Unfortunately, low oil prices have effectively driven the balance away from Vietnam’s interests; today we are seeing a weaker Russia, a stronger China, and a strongly anti-Russian America.
First of all, the falling oil prices have not only reduced Russia’s bargaining position in the international arena but also pushed Russia to depend more on Chinese cash. It’s possible weakening Russia through oil prices was intentional — a strategic move by the United States to render Russia helpless right after the economic sanctions from the West to punish Russian aggression in Crimea. “It’s time to drive Russia bankrupt – again,” read the headline for a 2014 Forbes piece by Louis Woodhill. “We should do to Russia what Ronald Reagan did to its predecessor, the old Soviet Union,” Woodhill argues. “We should drive them into bankruptcy by stabilizing the U.S. dollar” – and thereby driving down oil prices.
It is obviously not a coincidence that this history is repeating itself. In 1983, the notorious oil glut effectively pressed the oil price down from an annual average of $35 per barrel in 1980 to around $14 in 1986. One of the main causes was Reagan allowing oil prices in the United States to be decided by the free market and increasing American oil production. Again, in 2014, with Russia and the United States at odds over Crimea, Washington announced the possibility of increasing production.
Since then, oil prices have plummeted from over $100 a barrel to around $30. The decline in oil prices drove the Russian economy into the corner. According to estimates from the International Monetary Fund, Russia’s GDP shrank by 3.7 percent in 2015, and is projected to contract a further 1 percent in 2016. This constrained economic capacity has consequently harmed Moscow’s political influence.
It has also boosted China’s clout in the Sino-Russian relationship. Eager for more customers, Russia had to rush into the potentially non-profitable “Power of Siberia” pipeline with China in 2014. The gas deal with China, worth $400 billion, provides an alternative market for Russian energy exports.
Russia’s own problem with Crimea and the current economic doldrums has blocked Moscow from taking any definitive stand on the South China Sea disputes. In contrast to the tangible support given to China’s neighbor during the Sino-Soviet split — Soviet military advisers were stationed in Vietnam during the Sino-Vietnamese war, while Soviet troops massed at the Sino-Soviet border and Mongolian-Chinese border – Russia’s policy on the South China Sea disputes has been described as “non-existent.” A weakened and dependent Russia, the result of falling oil prices, is not encouraging for Vietnam’s status in South China Sea Dispute.
Furthermore, the drop in oil prices has strengthened China’s bargaining position as a regional price maker. China ranks third in global gas consumption and second in oil consumption. The falling oil prices lessen the burden on production costs and might help save China from its economic woes. The current oil surplus, and the resulting low prices, benefit China as a global producer and consumer. China stands to gain from the falling oil prices and this is against Vietnam’s geopolitical interests in the South China Sea dispute.
The United States, on the other hand, is busy designing her own game of power in the Asia-Pacific. U.S. moves to provide financial aid for the ASEAN countries in strengthening their marine defense capacity (the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative, or MSI) and have American ships guarding the Asia-Pacific are welcomed by all the nations involved, including Vietnam. However, from Vietnam’s geopolitical perspective, the U.S. position has not been as beneficial as desired.
It is important to remember that Vietnam is under the leadership of the Communist Party, which has unerasable links with the Russian Federation and remains trapped in a relationship with Communist China. For this reason, while rhetorically declaring support for Vietnam, the United States has chosen the Philippines to be its strategic partner instead. The American preference is shown in numbers, with the Philippines receiving $41 million dollars while Vietnam will receive only $2 million dollars in the MSI package. Meanwhile, the absence of Russia in the South China Sea disputes, due in part to the falling oil prices, fits with the U.S. desire to exclude Russian influence, but it is contrary to Vietnam’s geopolitical interest. An anti-Russia United States is not good for Vietnam’s standing in the South China Sea disputes.
In short, the falling price of oil has more than just economic implications for Vietnam. By assessing carefully the effect of the oil surplus on the balance of power among China, Russia, and the United States, the threats for Vietnam geopolitically become more visible. Of course, a strong Russia does not automatically translate to a constraint on Chinese aggression or balance against American activeness in the South China Sea dispute. Yet a strong Russia will at least contribute to better maintaining what Henry Kissinger has called a “global equilibrium” with “a greater harmony of values” compared to the weak and dependent Russia of today. Following such logic, the falling oil prices are having a detrimental effect on Vietnam’s geopolitical interests in the increasingly intense South China Sea dispute.
