Road to 1965 war – Part 1

[fatman17]

Global Village
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Pakistan
Road to 1965 war – Part 1

August 12, 2017

Saleem Akhtar Malik lThe 1965 War

Kashmir is simmering with a brazen homegrown resistance movement against the Indian state. Since last year, Kashmir is back as the main issue which could potentially start a war between two nuclear-armed rivals in India and Pakistan.

The war in 1965 has been couched in historical aberrations where historians from both sides of the border take diametrically different positions.

War and Kashmir have been intrinsically intertwined in the history of Indo-Pak ties. Both have locked horns many times in the past seven decades. The skirmishes in 1947-48 were followed by a full war in 1965. The war in 1965 has been couched in historical aberrations where historians from both sides of the border take diametrically different positions.

This is the first article of the six-part series which attempts to understand the 1965 war from its planning to its conduct and termination.

Read more: Changing Kashmir’s demography: India’s tactics to win Kashmir

PART-1

The first Kashmir war did not end in a decisive solution for either of the contestants. Pakistanis felt frustrated and bitter while their leadership tried to hide behind the United Nations resolutions and similar excuses.

On the other hand, Nehru, the man who had promoted himself as a person, symbolizing India, was generally content with what India had grabbed. For now, he appeared sated like a cat after it has polished off the mouse. For him, Pakistan-administered Kashmir could wait for another day. The Indian leadership, however, occasionally made noises about recovering the chunks of Kashmir India had lost to Pakistan.

According to the Indian version, Pakistan Army, having received military aid from the United States during the Cold War, and encouraged by India’s defeat in the 1962 Sino-India border war, was longing for a showdown with India.

Breaking the inertia was the main motive for Pakistan to move forward, hence the 65 War. There are many theories about the causes of this war. The explanation given by the Pakistani leadership is the refusal by India to grant the right to self-determination to the Kashmiris.

According to the proponents of this theory, the Valley was simmering with unrest due to the inept Kashmiri leadership, high- handedness of the occupation administration, and perhaps because Indian leadership was contemplating on withdrawing the special status accorded to the state under the Indian Constitution.

Presumably, Ayub based his calculations on two premises 1) a contrived insurgency will result in a major revolt against the Indian occupation. 2) The operations will remain localized to the disputed state. Bhutto’s opponents accuse him of misguiding Ayub regarding the second premise. This does not, however, exonerate Ayub from his responsibility.

According to the Indian version, Pakistan Army, having received military aid from the United States during the Cold War, and encouraged by India’s defeat in the 1962 Sino-India border war, was longing for a showdown with India.

Whatever the reason, Ayub Khan took steps to break the inertia. There should be nothing to apologize about this and start a blame game. However, Ayub started a war without proper planning and with faulty appreciation. Presumably, Ayub based his calculations on two premises 1) a contrived insurgency will result in a major revolt against the Indian occupation. 2) The operations will remain localized to the disputed state. Bhutto’s opponents accuse him of misguiding Ayub regarding the second premise. This does not, however, exonerate Ayub from his responsibility.

Read more: Pakistan finally learns what it must do to help Kashmiris

Escalation

Rann of Kutch, comprising an area of 30,000 square kilometers, is a seasonal salt marshland located between the Indian state of Gujarat and the southern tip of Pakistan’s Sindh province. Due to its marshy nature, the area was not regularly patrolled on the Pakistani side. In January 1965 the Indians reinforced the area with approximately two BSF battalions, and their patrols started probing forward towards the Rangers posts located along the Customs Track – the de-facto border.

Pakistan Army, while denying the Indian Army the possession of Rahimki Bazaar Post, captured Biar Bed, a strip of marshland to the south- west of the de facto international border.

There were accusations and counter accusations by both the sides about border violations. These were followed by attacks on each other’s posts. Pakistanis blamed Indians of establishing new posts on their side of the border, particularly the Sardar Post which was established in March 1965 on a high ground located to the south- west of Rahimki Bazaar.

