third eye
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Aug 24, 2008
- Messages
- 18,519
- Reaction score
- 13
- Country
- Location
Shadow of the past - Dr Maleeha Lodhi...The writer is special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former envoy to the US and the UK.
Last week marked the 25th death anniversary of the countrys longest serving ruler, General Ziaul Haq. A quarter of a century after his death in an air crash, Zias troublesome legacy survives in many ways. His era was arguably the most consequential for Pakistans subsequent history and political fortunes. The policies and governance habits formed in that decade were to have an enduring impact on the countrys political, economic and social dynamics for years to come.
A review of that period will help in understanding the genesis of many imposing challenges Pakistan faces today. Of the problems that came to afflict the country many are either rooted in that era or were compounded during those years.
General Zia would not have survived in power for so long (1977-1988) if he hadnt been such a wily manipulator. He vigorously exploited opportunities that came his way. He manipulated the polarisation between Zulfikar Ali Bhuttos supporters and opponents by using divide and rule tactics and exploited their political confrontation that had paved the way for the 1977 military coup. He leveraged western support for his frontline role in fighting Soviet occupation of Afghanistan to consolidate his domestic position.
The self-proclaimed caretaker turned his original 90-day operation into a long career, twice promising elections in 1977 and 1979, and then cancelling them. He used a combination of coercion and swift changes of course to keep his political opponents off balance and allowed himself to be underestimated to orchestrate the execution of the countrys first popularly elected prime minister. But for all his machinations he was never able to eliminate Bhuttos influence on Pakistans politics.
Four key aspects of Zias rule had long-term consequences for the country all of them deleterious. First and most significantly, the combination of external and internal policies he pursued led to the rise of religious extremism and militancy in the country.
Although the influence of religion in national politics had ebbed and flowed after independence, in the countrys first three decades the affairs of state were generally kept insulated from religion. This changed under General Zia when he embarked on a self-assigned mission to Islamise the country as well as its legal and educational system.
Zia fused politics and religion in using Islam to legitimise his rule. Among its repercussions were to divide society along religious and sectarian lines. This fostered the emergence of an intolerant, extremist mindset in society, unleashing passions that polarised the nation. Sectarianism too had its roots in these policies.
Combined with the effects of the long Afghan war these policies spawned religious radicalisation and saw the birth of militant groups, some of which were used to advance foreign policy goals. Under Zia, Pakistans long engagement in the US-directed campaign to roll back the Red Army from Afghanistan mired the country in a war of unintended consequences from which the country and the region was to reap a bitter harvest.
The Afghan enterprise was marked by a series of strategic mistakes. The most consequential was to use religion to fight communism. This produced the blowback of militant radicalisation that engulfed the neighbourhood and came to destabilise Pakistan itself. Zia and his cohorts failed to anticipate how this geo-political engagement would import diverse sources of instability to jeopardise Pakistans own security.
Thousands of nationals from dozens of Muslim countries were encouraged by the US-led forces of freedom to train and fight in the Afghan jihad. Several of these mujahideen were to later morph into Al-Qaeda. The last of the Cold War conflicts was to lead to the first military intervention of the 21st century in the wake of 9/11.
Other than militancy, the witches brew of problems the Afghan war brought to the country included proliferation of drugs and weapons, the exponential growth of madressahs and influx of refugees, which made it the largest displaced population anywhere in the world.
The second aspect of Zias legacy relates to his governments disastrous economic management. It is in those economic policies that the roots of the countrys chronic fiscal crises, financial imbalances and government indebtedness can be found. Annual GDP growth averaged six percent in the 1980s. But this statistically impressive growth rate was achieved by running down physical and social assets and by high levels of borrowing.
Moreover a unique opportunity was squandered to translate a combination of fortuitous factors significant western aid and inflows of remittances from overseas Pakistanis into investment in productive sectors and infrastructure. Instead this windfall was used to finance consumption.
The profligacy and fiscal indiscipline practiced by the regimes economic managers touched new heights when in 1984-85, current expenditure exceeded total revenue. This was a turning point in the countrys budgetary history. Unwilling to broaden the tax base or curb spending, the regime began to borrow excessively to finance not only development but also current expenditure or consumption. The seeds of an unsustainable resource imbalance, reflected in the twin deficits of the budget and balance of payments were planted firmly during the Zia era.
