What's new

Rapid Loss of Confidence Hits India Hard

RiazHaq

SENIOR MEMBER
Joined
Oct 31, 2009
Messages
6,611
Reaction score
70
Country
Pakistan
Location
United States
Haq's Musings: India Suffers Rapid Loss of Investor Confidence

Plummeting Indian rupee is the most obvious symptom of the world losing confidence in India. The crisis of confidence is so great that Jim O'Neill, former Goldman Sachs executive whose BRIC acronym made India an attractive investor destination in 2001, has recently said that “if I were to change it, I would just leave the "C"" in BRIC.


India has long run huge twin deficits which it has been able to finance with foreign capital inflows. Such flows have been driven mainly by the easy money policies pursued by the US Federal Reserve and other central banks in Europe and Japan in recent years.

The US Fed in Washington has been buying $85 billion worth of bonds with a few computer key strokes every month to stimulate the US economy.


Many investors had been borrowing money in US dollars at extremely low rates to invest their borrowings for higher returns in emerging markets like India. With US economic recovery beginning to take hold, the US Fed has signaled that it may reduce or end these bond purchases. As a result of this change, foreign investors are retrenching from the emerging markets to take advantage of better returns in US and frontier markets.

In contrast to big declines in emerging markets like India and Indonesia, some frontier markets such as the UAE, Bulgaria and Pakistan have returned over 50 percent this year in dollar terms, according to Reuters. Unlike in the big emerging economies, listed companies in Kenya or Pakistan tend to be true plays on the emerging market consumer. Earnings growth estimates for this year have risen sharply almost everywhere to 10-15 percent (versus the 9.8 percent average in emerging markets)

In addition to the stellar performance of Karachi's KSE-100 this year, Pakistani euro bonds listed on the Luxembourg stock exchange are also doing well, according to Pakistan's Dawn newspaper. In the last four months, these bonds have surged by more than 10 per cent (excluding coupon payment), which places them among the best performing in emerging and frontier markets. During this period, yields on the bonds have declined by more than 300 basis points.


India and Indonesia have been specially hard hit because both are dependent on significant foreign inflows to fill their current-account gaps. Foreign investors have already sold a net $11.6 billion of Indian debt and equities since late May, sparking fears of continued weakness, according to Reuters. As a result, Indian rupee and major Indian stock indices have both suffered double digit losses this year. Weakness in the Indian currency, which tumbled almost 15 percent this year, could further fuel inflation, and hurt consumers in an election year. Compared to 2011-12, the Indian GDP has declined by more than $200 billion to about $1.65 trillion this year.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the country's central bank, has said it plans to buy long-dated government debt to stabilize markets after rising volatility threatened to hurt an economy that is already growing at the slowest pace in a decade. But the BRI actions appear to be too little too late.

There does not appear to be any quick fix to the falling rupee and declining investor confidence. The longer term solution lies in containing both the budget and the trade deficits. It will require strong political will to cut spending and reduce imports in the immediate future. Such actions will make the situation worse before it hets better. Will India's ruling politicians muster the courage to swallow the bitter pill so close to the upcoming elections in 2014? I doubt it.


Haq's Musings: India Suffers Rapid Loss of Investor Confidence
 
. . .

So why is the Indian rupee hitting all time lows? It's already down 15% this year.

Over $170 billion of India's $390 billion foreign debt is due for repayment within a year. India's current foreign exchange reserves are $278 billion, and repaying $170 billion debt will dramatically deplete its reserves causing further panic in financial markets.
 
.
So why is the Indian rupee hitting all time lows? It's already down 15% this year.

Over $170 billion of India's $390 billion foreign debt is due for repayment within a year. India's current foreign exchange reserves are $278 billion, and repaying $170 billion debt will dramatically deplete its reserves causing further panic in financial markets.

You seems to have not taken into the account of the advantages of undervaluing currency with depreciation of reserves.

India is importing oil and paying in rupees, and we have food surplus no need for imports in this regard.

The situation is not that bad either.
 
.
You seems to have not taken into the account of the advantages of undervaluing currency with depreciation of reserves.

India is importing oil and paying in rupees, and we have food surplus no need for imports in this regard.

The situation is not that bad either.

Dismissing the current crisis as "not that bad" and failing to recognize the trend can be disastrous for any economy, not just India's whose serious issues of foreign capital dependence have been know for years.

