Plight of the refugees from SW

[Skeptic]

Was waiting for some Pakistani member to post this but... .


Tensions boil over as refugees arrive

DERA ISMAIL KHAN: After fleeing Pakistan’s latest war zone, grandfather Haji Abdullah had hoped for a warmer welcome when he reached safety.


‘When they realise you’re a Mehsud, they treat you like a suicide bomber who’s wearing an explosive jacket,’ said Abdullah, one of 120,000 people to have fled an anti-Taliban army offensive in the South Waziristan tribal belt.



‘It’s simply humiliating,’ added the 67-year-old, who travelled from his home in Makin, a Taliban redoubt, with five sons and seven grandchildren.



Like many of those fearing for their lives, Abdullah made his way to the city of Dera Ismail Khan where he soon encountered hostility as a member of the same tribe as Taliban chief Hakimullah Mehsud.



Such is the wariness of locals in a town which has endured a history of militant attacks, Abdullah’s family says he was only able to find somewhere to stay three days after one of his relatives put up guarantees.



‘No landlord was willing to rent out his house to me,’ he added.



But locals say they have every reason to suspect the uninvited new-arrivals from Waziristan, which lies outside direct government control, and believe many are active Taliban followers who are masquerading as innocent victims.



‘These people are a security risk as most of them belong to the Mehsud tribe and have strong Taliban sympathies,’ said Adeel Shahzad, a shoe shop salesman.



‘The situation has become very tense in our city because of the arrival of these people,’ Shahzad said, accusing them of triggering an increase in crime.



A local police commander said his men had received strict orders from the provincial government to keep a close eye out for trouble.



‘We have clear orders from the government to keep an eye on the displaced persons as the situation may further deteriorate with their arrival,’ district police chief Gul Afzal Afridi told AFP.



‘We have intelligence reports that many of these displaced persons were strong supporters of Taliban,’ he said, adding that dozens of new police checkposts have been set up across the city.



Police and army personnel can be seen patrolling the streets round the clock in the city, which has a history of Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence as well as Taliban attacks.



Hospitals and hotels have shut their gates and only people with valid identity documents can enter these places.



‘We have shut our gates and nobody without proper identification papers can enter,’ said Haji Munawar Khan, who works as a manager in a local hotel.



The International Crisis Group says the needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Waziristan are being neglected in a climate of animosity between Pashtuns from the tribal belt and those from the settled areas.



‘Few efforts, local or international, have been made to identify their needs or to help them rebuild their homes, schools, shops and places of work once they return,’ it said in a policy report published last week.



‘Most FATA (tribal belt) IDPs have not received adequate assistance or any compensation for the destruction of their properties and livelihoods.’ The think-tank accused the military of not allowing camps for Waziristan IDPs on the ‘unjustifiable grounds that they would offer jihadi groups pools of easy recruits,’ forcing Mehsuds to seek accommodation in private homes.



‘Host families have frequently faced harassment by the security agencies, including the military, paramilitary and police,’ said the report.



Cleaning the barrel of his gun with a handkerchief, Ghazanfar Ali, a private security guard, blamed lawlessness in his city on Afghans and the Taliban.



‘The Afghan refugees who migrated to Pakistan in 1980s started the law and order problems in our city and now it’s the Taliban,’ Ali said, accusing the Taliban for all the attacks to have rocked the flashpoint city in recent years.



Such attitudes infuriate Merajuddin Mehsud, who insists there is no reason for him to be tarred by association with the Islamist hardliners.



‘I found a house after roaming around for days but still the landlord wanted my national identity card and educational certificates of my son as a guarantee,’ said the 45-year-old, who has four children.



‘We were fed up with the attitude of Taliban in South Waziristan and here it is police and the local population who are creating problems for us.’— AFP

 

[Skeptic]

In Pakistan, Fear and Uncertainty for New Wave of Refugees

Under a blistering sun, the tribesmen queue impatiently for attention. Sweat drips from their heads as they attempt to edge closer to the doors of the refugee registration center in Dera Ismail Khan on the edge of the tribal areas in northwest Pakistan. As time slips by, so does their restraint. Waving angry fists with one hand and clasping their documents with the other, the group of men heaves toward the doors. Policemen on duty scatter the unruly crowd with forceful swings of their long bamboo sticks.