This established an unfortunate tradition, followed by his civilian and military successors of using assistance from abroad to avoid or postpone structural economic reforms that could have placed the economy on a self-sustaining footing. The costs of delayed or no reforms have since trapped the country in a vicious cycle of external dependence, fiscal imprudence and financial crises, which have in turn necessitated repeated IMF bailouts.
The third pernicious aspect of Zias legacy was the political and institutional erosion wrought by the countrys longest period of martial law. His eleven years in power left Pakistan institutionally impoverished, and undermined the foundation of later democratic rule. The prolonged prohibition of political activity, ban on political parties, assault on the independence of the judiciary, restrictions on press and academic freedom, all served to undermine the institutions of civil society. Weak political institutions in an increasingly fragmented society made governance a formidable challenge in the post-Zia era.
Although politicisation of the civil bureaucracy had begun under Bhutto, Zias actions also hastened the countrys descent into administrative chaos. Political manipulation of the steel frame, which had long provided administrative order to the country, inescapably produced erosion of the authority of state institutions. With the administrative and police machinery distorted to serve political ends, their efficiency underwent precipitous decline.
The fourth key aspect of Zias legacy relates to consequences that ensued from his policies of depoliticisation and parochialisation. This meant several things. As historian Ayesha Jalal has convincingly demonstrated parochialising politics involved encouraging the articulation of public demands in ethnic or localised terms. This was accompanied by efforts to spawn or strengthen countervailing political, ethnic and religious groups to undercut support for opposition parties. These actions inhibited national politics and fostered parochial trends that further fragmented society.
With national issues deliberately trumped by promoting local politics, a new genre of politician was spawned. This patronage-seeking politician was tied to the regime by new, clientelist networks resting on access to state assets: land, bank loans and development funds. This patronage-driven, local influential in turn ensured that the post-1985 non-party politics were mostly shorn of national orientation. This changed the complexion of politics, as well as the countrys political culture. Seeking elected office to leverage state resources became the main driver of politics.
This produced a number of harmful effects: the ascendency of politics without wider public purpose, abuse of government office for private gain, draining of state coffers, haemorrhaging of state-owned banks and enterprises, and ultimately the pervasiveness of corruption throughout the system. What Jalal calls the monetisation of politics was born in the Zia period.
Supporters and political heirs of President Zia often point to economic growth and political stability as the ostensible achievements of his years in power. But that claim is belied by an economy left in ruins, a more violent and fragmented society and state institutions with much weaker capacity to govern than ever before.
Last week marked the 25th death anniversary of the countrys longest serving ruler, General Ziaul Haq. A quarter of a century after his death in an air crash, Zias troublesome legacy survives in many ways. His era was arguably the most consequential for Pakistans subsequent history and political fortunes. The policies and governance habits formed in that decade were to have an enduring impact on the countrys political, economic and social dynamics for years to come.
A review of that period will help in understanding the genesis of many imposing challenges Pakistan faces today. Of the problems that came to afflict the country many are either rooted in that era or were compounded during those years.
General Zia would not have survived in power for so long (1977-1988) if he hadnt been such a wily manipulator. He vigorously exploited opportunities that came his way. He manipulated the polarisation between Zulfikar Ali Bhuttos supporters and opponents by using divide and rule tactics and exploited their political confrontation that had paved the way for the 1977 military coup. He leveraged western support for his frontline role in fighting Soviet occupation of Afghanistan to consolidate his domestic position.
The self-proclaimed caretaker turned his original 90-day operation into a long career, twice promising elections in 1977 and 1979, and then cancelling them. He used a combination of coercion and swift changes of course to keep his political opponents off balance and allowed himself to be underestimated to orchestrate the execution of the countrys first popularly elected prime minister. But for all his machinations he was never able to eliminate Bhuttos influence on Pakistans politics.
Four key aspects of Zias rule had long-term consequences for the country all of them deleterious. First and most significantly, the combination of external and internal policies he pursued led to the rise of religious extremism and militancy in the country.
Although the influence of religion in national politics had ebbed and flowed after independence, in the countrys first three decades the affairs of state were generally kept insulated from religion. This changed under General Zia when he embarked on a self-assigned mission to Islamise the country as well as its legal and educational system.
Zia fused politics and religion in using Islam to legitimise his rule. Among its repercussions were to divide society along religious and sectarian lines. This fostered the emergence of an intolerant, extremist mindset in society, unleashing passions that polarised the nation. Sectarianism too had its roots in these policies.
