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Is it finally the Pakistan Navy’s turn?
An overview of the Pakistan Navy's ongoing modernization programs and future operational needs
03 October 2015
By Bilal Khan
Compared to its sibling service arms, i.e. the Pakistan Army (PA) and Pakistan Air Force (PAF), the Pakistan Navy (PN) is, to put it politely, under-appraised. It is not that the Navy is not appreciated, but few seem to fully understand its importance in being the protector of Pakistan’s coasts and the guardian of the country’s sea lines of communication (SLOC). SLOCs are basically key maritime routes connecting ports for sea-trade and naval activity. In other words, the Navy’s worth is undervalued.
A quarter of Pakistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) is dependent on Karachi, the country’s leading commercial port and its largest city. Not only that, but with the planned rise of Gwadar, the country’s dependence on sea-trade (as well as that of China’s should the China Pakistan Economic Corridor or CPEC come to fruition) will only grow. In fact, any outcome that involves Pakistan becoming economically stronger and capable of trading on the global market will require a strong seafaring service arm.
However, in light of today’s problems and tomorrow’s challenges, can we with absolute certainty say the Pakistan Navy is in a position to overcome the currents facing it?
From a high-level view, it is abundantly apparent that the qualitative and quantitative gap between India and Pakistan is the widest (favouring India) in the realm of naval development. While it is true that India has a much larger coastline to defend, it is also a reality that its immediate naval problem (minus whatever ambitions Delhi may have in the Pacific) is Pakistan. In other words, in conflict, it is very likely that a significant portion of the Indian Navy will be available for fighting Pakistan.
While it is true that India is poised to operate multiple aircraft carriers as well as a strong fleet of destroyers, frigates and submarines in the future, it is worth noting that a 1:1 match-up with the Indian Navy (IN) is not necessary for the Pakistan Navy (in the defensive context). The overall capabilities of the PN as well as of the PAF need to reach a conventional threshold where Indian attempts at blockading Karachi (and Gwadar) become exceptionally risky and unfeasible.
This paper will assess whether that threshold is on-track to being reached, and if not, what can be done to actually get there. It is important this discussion be had given the importance of the seas in sustaining a major proportion of the Pakistani economy (the military machine’s engine) in times of war.
One only needs to look at one of the brutally hard lessons Pakistan had to learn in 1971 (and there were many, with the most obvious one being the succession of East Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh). India’s naval operations off the seas of both East Pakistan and West Pakistan were an unqualified success. India’s combined naval operations resulted in Karachi no longer being able to send out or receive merchant ships, thereby disabling Pakistan’s capacity to trade goods or receive supplies by sea.
The rest of the article is on the site.
Is it finally the Pakistan Navy’s turn?
An overview of the Pakistan Navy's ongoing modernization programs and future operational needs
03 October 2015
By Bilal Khan
Compared to its sibling service arms, i.e. the Pakistan Army (PA) and Pakistan Air Force (PAF), the Pakistan Navy (PN) is, to put it politely, under-appraised. It is not that the Navy is not appreciated, but few seem to fully understand its importance in being the protector of Pakistan’s coasts and the guardian of the country’s sea lines of communication (SLOC). SLOCs are basically key maritime routes connecting ports for sea-trade and naval activity. In other words, the Navy’s worth is undervalued.
A quarter of Pakistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) is dependent on Karachi, the country’s leading commercial port and its largest city. Not only that, but with the planned rise of Gwadar, the country’s dependence on sea-trade (as well as that of China’s should the China Pakistan Economic Corridor or CPEC come to fruition) will only grow. In fact, any outcome that involves Pakistan becoming economically stronger and capable of trading on the global market will require a strong seafaring service arm.
However, in light of today’s problems and tomorrow’s challenges, can we with absolute certainty say the Pakistan Navy is in a position to overcome the currents facing it?
From a high-level view, it is abundantly apparent that the qualitative and quantitative gap between India and Pakistan is the widest (favouring India) in the realm of naval development. While it is true that India has a much larger coastline to defend, it is also a reality that its immediate naval problem (minus whatever ambitions Delhi may have in the Pacific) is Pakistan. In other words, in conflict, it is very likely that a significant portion of the Indian Navy will be available for fighting Pakistan.
While it is true that India is poised to operate multiple aircraft carriers as well as a strong fleet of destroyers, frigates and submarines in the future, it is worth noting that a 1:1 match-up with the Indian Navy (IN) is not necessary for the Pakistan Navy (in the defensive context). The overall capabilities of the PN as well as of the PAF need to reach a conventional threshold where Indian attempts at blockading Karachi (and Gwadar) become exceptionally risky and unfeasible.
This paper will assess whether that threshold is on-track to being reached, and if not, what can be done to actually get there. It is important this discussion be had given the importance of the seas in sustaining a major proportion of the Pakistani economy (the military machine’s engine) in times of war.
One only needs to look at one of the brutally hard lessons Pakistan had to learn in 1971 (and there were many, with the most obvious one being the succession of East Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh). India’s naval operations off the seas of both East Pakistan and West Pakistan were an unqualified success. India’s combined naval operations resulted in Karachi no longer being able to send out or receive merchant ships, thereby disabling Pakistan’s capacity to trade goods or receive supplies by sea.
The rest of the article is on the site.
Is it finally the Pakistan Navy’s turn?