Potential Security Gaps In Iran Listed In Order Of Difficulty

[BlessedKingOfLonging]

Salam.

In light of recent murders and sabotage incidents in the Islamic Republic Of Iran, I thought it prudent to shortlist the deficiencies and potential challenges for the Iranian Armed Forces in provision of security. While this list isn't exhaustive by any means, I still shall attempt my best to cover all bases. Please note that I'll add the points one by one so as not to create one long essay which nobody has the time to read and nor do I weasel out midway due to fatigue after labouring through

Without further ado, let's dive right in.

(1) IRANIAN BORDER GUARDS

Issues:


(A) Armament and Standard Issue Equipment

First, we will examine the tactical problems regarding the Border Guard Command. Often underequipped and ill-prepared to face the challenges of the challenging terrain they're posted to stand guard over, there is an obvious vulnerability in this sphere and leaves much to be desired with regards to their operational capabilities.

The standard issue firearms for Border Guard Command are Type 56s and AKMs, both antiquated platforms with large MOAs and unable to support modern optics and accessories. Additionally, vehicles used by Border Guards are unarmoured pick-up trucks which are vulnerable to small-arms fire. Protective equipment is poor, generally with a Level 2 armour rating or worse and training standards are only marginally better than that of a field paramilitary.

However, they possess howitzers and field artillery in their inventory which though lacking in digital fire control systems are still a potent weapon against large formations of enemies attempting to breach the border. Yet these are limited in range to engage targets up to <20km only and rapidly approaching obsolescence.


(B) Personnel Reliability and Unit Sabotage

Border Guard Command falls under NAJA, the Iranian Law Enforcement agency and thus in reality, it's service members are police officers. Iranian policing is notoriously corrupt and LEOs are generally known to accept bribes to ignore breaches of the law, regardless of severity depending upon the case. In an embarrassing case from some years ago, an Icelandic tourist had photographed himself at a border checkpoint with Border Guard Personnel, the tourist in question and the officer smoking confiscated opium. While it makes for a funny anecdote, it exposes a serious flaw in the functioning of the agency if an officer - even if off-duty - consumes contraband and an intoxicant at that (made worse when you consider it's a theocracy).

The second case I'd like to highlight is infiltration. In flashpoints like Khuzestan, Kurdistan, Sistan and Balochestan and Iranian Azerbaijan, membership among border guards is drawn from the local populace and they're drawn to stand guard over an area they know best - a sound strategy in itself, if not for the high level of sabotage committed by these elements.

I would remind of the 2018 kidnapping of 10 Iranian Border Guards by the balochi sunni terrorist militant group jaish al-adl. They had been captured while drugged after consuming rations that were laced with a sleep-inducing agent and hauled over to Pakistan where they were held until a combination of negotiations, Pakistani military action and an Iranian cross-border intelligence raid succeeded in freeing them all. This terrorist attack was the result of treason and collusion as evident by the contamination of the Border Guards' rations and raises a troubling prospect of how deep these issues run. Similarly, infiltration by Kurdish separatists is frequent along hidden routes in the mountains and even across checkpoints; worse, there is poor filtration of cross-border traffic between northern Iraq and Iranian Kurdistan which enables spies and saboteurs to move to and fro with shocking ease.



Solutions:

(A) With regards to professionalizing border security, heavy investment is required by the Defence Ministry. A complete training overhaul and equipment replacement is required with a focus on quality rather than sheer numbers. It is recommended that border personnel be issued an AK-103 at the very least but Sayad 5.56 rifles are preferred, complete with a full tactical load-out consisting of attached grenade launchers, advanced optical sights, laser pointers and more (in future, the Zolfaghar platform chambered for 7.62 x 51 mm should be introduced once it passes all trials).

In terms of protection, Ratnik protection system is ideal but it would be more economical to develop an indigenous analogue to it parallel to the Sarbaze Velayat (SARV) program but specific to border units, modernized and improvised to handle the conditions of Iranian border regions. Field rations should be issued in the form of MRE packs so that they're impossible to tamper with in future and the artillery needs to be upgraded in terms of firepower, range and smart targeting as well.