Standing at a slight distance, the chaotic scene only makes Fazal Din more nervous. As Pakistani troops advanced into South Waziristan ten days ago to target the stronghold of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the villager from Karam was fleeing with his family in the opposite direction. After walking for several hours, a bus happened to stop nearby. Parting with whatever cash they had, they bought themselves a ride to this wild and dusty frontier town three days later. "The bombing was hard," Din recalls. "It destroyed five houses near my own."

Now, having abandoned his home and possessions, the 30-year-old farmer is filled with uncertainty. As over 155,000 refugees have poured into Dera Ismail Khan, the government seems unprepared for the mounting humanitarian crisis. Diligent aid workers are busy registering the fresh arrivals and distributing sanitation kits. But food aid is yet to arrive. Last week, forms ran out, forcing the NGO-run registration centers to close for three days. There are no plans for camps to be established, even with fears that the number of refugees could double. Instead, they will have to squeeze into relatives' homes; those without family in region are renting accommodation at steep prices.

As with the Swat refugee crisis earlier this year, the demands of hospitality can be heavy. In a rural suburb of Dera Ismail Khan, Hayat Khan, 55, gives a tour of a cramped, two-room mud-walled home where he brought 10 members of his family to join the 12 who already live there. A deep hole in the ground serves as a makeshift toilet. Barefoot children run around, their hair streaked red and large, brown spots mark their faces — both signs of severe malnutrition.

Dera Ismail Khan has traditionally welcomed the Mehsud tribe this time of year, as they vacate their homes in the chilly mountains in favor of the town's warmer plains. But the current influx is now is seen as fanning the flame of the town's existing ethnic and sectarian tensions. "It changes the dynamic," says Faiysal AliKhan, head of Fida, the main refugee support group in the area. "Dera Ismail Khan is already cash-strapped. There is a shortage of schools and water. There is a lot of crime. Some of the locals are growing resentful. They say that troubles will follow the Mehsuds down from South Waziristan."

Already scarred by two years of violence from sectarian bomb attacks and targeted killings, the town is now bracing for fresh attacks as fears rise that militants posing as refugees may creep in. The local Shi'ite community, which has suffered vicious suicide bomb attacks, has erected new fortifications as the refugees came to town. The garrisoned quarter of the city is sealed off to outsiders. On the streets, where a deceptive calm prevails, soldiers in fatigues plunge through the streets at high speeds, flashing their weaponry. Nearby civilian cars swerve and screech to a halt. The faintest sign of a threat, the drivers fear, may trigger shooting.

Helping the security effort in Dera Ismail Khan are some of its most unusual residents: the so-called "good Taliban." In a small, nondescript house deep inside the town live the successors of the late militant leader, Abdullah Mehsud. Once at the object of the army's fury, the group has since rediscovered favor as the enemy's enemy. Baitullah Mehsud, the Pakistani Taliban leader killed in a CIA-operated drone strike in August, had murdered two of their leaders, and they want revenge against his successors.

"We are with Pakistan," says Maulana Sher Muhammad Mehsud. "We have told the police about the threat coming to Dera Ismail Khan, with terrorists entering the city. The police are weak in this regard. They do not recognize these people — we have informants there." All around him, young men with long hair and disheveled beards flaunt a range of weapons. During the conversation, a farouche-looking man emerges, carrying a cleaver dripping with fresh blood. "Don't worry," says one of the gunmen, with a broad and satisfied grin. "They are only slaughtering a lamb, not men."

