asad71
PROFESSIONAL
- Joined
- May 24, 2011
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1. The euphoria is quietening. The dust is settling down both in BD and in India. Soon people would have forgotten this sordid chapter in our national security. It is time for an introspection.
2. It is unfortunate and strange that our political leaders, media and think tanks have been arguing endlessly focusing on what happened or was to happen during the two and half days. The mastery of Indian diplomacy and media war was able to bring all attention focusing on only two issues - Teesta water and Transit. Everybody therefore forgot all other issues - issues of far greater concern to BD.
3. It was foolish on our part to forget the genesis of issues with India. These go back to the Partition 1947, Noon-Nehru Accord, pre-71 Farakka talks, Mujib-Indira Pact, Farakka accord by Zia's Minister B M Abbas, subsequent talks during various administrations and so on. Of disastrous consequence to BD has been to overlook what India grabbed from a vulnerable BAL govt since 2009.
4. SHW/BAL are obliged to India for a number of reasons. SHW, her family and top BAL leaders had enjoyed the hospitality of India for seven years at a stretch after 1975. Thereafter, whenever there was a fear of arrest, BAL leaders fled into India and lived in "safe houses". SHW and BAL always enjoyed a privileged patronage by India.
5. The election of 2009 saw an aggressive Indian support for BAL. It is said several MPs were recommended from Kolkata and Delhi for nomination. If that was not enough India stood by SHW for the protection of the person and the security of the govt during and post Peelkhana Carnage. The debt of gratitude now measured very deep. It was time for India to claim her pound of flesh.
6. BD planners somehow never understood, or were snubbed by a stubborn political establishment, that India's policy on BD was not in isolation to her plans for the NE penned after the 1965 War. The Agartala Conspiracy, subversion of workers' and students' unions, media/psy war at destabilizing E Pak situation exploiting disparity between the wings, and right upto the crack down on 25 March 1971 are to be considered in this mosaic.
7. An uncompromising nationalist and patriotic Sheikh Mujib was a hindrance to India's initial expectations. Mujib did not allow overflights by Indian aircraft or using different entry and exit points in an effort to shut down free entry and through passage to Indians. He resolutely dismissed any possibility of India using Chittagong port. The first Indian Astt HiCom at Chittagong was a Lieut Col of IA. He used to lobby openly for allowing India to use Chittagong Port.
8. Among the NE insurgents Lal Denga, the Mizo leader was the first to compromise with India saying that the Mizo insurgency was untenable because BD was a pro-India outcome. However, the all important Nagas continued. The Assamese, Tripuras, Manipuris and othe insurgents sprung up by the dozens.
8. Coming back to 2009, taking full advantage of SHW/BAL's weaknesses, India apparently planned her work in fol segments:
a. The crucial problem for India is the NE insurgency. To tackle this the measures decided are:
(1) Internal within BD. The 10 Truck Arms Case was reopened and publicized widely in the media. The proceedings were also prolonged. These has resulted in the arrest of high mily and civil security officers who are regularly paraded on case dates as if to refrain others from following in their patriotic path. With prolonged and detailed investigations all links, contact and moles have been exposed. This bears a negative effect on the insurgents in India.
(2) Several insurgents and their leaders have been handed over to India.
(3) Bhutan was assisted to clear all insurgents from her territory. The Burmese junta has been bribed and influenced variously to start ops against Indian insurgent bases within Burma. This is going on.
(4)While internal ops have been stepped up, GOI has been negotiating with breakaway groups to work out deals.
b. Indian state of Tripura needed a power station to use her gas to electrify the state. Even when the talk of transit/corridor had not started properly, the power station was pushed into Tripura through Ashuganj and Akhaura without any sanction. Soon thereafter, Tripura has been able to allocate electricity even to electrify the border with BD. This has been a major gain of India conveniently overlooked in BD.
c. The port of Chittagong is the crucial gateway to NE trade. This has been opened. Not only that, now the port of Mongla is also available to India to provide relief to Kolkata which is notoriously inefficient, slow and overburdened.
9. In short India has achieved all her strategic goals. She doesn't need transit/corridor because her problems are solved by the use of Mongla, Ashuganj and Chittagong.
10. What about our water? What about it? By Mamta not coming only Teesta was not decided on. What about Feni and the remaining of the 54 common rivers?
11. What about a guarantee clause and an arbitration clause in Farakka? What about Talpotti? What about maritime boundary? What about India acting on the Mujib-Indira enclave exchange pact? We had given ours then and there. But now India has granted 24 hrs entry into some of the enclaves whereas the corridor was to be transferred in perpetuity.
12. BD leaders and officers would do well to remember that Indian senior officers have to study The Arthasastra of Katulya/Chanokya in senior courses. This is in addition to most Hindu Indians reading the treatise like they read Hindu mythology.