Vehicles and logistics present the single most daunting roadblock as of now. While pickups, jeeps and light tactical vehicles are sufficient for shuttling small loads of cargo or serving as an emergency ride to rush men to a flashpoint, they're woefully inadequate for patrolling purposes. As such, Toophan MRAPs must be issued to the Border Guards and brand new APCs have to be designed in a complete departure from BTR-based designs, mechanizing patrols. Training ought to be imparted along the lines of US Army units, complete with mortar squads and rifle teams, armed with a rocket launcher (here, it is advisable to forego the RPG-7/RPG-29 and instead opt for the chinese PF-98A or build a 105mm reusable rocket launcher with inspiration from the 84mm Carl Gustaf recoilless rifle) backed with small reconnaissance UAVs. As precaution, drone jamming equipment would be advised given the lessons of Ukraine and the recent incidents within Iran involving explosive-laden quadcopters.

(B) To prevent corruption from taking root in border guards posted on duty, personnel positions must be rotated every month, shuffling them across the term of deployment so that it becomes impossible for them to be contracted by the enemy, knowingly or unknowingly. K-9 units trained to detect contraband (drugs, explosives, ammunition etc.) must be stationed at every checkpoint, as must X-ray devices to properly scan vehicles entering or departing.

Special emphasis is to be laid on recruiting the best candidates who aren't easily swayed by promises of dollars or engage in decadence by consumption of prohibited goods - indeed, one of the revisions should be to increase salaries across the board for the service and a strict policy of enforcement with regards to abuse of confiscated materials. Personnel recruited should preferably be Shia Muslims, with occasional tolerance of a sunni local if no other choice presents itself though in such cases, they must be outnumbered by Shia servicemen within the unit.

Database entries must be logged with passport details, biometric data and number plates of people making crossings, flagging those who do so with regularity and imposing electronic tagging/tracking of newcomers and irregular, particularly foreigners. Conversely, an intelligence bureau for each border zone is to be stood up investigating the movements of Iranian citizens who pass out of Iranian territory for the duration they are staying in the concerned neighbouring state.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To be continued...(all criticism, input and recommendations accepted)

 

[BlessedKingOfLonging]

(2) KURDISH SEPARATISTS

Issues:

The single most widespread challenges Iran faces in the form of a large disloyal demographic is the Kurds. Kurds are divided from the rest of the Iranian populace in sub-ethnic background, linguistic heritage, religion and political ideology. Centred around Iranian Kurdistan and Kermanshah, theirs has been a rocky history with Iran since the early 20th century.

The origins of the conflict can be traced back to the ottoman-backed Shimo Shikak revolt which aimed to establish an independent Kurdish state within Iran friendly to the sultanate but was ultimately suppressed, even though there were other unsuccessful follow-ups. However, the biggest gripe the Kurds have was the Iranian state's overthrow of their short-lived "Republic of Mahabad", created out of a wave of popular sentiment exploited by the erstwhile USSR in order to collapse Iran's sovereignty and reduce it to a rump state.

Thereafter, conflict has been the order of Persian-Kurdish relations with a third uprising in 1979 that was crushed once more and since then, there's been an insurgency which spikes and ebbs by the decade, supported by hostile enemy powers and Kurdish factions operating outside Iran. To that effect, they exploit Kurdish sentiments inside Iran and entice them into committing treason and terrorism with a generous amount of funding and logistical supply.

(A) Religious gap - Kurds are nominally sunnis and even those who eschew the faith retain all the prejudices espoused within it. For example, it isn't uncommon for a Kurd who claims Zoroastrianism or atheism to scoff at an Iranian Shia as a "Son of Mut'ah". Similarly, in keeping with the traditions of the sunni faith, they offer insults to the Fourteen Infallibles {A} and encourage attacks on Shia mosques and shrines.

Furthermore, this undercurrent of sectarianism ingrained among the Kurds is common knowledge among sunni arabs who've managed to establish common ground with them on this particular issue. As a result, saudi arabia has fostered close ties with Kurdish separatists and offers them monetary support as well as ideological fuel to attack Iran and Iranians.