Falling oil prices are usually analyzed from an economic point of view; Vietnam is no exception. Myriad domestic and international articles have provided in-depth analysis of the “double-edged” effects that falling oil prices might have on Vietnam’s GDP. The Voice of Vietnam concluded that “falling oil prices’ negative effects might be offset by well-planned economic strategies, which can turn adversity into opportunities for Vietnam economy.”
However, economic impacts are not the only dangers posed by rock-bottom oil prices for Vietnam. Low oil prices also have non-negligible geopolitical implications – including on the strength of Vietnam’s position in the South China Sea.
The top geopolitical concern for the Vietnamese government is well-known to be the South China Sea dispute, and particularly China’s maneuvers in the region. As a small nation next to the great power (in terms of both population size and international influence) of China, Vietnam has little ability to balance China on its own. The ASEAN community is too fragmented and divided in its individual national interests to stay united against China. And neither the United States nor Russia is close or sincere enough for Vietnam to wholeheartedly rely upon. The old era of the Communist bloc has long since passed; the current Russian Federation greatly values its comprehensive strategic partnership with China. The United States, meanwhile, seems reluctant to take concrete steps to counter China’s rising influence. Given the reality of the current international and regional order, Vietnam’s only realistic choice is to be self-reliant and make use of the multi-polar balance in the international arena.
For the purposes of this balancing, Vietnam generally prefers a stronger Russia, a weaker China, and less anti-Russian America. That combination provides Vietnam a better negotiating position on the South China Sea disputes. The underlying logic is that the better the balance of power among the United States, Russia, and China, the less power China has, and consequently the relatively greater bargaining power Vietnam can get. Unfortunately, low oil prices have effectively driven the balance away from Vietnam’s interests; today we are seeing a weaker Russia, a stronger China, and a strongly anti-Russian America.
First of all, the falling oil prices have not only reduced Russia’s bargaining position in the international arena but also pushed Russia to depend more on Chinese cash. It’s possible weakening Russia through oil prices was intentional — a strategic move by the United States to render Russia helpless right after the economic sanctions from the West to punish Russian aggression in Crimea. “It’s time to drive Russia bankrupt – again,” read the headline for a 2014 Forbes piece by Louis Woodhill. “We should do to Russia what Ronald Reagan did to its predecessor, the old Soviet Union,” Woodhill argues. “We should drive them into bankruptcy by stabilizing the U.S. dollar” – and thereby driving down oil prices.
It is obviously not a coincidence that this history is repeating itself. In 1983, the notorious oil glut effectively pressed the oil price down from an annual average of $35 per barrel in 1980 to around $14 in 1986. One of the main causes was Reagan allowing oil prices in the United States to be decided by the free market and increasing American oil production. Again, in 2014, with Russia and the United States at odds over Crimea, Washington announced the possibility of increasing production.
Since then, oil prices have plummeted from over $100 a barrel to around $30. The decline in oil prices drove the Russian economy into the corner. According to estimates from the International Monetary Fund, Russia’s GDP shrank by 3.7 percent in 2015, and is projected to contract a further 1 percent in 2016. This constrained economic capacity has consequently harmed Moscow’s political influence.
It has also boosted China’s clout in the Sino-Russian relationship. Eager for more customers, Russia had to rush into the potentially non-profitable “Power of Siberia” pipeline with China in 2014. The gas deal with China, worth $400 billion, provides an alternative market for Russian energy exports.
Russia’s own problem with Crimea and the current economic doldrums has blocked Moscow from taking any definitive stand on the South China Sea disputes. In contrast to the tangible support given to China’s neighbor during the Sino-Soviet split — Soviet military advisers were stationed in Vietnam during the Sino-Vietnamese war, while Soviet troops massed at the Sino-Soviet border and Mongolian-Chinese border – Russia’s policy on the South China Sea disputes has been described as “non-existent.” A weakened and dependent Russia, the result of falling oil prices, is not encouraging for Vietnam’s status in South China Sea Dispute.
Furthermore, the drop in oil prices has strengthened China’s bargaining position as a regional price maker. China ranks third in global gas consumption and second in oil consumption. The falling oil prices lessen the burden on production costs and might help save China from its economic woes. The current oil surplus, and the resulting low prices, benefit China as a global producer and consumer. China stands to gain from the falling oil prices and this is against Vietnam’s geopolitical interests in the South China Sea dispute.
The United States, on the other hand, is busy designing her own game of power in the Asia-Pacific. U.S. moves to provide financial aid for the ASEAN countries in strengthening their marine defense capacity (the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative, or MSI) and have American ships guarding the Asia-Pacific are welcomed by all the nations involved, including Vietnam. However, from Vietnam’s geopolitical perspective, the U.S. position has not been as beneficial as desired.