Combined with the effects of the long Afghan war these policies spawned religious radicalisation and saw the birth of militant groups, some of which were used to advance foreign policy goals. Under Zia, Pakistans long engagement in the US-directed campaign to roll back the Red Army from Afghanistan mired the country in a war of unintended consequences from which the country and the region was to reap a bitter harvest.
The Afghan enterprise was marked by a series of strategic mistakes. The most consequential was to use religion to fight communism. This produced the blowback of militant radicalisation that engulfed the neighbourhood and came to destabilise Pakistan itself. Zia and his cohorts failed to anticipate how this geo-political engagement would import diverse sources of instability to jeopardise Pakistans own security.
Thousands of nationals from dozens of Muslim countries were encouraged by the US-led forces of freedom to train and fight in the Afghan jihad. Several of these mujahideen were to later morph into Al-Qaeda. The last of the Cold War conflicts was to lead to the first military intervention of the 21st century in the wake of 9/11.
Other than militancy, the witches brew of problems the Afghan war brought to the country included proliferation of drugs and weapons, the exponential growth of madressahs and influx of refugees, which made it the largest displaced population anywhere in the world.
The second aspect of Zias legacy relates to his governments disastrous economic management. It is in those economic policies that the roots of the countrys chronic fiscal crises, financial imbalances and government indebtedness can be found. Annual GDP growth averaged six percent in the 1980s. But this statistically impressive growth rate was achieved by running down physical and social assets and by high levels of borrowing.
Moreover a unique opportunity was squandered to translate a combination of fortuitous factors significant western aid and inflows of remittances from overseas Pakistanis into investment in productive sectors and infrastructure. Instead this windfall was used to finance consumption.
The profligacy and fiscal indiscipline practiced by the regimes economic managers touched new heights when in 1984-85, current expenditure exceeded total revenue. This was a turning point in the countrys budgetary history. Unwilling to broaden the tax base or curb spending, the regime began to borrow excessively to finance not only development but also current expenditure or consumption. The seeds of an unsustainable resource imbalance, reflected in the twin deficits of the budget and balance of payments were planted firmly during the Zia era.
This established an unfortunate tradition, followed by his civilian and military successors of using assistance from abroad to avoid or postpone structural economic reforms that could have placed the economy on a self-sustaining footing. The costs of delayed or no reforms have since trapped the country in a vicious cycle of external dependence, fiscal imprudence and financial crises, which have in turn necessitated repeated IMF bailouts.
The third pernicious aspect of Zias legacy was the political and institutional erosion wrought by the countrys longest period of martial law. His eleven years in power left Pakistan institutionally impoverished, and undermined the foundation of later democratic rule. The prolonged prohibition of political activity, ban on political parties, assault on the independence of the judiciary, restrictions on press and academic freedom, all served to undermine the institutions of civil society. Weak political institutions in an increasingly fragmented society made governance a formidable challenge in the post-Zia era.
Although politicisation of the civil bureaucracy had begun under Bhutto, Zias actions also hastened the countrys descent into administrative chaos. Political manipulation of the steel frame, which had long provided administrative order to the country, inescapably produced erosion of the authority of state institutions. With the administrative and police machinery distorted to serve political ends, their efficiency underwent precipitous decline.
The fourth key aspect of Zias legacy relates to consequences that ensued from his policies of depoliticisation and parochialisation. This meant several things. As historian Ayesha Jalal has convincingly demonstrated parochialising politics involved encouraging the articulation of public demands in ethnic or localised terms. This was accompanied by efforts to spawn or strengthen countervailing political, ethnic and religious groups to undercut support for opposition parties. These actions inhibited national politics and fostered parochial trends that further fragmented society.
With national issues deliberately trumped by promoting local politics, a new genre of politician was spawned. This patronage-seeking politician was tied to the regime by new, clientelist networks resting on access to state assets: land, bank loans and development funds. This patronage-driven, local influential in turn ensured that the post-1985 non-party politics were mostly shorn of national orientation. This changed the complexion of politics, as well as the countrys political culture. Seeking elected office to leverage state resources became the main driver of politics.
This produced a number of harmful effects: the ascendency of politics without wider public purpose, abuse of government office for private gain, draining of state coffers, haemorrhaging of state-owned banks and enterprises, and ultimately the pervasiveness of corruption throughout the system. What Jalal calls the monetisation of politics was born in the Zia period.
Supporters and political heirs of President Zia often point to economic growth and political stability as the ostensible achievements of his years in power. But that claim is belied by an economy left in ruins, a more violent and fragmented society and state institutions with much weaker capacity to govern than ever before.