(B) Political divide - Kurdish separatism has worn many masks over the years; religion, marxist-socialism, democracy - all have been tried and tested but the end goal has been the same. Groups that declare a communist allegiance are given funds and assistance from Western organizations like Antifa and money is channeled through eastern syria which currently Kurdish-held and occupied by the United States.

Outright sunni extremist organizations are funded by wealthy Gulf donors and sunnis from the West and Turkey who see it as an opportunity to expand their footprint into Kurdish territories and establish a sunni terror state on the Iranian hinterland.

Of course, the current image that Kurds want to present is those of "secular and democratic" Islam and the biggest champions of those are the KDP and it's armed wing Peshmerga which exaggerate and outright falsify their accounts of participation in the war against daesh, something Western media assists them with. Hence do they build up a brand image and garner political capital in the eyes of the world.


(C) Militancy - Funding and media buzz is meaningless unless it can be capitalized upon. Here is where the Kurds' true strategy lies - insurgencies backed by Western/Israeli arms and SIGINT plus funding from their various supporters across the globe. Noteworthy is the fact that all of these factions that pose any credible threat are based in Syria, Iraq and Iran, all of which are aimed at hurting Iran and none else (Turkey's PKK is a spent force that is left to suffer in brutal offensives by the Turkish Armed Forces and this is by design).

Over the past decade, all of them have flexed their muscles. Kurds in Syria managed to form a de facto autonomous state when Damascus was occupied with battling sunni terrorists, KDP in Iraqi Kurdistan has become a den for the CIA and AMAN/Mossad, all of whom have observation positions, recruitment offices and training centers established there and Iran saw a huge rise in PJAK insurgency that only recently was squashed and has become functionally non-operational save for occasional skirmishes.

Kurdish separatists have openly boasted in the past of receiving American support and Israeli arms to conduct operations with. They draw encouragement from the fact that the government based in Baghdad's Green Zone is a puppet installed as a caretaker to serve the United States and the Iraqi President is always a Kurd and thus provides some level of security for their misdeed. Additionally, many Iraqi Armed Forces generals and high-ranking intelligence officers are Kurds or Baathists and they collaborate in their efforts to hurt Iran.

(D) Internal collusion - There is no secret that Iranian Kurds are the ones who provide ground assistance to cross-border separatism and with regularity. Three methods are primarily employed:

(I) Arrangement of fake Iranian documents which are provided to Iraqi Kurds who use them to shuttle across the border with regularity. These infiltrators are trained in the Persian language as well to blend in and use their documents and connections to rent houses where all their planning, logistics and operations are carried out from. Recent drone attacks on sensitive sites have occurred using military-grade quadcopters which are smuggled in component by component and swiftly assembled prior to operation timing and deployed.

It is also worth mentioning that many a time, it's Iranian Kurds who travel to Irbil and get in contact with the CIA/AMAN/Mossad that recruit, train and deploy them. These treacherous elements have an advantage over their Iraqi counterparts in that they have a better understanding of Iran and can approach disgruntled and politically unreliable elements within the Persian ethnic group, particularly those who hold public office, positions in military or law enforcement services and even the military industrial complex and nuclear program and turn them into assets/collaborators.

(II) Smuggling has plagued the Iranian border regions for decades but nowhere is it worse than the western border and along Iraqi Kurdistan. Using the disguise of kolbar porters, Kurdish terrorists have smuggled in arms, drugs and sensitive equipment, all of which has been deployed by Iran. Knowledge of secret pathways over the mountains facilitates their movement and satellite surveillance by the enemy powers fills in whatever gaps may arise.

(III) Kurdish separatists kidnap and brainwash teenagers with the use of drugs and mentally fetter them in their lifestyle. Children who otherwise grow up having normal lives tend to become indoctrinated and moulded in a destructive mindset which sees them killed by the Iranian Armed Forces in encounters or ends in suicide/execution by their "comrades" once disillusionment sets in. MeK has been the one to teach them these tactics - indeed, most MeK operations are conducted through Kurdish elements to whom they've promised self-autonomy once they come into power (and MeK itself gets it's mission orders from Washington and Tel Aviv).