The ensuing skirmishes remained localized and, harking back to the era of the limited wars, the two air chiefs agreed on keeping their respective air forces out of the conflict. Pakistan Army, while denying the Indian Army the possession of Rahimki Bazaar Post, captured Biar Bed, a strip of marshland to the south- west of the de facto international border. This was hailed as a great victory for Pakistan. Emboldened by the setback to the Indians, Major General Tikka Khan, GOC 8 Division, outlined a tactical plan called Plan Alpha to capture the northern half of the Rann. However, Ayub Khan did not allow such an offensive. Ayub Khan’s critics think he had missed an opportunity to push India further to the south (Ali, 2009; Gauhar, 1993).

Read more: Indian army officer who used Kashmiri youth as human shield praised…

Prerequisites to a Military Option

How serious was Ayub Khan in opting for a military solution to break the inertia? Such an option implied meeting the following pre-requisites:-

Formulating a national policy by identifying and merging the political and military objectives.Neutralizing the pro-India J&K National Conference in IHK and cultivating a parallel pro-plebiscite leadership.Nurturing political awareness in IHK conducive for an uprising in the state.Exploiting the UN resolutions and international opinion to the hilt, wherever they suited Pakistan, without making them the sole instrument of conflict resolution.Identifying the type of war required to achieve the military objectives and training for it.Crafting a comprehensive plan aimed at achieving the military objectives across the Cease-fire Line while holding the enemy along the international border. This required abandoning the limited war mindset.

Let us see to what extent the decision makers addressed the prerequisites to a military option to unfreeze the Kashmir dispute.

Read more: Kashmir on fire: Has Pakistan really helped the cause?

Pakistan’s National Policy on Jammu and Kashmir?

Pakistan’s national policy regarding Jammu & Kashmir is based on two broad precepts: 1) Kashmir is Pakistan’s jugular vein. 2) The future of Jammu & Kashmir should be decided through a UN- sponsored plebiscite. Over the period of time, these precepts have been reduced to clichés.

True, the Military Operations Directorate at the General Headquarters had ponderously made and kept updated contingency plans to recover the IHK, these plans were ( and are even today) broad guidelines. No effort had been made to mesh these plans with the political strategy

Whereas Pakistani leadership hoped against hope that someday, somehow the Kashmiris will be allowed by India to exercise their right to self-determination as a result of which IHK will become part of Pakistan, short of half-hearted attempts like the one sponsored in 1947 through the tribal invasion, they had never seriously thought of a military solution. True, the Military Operations Directorate at the General Headquarters had ponderously made and kept updated contingency plans to recover the IHK, these plans were ( and are even today) broad guidelines. No effort had been made to mesh these plans with the political strategy (How to transform the general resentment among Kashmiris into a meaningful insurgency? How to exploit the world opinion in favor of a projected Kashmiri uprising? How to deliver, in concert with a fomented Kashmiri revolt, the coup de grace on India? Etc.).

Saleem Akhtar Malik was a Lt Colonel in the Pakistan Army. He holds an honors degree in War Studies, an MBA and an M.Phil in Management Sciences. He is the author of the book Borrowed Power. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Global Village Space’s editorial policy.

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[fatman17]

How Pakistan planned and prepared for the 1965 war against a stronger enemy?

August 20, 2017


Saleem Akhtar Malik l




Planning and Preparation

Force Ratios

War plans are based on the threat assessment. Let us have a look at the relative force ratios before the September war. Pakistan entered the war with eight infantry divisions out of which 14 Division was in East Pakistan. Pakistan has two armoured divisions – 1 and 6. The 6 Armoured division had only one brigade. Against this, India had twelve infantry divisions (Indian 9 Infantry Division was based in Ranchi for East Pakistan), one armoured division, and two independent armoured brigades. India had also deployed twelve mountain divisions against China, out of which it moved three divisions from the Chinese front to fight in the western sector, against Pakistan (4 Mountain, 6 Mountain, and 23 Mountain). So, the final tally on the western front was Indian eleven infantry divisions , three mountain divisions, one armoured division and two independent armoured brigades against Pakistan’s seven infantry divisions and two armoured divisions (6 Armoured Division with only one brigade).

