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Russian nuclear forces, 2014
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Abstract
Russia has taken important steps in modernizing its nuclear forces since early 2013, including the continued development and deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), construction of ballistic missile submarines, and development of a new strategic bomber. As of March 2013, the authors estimate, Russia had a military stockpile of approximately 4,300 nuclear warheads, of which roughly 1,600 strategic warheads were deployed on missiles and at bomber bases. Another 700 strategic warheads are in storage along with roughly 2,000 nonstrategic warheads. A large number—perhaps 3,500—of retired but still largely intact warheads await dismantlement.
Since our last Russian Notebook in early 2013, Russia has taken several important steps in modernizing its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces. These include continued development and deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), construction of ballistic missile submarines, development of a new strategic bomber, and deployment of tactical ballistic and cruise missiles and fighter-bombers. While much of this development continues well-known programs that have been under way for many years, other developments are new. Combined, the steps contribute to growing concern in other countries about Russian intentions and help justify nuclear modernization programs and political opposition to reductions in other nuclear weapon states. Those developments are not in Russia’s long-term interest.
As of March 2013, we estimate that Russia had a military stockpile of approximately 4,300 nuclear warheads, of which roughly 1,600 strategic warheads are deployed on missiles and at bomber bases.1 Another 700 strategic warheads are in storage along with roughly 2,000 nonstrategic warheads. In addition to the military stockpile for operational forces, a large number—perhaps 3,500—of retired but still largely intact warheads await dismantlement.2
Col. Gen. Sergei Karakayev, the head of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, explained in December 2013 that Russia needs approximately 1,500 warheads for its strategic missiles and bombers “to resolve tasks of strategic deterrence.” This force level keeps approximate parity with the United States while also taking into consideration “the level of strategic forces of other nuclear powers—the United Kingdom, France, China and nuclear weapons of new nuclear powers—India, Pakistan and others,” Karakayev said (Interfax, 2013).
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ICBMs
Russia deploys an estimated 313 ICBMs that can carry approximately 976 warheads. The ICBMs are organized under the Strategic Rocket Forces in three missile armies with a total of 12 divisions.
Retirement of all Soviet-era ICBMs is well under way and scheduled for completion in 2022. Deployment of the first-generation SS-27 Mod. 1 (Topol-M) is complete, deployment of the second-generation SS-27 Mod. 2 well under way, and development of a follow-on version is in progress. Despite the modernization, the ICBM force is expected to shrink to 220 to 250 missiles by 2022, depending on production and deployment rates for the new missiles. Because this force is significantly smaller than the 400 ICBMs the United States plans to retain, Russian planners compensate by increasing the share of the ICBM force that is equipped with multiple warheads from 35 percent today to approximately 70 percent by 2022. Although Russia by 2022 will deploy fewer ICBM warheads, roughly 90 percent of them will be multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). That trend is unhealthy for strategic stability because relatively few warheads on more US ICBMs can threaten many warheads on fewer Russian ICBMs.
SS-27 (Topol-M)
Russia deploys two versions of the SS-27 missile: the SS-27 Mod. 1, a single-warhead missile that comes in either mobile (RS-12M1) or silo-based (RS-12M2) variants, and the SS-27 Mod. 2 (RS-24), a road-mobile missile equipped with MIRVs. Deployment of the SS-27 Mod. 1 was completed in 2012 at a total of 78 missiles: 60 silo-based missiles with the 60th Missile Division in Tatishchevo and 18 road-mobile missiles with the 54th Guards Missile Division at Teykovo, northeast of Moscow.
All new Russian ICBM deployments are MIRVed SS-27 Mod. 2 ICBMs, or RS-24 (Yars). Following deployment of the first two regiments with a total of 18 missiles at the 54th Guards Missile Division at Teykovo, preparations are under way to deploy the RS-24 at four to five other missile divisions: Novosibirsk, Nizhniy Tagil, Irkutsk, Kozelsk, and possibly Dombarovsky.
In late 2013, one regiment with nine RS-24 road-mobile launchers was placed on “experimental combat duty” with the 39th Guards Missile Division at Novosibirsk, and another regiment (initially only with six launchers) with the 42nd Missile Division at Nizhniy Tagil. A second RS-24 regiment is planned for each base in 2014, replacing SS-25 launchers deployed there. Each division will probably be armed with three to four regiments. After Novosibirsk and Nizhniy, deployment of the road-mobile RS-24 will follow at the 51st Guards Missile Division at Irkutsk to replace SS-25s currently deployed there.
Following completion of the deployment of silo-based SS-27 Mod. 1 s, preparations are now under way to begin deploying silo-based RS-24s with the 28th Guards Missile Division at Kozelsk in 2014 to replace the remaining SS-19 s. It is unknown how many of the original 60 SS-19 silos will be converted to RS-24.
Once deployment at Kozelsk is completed, RS-24 deployment in silos might follow at the 13th Missile Division at Dombarovsky to replace the remaining SS-18 s currently deployed there. A statement by Rocket Forces commander Karakayev in late 2013 left some uncertainty about whether the missile to be deployed at Dombarovsky in the future will be the RS-24 or another missile (Itar-Tass, 2013).
SS-18 (RS-20 V)
The SS-18 is a silo-based, 10-warhead heavy ICBM first deployed in 1988. The missile is being gradually retired with approximately 46 SS-18 s with 460 warheads remaining in the 13th Missile Division at Dombarovsky and the 62nd Missile Division at Uzhur. The SS-18 is scheduled to remain in service until 2022.
SS-19 (RS-18 or UR-100NUTTH)
The silo-based, six-warhead SS-19 entered service in 1980 and is gradually being retired. We estimate that a total of 30 missiles remain in service with 210 warheads with the 60th Missile Division at Tatishchevo and the 28th Guards Missile Division at Kozelsk. The SS-19 is scheduled to be retired in 2019.