In an attempt to ease its task in South Waziristan, the army has sought to isolate what remains of Baitullah Mehsud's network by striking arrangements with such unsavory groups. Most notably, it has revived non-aggression pacts with two powerful militant leaders from the rival Wazir tribe. As the army advances toward the Baitullah Mehsud network's strongholds from three different directions, Mullah Nazir in western South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan are facilitating its movements. Troublingly for U.S. troops in Afghanistan, both groups still mount cross-border attacks there. To the east, Turkistan Bhittani, another militant leader, who has mustered a small militia to fight alongside Pakistan's army, is leading it into South Waziristan through his tribe's traditional territory. So far, the Mehsuds have sat out the fight. "Our tribe is against these militants, but they are all afraid," says Maulana Banat Khan Mehsud, another elder of the Abdullah Mehsud group.

That fear also pervades the refugee registration centers, where few are willing to openly denounce the Taliban's brutality. Instead, there are fierce criticisms of the army's earlier operations, the ruinous peace deals that they left behind, and its role in the creation of these factions. "I don't like Baitullah Mehsud at all. He caused all this to happen in the first place," says Dilawar Khan, 50, a teacher from Kotkai village. "But who made these Taliban? It was the army."

Perhaps only by finally ridding their mountains of the Taliban will those hearts and minds be won back. So far, as the army slowly pushes deeper in the face of stiff resistance, there are signs of stronger resolve. But victory remains distant — and until then, the refugees' anger will only grow.

 

[Skeptic]

Refugee Advocacy Group Blasts Pakistan’s Displaced-Persons Policies

Refugees International, a humanitarian non-governmental organization recently headed by former Pentagon official Kenneth Bacon, is out this morning with a new paper sounding an alarm about the ongoing displaced-persons crisis in Pakistan, a result of insurgent violence and Pakistani military reprisal. The group calls on the Obama administration to “insist that the [Pakistani] government prioritize the protection of civilians,” something it says the current offensive in Waziristan against the Pakistani Taliban is failing to do.

Already, the group assesses, the week-old Waziristan campaign has created 200,000 internally displaced persons, while another 10,000 families are displaced in nearby Khyber to the north, and an additional 700,000 remain displaced after the spring fighting in the Swat Valley. Refugees International blasts the Pakistani government and military for severely restricting international and NGO access to the displaced, even using the term “dislocated” persons “to circumvent its responsibilities under international humanitarian law,” according to its report. As a result, it’s difficult to know how dire conditions really are amongst the displaced.

Even so, Refugees International reports an alarming trend in Pakistan: the displaced are becoming targets for persecution and not aid, as officials consider the refugees to be little more than insurgent collaborators.

According to a senior UN official, the government holds the view that civilians from certain areas, including those who fled, are “all insurgents who deserve to be punished.” Civilians from FATA are the primary victims of these policies, with aid groups reporting that wounded civilians are kept from leaving Khyber agency to go to Peshawar hospitals. As for the new military offensive in South Waziristan, the government’s strategy seems to be to cordon off the area, restrict civilian movements, and keep aid groups away. A major international aid organization was escorted out of D.I. Khan, Waziristan’s neighboring agency, when it tried to conduct an assessment there. A senior diplomat told Refugees International that in this “dirty war” it has waged, the government wants “to keep all ears and eyes away.” This is resulting in a policy of containment, with civilians kept from leaving, and only members of the Mehsud, the tribe of the insurgents, allowed to register as internally displaced people. NGOs also report being kept from distributing assistance to internally displaced people from South Waziristan.

The U.S. responded to the refugee crisis in Swat with unorthodox measures like setting up a text-messaging campaign to donate $5 to refugee aid. No such effort has accompanied the Waziristan campaign — an offensive pursued, in part, because of pressure from the Obama administration. Refugees International calls on the administration to take a variety of steps:

While U.S. humanitarian assistance was forthcoming and generous during the summer, it is important that the U.S. lends its political weight on ensuring the protection of civilians. In particular it should ensure that relief assistance is provided to vulnerable individuals and that they receive protection from the Pakistani government, regardless of their geographic origin or allegiances. It should ensure the UN has the independence to assess where and how it should work, and in particular that food distributions are delinked from government lists.