13. BD now has no cards that she can play against India
2. It is unfortunate and strange that our political leaders, media and think tanks have been arguing endlessly focusing on what happened or was to happen during the two and half days. The mastery of Indian diplomacy and media war was able to bring all attention focusing on only two issues - Teesta water and Transit. Everybody therefore forgot all other issues - issues of far greater concern to BD.
3. It was foolish on our part to forget the genesis of issues with India. These go back to the Partition 1947, Noon-Nehru Accord, pre-71 Farakka talks, Mujib-Indira Pact, Farakka accord by Zia's Minister B M Abbas, subsequent talks during various administrations and so on. Of disastrous consequence to BD has been to overlook what India grabbed from a vulnerable BAL govt since 2009.
4. SHW/BAL are obliged to India for a number of reasons. SHW, her family and top BAL leaders had enjoyed the hospitality of India for seven years at a stretch after 1975. Thereafter, whenever there was a fear of arrest, BAL leaders fled into India and lived in "safe houses". SHW and BAL always enjoyed a privileged patronage by India.
5. The election of 2009 saw an aggressive Indian support for BAL. It is said several MPs were recommended from Kolkata and Delhi for nomination. If that was not enough India stood by SHW for the protection of the person and the security of the govt during and post Peelkhana Carnage. The debt of gratitude now measured very deep. It was time for India to claim her pound of flesh.
6. BD planners somehow never understood, or were snubbed by a stubborn political establishment, that India's policy on BD was not in isolation to her plans for the NE penned after the 1965 War. The Agartala Conspiracy, subversion of workers' and students' unions, media/psy war at destabilizing E Pak situation exploiting disparity between the wings, and right upto the crack down on 25 March 1971 are to be considered in this mosaic.
7. An uncompromising nationalist and patriotic Sheikh Mujib was a hindrance to India's initial expectations. Mujib did not allow overflights by Indian aircraft or using different entry and exit points in an effort to shut down free entry and through passage to Indians. He resolutely dismissed any possibility of India using Chittagong port. The first Indian Astt HiCom at Chittagong was a Lieut Col of IA. He used to lobby openly for allowing India to use Chittagong Port.
8. Among the NE insurgents Lal Denga, the Mizo leader was the first to compromise with India saying that the Mizo insurgency was untenable because BD was a pro-India outcome. However, the all important Nagas continued. The Assamese, Tripuras, Manipuris and othe insurgents sprung up by the dozens.
8. Coming back to 2009, taking full advantage of SHW/BAL's weaknesses, India apparently planned her work in fol segments:
a. The crucial problem for India is the NE insurgency. To tackle this the measures decided are:
(1) Internal within BD. The 10 Truck Arms Case was reopened and publicized widely in the media. The proceedings were also prolonged. These has resulted in the arrest of high mily and civil security officers who are regularly paraded on case dates as if to refrain others from following in their patriotic path. With prolonged and detailed investigations all links, contact and moles have been exposed. This bears a negative effect on the insurgents in India.
(2) Several insurgents and their leaders have been handed over to India.
(3) Bhutan was assisted to clear all insurgents from her territory. The Burmese junta has been bribed and influenced variously to start ops against Indian insurgent bases within Burma. This is going on.
(4)While internal ops have been stepped up, GOI has been negotiating with breakaway groups to work out deals.
b. Indian state of Tripura needed a power station to use her gas to electrify the state. Even when the talk of transit/corridor had not started properly, the power station was pushed into Tripura through Ashuganj and Akhaura without any sanction. Soon thereafter, Tripura has been able to allocate electricity even to electrify the border with BD. This has been a major gain of India conveniently overlooked in BD.
c. The port of Chittagong is the crucial gateway to NE trade. This has been opened. Not only that, now the port of Mongla is also available to India to provide relief to Kolkata which is notoriously inefficient, slow and overburdened.
9. In short India has achieved all her strategic goals. She doesn't need transit/corridor because her problems are solved by the use of Mongla, Ashuganj and Chittagong.
10. What about our water? What about it? By Mamta not coming only Teesta was not decided on. What about Feni and the remaining of the 54 common rivers?
11. What about a guarantee clause and an arbitration clause in Farakka? What about Talpotti? What about maritime boundary? What about India acting on the Mujib-Indira enclave exchange pact? We had given ours then and there. But now India has granted 24 hrs entry into some of the enclaves whereas the corridor was to be transferred in perpetuity.
12. BD leaders and officers would do well to remember that Indian senior officers have to study The Arthasastra of Katulya/Chanokya in senior courses. This is in addition to most Hindu Indians reading the treatise like they read Hindu mythology.
13. BD now has no cards that she can play against India