SS-25 (RS-12 M or Topol)
Russia has been retiring SS-25 missiles for several years, each year removing between one and three regiments (nine to 27 missiles) from service. During the past few years, six SS-25 regiments have been retired, leaving 117 launchers in five divisions. Dismantlement has begun at Yoshkar-Ola, and SS-25 regiments at Novosibirsk and Nizhniy Tagil are being replaced with RS-24s. The last SS-25 s will be withdrawn from service in 2021.
New ICBMs
The Strategic Rocket Forces apparently are working on developing several new ICBMs, although some may be modifications of existing versions. A lightweight version of the RS-24—tentatively known as Yars-M, RS-26, or Rubezh—has been flight-tested and might be deployed within the next two to three years. The missile was tested at intercontinental range in 2012 and intermediate range later in 2012 and in 2013—as were other ICBMs (Kristensen, 2013). The RS-26 apparently weighs 40 tons less than the 120-ton RS-24, carries a modified warhead payload, and might be deployed in 2015 (RIA-Novosti, 2013a).
In 2014, Russia is also expected to begin production of the liquid-fuel Sarmat or heavy ICBM intended to replace the SS-18. With a rumored throw weight of about five tons, the Sarmat would be able to deliver a similar number of MIRVs as the SS-18, or an advanced payload with countermeasures against missile defenses. The Sarmat is scheduled for deployment in 2018 to 2020 but will first have to undergo a series of flight tests. Soviet liquid-fuel ICBMs such as the SS-18 were produced in Ukraine, and given the reliability problems with the Bulava SLBM, it remains to be seen whether Russia can develop and produce a new liquid-fuel missile or whether the Sarmat will be a modified or life-extended version of the SS-18.
Six ICBMs were test-launched in 2013, well short of the 11 ICBM launches officially predicted for the year in January 2013 (Interfax-AVN, 2013); the tests included the first-ever launch of a silo-based RS-24.
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SSBNs/SLBMs
Technical problems continue to hamper modernization of the Russian nuclear submarine fleet. After two decades of design, development, and construction of the Borei-class boats (Project 955), half a dozen flight-tests of the SS-N-32 (Bulava-30) missile, and transfer of the first two boats to the Russian navy, the Borei/Bulava weapon system is still not operational. A Bulava malfunctioned during a test-launch from the Alexander Nevsky on September 3, 2013, further delaying the program. After the failed test, Russian defense minister Sergei Shoygu reportedly ordered an additional five Bulava flight-tests (RIA-Novosti, 2013c).
On December 30, 2013, the first two Borei-class boats—Yuri Dolgoruki and Alexander Nevsky—arrived at the Northern Fleet base at Yagel’naya (Gadzhiyevo). The base is also the homeport of Russia’s fleet of Delta IV nuclear missile submarines and includes a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) depot and underground warhead storage facility. The Yuri Dolgoruki will be permanently based at Yagel’naya, while the Alexander Nevsky will be transferred to the Pacific Fleet nuclear submarine base at Rybachiy (near Petropavlovsk) in late 2014 or 2015 to begin replacing the Delta III boats at the base.
A total of eight Borei-class nuclear submarines are planned, each armed with 16 SS-N-32 (Bulava) SLBMs that can carry up to six warheads apiece. The third boat, theVladimir Monomakh, was launched in late 2012 and is undergoing ship-builder sea trials. Handover to the navy has been delayed until later in 2014 as a result of the problems with the Bulava missile. This boat will also be based in the Pacific Fleet.
The fourth and subsequent Borei-class submarines will be of an improved design known as Borei-II (Project 955A). The first improved Borei, expected to be namedKnyaz Vladimir, began construction in July 2012 and is scheduled to enter service in 2015 to 2017. The keels for the fifth boat, the Alexander Suvorov, will be laid in late 2014 for possible completion in 2018. The schedule of the last three boats means that the eight-boat program will probably not be completed until the early 2020s.
There is considerable uncertainty about how the improved Borei submarine will be armed. Numerous articles over the past several years have reported that each Borei-II will be equipped with 20 missile tubes, four more than each of the first three boats (Interfax-AVN, 2012a). But in February 2013, a senior defense industry source told RIA-Novosti that the number of tubes would not be increased. “The Project 955A differs significantly from the original Borey (Project 955) but not in the number of missiles carried—there will still be 16 on board,” the source was quoted as saying (RIA-Novosti, 2013b).
For the remainder of this decade, the mainstay of Russia’s nuclear submarine force will continue to be the six third-generation Delta IVs built between 1985 and 1992, each equipped with 16 SLBMs. All Delta IVs are part of the Northern Fleet and based at Yagel’naya Bay on the Kola Peninsula. Since 2007, Russia has been upgrading the Delta IVs to carry a modified SS-N-23 SLBM known as the Sineva. Each missile carries up to four warheads. All six boats have now completed an overhaul and conversion to Sineva. The Yekaterinburg was damaged by a fire in December 2011 and will not return to service until 2014 at the earliest. As a result, only four of the six Delta IVs are currently operational.
There are also rumors of a modified version of Sineva, called Layner or Liner, that will be deployed on the Delta IVs over the next several years. One unnamed Navy General Staff official reportedly said that “while the Sineva can carry four warheads, the Layner will carry 10” (Izvestia, 2012). But another source in the Russian General Staff said that the Layner is not a new missile but a modified Sineva: “It is in fact a Sineva. Only the warhead is new.” The Layner has an improved penetration capability achieved by, among other things, “a greater number of re-entry vehicles (boyevoy blok) in the warhead [sic]” (Interfax-AVN, 2012b). Instead of more than twice the number of warheads, it seems more likely that the modified payload includes modified warheads and additional penetration aids.