 

[Skeptic]

Pakistan: Protect People First

Pakistan is facing a complex humanitarian crisis. Recent military offensives against militant groups have displaced several million civilians and left thousands dead. While many have returned home, the new offensive in South Waziristan is currently displacing hundreds of thousands more. The UN’s activities are limited by both the insecure environment and restrictions by the government of Pakistan, but it must do a better job at adopting a principled approach to humanitarian assistance. As for the U.S., if it wants to help stabilize Pakistan, it needs to insist that the government prioritize the protection of civilians.

A Dire Humanitarian Picture

The humanitarian and displacement situation remains dire in Pakistan and a comprehensive response is still required to identify needs and ensure that resources are available to respond. Even though the major military offensive against militant groups is officially over in parts of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and in the Bajaur and Mohmand agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), pockets of violence remain, causing continued civilian displacement. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that up to one hundred families were displaced in Bajaur during the week of October 12 alone. Because of the ongoing conflict and difficulties in access, international organizations struggle to monitor new displacement and assist vulnerable civilians. FATA in particular remains a “black hole,” with very few agencies able to access the populations in need.

The UN and the government of Pakistan believe that 2.4 million civilians were displaced over the past year by the violence. According to OCHA, around 1.7 million have returned, leaving approximately 700,000 still displaced. On October 16th, OCHA reported in its humanitarian update that there were still 12 camps operating and many displaced were still being hosted by relatives in safer communities. The UN refugee agency (UNHCR) is currently undertaking an assessment to determine how many people are still displaced, and what their needs are.

The UN and international organizations know very little about the situation of those who have returned, as access to return areas is severely limited. There has been no comprehensive assessment looking at basic conditions or sustainability of return. Return monitoring is taking place in few communities, while secondary displacement goes largely unnoticed because of the lack of assessments. With winter coming, many returnees will need assistance. Livelihoods have been severely affected by the military offensive which destroyed crops before the harvest. Refugees International visited IDP families from Swat who went home, only to be displaced again. “We were receiving no assistance, were under curfew and have no jobs. We simply couldn’t stay,” a mother of six told Refugees International.

Many question the success of the military offensive and argue that districts affected are far from stable. Moreover, the expansion of the military offensive is uprooting more people. In Khyber agency, more than 10,000 families have been displaced in the past couple of months, while the offensive in South Waziristan, launched on October 17th, has already displaced 200,000 civilians, and threatens to uproot many more. Access to the displaced and other vulnerable civilians is an even bigger problem in these areas, as insecurity and government restrictions on movements impede humanitarian work.

The UN is currently working on a humanitarian appeal for 2010 that seeks to address the needs of actual and potential internally displaced people, returnees, and other vulnerable civilians affected by conflict. It is essential the U.S. and other international donors fully fund the appeal and provide separate funding for NGOs to work with the displaced and other affected groups. NGO response has been uneven until now, with most of the international attention focused on Swat district, resulting in 60 NGOs establishing programs there, while only a handful work in FATA. Donors must encourage aid groups to respond to all needs, irrespective of geographical origin or Pakistani government preferences.

While the internal conflict and the IDP crisis have been the focus of most donors, they should not forget that Pakistan is still hosting two million Afghan refugees, who will most likely never return to Afghanistan. The current security concerns in Pakistan have led to the scapegoating of Afghan refugees, and the Ministry of Interior has unsuccessfully lobbied the Pakistani government to send all Afghans back home.

Donor governments and international agencies must send a strong message of support to the government of Pakistan by reiterating their commitment to refugee protection and by fully funding the UN Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas (RAHA) project. Refugees International has been advocating for full funding of RAHA for the past year, which would allow for increased integration of Afghans and assistance for their host communities. The U.S. has only provided $2 million, whereas Europe plans to contribute more than twenty times this amount. Germany alone provided over €10 million. There is a current $60 million gap over five years, which the U.S. should commit to funding.