If we assign a combat power value of 1 to the infantry division, 1 to the mountain division, 3 to the armoured division, and 2 to an independent armoured brigade, we get following values:-

Pakistan

7x Infantry divisions : 1×7 = 7

1 Armoured Division : 3×1= 3

6 Armoured Division : 2×1= 2

Total 12

India

11x Infantry divisions : 1×11=11

3x Mountain divisions : 1×3 = 3

1x Armoured division : 3×1 = 3

2x (I) armoured brigades: 2×2= 4

Total 21

Adding up the values, we get a score of 12 for Pakistan, and 21 for India. Using Lanchester’s Equation, we square the values and get a combat value of 144 for Pakistan and 441 for India. Combat Power ratio (western front) at the start of the war was 3.0625: 1 in India’s favour.

The Plan

The original plan for the operation code-named Gibraltar may have been prepared by the Pakistan Army as early as the 1950s, but, according to the folklore, was resurrected by Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, GOC 12 Division. The plan called for infiltrating groups of “Mujahideen” comprising regular army troops and irregulars into IHK for contriving a local uprising and unfreezing the issue without provoking a general war (Hali,2012). It was almost going to be a replay of the first Kashmir war.

The mission assigned to the various infiltration groups was warfare in the enemy’s rear with a view to creating conditions for an open revolt against the Indian occupation. Within the four to six weeks time frame available one can imagine what sort of training, ground work, coordination with the local Kashmiris and logistics planning would have been done. The total strength of the “Gibraltar Force” was not more than 5,000 to 7,000 men subdivided into nine forces. Operation Gibraltar surprised the Kashmiris more than the Indian Army. Instead of receiving help from the locals, most of the infiltrators were handed over to the Indian Army. Those who were not discovered were in a more pathetic state since rations, ammunition and supplies ran out.

Holding the Enemy

Earlier, we had identified as an essential of military option

“Crafting a comprehensive plan aimed at achieving the military objectives across the Cease-fire Line while holding the enemy along the international border”.

In the Kargil sector, Srinagar-Leh road, Indian Army’s lifeline to Ladakh, was dominated by the heights held by Pakistan. Indian Army convoys traversing Srinagar – Leh road would frequently come under heavy fire from the Pakistani posts overlooking the road.

This required abandoning the limited war mind- set. Were the Indians going to sit idle? No. They would definitely retaliate by exploiting the weaknesses and gaps in Pakistani defences.

Read more:What led to 1965 war? – Part 1

Nothing was done to reinforce the holding troops and plug the gaps in own defences. Alerted by the infiltration attempts and skirmishes with the Mujahideen, from 16th August onwards Indians increased their patrolling along the CFL. In the Kargil sector, Srinagar-Leh road, Indian Army’s lifeline to Ladakh, was dominated by the heights held by Pakistan. Indian Army convoys traversing Srinagar – Leh road would frequently come under heavy fire from the Pakistani posts overlooking the road. Indians had the compulsion to keep the CFL as far away from this road as possible. Since 1948 Indians had been nibbling at the heights dominating this vital road. Despite the constant Indian threat, this sector was thinly held by the scouts. Indians had, therefore, no difficulty in capturing, in late August, some scattered and isolated Pakistani posts (notably Kuru, Laila, and Majnun) in this area.

In the confusion of battle, companies lost contact with each other and with their battalion headquarters. This was the state of planning to liberate Kashmir.

Between 25th August and 11th September Indians attacked and captured important Pakistani posts in Neelam and Jhelum valleys. It is not easy to capture a dominating feature held by a well- trained defender. Why were Pakistani defences in the area falling like nine pins?

Read more:Why war with Pakistan — is not an option!

During Operation Gibraltar whole infantry battalions were pulled out from their defensive positions by bleeding the holding brigades (Sectors) to beef up the infiltration forces. Some of the units were hastily moved into the area from their peacetime locations. When the Indians retaliated by attacking Pakistani posts all along the CFL, the infiltrating units were recalled and asked to counter attack. There was little time for preparation.In the confusion of battle, companies lost contact with each other and with their battalion headquarters. This was the state of planning to liberate Kashmir.