Three Delta III nuclear submarines remain in service on the Kamchatka Peninsula as part of Russia’s Pacific Fleet. Each boat is equipped with 16 SS-N-18 M1 Stingray (RSM-50) SLBMs with three warheads each. One of the Delta IIIs—the Georgiy Pobedonosets—launched an SS-N-18 on October 30, 2013. In preparation for the Pacific Fleet’s upcoming transition from Delta III to Borei SSBNs, Russian defense minister Sergei Shoygu visited the Pacific SSBN base in April 2013 and said the modernization “will significantly increase the possibilities for utilizing submarines in the context of strategic deterrence” and is of “special significance in maintaining strategic stability and Russia’s military security in the Far East.” During the visit, Shoygu also visited the Delta III submarine Podolsk (Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, 2013).
An Itar-Tass news agency report in June 2013 quoted an unnamed source in the Russian General Staff saying the navy would expand its strategic submarine patrols, starting in 2014. According to the source, once the Borei-class boat comes into service, the navy “will not only continue the patrolling of the Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific Oceans,” but also return to the regions in the southern hemisphere that were patrolled by Soviet subs until the dissolution of the USSR in the 1990s. “This would serve to solve the tasks of strategic nuclear deterrence not only across the North Pole but also the South Pole,” the source was quoted as saying (Russia Today, 2013). It is not clear that the Soviet Union ever operated its nuclear submarines south of the equator, but exposing Russian subs to the wear, tear, and risks of operating so far from their bases makes no sense. Moreover, there is no strategic need for such operations; Russian SLBMs can reach all continents from northern waters. We suspect Itar-Tass misunderstood the source. The Russian Navy declared in 2012 that continuous nuclear submarine deterrent patrols would resume by mid-year (RIA-Novosti, 2012), but so far we have seen no indication this has happened.
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Strategic bombers
Russia operates two types of nuclear-capable heavy bombers: the Tu-160 Blackjack and the Tu-95MS Bear H. Both types can carry the nuclear AS-15 Kent (Kh-55) air-launched cruise missile (ALCM)3 and possibly gravity bombs;4 the Tu-160 can also carry the nuclear AS-16 Kickback (Kh-15) short-range attack missile.5 A new long-range nuclear cruise missile, designated the Kh-102, is under development.
There is growing uncertainty about the number of bombers and their operational status because Russia and the United States no longer disclose the number of aircraft counted under arms control treaties. Our current estimate of roughly 60 deployed nuclear bombers is based largely on commercial satellite images, which show an average of 51 to 54 bombers typically present at the two strategic bomber bases (Engels and Ukrainka). Another 23 to 26 bombers are typically present at the Ryazan training base, the Kazan production plant, and the Zhukovsky design plant, for a total inventory of 74 to 80 bombers. This number is probably a little high because some of the visible bombers may have been retired and because the satellite images were not all taken on the same day. Nevertheless, by averaging the numbers visible on all of the images we can arrive at a rough estimate of 72 nuclear-capable bombers in service. In addition to the 51 to 54 deployed bombers normally visible at Engels and Ukrainka, another half a dozen or so aircraft from the bases might be on training flights or temporarily at other bases, for an estimated force of perhaps 60 deployed nuclear bombers.
The 60 deployed bombers would only be counted as 60 weapons under the New START counting rule, but the aircraft could in fact carry a maximum load of 676 weapons (all 72 bombers could carry an estimated 810 weapons). The weapons are not loaded on the bombers under normal circumstances, and most bomber weapons have probably been moved from the bases to central storage facilities. We estimate that only a small number of the air-delivered nuclear weapons—perhaps 200—might be present at Engels and Ukrainka. This deployment would be similar to the US deployment of a few hundred nuclear weapons at its bomber bases.
The Russian Air Force in November 2013 approved the conceptual design of a replacement heavy bomber. The new design, currently known as PAK-DA, apparently is a subsonic stealthy flying wing aircraft designed by Tupolev (Russian Aviation, 2013). The new bomber is intended to replace the Tu-160 and Tu-95MS sometime in the 2020s, but upgrades continue to be made to the old bombers.
Russian heavy bombers continued their long-range training exercises during 2013, with periodic sorties flown over the Arctic, North Atlantic, and North Pacific, where they were intercepted by NATO and Japanese fighter aircraft in scenarios reminiscent of the Cold War. The most noticeable Russian deployment occurred in October 2013, when two Tu-160s from Engels Air Base deployed to Venezuela and Nicaragua.
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Nonstrategic (tactical) weapons
We estimate that Russia has approximately 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads assigned for delivery by air, naval, and various defensive forces.6 As with the US government, the Russian government does not provide any information about how many nonstrategic nuclear weapons it possesses. We estimate that the Russian inventory is declining and will continue to decline over the next decade with or without an arms control agreement. The Russian government has repeatedly stated that all its nonstrategic nuclear weapons are in central storage.
We estimate that Russia’s tactical air forces are assigned approximately 730 AS-4 air-to-surface missiles and bombs. Tu-22M3 (Backfire-C) intermediate-range bombers can deliver both the missiles and bombs, whereas Su-24 M (Fencer-D) and Su-34 (Fullback) fighter-bombers deliver bombs only. Russia is modernizing some of its Fencers, but the aircraft will be replaced by Su-34 (Fullback) fighter-bombers; deployment of the Fullback has started at bases in western Russia. It is possible that other types of fighter-bombers also have nuclear capability, but we have not found authoritative information to that effect.
The approximately 700 warheads assigned to Russia’s naval nonstrategic delivery platforms arm cruise missiles, antisubmarine weapons, anti-air missiles, torpedoes, and depth bombs. The first new nuclear-capable Severodvinsk-class (Yasen-class) nuclear-powered guided-missile attack submarine (SSGN) was delivered to the Russian navy in December 2013. A second sub is under construction, and the keel of the third sub was laid down in July 2013. A total of eight to 10 Yasen subs are planned. The submarine is equipped for nonstrategic nuclear weapons, including antisubmarine rockets, and has eight vertical launch tubes for cruise missiles.