Provide Aid According to Need

The Pakistani government has been very reluctant to acknowledge the humanitarian toll the conflict has taken on civilians. Pakistan did not like the idea of the UN issuing a humanitarian appeal, and has refused to recognize the violence in the country as a civil conflict, fearing it would give legitimacy to insurgents. It also refused to talk about internally displaced people, preferring to use the term “dislocated” to circumvent its responsibilities under international humanitarian law.

The government has made some efforts to respond to humanitarian needs. Yet, The choice of retired General Farooq at first, then General Nadeem to coordinate tte relief efforts over the last six months, reflects the power of the military in Pakistan and its predominance over Pakistani civilian institutions. It also points to the lack of a national IDP policy and legislative framework that would determine which civilian institutions are in charge of responding to internal displacement and how the army should relate to the overall effort.

With the government in charge of responding to the needs of the victims of a conflict they are party to, assistance is often used as a tool to advance military or political objectives. The U.S and the UN must address this issue, and ensure that assistance is delivered based on needs, and protection of civilians takes precedence over military strategy.

The Pakistani government has coordinated registration of the displaced, which determines who is entitled to IDP status and assistance based on their area of origin, not on vulnerability. As a result, arbitrary and discriminatory decisions are made, leaving displaced families unable to access humanitarian assistance because they come from the wrong district. Refugees International interviewed a government official in Jalozai camp, near Peshawar, who told us that the displaced from Khyber could not register because there was no conflict there, just a “police operation,” and the government had not given civilians permission to leave. Meanwhile, the displaced from Khyber told us they left because of shelling of their villages and fear for their lives.

Aid agencies report discrimination against civilians who did not flee during the fighting, as the military considers them “collaborators” of the insurgents. The insistence that humanitarian organizations use government beneficiary lists to conduct distribution of aid has also been problematic. The government expelled The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from Swat in July in part for wanting to operate independently and conduct its own assessments.

According to a senior UN official, the government holds the view that civilians from certain areas, including those who fled, are “all insurgents who deserve to be punished.” Civilians from FATA are the primary victims of these policies, with aid groups reporting that wounded civilians are kept from leaving Khyber agency to go to Peshawar hospitals. As for the new military offensive in South Waziristan, the government’s strategy seems to be to cordon off the area, restrict civilian movements, and keep aid groups away. A major international aid organization was escorted out of D.I. Khan, Waziristan’s neighboring agency, when it tried to conduct an assessment there. A senior diplomat told Refugees International that in this “dirty war” it has waged, the government wants “to keep all ears and eyes away.” This is resulting in a policy of containment, with civilians kept from leaving, and only members of the Mehsud, the tribe of the insurgents, allowed to register as internally displaced people. NGOs also report being kept from distributing assistance to internally displaced people from South Waziristan.

The management of returns has also been problematic. Seen as part of a stabilization strategy, returns have been strongly encouraged by the government. On July 10th the government decided to organize returns on July 13th, and many question whether the returns were voluntary or safe. A major international organization conducted a survey in a camp in Swabi at the beginning of July, where 80% of respondents stated they wanted to return, but not anytime soon. Two weeks later, the camp was nearly empty. Refugees International interviewed displaced people from Swat who, to receive government assistance, had to sign a statement in English expressing their intention to return quickly. According to a UN official, about “a third of returns were not conforming to international principles.”

Support the UN Politically

The humanitarian community in Pakistan has had to make a difficult adjustment in the last few months. It has ramped up its presence considerably, sometimes to the detriment of the principles it professes to abide by. In particular, the United Nations finds itself in a tight spot. Up until recently, the UN was in Pakistan to help the country’s long-term socio-economic development. There was no Humanitarian Coordinator and no OCHA, while UNHCR was managing small programs for Afghan refugees.

In response to the displacement in NWFP, in just a few months humanitarian operations grew to half a billion dollars. With the Pakistani government legitimately taking the lead in the relief effort — through a civilian body at the provincial level but led by an active military general at the federal level — humanitarian actors have been forced to find a balance between outright collaboration with the government and opting out of the assistance framework, as with the ICRC and Médecins Sans Frontières. While the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) drafted operational guidelines which promoted impartial delivery of aid, this initiative was undermined by the lack of coherence in the operational approaches of the various humanitarian actors.