Operation Grand Slam

In order to ease the pressure on 12 Division , which was defending against repeated Indian attacks, and to guard against the threat to the important city of Muzaffarabad, which resulted from the gain by Indian forces of strategic areas like the Hajipir Pass, the Pakistan Army commenced Operation Grand Slam at 0500 hours on 1st September 1965.

When the attack recommenced on 3rdSeptember, the Indian forces in the sector were sufficiently reinforced to hold out for a few more days, but they did not have the strength to launch a counterattack.

Chamb was defended by the Indian 191 Infantry Brigade Group (provisionally under command 15 Division) and a squadron of AMX-13 tanks. The infantry was stretched thin along the border and the AMX-13 tanks, though possessing the same firepower as the Pakistani M47 and M48 Patton tanks, were outnumbered in this sector. For the operation, Major General Akhtar Husain Malik had set up his headquarters at Kharian. Forces under his command were 3x infantry brigades (No. 4 Sector, 10 Brigade, and 102 Brigade), 2x armoured regiments (ex 6 Armoured Division), and Artillery I Corps (Amin, 2000). Against a militarily stronger and larger Pakistani thrust, the Indian forces retreated from their defensive positions.

Read more: Remember the hero of Lakshmipur: Major Tufail!

On the second day of the attack, Major General Akhtar Malik was replaced by GOC 7 Division, Major General Yahya Khan, which delayed the attack by one day. Not only did this decision cause confusion among the Pakistani officer cadre, the delay also permitted the Indians to rush reinforcements to the sector. When the attack recommenced on 3rd September, the Indian forces in the sector were sufficiently reinforced to hold out for a few more days, but they did not have the strength to launch a counterattack. The Pakistani attack staggered for two more days without any significant gains in territory. To relieve pressure from Chamb and Akhnoor , on night 5th /6th September India attacked Pakistan along the Radcliffe Line. The advance of the Indian Army also threatened to cut across the right flank of the Pakistani attack. Realizing the gravity of the threat, the Pakistani Army stopped its thrust into Kashmir and diverted 7 Division to counter the Indian incursion.

Saleem Akhtar Malik was a Lt Colonel in the Pakistan Army. He holds an honors degree in War Studies, an MBA and an M.Phil in Management Sciences. He is the author of the book Borrowed Power. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Global Village Space’s editorial policy.

____________________________

 

[Pakistani E]

@fatman17

Loved reading this. Thanks.

Just a point though and forgive me if I'm wrong, but wasn't Akhtar Hussain Malik (shaheed) a Lieutenant General and not Major General? Or maybe I am just playing with semantics?

 

[fatman17]

@fatman17

Loved reading this. Thanks.

Just a point though and forgive me if I'm wrong, but wasn't Akhtar Hussain Malik (shaheed) a Lieutenant General and not Major General? Or maybe I am just playing with semantics?

I think he was MGen. We didn't have too many LtGs then as we do now. Every tom, dick and Harry is a LtG. Too bad he was yanked from his command as he was about to cut off the rest of India from kashmir.

 

[fatman17]

Cheers at Gymkhana remained a dream for Indian Generals


September 3, 2017

Saleem Akhtar Malik l

General Chuadhari’s dream of having a toast at Gymkhana remained unfulfilled. At the Lahore front Indian XI Corps began its operations by advancing on three axes –15 Division (three infantry brigades and an armour regiment) was to attack Lahore along Amritsar –Lahore axis (Wagah road), 7 Division (three infantry brigades and an armour regiment) to attack Burki along Khalra –Burki axis, and 4 Mountain Division ( two mountain brigades and an armour regiment) advancing along Khem Karan- Kasur axis was to capture Kasur.

Facing the Indians along Amritsar-Lahore and Khalra- Burki axes was 10 Division (seven infantry battalions within three infantry brigades, and an armour regiment). Rann of Kutch clash had resulted in the forward deployment of troops along the international border. The official history tells us about troop deployment in early July. The defensive positions were strengthened with barbed wire and mines. In the last week of July, the troops were ordered to completely dismantle the defences and return to barracks. When the Indians attacked, there were no mines or barbed wire.