We estimate that Russia maintains around 430 warheads for air defense, ballistic missile defense, and coastal defense forces. The warheads are used in Gazelle ballistic missile defense interceptors at five sites around Moscow, in parts of the S-300 air-defense system, and in the SSC-1B Sepal coastal defense system. The ballistic missile defense system (A-135) is being upgraded, and Russia has begun introduction of S-400 air-defense regiments (with about eight launchers and 32 missiles each) around Moscow to replace the S-300 system. There is considerable uncertainty about which of the S-300 air-defense interceptors (SA-10, SA-12, SA-20) are nuclear-capable, whether the new S-400 also has a nuclear capability, and how many warheads are assigned to each unit.
Despite Russia’s declaration in 1991 and 1992 that it would eliminate all ground-launched nonstrategic nuclear warheads, it has not done so. We estimate that approximately 170 warheads are assigned to SS-21 Scarab (Tochka) and SS-26 Stone (Iskander) short-range ballistic missiles. The SS-26 will replace the SS-21 completely over the next decade, eventually arming 10 tactical missile brigades.
Rumors resurfaced in 2013 suggesting that Russia had deployed SS-26s in the Kaliningrad region. The German magazine Bild claimed the deployment was revealed by satellite images, but did not show any (Solms-Laubach, 2013). The report was wrong, and President Putin later stated that Russia had not made a decision on whether to deploy the missile in Kaliningrad. At the same time, he reiterated that such a deployment potentially could become a response to NATO’s missile defense system: “We have said many times that the missile shield threatens our nuclear potential, and so we must respond. One possible response would be to station Iskanders in Kaliningrad” (RIA-Novosti, 2013d).
The New York Times reported in January 2014 that Russia had test-fired a new ground-launched cruise missile that might constitute a violation of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty (Gordon, 2014). While hardliners called the test a violation, the United States has not formally declared Russia in violation of the INF treaty. The test probably involved the R-500 cruise missile being developed for the Iskander launcher. The 2013 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat report by the USAF National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) did not list a Russian INF-range cruise missile.
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Funding
This research was carried out with grants from the New-Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund.
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Article Notes
References
Russian nuclear forces, 2014
@vostok
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Abstract
Russia has taken important steps in modernizing its nuclear forces since early 2013, including the continued development and deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), construction of ballistic missile submarines, and development of a new strategic bomber. As of March 2013, the authors estimate, Russia had a military stockpile of approximately 4,300 nuclear warheads, of which roughly 1,600 strategic warheads were deployed on missiles and at bomber bases. Another 700 strategic warheads are in storage along with roughly 2,000 nonstrategic warheads. A large number—perhaps 3,500—of retired but still largely intact warheads await dismantlement.
Since our last Russian Notebook in early 2013, Russia has taken several important steps in modernizing its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces. These include continued development and deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), construction of ballistic missile submarines, development of a new strategic bomber, and deployment of tactical ballistic and cruise missiles and fighter-bombers. While much of this development continues well-known programs that have been under way for many years, other developments are new. Combined, the steps contribute to growing concern in other countries about Russian intentions and help justify nuclear modernization programs and political opposition to reductions in other nuclear weapon states. Those developments are not in Russia’s long-term interest.
As of March 2013, we estimate that Russia had a military stockpile of approximately 4,300 nuclear warheads, of which roughly 1,600 strategic warheads are deployed on missiles and at bomber bases.1 Another 700 strategic warheads are in storage along with roughly 2,000 nonstrategic warheads. In addition to the military stockpile for operational forces, a large number—perhaps 3,500—of retired but still largely intact warheads await dismantlement.2
Col. Gen. Sergei Karakayev, the head of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, explained in December 2013 that Russia needs approximately 1,500 warheads for its strategic missiles and bombers “to resolve tasks of strategic deterrence.” This force level keeps approximate parity with the United States while also taking into consideration “the level of strategic forces of other nuclear powers—the United Kingdom, France, China and nuclear weapons of new nuclear powers—India, Pakistan and others,” Karakayev said (Interfax, 2013).
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ICBMs
Russia deploys an estimated 313 ICBMs that can carry approximately 976 warheads. The ICBMs are organized under the Strategic Rocket Forces in three missile armies with a total of 12 divisions.
Retirement of all Soviet-era ICBMs is well under way and scheduled for completion in 2022. Deployment of the first-generation SS-27 Mod. 1 (Topol-M) is complete, deployment of the second-generation SS-27 Mod. 2 well under way, and development of a follow-on version is in progress. Despite the modernization, the ICBM force is expected to shrink to 220 to 250 missiles by 2022, depending on production and deployment rates for the new missiles. Because this force is significantly smaller than the 400 ICBMs the United States plans to retain, Russian planners compensate by increasing the share of the ICBM force that is equipped with multiple warheads from 35 percent today to approximately 70 percent by 2022. Although Russia by 2022 will deploy fewer ICBM warheads, roughly 90 percent of them will be multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). That trend is unhealthy for strategic stability because relatively few warheads on more US ICBMs can threaten many warheads on fewer Russian ICBMs.
SS-27 (Topol-M)
Russia deploys two versions of the SS-27 missile: the SS-27 Mod. 1, a single-warhead missile that comes in either mobile (RS-12M1) or silo-based (RS-12M2) variants, and the SS-27 Mod. 2 (RS-24), a road-mobile missile equipped with MIRVs. Deployment of the SS-27 Mod. 1 was completed in 2012 at a total of 78 missiles: 60 silo-based missiles with the 60th Missile Division in Tatishchevo and 18 road-mobile missiles with the 54th Guards Missile Division at Teykovo, northeast of Moscow.