In particular, UN officials mention tensions inside the HCT because some agencies collaborate closely with the government. Food aid, which represents a third of the humanitarian appeal, is particularly contentious. The World Food Program (WFP) is said to have used government-drawn lists for its distributions, leaving out unregistered families and vulnerable families from designated non-conflict areas. Many aid organizations express concerns over policy decisions that clearly prioritize political and military objectives over humanitarian considerations, but see the ability to deliver aid to a segment of the population as a more acceptable option than refusing to operate. The UN needs greater operational coherence, but also greater support from the U.S. and the international community to respond to the current crisis more effectively.

The recent appointment of Jean-Maurice Ripert as Special Envoy for Assistance to Pakistan is positive. His role in coordinating the humanitarian, recovery and reconstruction needs will be critical, especially in ensuring predictable funding in the coming months. However, his role should not be confined to donor relations. Mr. Ripert will need to liaise with the Humanitarian Coordinator and address problems with the relief operation with both the international community and the government of Pakistan. His experience and position within the UN give him the necessary political clout to access high ranking Pakistani officials and express concerns from the humanitarian community and the UN. His first task should be to help depoliticize the aid efforts, and underscore the importance of responding to the needs of all vulnerable Pakistanis. Mr. Ripert, to be successful, will need the full backing of the international community, the U.S. in particular.

Show U.S. Concern for Protection of Civilians

President Obama just signed into law a bill authorizing $7.5 billion in non-military assistance to Pakistan over the next five years. The “Kerry-Lugar” bill has been controversial in Pakistan because of its conditions on military assistance, which Pakistanis both in and out of government view as infringing on the country’s sovereignty. The opposition to the bill is fanning the flames of anti-western sentiments in Pakistan — a mix of nationalism, resentment of American drone attacks, fear of American military intervention and mistrust of the UN. The U.S. will need to communicate clearly and repeatedly what its objectives are, in particular when it comes to this new development money.

Ambassador Richard Holbrooke’s announced intention to channel U.S. aid money through Pakistani organizations and the Pakistani government has generated tensions within USAID and in the U.S. development community. The discussions center on the capacity of Pakistani institutions to manage large grants and respect high transparency and accountability standards. Ambassador Holbrooke’s objective to strengthen the civilian government and empower Pakistani organizations is important, but sequencing is crucial. The handing over of U.S.-funded projects to Pakistani institutions should be done carefully and be closely monitored. It must be recognized, however, that the reliance on U.S.-based organizations brings with it high transaction costs, the inability to access insecure areas, and the complications of further subcontracting to Pakistani organizations. Much of the current resentment towards Ambassador Holbrooke’s plan can be reduced by better communication and coordination between the State Department, USAID and Congress.

The U.S. has encouraged the Pakistani army’s crackdown on Taliban militants, and the country remains a top foreign policy priority for the Obama administration. While U.S. humanitarian assistance was forthcoming and generous during the summer, it is important that the U.S. lends its political weight on ensuring the protection of civilians. In particular it should ensure that relief assistance is provided to vulnerable individuals and that they receive protection from the Pakistani government, regardless of their geographic origin or allegiances. It should ensure the UN has the independence to assess where and how it should work, and in particular that food distributions are delinked from government lists.

In the medium term, the Pakistani government should develop a national policy for internal displacement, ensuring a clear chain of command and responsibility at federal and provincial levels. The establishment of ad-hoc governmental bodies leads at times to conflicting policies and discrimination in the provision of assistance. The U.S. can play a positive role by pointing to the provisions of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and legislative models in other countries. Both can be used as a basis to ensure the protection of displaced families.