It is important to remember that Vietnam is under the leadership of the Communist Party, which has unerasable links with the Russian Federation and remains trapped in a relationship with Communist China. For this reason, while rhetorically declaring support for Vietnam, the United States has chosen the Philippines to be its strategic partner instead. The American preference is shown in numbers, with the Philippines receiving $41 million dollars while Vietnam will receive only $2 million dollars in the MSI package. Meanwhile, the absence of Russia in the South China Sea disputes, due in part to the falling oil prices, fits with the U.S. desire to exclude Russian influence, but it is contrary to Vietnam’s geopolitical interest. An anti-Russia United States is not good for Vietnam’s standing in the South China Sea disputes.
In short, the falling price of oil has more than just economic implications for Vietnam. By assessing carefully the effect of the oil surplus on the balance of power among China, Russia, and the United States, the threats for Vietnam geopolitically become more visible. Of course, a strong Russia does not automatically translate to a constraint on Chinese aggression or balance against American activeness in the South China Sea dispute. Yet a strong Russia will at least contribute to better maintaining what Henry Kissinger has called a “global equilibrium” with “a greater harmony of values” compared to the weak and dependent Russia of today. Following such logic, the falling oil prices are having a detrimental effect on Vietnam’s geopolitical interests in the increasingly intense South China Sea dispute.
yusheng
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近日，有网友曝出了永暑岛5月12日和4月21日对比图。可以清晰的看出，5月12日的最新卫星照比4月21日的卫星图疑似多了三个机库!不得不感叹：这就是“中国速度”啊!（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 a缺钱不缺德a）
图为永暑岛4月20日合成孔径雷达成像图。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 小鱼尔）
图为永暑岛5月12日合成孔径雷达成像图。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 小鱼尔）
有网友也发布了4月21日永暑岛的最新卫星图，可以看到永暑岛的码头停靠了疑似054A护卫舰和大型补给舰各一艘!图为2016-04-21 永暑岛 DS超高清卫星图。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 戒急用忍）
图为2016-04-21 永暑岛 DS超高清卫星图。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 戒急用忍）
有网友也发布了4月21日永暑岛的最新卫星图，可以看到永暑岛的码头停靠了疑似054A护卫舰和大型补给舰各一艘!图为2016-04-21 永暑岛 DS超高清卫星图。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 戒急用忍）
疑似054A护卫舰和大型补给舰现身永暑岛港口。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 戒急用忍）
yusheng
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- Sep 15, 2007
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- 6
4月21日永暑岛的最新卫星图，可以看到永暑岛的码头停靠了疑似054A护卫舰和大型补给舰各一艘!图为2016-04-21 永暑岛 DS超高清卫星图。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 戒急用忍）
岛礁上已经建好了数座小楼，马路上还划设了斑马线，还有塑胶跑道等活动设施，港池已经投入使用。图为2016-04-21 永暑岛 DS超高清卫星图。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 戒急用忍）
岛礁此前只有个巴掌大的哨所，如今既有居住区又有娱乐区，还有港口和机场，俨然已经成了个小城市。图为2016-04-21 永暑岛 DS超高清卫星图。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 戒急用忍）
可以看到永暑岛的码头停靠了疑似054A护卫舰和大型补给舰各一艘!图为2016-04-21 永暑岛 DS超高清卫星图。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 戒急用忍）
图为网友发布的永暑岛高清局部照。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 a缺钱不缺德a）
图为网友发布的永暑岛高清局部照。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 a缺钱不缺德a）
图为网友发布的永暑岛高清局部照。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 a缺钱不缺德a）
图为网友发布的永暑岛高清局部照。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 a缺钱不缺德a）
岛礁上已经建好了数座小楼，马路上还划设了斑马线，还有塑胶跑道等活动设施，港池已经投入使用。图为2016-04-21 永暑岛 DS超高清卫星图。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 戒急用忍）