All new Russian ICBM deployments are MIRVed SS-27 Mod. 2 ICBMs, or RS-24 (Yars). Following deployment of the first two regiments with a total of 18 missiles at the 54th Guards Missile Division at Teykovo, preparations are under way to deploy the RS-24 at four to five other missile divisions: Novosibirsk, Nizhniy Tagil, Irkutsk, Kozelsk, and possibly Dombarovsky.
In late 2013, one regiment with nine RS-24 road-mobile launchers was placed on “experimental combat duty” with the 39th Guards Missile Division at Novosibirsk, and another regiment (initially only with six launchers) with the 42nd Missile Division at Nizhniy Tagil. A second RS-24 regiment is planned for each base in 2014, replacing SS-25 launchers deployed there. Each division will probably be armed with three to four regiments. After Novosibirsk and Nizhniy, deployment of the road-mobile RS-24 will follow at the 51st Guards Missile Division at Irkutsk to replace SS-25s currently deployed there.
Following completion of the deployment of silo-based SS-27 Mod. 1 s, preparations are now under way to begin deploying silo-based RS-24s with the 28th Guards Missile Division at Kozelsk in 2014 to replace the remaining SS-19 s. It is unknown how many of the original 60 SS-19 silos will be converted to RS-24.
Once deployment at Kozelsk is completed, RS-24 deployment in silos might follow at the 13th Missile Division at Dombarovsky to replace the remaining SS-18 s currently deployed there. A statement by Rocket Forces commander Karakayev in late 2013 left some uncertainty about whether the missile to be deployed at Dombarovsky in the future will be the RS-24 or another missile (Itar-Tass, 2013).
SS-18 (RS-20 V)
The SS-18 is a silo-based, 10-warhead heavy ICBM first deployed in 1988. The missile is being gradually retired with approximately 46 SS-18 s with 460 warheads remaining in the 13th Missile Division at Dombarovsky and the 62nd Missile Division at Uzhur. The SS-18 is scheduled to remain in service until 2022.
SS-19 (RS-18 or UR-100NUTTH)
The silo-based, six-warhead SS-19 entered service in 1980 and is gradually being retired. We estimate that a total of 30 missiles remain in service with 210 warheads with the 60th Missile Division at Tatishchevo and the 28th Guards Missile Division at Kozelsk. The SS-19 is scheduled to be retired in 2019.
SS-25 (RS-12 M or Topol)
Russia has been retiring SS-25 missiles for several years, each year removing between one and three regiments (nine to 27 missiles) from service. During the past few years, six SS-25 regiments have been retired, leaving 117 launchers in five divisions. Dismantlement has begun at Yoshkar-Ola, and SS-25 regiments at Novosibirsk and Nizhniy Tagil are being replaced with RS-24s. The last SS-25 s will be withdrawn from service in 2021.
New ICBMs
The Strategic Rocket Forces apparently are working on developing several new ICBMs, although some may be modifications of existing versions. A lightweight version of the RS-24—tentatively known as Yars-M, RS-26, or Rubezh—has been flight-tested and might be deployed within the next two to three years. The missile was tested at intercontinental range in 2012 and intermediate range later in 2012 and in 2013—as were other ICBMs (Kristensen, 2013). The RS-26 apparently weighs 40 tons less than the 120-ton RS-24, carries a modified warhead payload, and might be deployed in 2015 (RIA-Novosti, 2013a).
In 2014, Russia is also expected to begin production of the liquid-fuel Sarmat or heavy ICBM intended to replace the SS-18. With a rumored throw weight of about five tons, the Sarmat would be able to deliver a similar number of MIRVs as the SS-18, or an advanced payload with countermeasures against missile defenses. The Sarmat is scheduled for deployment in 2018 to 2020 but will first have to undergo a series of flight tests. Soviet liquid-fuel ICBMs such as the SS-18 were produced in Ukraine, and given the reliability problems with the Bulava SLBM, it remains to be seen whether Russia can develop and produce a new liquid-fuel missile or whether the Sarmat will be a modified or life-extended version of the SS-18.
Six ICBMs were test-launched in 2013, well short of the 11 ICBM launches officially predicted for the year in January 2013 (Interfax-AVN, 2013); the tests included the first-ever launch of a silo-based RS-24.
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SSBNs/SLBMs
Technical problems continue to hamper modernization of the Russian nuclear submarine fleet. After two decades of design, development, and construction of the Borei-class boats (Project 955), half a dozen flight-tests of the SS-N-32 (Bulava-30) missile, and transfer of the first two boats to the Russian navy, the Borei/Bulava weapon system is still not operational. A Bulava malfunctioned during a test-launch from the Alexander Nevsky on September 3, 2013, further delaying the program. After the failed test, Russian defense minister Sergei Shoygu reportedly ordered an additional five Bulava flight-tests (RIA-Novosti, 2013c).
On December 30, 2013, the first two Borei-class boats—Yuri Dolgoruki and Alexander Nevsky—arrived at the Northern Fleet base at Yagel’naya (Gadzhiyevo). The base is also the homeport of Russia’s fleet of Delta IV nuclear missile submarines and includes a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) depot and underground warhead storage facility. The Yuri Dolgoruki will be permanently based at Yagel’naya, while the Alexander Nevsky will be transferred to the Pacific Fleet nuclear submarine base at Rybachiy (near Petropavlovsk) in late 2014 or 2015 to begin replacing the Delta III boats at the base.
A total of eight Borei-class nuclear submarines are planned, each armed with 16 SS-N-32 (Bulava) SLBMs that can carry up to six warheads apiece. The third boat, theVladimir Monomakh, was launched in late 2012 and is undergoing ship-builder sea trials. Handover to the navy has been delayed until later in 2014 as a result of the problems with the Bulava missile. This boat will also be based in the Pacific Fleet.