Solutions:

(A) There is only one way to tackle this issue in particular and I say this with a heavy heart but there is no other choice. Iran must learning from the Chinese model implemented in "Xinjiang" (false name - there's no such thing and is a made-up entity) and enforce a crackdown on Iranian Kurdistan and Kermanshah.

Police and military forces must be mobilized and those provinces treated like warzones. The border must be closed immediately and the security teams must go on a hunting spree, raiding from house to house and marking down politically unreliable, suspicious, treasonous and criminal elements to be liquidated and nabbed. Sunnis in particular must be under scrutiny and taken into custody in a similar incarceration/reeducation program as the ones uygurs are subject to. Children must be separated from parents who have anti-Shia views and placed in kindergartens and schools with a focus on religious education where they are raised as Shias. Similarly, the adults also must be taught comparative religion and made to understand Shia Islam (particularly material from sunnis who converted to the Shia fiqh) and brought into the fold of Shiaism.

In the resulting vaccum, Shia Iranic populations with a high religious zeal ought to be moved in, particularly from Iranian Azerbaijani groups but also Persians as well as Feyli Shia Kurds from Iraq who must be naturalized as citizens and taught Persian plus given huge economic incentives for settling the land. These people can also become part of a government effort to monitor reeducated Kurds and to keep an eye on their religious and political sanitation, in case it's incomplete or compromised.

It goes without saying our goal should be to be less brutal than Beijing has been but we shouldn't compromise at all and allow dissent to continue taking root. In order to achieve security and stability among the Kurdish demographic, Iran should make sacrifices with regards to the Constitutional mandate for the greater good.


(B) Iran must fiercely sponsor Shia Kurdish factions right back and arm them. Feyli Shia Kurds have a presence in the PMU but Iranian support for them has been rather tepid to lukewarm, unwilling to use them as pawns in the bigger political game. This attitude must change as it opens a door not just into a huge section of southern Iraq like never before but also into Iraqi Kurdistan and permits greater surveillance and a chance to place roadblocks against American and Israeli intelligence operations.

Although, this must not be limited to Shias alone - Iran must capitalize on the Ezidi sentiment and flip them into willing assets through community outreach, programs to preserve their cultural heritage and supply of arms and training to their self-defence squads in Iraq AND Syria so that they can function as Tehran's extended arm into these regions. This will require a lot of time, effort, funds and trust but is achievable so I would highly encourage embarking on this drive.


(C) The best method to counter insurgency is through counterintelligence and special operations. The first thing Iran should do is to reach out to the PUK Kurdish faction and use the exact same methods as the enemy - getting sympathetic Kurds to help Iranians obtain false documents which they can use to carry out sleeper operations or bring the Iraqi Kurds in to be trained and released on Iraqi soil in order to carry out missions.

With regards to enemy SIGINT support, Iran must develop and deploy anti-satellite weaponry, electronic jamming systems both on it's own territory and enemy soil and electromagnetic weaponry to blind and cripple sensors. Regular sweeps must be conducted aerially by drones and ground patrols to search for infiltrators and embedded listening devices, particularly around sensitive locations.

Also, Border Guards must be well-trained, reliable and honest with an aversion to corruption and regularly rotated so no enemy agents are able to build rapport with them (their passports should also be frozen or their visits across the border regulated in order to prevent recruitment).

(D) Tackling sabotage by disloyal Iranian Kurds requires the following measures:

(I) Creation of special features in passports/documents that can be scanned to determine authenticity on computers hooked to government databases. These machines should be present at every border checkpoint and further in. Police should be empowered to stop, search and detain on suspicion without habeas corpus and the intelligence service bureaus (these must be created/expanded in scope for Kurdish provinces) must be involved in such cases.

(II) Three-tiered border checkpoints will reduce the volume of contraband flowing in - one operated by Border Guards, one by the IRGC and one by joint intelligence bureaus for both Artesh and Sepah. Each must be given a special set of expertise and skills with myriad methods to tackle the different ways the enemy might seek to smuggle in forbidden goods. I would suggest that all of them ought to be trained by the North Korean Reconnaissance General Bureau (North Korea's intelligence agency) since they have a long history of handling border issues and prevention of inflow of contraband and it's seizure.