岛礁此前只有个巴掌大的哨所，如今既有居住区又有娱乐区，还有港口和机场，俨然已经成了个小城市。图为2016-04-21 永暑岛 DS超高清卫星图。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 戒急用忍）
可以看到永暑岛的码头停靠了疑似054A护卫舰和大型补给舰各一艘!图为2016-04-21 永暑岛 DS超高清卫星图。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 戒急用忍）
图为网友发布的永暑岛高清局部照。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 a缺钱不缺德a）
图为网友发布的永暑岛高清局部照。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 a缺钱不缺德a）
图为网友发布的永暑岛高清局部照。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 a缺钱不缺德a）
图为网友发布的永暑岛高清局部照。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 a缺钱不缺德a）
yusheng
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图为网友发布的永暑岛高清局部照。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 a缺钱不缺德a）
图为网友发布的永暑岛高清局部照。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 a缺钱不缺德a）
近日央视媒体曝光轰6K赴西太演习，穿越第一岛链的画面，画面中有疑似穿越南沙的镜头，注意右下角的疑似为永暑岛工地。
4月17日上午，一架正在南海执行空中巡逻任务的海军巡逻机，紧急飞赴南沙，降落永暑礁机场，将李万美等三名重病工人转运至海南三亚425医院接受救治。这也是“首次官泄南沙永暑岛街景与机场”。
图为永暑岛2016年3月6日高清卫星图。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 simwong）
永暑礁是中国南沙群岛的一个环形珊瑚礁，地理位置优越，战略价值高。中国官方证实已经在该岛礁进行相关建设，建造了飞机跑道，并进行了试飞。图为永暑岛2016年3月6日高清卫星图，疑似为楼层建筑。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 我心中的大海）
马路上的斑马线清晰可见，由此可以推测岛礁上未来驻扎的人数不会少，不然根本不需要这些辅助交通的设施。
跑道尽头有一片绿色的区域，疑似已经开始开始初步绿化。虽说现在后勤补给越来越好了，种菜相对少了，但是可以搞绿化啊，总之勤劳的中国人不爱“闲着”。如今南沙有了这么大一块土地，想必岛上的人们又有的忙了。
之前的永暑礁碉堡哨所跑个步只能绕着半个篮球场绕圈，现在光飞行跑道就有3公里长，还有塑胶跑道、足球场、篮球场、网球场，让你一次活动个够。
图为网友发布的永暑岛高清局部照。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 a缺钱不缺德a）
近日央视媒体曝光轰6K赴西太演习，穿越第一岛链的画面，画面中有疑似穿越南沙的镜头，注意右下角的疑似为永暑岛工地。
4月17日上午，一架正在南海执行空中巡逻任务的海军巡逻机，紧急飞赴南沙，降落永暑礁机场，将李万美等三名重病工人转运至海南三亚425医院接受救治。这也是“首次官泄南沙永暑岛街景与机场”。
图为永暑岛2016年3月6日高清卫星图。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 simwong）
永暑礁是中国南沙群岛的一个环形珊瑚礁，地理位置优越，战略价值高。中国官方证实已经在该岛礁进行相关建设，建造了飞机跑道，并进行了试飞。图为永暑岛2016年3月6日高清卫星图，疑似为楼层建筑。（鸣谢：南海研究论坛 我心中的大海）
马路上的斑马线清晰可见，由此可以推测岛礁上未来驻扎的人数不会少，不然根本不需要这些辅助交通的设施。
跑道尽头有一片绿色的区域，疑似已经开始开始初步绿化。虽说现在后勤补给越来越好了，种菜相对少了，但是可以搞绿化啊，总之勤劳的中国人不爱“闲着”。如今南沙有了这么大一块土地，想必岛上的人们又有的忙了。
之前的永暑礁碉堡哨所跑个步只能绕着半个篮球场绕圈，现在光飞行跑道就有3公里长，还有塑胶跑道、足球场、篮球场、网球场，让你一次活动个够。
Kiss_of_the_Dragon
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wow that I call piece of art to build such island. China must have spend a lot of money to do that
SBUS-CXK
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Vietnam, for example, when the invasion of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia do?? As in Germany, there is no war restraint. What is the difference between the Viet cong with Nazi? ... Facts have proven that indosinian federal ambition cannot be achieved.
Ha... I remember some armchair "thinktank" kids laughing at me about a year ago for suggesting catamaran types will likely see use use in the South China Sea, because it would be "too far away from the shores" or something like that and China could only project power close to its shores and the navy would be underpoweredin the SCS.
Many Arab nations back China's stance on South China Sea
MENAFN - The Journal Of Turkish Weekly - 14/05/2016
China's stance on the South China Sea is backed by many Arab countries, which expressed staunch support for Beijing's efforts to settle the issue peacefully.
In a statement issued at the 7th Ministerial Meeting of China-Arab Cooperation Forum, the participating Arab countries said they support China's efforts to peacefully resolve territorial and maritime differences with certain nations through friendly dialogue and negotiation.
They also stressed that the rights of sovereign nations as well as the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) signatories to choose how to solve their disputes should be respected.