The fourth and subsequent Borei-class submarines will be of an improved design known as Borei-II (Project 955A). The first improved Borei, expected to be namedKnyaz Vladimir, began construction in July 2012 and is scheduled to enter service in 2015 to 2017. The keels for the fifth boat, the Alexander Suvorov, will be laid in late 2014 for possible completion in 2018. The schedule of the last three boats means that the eight-boat program will probably not be completed until the early 2020s.
There is considerable uncertainty about how the improved Borei submarine will be armed. Numerous articles over the past several years have reported that each Borei-II will be equipped with 20 missile tubes, four more than each of the first three boats (Interfax-AVN, 2012a). But in February 2013, a senior defense industry source told RIA-Novosti that the number of tubes would not be increased. “The Project 955A differs significantly from the original Borey (Project 955) but not in the number of missiles carried—there will still be 16 on board,” the source was quoted as saying (RIA-Novosti, 2013b).
For the remainder of this decade, the mainstay of Russia’s nuclear submarine force will continue to be the six third-generation Delta IVs built between 1985 and 1992, each equipped with 16 SLBMs. All Delta IVs are part of the Northern Fleet and based at Yagel’naya Bay on the Kola Peninsula. Since 2007, Russia has been upgrading the Delta IVs to carry a modified SS-N-23 SLBM known as the Sineva. Each missile carries up to four warheads. All six boats have now completed an overhaul and conversion to Sineva. The Yekaterinburg was damaged by a fire in December 2011 and will not return to service until 2014 at the earliest. As a result, only four of the six Delta IVs are currently operational.
There are also rumors of a modified version of Sineva, called Layner or Liner, that will be deployed on the Delta IVs over the next several years. One unnamed Navy General Staff official reportedly said that “while the Sineva can carry four warheads, the Layner will carry 10” (Izvestia, 2012). But another source in the Russian General Staff said that the Layner is not a new missile but a modified Sineva: “It is in fact a Sineva. Only the warhead is new.” The Layner has an improved penetration capability achieved by, among other things, “a greater number of re-entry vehicles (boyevoy blok) in the warhead [sic]” (Interfax-AVN, 2012b). Instead of more than twice the number of warheads, it seems more likely that the modified payload includes modified warheads and additional penetration aids.
Three Delta III nuclear submarines remain in service on the Kamchatka Peninsula as part of Russia’s Pacific Fleet. Each boat is equipped with 16 SS-N-18 M1 Stingray (RSM-50) SLBMs with three warheads each. One of the Delta IIIs—the Georgiy Pobedonosets—launched an SS-N-18 on October 30, 2013. In preparation for the Pacific Fleet’s upcoming transition from Delta III to Borei SSBNs, Russian defense minister Sergei Shoygu visited the Pacific SSBN base in April 2013 and said the modernization “will significantly increase the possibilities for utilizing submarines in the context of strategic deterrence” and is of “special significance in maintaining strategic stability and Russia’s military security in the Far East.” During the visit, Shoygu also visited the Delta III submarine Podolsk (Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, 2013).
An Itar-Tass news agency report in June 2013 quoted an unnamed source in the Russian General Staff saying the navy would expand its strategic submarine patrols, starting in 2014. According to the source, once the Borei-class boat comes into service, the navy “will not only continue the patrolling of the Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific Oceans,” but also return to the regions in the southern hemisphere that were patrolled by Soviet subs until the dissolution of the USSR in the 1990s. “This would serve to solve the tasks of strategic nuclear deterrence not only across the North Pole but also the South Pole,” the source was quoted as saying (Russia Today, 2013). It is not clear that the Soviet Union ever operated its nuclear submarines south of the equator, but exposing Russian subs to the wear, tear, and risks of operating so far from their bases makes no sense. Moreover, there is no strategic need for such operations; Russian SLBMs can reach all continents from northern waters. We suspect Itar-Tass misunderstood the source. The Russian Navy declared in 2012 that continuous nuclear submarine deterrent patrols would resume by mid-year (RIA-Novosti, 2012), but so far we have seen no indication this has happened.
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Strategic bombers
Russia operates two types of nuclear-capable heavy bombers: the Tu-160 Blackjack and the Tu-95MS Bear H. Both types can carry the nuclear AS-15 Kent (Kh-55) air-launched cruise missile (ALCM)3 and possibly gravity bombs;4 the Tu-160 can also carry the nuclear AS-16 Kickback (Kh-15) short-range attack missile.5 A new long-range nuclear cruise missile, designated the Kh-102, is under development.
There is growing uncertainty about the number of bombers and their operational status because Russia and the United States no longer disclose the number of aircraft counted under arms control treaties. Our current estimate of roughly 60 deployed nuclear bombers is based largely on commercial satellite images, which show an average of 51 to 54 bombers typically present at the two strategic bomber bases (Engels and Ukrainka). Another 23 to 26 bombers are typically present at the Ryazan training base, the Kazan production plant, and the Zhukovsky design plant, for a total inventory of 74 to 80 bombers. This number is probably a little high because some of the visible bombers may have been retired and because the satellite images were not all taken on the same day. Nevertheless, by averaging the numbers visible on all of the images we can arrive at a rough estimate of 72 nuclear-capable bombers in service. In addition to the 51 to 54 deployed bombers normally visible at Engels and Ukrainka, another half a dozen or so aircraft from the bases might be on training flights or temporarily at other bases, for an estimated force of perhaps 60 deployed nuclear bombers.
The 60 deployed bombers would only be counted as 60 weapons under the New START counting rule, but the aircraft could in fact carry a maximum load of 676 weapons (all 72 bombers could carry an estimated 810 weapons). The weapons are not loaded on the bombers under normal circumstances, and most bomber weapons have probably been moved from the bases to central storage facilities. We estimate that only a small number of the air-delivered nuclear weapons—perhaps 200—might be present at Engels and Ukrainka. This deployment would be similar to the US deployment of a few hundred nuclear weapons at its bomber bases.