Haq's Musings: Soaring Chinese Imports and Twin Deficits Worry India
 
.
The ironies of India’s economic crisis

A not so funny thing happened while the world was watching for an emerging markets crisis to erupt in China. The crisis erupted in India instead. :omghaha:

Contagion typically attacks weak links first, often exposing vulnerabilities hidden in plain sight. The fall of the rupee exposes India as having the emerging world’s worst fiscal deficit and largest current account deficit in absolute terms.

What went wrong? For much of the past decade, India was celebrated as one of the emerging nations destined to rise indefinitely. Even after the global crisis of 2008, like China and others, it kept growth alive by spending heavily, helped by the easy money flowing out of the US. Behind the scenes, though, the picture was deteriorating, with crony capitalism, government subsidies and inflation rising rapidly.

As early as 2011, money started to flow out of emerging nations as the post-crisis stimulus began to wear off. Economic growth slowed and the flawed structures on which it was built became apparent. The tipping point came in May, when signals that the US Federal Reserve was serious about tapering off its quantitative easing programme triggered a sharp rise in long-term interest rates in the US, drawing dollars home. The trickle of money out of emerging markets turned into a flood. In India, more dependent than ever on foreign capital, the rupee has fallen 20 per cent since May – the largest decline of all emerging market currencies.

The reversal of global money flows has hit particularly hard those emerging markets with a high current account deficit, and leadership that has clung to power too long and lost the will to reform. Along with India, high on this list are countries recently struck by political unrest, including Turkey, Brazil and South Africa. In these nations, the stock market is this year down 10 to 20 per cent, and currencies another 8 to 20 per cent.

Economic growth has now fallen to an average of 4 per cent in emerging nations. In India, it is barely 5 per cent, disappointing for a country with an income of only $1,500 a head, compared with the emerging market average of nearly $10,000.

This is a familiar pickle for India, which has faced a crisis early in each decade since the 1980s. Like leaders in many emerging nations, India’s tend to grow complacent in good times, triggering a crisis, which forces reform, leading to a revival. What is unexpected today is that the crisis phase is unfolding under a leader credited for leading reforms after the 1991 crisis. Prime minister Manmohan Singh, an economist, has been consistently wrong on the economy. He has assumed strong investment and savings rates would keep growth above 8 per cent, and dismissed inflation as the natural price of prosperity and crony capitalism as a normal symptom of early-stage growth, rather than recognising it as the cancer it is.

India’s fundamentals have deteriorated steadily under Mr Singh’s government. Since 2007, the current account deficit has exploded from $8bn to $90bn; it now equals 5 per cent of gross domestic product, twice the level academic studies suggest is sustainable. Meanwhile, many corporations have been on a borrowing binge. Since 2007, borrowing by the 10 most indebted companies has risen sixfold to $120bn, with much of it denominated in foreign currencies. One in four companies does not have the cash flow to cover its interest payments adequately. Total short-term external debt has risen from $80bn to $170bn. There is talk in New Delhi that, for the third time since the crisis of 1981, India may have to appeal to the International Monetary Fund.

The situation is not yet that critical. The last time India turned to the IMF, in 1991, it had enough foreign exchange reserves to pay for less than a month’s worth of imports, compared with more than five months today. It also had much heavier short-term external debts. Nonetheless, the situation is now in the hands of global forces beyond India’s control.

The weak coalition government has been unable to muster a coherent response. Some tentative steps, such as recent openings to foreign direct investment, make sense but will affect the national accounts only after the crisis is decided by larger forces, such as the extent to which the Fed cuts back on quantitative easing.

The irony is profound. Indian leaders were quick to credit the boom to the country’s natural strengths, rather than the incoming tide of easy money. But now they are quick to blame their troubles on the receding global tide. Voters are wondering aloud how their “breakout nation” became a “breakdown nation”, seemingly overnight.

This crisis, too, shall pass, but a meaningful turnround is not likely until a new government is in place. With general elections due next year, it will be difficult to push tough reform in the coming months. India has always wanted to be the next China in economic terms – but beating China to the next crisis is not what Indians had in mind.

The ironies of India’s economic crisis - FT.com
 
.
India: From breakout to breakdown nation. What went wrong?

NEW DELHI, India — As recently as 2010, India's economic rise was thought to be inevitable. Poverty? Call it a “low base.” Unemployed millions? Call that the “demographic dividend.” A runaway deficit? That's “inclusive growth.”

Morgan Stanley's Ruchir Sharma warned against that kind of thinking in his 2012 book “Breakout Nations: In pursuit of the next economic miracles,” cautioning that India's rise was in no way guaranteed.