These were haphazardly blown up belatedly in the face of the stiff enemy pressure. While the advance positions were overrun by the enemy, some elements ex 10 Division continued operating on the east bank of BRB till the cease-fire. All the enemy attacks on forward defended localities were beaten back, mainly by own artillery.

On persistence from his brigade commanders, GOC 10 Division permitted them to take up defensive positions during night 5th / 6thSeptember, start time midnight. This implied that the troops would not be in position before 0400 hours and defensive positions could not be occupied before 0700 hours, 6th September. As a result, infantry battalions, under command armour elements, and line parties of artillery observers bumped into the attackers while occupying the assigned forward defended localities/ artillery observation posts. None of the twenty odd bridges was prepared for demolition. These were haphazardly blown up belatedly in the face of the stiff enemy pressure. While the advance positions were overrun by the enemy, some elements ex 10 Division continued operating on the east bank of BRB till the cease-fire. All the enemy attacks on forward defended localities were beaten back, mainly by own artillery. By 22nd September, Indians, while leaning on the water obstacle, had captured two major villages, Burki and Dograi, to the east of BRB.

The Indian claim that the invading divisions did not attempt to establish a bridgehead anywhere across the BRB Canal has been rejected by Singh and Rikhye (1991). Pakistan prevented the Indian Army from crossing the last defence before Lahore, the BRB Canal just in time, and saved itself a very major defeat in the process. Much of the credit has deservedly gone to a single company of the 3 Baluch Regiment, which held up the Indians for several hours. Only this battalion was in position because the rest of Pakistan 10 Infantry Division had not been alerted as Pakistan did not expect India to cross the international frontier. But what few know is that the PAF also had a major role in stalling the Indians. But for the PAF, the weak Pakistani defence would have been overwhelmed and the Indian Army would have poured across the BRB Canal and into Lahore.

The Indians claim that during the 1965 War they stopped short of Lahore because, by their own admission, they did not want to get embroiled with Pakistan Army and para-military forces in the city and its environs.

The lead brigade of Indian 15 Infantry Division was about to throw a bridgehead across the BRB Canal when it was attacked by the F-86s ( of No 19 Squadron, sic) that strafed it and other elements of the Division up and down the Grand Trunk Road, throwing the Indians into confusion, delaying the advance, and thus allowing Pakistan’s 10 Division to assume its forward positions, which ended the hope of a quick victory.


The Indians claim that during the 1965 War they stopped short of Lahore because, by their own admission, they did not want to get embroiled with Pakistan Army and para-military forces in the city and its environs. But then you do not attack with a superior force, yet avoid suffering casualties. General Chaudhuri claimed that during the war Indian Army’s aim was to destroy Pakistan’s war machine instead of capturing territory. We know that Chaudhuri was giving a lame excuse because the destruction of enemy forces and equipment requires superiority in the air, armour, and artillery. IAF possessed more aircraft than PAF but failed to translate this superiority in the air. It was because, according to Shukla (2014), PAF’s qualitative edge and superior training evenly matched IAF’s numerical superiority. Indian armour was, in quantity and, to some extent, qualitatively inferior to Pakistani armour, and during the war, only Pakistan had 155 mm heavy artillery. Yes, India had more infantry formations and we know that infantry is essentially employed not to destroy the enemy but to capture and hold ground.

Saleem Akhtar Malik was a Lt Colonel in the Pakistan Army. He holds an honors degree in War Studies, an MBA and an M.Phil in Management Sciences. He is the author of the book Borrowed Power. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Global Village Space’s editorial policy.

____________________________

 

[Indus Pakistan]

Combat Power ratio (western front) at the start of the war was 3.0625: 1 in India’s favour.

If it was over 3:1 in India's favour on the western front what was it on the eastern front? 100:1?

 

[fatman17]

If it was over 3:1 in India's favour on the western front what was it on the eastern front? 100:1?

Maybe in 71 on the eastern front

 

[Indus Pakistan]

Maybe in 71 on the eastern front

No that must have been 200:1. They won did they not?

 

[SQ8]

A repeat of what is already known as the folly of Ayub Khan goaded on by Bhutto. Launching a conflict without proper on the ground preparations and logistics.