The Russian Air Force in November 2013 approved the conceptual design of a replacement heavy bomber. The new design, currently known as PAK-DA, apparently is a subsonic stealthy flying wing aircraft designed by Tupolev (Russian Aviation, 2013). The new bomber is intended to replace the Tu-160 and Tu-95MS sometime in the 2020s, but upgrades continue to be made to the old bombers.
Russian heavy bombers continued their long-range training exercises during 2013, with periodic sorties flown over the Arctic, North Atlantic, and North Pacific, where they were intercepted by NATO and Japanese fighter aircraft in scenarios reminiscent of the Cold War. The most noticeable Russian deployment occurred in October 2013, when two Tu-160s from Engels Air Base deployed to Venezuela and Nicaragua.
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Nonstrategic (tactical) weapons
We estimate that Russia has approximately 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads assigned for delivery by air, naval, and various defensive forces.6 As with the US government, the Russian government does not provide any information about how many nonstrategic nuclear weapons it possesses. We estimate that the Russian inventory is declining and will continue to decline over the next decade with or without an arms control agreement. The Russian government has repeatedly stated that all its nonstrategic nuclear weapons are in central storage.
We estimate that Russia’s tactical air forces are assigned approximately 730 AS-4 air-to-surface missiles and bombs. Tu-22M3 (Backfire-C) intermediate-range bombers can deliver both the missiles and bombs, whereas Su-24 M (Fencer-D) and Su-34 (Fullback) fighter-bombers deliver bombs only. Russia is modernizing some of its Fencers, but the aircraft will be replaced by Su-34 (Fullback) fighter-bombers; deployment of the Fullback has started at bases in western Russia. It is possible that other types of fighter-bombers also have nuclear capability, but we have not found authoritative information to that effect.
The approximately 700 warheads assigned to Russia’s naval nonstrategic delivery platforms arm cruise missiles, antisubmarine weapons, anti-air missiles, torpedoes, and depth bombs. The first new nuclear-capable Severodvinsk-class (Yasen-class) nuclear-powered guided-missile attack submarine (SSGN) was delivered to the Russian navy in December 2013. A second sub is under construction, and the keel of the third sub was laid down in July 2013. A total of eight to 10 Yasen subs are planned. The submarine is equipped for nonstrategic nuclear weapons, including antisubmarine rockets, and has eight vertical launch tubes for cruise missiles.
We estimate that Russia maintains around 430 warheads for air defense, ballistic missile defense, and coastal defense forces. The warheads are used in Gazelle ballistic missile defense interceptors at five sites around Moscow, in parts of the S-300 air-defense system, and in the SSC-1B Sepal coastal defense system. The ballistic missile defense system (A-135) is being upgraded, and Russia has begun introduction of S-400 air-defense regiments (with about eight launchers and 32 missiles each) around Moscow to replace the S-300 system. There is considerable uncertainty about which of the S-300 air-defense interceptors (SA-10, SA-12, SA-20) are nuclear-capable, whether the new S-400 also has a nuclear capability, and how many warheads are assigned to each unit.
Despite Russia’s declaration in 1991 and 1992 that it would eliminate all ground-launched nonstrategic nuclear warheads, it has not done so. We estimate that approximately 170 warheads are assigned to SS-21 Scarab (Tochka) and SS-26 Stone (Iskander) short-range ballistic missiles. The SS-26 will replace the SS-21 completely over the next decade, eventually arming 10 tactical missile brigades.
Rumors resurfaced in 2013 suggesting that Russia had deployed SS-26s in the Kaliningrad region. The German magazine Bild claimed the deployment was revealed by satellite images, but did not show any (Solms-Laubach, 2013). The report was wrong, and President Putin later stated that Russia had not made a decision on whether to deploy the missile in Kaliningrad. At the same time, he reiterated that such a deployment potentially could become a response to NATO’s missile defense system: “We have said many times that the missile shield threatens our nuclear potential, and so we must respond. One possible response would be to station Iskanders in Kaliningrad” (RIA-Novosti, 2013d).
The New York Times reported in January 2014 that Russia had test-fired a new ground-launched cruise missile that might constitute a violation of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty (Gordon, 2014). While hardliners called the test a violation, the United States has not formally declared Russia in violation of the INF treaty. The test probably involved the R-500 cruise missile being developed for the Iskander launcher. The 2013 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat report by the USAF National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) did not list a Russian INF-range cruise missile.
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Funding
This research was carried out with grants from the New-Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund.
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Article Notes
- ↵1 The New START aggregate data from March 2013 attributes 1,480 warheads on 492 deployed launchers. The number is lower than our estimate because it does not count weapons stored at bomber bases, but instead attributes an artificial number of one weapon per bomber. In reality, Russian bombers can carry six to 16 nuclear weapons each.
- ↵2 We estimate that Russia stores its nuclear weapons at 48 permanent storage sites across Russia, including about 10 national-level central storage sites (Norris and Kristensen, 2009). Other essential references for following Russian strategic nuclear forces include the general New START aggregate data that the US and Russian governments release biannually; the Open Source Center (www.opensource.gov); Pavel Podvig’s website on Russian strategic nuclear forces (www.russianforces.org); and the Russia profile maintained by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies for the Nuclear Threat Initiative (www.nti.org/country-profiles/russia/nuclear/).
- ↵3 The Tu-95MS is equipped with the AS-15A and the Tu-160 with the AS-15B, which has a longer range. Depending on aircraft type, Russian bombers can carry up to 16 weapons; hence, it would be possible for 72 bombers to be loaded with 820 warheads but only be attributed 72 warheads under New START.