Earlier,Arab LeagueSecretary-General Nabil al-Araby made a similar statement at a joint press conference with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman Bin Jassim Al-Thani.
He said both the Arab world and China will continue to support each other on issues concerning their respective core interests.
On Thursday, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ibrahim Ghandour also expressed the country's support for China's stance on this issue while meeting with Wang after the ministerial conference.
Ghandour stressed Sudan's firm stance on the issue of the South China Sea, backing China's legitimate rights in preserving territorial integrity and sovereignty.
While meeting Wang at the sidelines of the conference, Dr. Nizar Bin Obaid Madani, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, said his country appreciates China's adherence to peaceful means in settling dispes concerning the South China Sea.
In Doha, Wang held separate meetings on Wednesday with Abdelkader Messahel, Algerian Minister of Maghreb Affairs, high-profile officials of theAfrican Unionand the Arab League as well as his Lebanese counterpart Joubran Bassil,Yemeni Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Abdulmalik al-Mekhlafi.
During their meeting, Wang briefed Messahel on the historical facts about, and China's principled position on, the South China Sea issue.
Messahel said Algeria fully understands and supports China's position on the issue, and supports the settlement of relevant disputes through direct dialogue.
Bassil expressed support for China's position on the South China Sea, and Mekhlafi also expressed support for China's just position on the issue.
Manila unilaterally initiated an arbitration case against China over the maritime disputes at an international tribunal in The Hague in early 2013 under the UNCLOS.
China insists that the South China Sea disputes should be resolved peacefully through negotiation between the parties directly concerned.
Wang said last month that China is exercising its legitimate right to reject a compulsory arbitration, adding that thePhilippines' attempt to pressure China over an arbitration of maritime disputes is "either political arrogance or legal prejudice."
Under Article 4 of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed by China and ASEAN countries, the disputes should be resolved through consultations and negotiations by parties directly concerned.
http://www.menafn.com/1094764712/Many-Arab-nations-back-Chinas-stance-on-South-China-Sea
MENAFN - The Journal Of Turkish Weekly - 14/05/2016
China's stance on the South China Sea is backed by many Arab countries, which expressed staunch support for Beijing's efforts to settle the issue peacefully.
In a statement issued at the 7th Ministerial Meeting of China-Arab Cooperation Forum, the participating Arab countries said they support China's efforts to peacefully resolve territorial and maritime differences with certain nations through friendly dialogue and negotiation.
They also stressed that the rights of sovereign nations as well as the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) signatories to choose how to solve their disputes should be respected.
Earlier,Arab LeagueSecretary-General Nabil al-Araby made a similar statement at a joint press conference with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman Bin Jassim Al-Thani.
He said both the Arab world and China will continue to support each other on issues concerning their respective core interests.
On Thursday, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ibrahim Ghandour also expressed the country's support for China's stance on this issue while meeting with Wang after the ministerial conference.
Ghandour stressed Sudan's firm stance on the issue of the South China Sea, backing China's legitimate rights in preserving territorial integrity and sovereignty.
While meeting Wang at the sidelines of the conference, Dr. Nizar Bin Obaid Madani, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, said his country appreciates China's adherence to peaceful means in settling dispes concerning the South China Sea.
In Doha, Wang held separate meetings on Wednesday with Abdelkader Messahel, Algerian Minister of Maghreb Affairs, high-profile officials of theAfrican Unionand the Arab League as well as his Lebanese counterpart Joubran Bassil,Yemeni Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Abdulmalik al-Mekhlafi.
During their meeting, Wang briefed Messahel on the historical facts about, and China's principled position on, the South China Sea issue.
Messahel said Algeria fully understands and supports China's position on the issue, and supports the settlement of relevant disputes through direct dialogue.
Bassil expressed support for China's position on the South China Sea, and Mekhlafi also expressed support for China's just position on the issue.
Manila unilaterally initiated an arbitration case against China over the maritime disputes at an international tribunal in The Hague in early 2013 under the UNCLOS.
China insists that the South China Sea disputes should be resolved peacefully through negotiation between the parties directly concerned.
Wang said last month that China is exercising its legitimate right to reject a compulsory arbitration, adding that thePhilippines' attempt to pressure China over an arbitration of maritime disputes is "either political arrogance or legal prejudice."
Under Article 4 of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed by China and ASEAN countries, the disputes should be resolved through consultations and negotiations by parties directly concerned.
http://www.menafn.com/1094764712/Many-Arab-nations-back-Chinas-stance-on-South-China-Sea