 

[Stephen Cohen]

http://www.defencejournal.com/2001/september/1965.htm

Pakistan failed because its military leaders lacked the strategic insight which was necessary to transform its tangible qualitative superiority in equipment and manpower at the tactical level into a victory!

1965 was an undoubted strategic failure on part of Pakistani higher command. Pakistan paid the price six years later. Success would have meant unity.

Defeat led to civil war and secession. The fault lay in lack of strategic insight at the military level.

 

[Shinigami]

If it was over 3:1 in India's favour on the western front what was it on the eastern front? 100:1?

incorrect. its more like 1:1
a mistake was made here by the pakistani who wrote this. (or deliberately?)

If we assign a combat power value of 1 to the infantry division, 1 to the mountain division, 3 to the armoured division, and 2 to an independent armoured brigade, we get following values:-

Pakistan

7x Infantry divisions : 1×7 = 7

1 Armoured Division : 3×1= 3

6 Armoured Division : 2×1= 2 (actual value 6x3=18)

Total 12 (actual value 28)

India

11x Infantry divisions : 1×11=11

3x Mountain divisions : 1×3 = 3

1x Armoured division : 3×1 = 3

2x (I) armoured brigades: 2×2= 4

Total 21

 

[Indus Pakistan]

incorrect. its more like 1:1

Okay you know India is vastly larger then Pakistan. You know the Indian Army was and is vastly larger then Pakistan. Please tell me, do, where was rest of the "vastness" if it was 1:1? Sleeping?

 

[Shinigami]

firstly, IA is not "vastly larger" than PA, its just 2:1. and half of that is on the chinese border

then, i had already showed the mistake in the combat power comparison:

If we assign a combat power value of 1 to the infantry division, 1 to the mountain division, 3 to the armoured division, and 2 to an independent armoured brigade, we get following values:-

Pakistan

7x Infantry divisions : 1×7 = 7

1 Armoured Division : 3×1= 3

6 Armoured Division : 2×1= 2 (actual value 6x3=18)

Total 12 (actual value 28)

India

11x Infantry divisions : 1×11=11

3x Mountain divisions : 1×3 = 3

1x Armoured division : 3×1 = 3

2x (I) armoured brigades: 2×2= 4

Total 21

Okay you know India is vastly larger then Pakistan. You know the Indian Army was and is vastly larger then Pakistan. Please tell me, do, where was rest of the "vastness" if it was 1:1? Sleeping?

 

[Joe Shearer]

@Shinigami

Useful interventions.

It is interesting to read a relatively honest Pakistani account, although the portions about the imminent threat to Lahore and why it was not captured does not relate all the facts, including Desmond Hyde's penetration to the outskirts and his incredible recall by his brigade commander, when the Jats had nothing in front.

Still, in other respects, it is far more honest an account than we have had to suffer in the past. Let us be thankful for small mercies.

About the PAF, the tacit agreement not to attack each other, established between the then Air Chiefs, was not explicitly renewed after Nur Khan took over, barely weeks before the hostilities; the IAF was caught napping and suffered heavy losses on the ground. This is not reported, but it is a conjecture; nobody came right out and said as much from among the military leadership on either side. Not being demolished was in itself a victory for the PAF; let us acknowledge that fact.

 

[fatman17]

@Shinigami

Useful interventions.

It is interesting to read a relatively honest Pakistani account, although the portions about the imminent threat to Lahore and why it was not captured does not relate all the facts, including Desmond Hyde's penetration to the outskirts and his incredible recall by his brigade commander, when the Jats had nothing in front.

Still, in other respects, it is far more honest an account than we have had to suffer in the past. Let us be thankful for small mercies.

About the PAF, the tacit agreement not to attack each other, established between the then Air Chiefs, was not explicitly renewed after Nur Khan took over, barely weeks before the hostilities; the IAF was caught napping and suffered heavy losses on the ground. This is not reported, but it is a conjecture; nobody came right out and said as much from among the military leadership on either side. Not being demolished was in itself a victory for the PAF; let us acknowledge that fact.

Ha ha ha .Like the last "demolished " part about the PAF. more like unscathed . anyway history is written, cannot change it.