The much touted demographic dividend — a population getting younger and more numerous as the rest of the world is aging — would only pay off if India could train and educate its young people and create jobs, he argued. And there were serious impediments to doing either.

These days, those warnings are looking especially prescient.

Growth has plunged to less than 5 percent, and inflation continues to rise. Meanwhile, the rupee continues to plummet, threatening to increase prices even further and widen the large current account deficit at the root of the problem.

Perhaps worse, this week Nokia joined a long list of foreign companies threatening to quit India if the government doesn't get its act together, according to the Indian Express.

What went wrong? And, more importantly, how can it be fixed? GlobalPost's Jason Overdorf spoke with Sharma to find out. The interview has been edited and condensed by GlobalPost.

GlobalPost: How bad do you think the current crisis will get, and what are you advising Western investors to do?

Ruchir Sharma: We are watching this from the sidelines and not really doing anything here. For India, the per capita income is still only $1500. There's still a lot of natural buoyancy at that level for things to go up. There are some trends for example on consumption, where we think things will not decline that much, even though growth has slowed down, because people are still looking to buy more toothpaste or more hair oil.

How worried should India really be about the rupee? Is it the real problem, or a symptom of bigger things?

It is a real problem. If the rupee freefalls, it has a domino effect. Sure, it will help exports eventually. But you have to understand that when it happens sharply and suddenly, it has negative consequences. A lot of corporate India has taken loans over the past decade in foreign currency [which will now be harder to reimburse].

You warned in your book that India's rise was not a sure bet. What has India done wrong over the past five years to get itself into the current crisis?

The biggest fault line in India was that they completely misinterpreted the last decade's boom. It was a rising tide of global liquidity and a very strong emerging market boom that lifted all emerging markets, and India benefited in equal measure. But in India I think we mistook that boom for being our boom.

What problems did that miscalculation cause?

India spent that entire windfall, because the narrative was all about the fact that growth is coming anyway, so let's figure out how to redistribute the pie. There was hardly any productivity-enhancing reform throughout the boom period. It was seen as inevitable that with a high savings and investment rate, India would do well. [That] hubris, and the complacency that set in after that boom set the stage for what is happening now.

Having presided over economic reforms prior to becoming prime minister, Manmohan Singh was seen as a promising leader for India. What went wrong, and what should he have done differently?

I think he epitomized this complacency and hubris. A lot is spoken about how he had no political power and his power was undermined. But one of the things that is underappreciated about Manmohan Singh is how he's failed as an economist. He's been consistently been wrong in analyzing India's troubles.

What are some of his mistakes?

He was on record when inflation was going up as saying that rising food prices and other prices was a sign of prosperity, so rising inflation was perfectly fine. ... He was talking about how — because India has a savings rate of more than 30 percent and an investment rate of more than 35 percent — growth has to be 9 percent. [That’s] an academic concept that had no connection with what was happening on the ground. So he completely missed the downturn when it came.

Then they've allowed a current account deficit of 4-5 percent of GDP, knowing as any economist knows that a current account deficit of more than 2 or 3 percent of GDP is a dangerous sign for any economy.

Everybody talks about economic reforms, but plenty of projects are delayed by bureaucratic inertia. Are bad rules the main problem, failure to implement the rules?

I think it's a combination of both. One [problem] is the regulatory uncertainty [that results] when you keep changing rules. That causes a whole lot of tension.

Plus you do need some sort of policies to be put in place. You do need labor market reforms. You do need prices of your inputs, whether it's petrol prices or diesel, to be market-linked, rather than subsidies going out there. You do need some check on the fiscal deficit. They had a fiscal responsibility act [limiting the fiscal deficit to] 3 percent of GDP, but they've busted that.

What, if anything, can India do now to get back on track, and what is the likelihood of that happening in the current political situation?

Any step that is dialing back, and regressive in nature, will do nothing. From an accounting perspective, you may think you're saving a billion here and a billion there [with steps like raising the import duty on gold or TV sets, or limiting the amount of money Indians can send abroad]. But the confidence damage you do is far greater than this nickel and diming. They've got to stop this sort of thing to start with. But any major step will have to wait for a new election.

Whether for Singh or the next PM... What are the government's best options for long-term, sustainable growth?