Local and international civil society groups have documented human rights abuses on the part of the Pakistani military, including forced enrollment into lashkar militia, torture and extra-judicial killings. The U.S. should encourage international human rights monitoring through the hospices of Walter Kälin, Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The OHCHR should have a permanent presence in Pakistan and should tap into the work of the Pakistani human rights community – so as to bring their investigative work to international attention.

Conclusion

The current operating environment for humanitarian agencies in Pakistan is difficult.
The recent bombing of the WFP offices in Islamabad is just the latest attack on the humanitarian community. It is an unjustifiable act, which will only hamper the effective delivery of aid.

With humanitarian organizations under siege, donor governments have repeatedly failed to provide them the requisite political support. To avoid further disrupting relations with a key ally in the war on terror, the U.S. and the European Union have not insisted that humanitarian aid be provided to the most vulnerable and they have remained silent in the face of discrimination in the provision of assistance and reports of human rights abuses by the Pakistani military. If the goal is to earn the allegiance of the population, this is a mistake. Enabling humanitarian organizations to provide relief impartially is not only principled, but may prove to be good politics as well.

 

[Javed3]

Nobody in mainstream Pakistan cares about the plight of refugees. The tribal s rank pretty low on the list of priorities. They are treated as "terrorist sympathizers". Even Red Cross and UNHCR cannot set camps in the Army operation areas.

 

[Skeptic]

Refugees see Waziristan operation as pointless

DERA ISMAIL KHAN: Fed up and disillusioned, Sharaf Khan says he has lived in misery for years, a pawn between Taliban gangs and the Pakistani military whose previous offensives ended in stalemate.



‘There is no likelihood of this operation being a success. It’s just for show,’ said the 45-year-old shepherd, whose family’s meagre belongings are crammed into a minivan.



‘We have spent the last four or five years living in misery. As far as we are concerned, neither the army nor Taliban are any good.’ Khan, married with an 18-month-old child, was speaking after an exhausting three-day journey with his family across mountain paths to circumvent army checkpoints, road closures and night-time curfews.



He is one of at least 110,500 people who have fled South Waziristan where the army launched a massive operation that Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani says is poised to deliver a ‘decisive blow’ against the Islamist insurgents.



But those who have been caught up in previous military pushes in Pakistan’s lawless tribal belt, which lies outside direct government control and has a fierce warrior culture, are sceptical.



‘It seems like a drama whose characters are troops and Taliban but we are the one who really do suffer in this situation,’ said Aamanullah Mehsud, a father of six children.



The 55-year-old farmer, who comes from the Kanigurram region, a Taliban stronghold of South Waziristan, said he had fled with 15 family members.



‘There was very heavy bombardment in our area. Children were crying because the sound was deafening,’ he said.



Those who make it to Dera Ismail Khan, which neighbours Waziristan, try to stuff as much as they can into the pickup trucks and minivans that ferry them to safety.



As well as wooden cots, bedding and cooking utensils, some have even brought their goats and chicken with them.



Every vehicle had 12-14 passengers crammed inside, most of them women and children.



Many complained of pain and exhaustion after having had to cover part of their journey by foot. Others picked up stomach bugs after having no option but to drink muddy water.



The journey between the towns of Jandola and Tank should normally take six hours but the army closed the main road and Tank itself is under curfew.



Mohammad Yasin, another farmer who has made it to Dera Ismail Khan from Kanigurram, said his journey with 14 relatives — including five children — had taken three days.



Limping from the injuries he suffered in a bombing raid in 2004, Yasin said fellow villagers were wounded in front of his eyes as a result of air strikes.



‘People from our village hired six vehicles and the jets started bombing soon after we left. Two vehicles in front of us were totally destroyed. We saw wounded people and we were told 11 people died.



‘Military operations have never been successful in the area. If they want success they need local help but the people do not support the offensive.’ Trying to sow division, the military air-dropped leaflets urging Taliban chief Hakimullah Mehsud’s own tribe to rise up and fight alongside the army.



‘The aim of the army is to provide an opportunity to the Mehsud tribe to live in peace and tranquility,’ said the flyers.