Along unmapped paths, specialized mountain warfare units must patrol, automated gun turrets installed and UAVs must keep watch from the skies so that any infiltration and smuggling is rapidly intercepted/neutralized. This will require increased budget, training, expansion and purchases but is guaranteed to stem the tide of arms, explosives and drugs incoming.

(III) To prevent children from being ensnared, intelligence services must keep track through hospital and school databases of children born and enrolled in the education system, frequently checking on their progress and presence. Police operations in Iranian Kurdistan and Kermanshah must be militarized with a particular focus on drugs and gang-related crime, choking off this means of recruitment.

Moreover, Iran needs an "Intranet" completely disconnected from the world wide web and a good place for a test run would be the Kurdish regions. Implementing this successfully would make it easier to spread it from province to province, eventually spanning the country and undermining enemy SIGINT and recruitment in the process, effectively closing Iran behind a digital wall.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To be continued...(all criticism, input and recommendations accepted)

 

[Hack-Hook]

nonsense thread.

 

[BlessedKingOfLonging]

nonsense thread.

"nOnSeNse ThReAd"

~Gabar-e-koskesh

 

[Hack-Hook]

"nOnSeNse ThReAd"

~Gabar-e-koskesh

some people tends to show the quality of their family upbringing in every post they make

nevertheless the article is work of someone who is not aware of the situation on the ground in those regions

 

[BlessedKingOfLonging]

some people tends to show the quality of their family upbringing in every post they make

nevertheless the article is work of someone who is not aware of the situation on the ground in those regions

Nah, my family is much too nice to characters like yourself and to be fair, that's the entire problem.

That being said, my input comes from Kurds themselves, both from within Iran and outside it.

 

[PDF]

Shouldn't Number 1 be black sheep and people who sell themselves for money? It is not the external enemies but internal ones that you should fight first.

 

[Hack-Hook]

Shouldn't Number 1 be black sheep and people who sell themselves for money? It is not the external enemies but internal ones that you should fight first.

the articles is just bushtit , around 5 million Kurds leave in Iran ,
I dare people to even find 10000 one who want get separated from Iran and you find the majority of those living in Iraqi kurdistan , you can easily go to remotest village in the region for business , sightseeing , sport or .... and you will be welcomed with open hand and heart , well till you respect them

 

[BlessedKingOfLonging]

Shouldn't Number 1 be black sheep and people who sell themselves for money? It is not the external enemies but internal ones that you should fight first.

It is mentioning internal enemies. Notice that the points I raised about Kurdish separatists cover Iranian Kurds (actual citizens with Iranian passports) with a militant mindset also...and those are many, at least 10% of the total who in some form or the other have an axe to grind with Tehran.

 

[Hack-Hook]

It is mentioning internal enemies. Notice that the points I raised about Kurdish separatists cover Iranian Kurds (actual citizens with Iranian passports) with a militant mindset also...and those are many, at least 10% of the total who in some form or the other have an axe to grind with Tehran.

if 10% of Kurds wanted separation right now we had a military government there

 

[BlessedKingOfLonging]

if 10% of Kurds wanted separation right now we had a military government there

10% is not just military aged males but women, toothless old ghosts and hags and their brats as well being counted. Plus you ignore the very first reality of Kurdish society - they are fiercely tribal and put their clan interests first, which is partially why they've been so unsuccessful in Iran despite having the resentment against Tehran being so widespread; their disunity has worked in Iran's favour thus far.

 

[zartosht]

looks like hasbara are sending some farsi speaking trolls

 

[Hack-Hook]

10% is not just military aged males but women, toothless old ghosts and hags and their brats as well being counted. Plus you ignore the very first reality of Kurdish society - they are fiercely tribal and put their clan interests first, which is partially why they've been so unsuccessful in Iran despite having the resentment against Tehran being so widespread; their disunity has worked in Iran's favour thus far.

How many picture of Kurd women with gun will convince you ?