- ↵4 One normally well-informed source says there are no nuclear gravity bombs for the Tu-95MS and Tu-160 aircraft (Podvig, 2005).
- ↵5 There are rumors that the AS-16 may have been retired or placed in storage.
- ↵6 A US Embassy cable stated in September 2009 that Russia had 3,000 to 5,000-plus nonstrategic nuclear weapons (Hedgehogs.net, 2010), a number that comes close to our estimate at the time (Kristensen, 2009). US Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James Miller stated in 2011 that Russia was estimated to have 2,000 to 4,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons (Miller, 2011). We estimate that the number is at the lower end of that range with the rest awaiting dismantlement. For a more in-depth overview of Russian and US nonstrategic nuclear weapons, see Kristensen (2012). Some analysts estimate that Russia has significantly fewer warheads assigned to nonstrategic forces. See, for example, Sutyagin (2012).
References
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Gordon MR (2014) U.S. says Russia tested missile, despite treaty. New York Times, January 29. Available at: www.nytimes.com/2014/01/30/world/europe/us-says-russia-tested-missile-despite-treaty.html?_r=0.
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Hedgehogs.net (2010) US embassy cables: US targets terrorists with conventional warheads fitted to nuclear weapons. Wikileaks document. Previously available at: www.hedgehogs.net/pg/newsfeeds/hhwebadmin/item/6728052/us-embassy-cables-us-targets-terrorists-with-conventional-warheads-fitted-to-nuclear-weapons .
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Interfax (2013) Russia needs about 1,500 nuclear warheads for strategic deterrence—commander. December 17. Available at:http://rbth.ru/news/2013/12/17/russia_needs_about_1500_nuclear_ warheads_for_strategic_deterrence_-_comm_ 32652.html .
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Interfax-AVN (2012a) Russia to start building first project 955A sub, while design work continues. July 25. Translation by Open Source Center via World News Connection.
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Interfax-AVN (2012b) No new missile for Russian strategic missile troops. November 21. Translation by Open Source Center via World News Connection.
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Interfax-AVN (2013) Russia to double ICBM launches in 2013—spokesman. January 3. Translation by Open Source Center via World News Connection.
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Itar-Tass (2013) Командующий РВСН: в Ракетных войсках идет интенсивный процесс перевооружения [Commander of the strategic rocket forces: Rocket forces in an intensive process of rearming]. December 18. Available at: ИТАР-ТАСС: Политика - Командующий РВСН: в Ракетных войсках идет интенсивный процесс перевооружения .
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Izvestia (2012) Layner devised for monetary savings. February 17. Translated by Open Source Center via World News Connection.
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Kristensen HM (2009) Russian tactical nuclear weapons. FAS Strategic Security Blog, March 25. Available at: Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons - FAS Strategic Security Blog .
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Kristensen HM (2012) Non-strategic nuclear weapons. Special report no. 3. Federation of American Scientists, May. Available at:www.fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf .
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Kristensen HM (2013) Russian missile test creates confusion and opposition in Washington. FAS Strategic Security Blog, July 3. Available at:http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/07/yars-m/. .
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Miller JN (2011) Statement before the House Armed Services Committee. November 2. Available at: http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=faad05df-9016-42c5-86bc-b83144c635c9 .
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- Norris RS,
- Kristensen HM
Abstract/FREE Full Text - ↵
Podvig P (2005) Test of a Kh-555 cruise missile. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, May 26. Available at:Test of a Kh-555 cruise missile - Blog - Russian strategic nuclear forces .
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RIA-Novosti (2012) Russian strategic subs to resume routine world patrols. February 4. Available at: Russian Strategic Subs to Resume Routine World Patrols | Defense | RIA Novosti.
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RIA-Novosti (2013a) Комплекс с МБР РС26 планируется поставить на дежурство в 2015 году [RS-26 missile scheduled to be put on duty in 2015]. December 18. Available at: Комплекс с МБР РС-26 планируется поставить на дежурство в 2015 году | РИА Новости.
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RIA-Novosti (2013b) Later Borey class subs to carry only 16 missiles—source. February 2. Available at:Iran to Conduct Military Drills Over 3 Days | Defense | RIA Novosti–Source.html.
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RIA-Novosti (2013c) Russia’s troubled Bulava missiles returned to maker—official. September 16. Available at:Assad Overthrow in Syria Risky for US – Ex-CIA Official | News | RIA Novosti—Official.html.
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RIA-Novosti (2013d) Putin says no Iskanders deployed in Kaliningrad. December 19. Available at: Putin Says No Iskanders Deployed in Kaliningrad | Defense | RIA Novosti .
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Russia Today (2013) Russian nuke subs to patrol southern seas for first time since Soviet era. June 1. Available at: http://rt.com/news/submarines-nuclear-partol-seas-116/. .
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Russian Aviation (2013) Tupolev design bureau will develop an advanced long-range bomber. March 5. Available at: www.ruaviation.com/news/2013/3/5/1552/. .
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Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (2013) The minister of defense paid a working visit to Pacific Fleet troops and forces stationed in Kamchatka. Press Service and Information Directorate, April 10. Translation by Open Source Center via World News Connection.
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Solms-Laubach F (2013) Putin stationiert Raketen für Atomsprengköpfe [Putin deploys missiles for nuclear warheads]. Bild, December 14. Available at:www.bild.de/politik/ausland/nuklearwaffe/putin-stationiert-raketen-fuer-atomsprengkoepfe-nahe-polnischer-grenze-33848846.bild.html .
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Sutyagin I (2012) Atomic accounting: A new estimate of Russia’s non-strategic nuclear forces. Occasional paper. Royal United Services Institute, November. Available at:www.rusi.org/publications/occasionalpapers/ref:O509A82F347BFC/. .
Russian nuclear forces, 2014
@vostok