But rather than stay to fight, large numbers are leaving the war zone to seek shelter with relatives or in rented accommodation.



Pakistani and UN officials say 110,500 people have fled South Waziristan since August. But Gul Afzal Afridi, district police officer in Dera Ismail Khan, believes the number is up to 150,000.



For the moment he expects them to head back to their villages when there is some respite.



‘We have no plan to set up camps because these people do not want to live in camps,’ he told.

 

[Skeptic]

Neglected hearts and minds

Operation Rah-i-Nijat, ‘the path to deliverance’ is the name given to the military operation in South Waziristan. But as the military makes inroads in the tribal area, evoking a spirit of redemption amongst the locals seems to be the most challenging aspect.

As military troops enter a decisive battle in the heart of the Taliban stronghold, over 120,000 locals have been forced to flee their houses. The exodus is not expected to be as big as that from Swat since the population of the tribal agency is nearly half that of the Malakand division. Still, prompt actions need to be taken.

It is important to note that the differences between the humanitarian crises in Malakand and Waziristan are significant, and involve more than just a numbers game. With the Rah-i-Rast operation in Swat, the military was aided by local lashkars in their fight against insurgents who had occupied the valley. In Waziristan, however, the military is not expected to enjoy local support, which makes things more challenging. Unlike Swat, where militants were outsiders to begin with, the Taliban in Waziristan are amongst the local Mehsud tribe, making things far more complex.

For that reason, the military’s fight in Waziristan will have to go well beyond warfare. It will not only be about battling militants, but also winning the hearts of the locals. In an early gesture to counter Taliban propaganda and win hearts and minds, leaflets – both in Urdu and Pashto – containing a message from the Chief of Army Staff were dropped in Mehsud areas. The purpose was to clarify that the army’s war is not against the Mehsud tribe, but against the Taliban in particular. The pamphlets stated:

The aim of current military operation is not to attack proud and patriotic Mehsud but it is to save them from the clutches of ruthless terrorists who have destroyed peace of the whole region.

The message speaks volumes about the mindset of the locals in Waziristan and the challenges in store for the Pakistan government and military.

These initial attempts by the army to distinguish between Taliban militants and ordinary Mehsud tribesmen have not been too effective, though, and the people fleeing from Waziristan appear to be disillusioned by the ongoing operation. Despite reassurances, the locals still feel that their background immediately provokes discrimination. According to reports, most of the IDPs fleeing Waziristan have alleged discrimination by the authorities and say they are being coldly received as compared to those who fled from Swat. The attitude the tribal displaced are encountering is no doubt humiliating and unwelcoming.

For their part, the authorities justify the strict treatment of refugees by pointing to intelligence reports accusing the majority of the locals of being supportive of the Taliban. The fear of Taliban sneaking out of the tribal area with the displaced locals is higher than ever before. As a result, the IDP camps are not a friendly abode. Most of those fleeing Waziristan are thus refusing to stay in camps, and are renting houses, a decision that makes them vulnerable to security checks (for example, they have been asked to provide adequate paper work as guarantees).

Alarmingly, the anti-Taliban locals are not very hopeful about the operation. Popular belief amongst them pits the army operation as a ‘power show,’ rather than a significant step towards eliminating the Taliban. Forced to evacuate their homes and suffer ill-treatment at the hands of security personnel for a mission that they do not fully believe in makes the IDPs of Waziristan particularly vulnerable to Taliban recruitment.

The fact is, the attitude of the authorities and the public at large towards the Mehsuds is one of caution and fear more than sympathy and concern. Such prejudice only bolsters the Taliban agenda, fueling recruitment from among Mehsud ranks. But the war cannot be won if the Waziristan locals show indifference towards the need for combating Taliban and their infrastructure. Without winning the hearts of the people, the military’s victory will only be temporary. If we want this to be a ‘decisive blow,’ we have to overcome our insecurities and let sympathy overcome prejudice.

 

[Elmo]

It's quite sad that till now refugee camps have not been set up in DI Khan or Tank. Shoddy governance