A lot of this needs to be done at a local level. India is pretty much like Europe. It's a very federal structure. Having top-down reform in India is passé. More and more power needs to be given to the states, to figure out what is the best policy for them, and what they need to do. If you do retail reform, it needs to be done at the state level, so they can figure out what they need to do. Similarly labor reform. More freedom needs to be given to the states to decide. And [instead of] these huge central schemes, more schemes need to be given to the states to decide how to spend it, what to do, rather than having a central agency allocate funds.

India: From breakout to breakdown nation. What went wrong? | GlobalPost
 
. . .
actually when the rupee stabilizes around 60 mark it will attract more investors... and also it's good for our exports...
 
.
actually when the rupee stabilizes around 60 mark it will attract more investors... and also it's good for our exports...

there will be no more easy money thats what the articles says.
 
.
How India got its funk

India’s economy is in its tightest spot since 1991. Now, as then, the answer is to be bold

IN MAY America’s Federal Reserve hinted that it would soon start to reduce its vast purchases of Treasury bonds. As global investors adjusted to a world without ultra-cheap money, there has been a great sucking of funds from emerging markets. Currencies and shares have tumbled, from Brazil to Indonesia, but one country has been particularly badly hit.

Not so long ago India was celebrated as an economic miracle. In 2008 Manmohan Singh, the prime minister, said growth of 8-9% was India’s new cruising speed. He even predicted the end of the “chronic poverty, ignorance and disease, which has been the fate of millions of our countrymen for centuries”. Today he admits the outlook is difficult. The rupee has tumbled by 13% in three months. The stockmarket is down by a quarter in dollar terms. Borrowing rates are at levels last seen after Lehman Brothers’ demise. Bank shares have sunk.

India's economy: How India got its funk | The Economist
 
.
In next couple of months Rs is expected to settle around 57-59 slab, the economies dependent largely on FII inflows face this sort problem when world markets are in limbo specially major FII contributors like US N Europe but here again costly $ is good for exporters specially IT sector, jewellery and textiles, leather, chemical, pharmaceuticals and raw material etc,
 
.
India has to repay $172 billion debt by March 2014

...India’s short-term debt maturing within a year stood at $172 billion end-March 2013. This means the country will have to pay back $172 billion by March 31, 2014. The corresponding figure in March 2008 — before the global financial meltdown that year — was just $54.7 billion. India has accumulated a huge short-term debt with residual maturity of one year after 2008. The figure has gone up over three times largely because this period also coincided with the unprecedented widening of the current account deficit from roughly 2.5 percent in 2008-09 to nearly 5 per cent in 2012-13. Much of this expanded CAD has been funded by debt flows.

This may turn into a vicious cycle.

More pertinently, short-term debt maturing within a year is now nearly 60 per cent of India’s total foreign exchange reserves. In March 2008, it was only 17 per cent of total forex reserves. This shows the actual increase in the country’s repayment vulnerability since 2008.

Theoretically, if capital flows were to dry up due to some unforeseen events and NRIs stopped renewing their deposits with India, then 60 per cent of the country’s forex reserves may have to be deployed to pay back foreign borrowings due within a year.

A lot of the surge in external debt maturing within the next year is on account of big borrowings by Indian corporates during the boom years after 2004. Corporates became quite heady from their initial growth success and stocked up on huge external debts of 5- to 7-years maturity. The repayment clock is ticking for many of them now.

External commercial borrowings are now 31 per cent of the country’s total external debt of $390 billion as of 31 March 2013. Short-term debt with one year maturity is 25 per cent of total external debt. However, total short term debt to be paid back by the end of this fiscal, which includes a lot of corporate borrowings payable by end March 2014, is 44 per cent of the country’s external debt or $172 billion.

Corporates have managed to roll over their foreign borrowings over the past year because of the easy liquidity conditions kept by the U.S. Federal Reserve. But if the Fed’s easy liquidity stance were to reverse, there is no knowing how Indian corporates will pay back their foreign debt at a depreciated exchange rate of the rupee.

In any case, besides meeting its debt repayment obligation of $172 billion by 31 March 2014, India needs another $90 billion of net capital flows to meet its current account deficit projected at 4.7 per cent of GDP by the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council (PMEAC) for the coming fiscal.

The chairman of the PMEAC, C. Rangarajan, told The Hindu that an otherwise manageable CAD may create a perception of vulnerability in the backdrop of the Fed’s latest stance.

The $172 billion that has to be paid back by March 31, 2014, will no doubt add to this growing sense of unease.

India has to repay $172 billion debt by March 2014 - The Hindu
 
.
Back
Top Bottom