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Pakistan’s foreign policy dilemma keeps getting complicated
Salman Rafi, June 11, 2017
A pentagon report has claimed that China is seeking to build military bases in Pakistan as part of its global military expansion, seeking to translate its economic resources into strategic outposts in the Indian Ocean.
While China has officially rejected this report, there is no gainsaying that China, as the leaked original plan of China-Pakistan-Economic Corridor (CPEC) shows, is gradually expanding its presence and influence in countries that have tapped into Beijing’s billion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
However, notwithstanding what China is planning or not planning to do, for countries like Pakistan CPEC presents an opportunity that they want to use to improve their regional standing. However, at the same time, an absence of coherent and clear foreign policy is turning this opportunity into a liability and hindering, rather than enabling, Pakistan’s outreach to its neighbours such as Afghanistan and Iran.
As it stands, Pakistan’s relations with all of its territorial neighbours, save China, are either hostile or far from normal. If we extend the conundrum to the Middle East, particularly the Arab world, Pakistan’s remains caught not only between the schism between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but also between Saudi Arabia and Qatar as well.
While officials from Pakistan’s foreign office continue to make up-beat claims about using the CPEC for greater regional connectivity—an idea nothing short of a potential foreign policy tool—Pakistan’s foreign policy orientation remains conspicuously devoid of application of CPEC as such. Thanks to Pakistan’s inability to chalk out an independent course of action!
Nothing perhaps better illustrates this absence that the recent rift Pakistan had had to face with Iran, which is then deeply rooted in Pakistan’s engagement with Saudia led Islamic Military Alliance (IMA), an explicitly anti-Iran coalition, comprising “Sunni world.”
While Pakistan’s civil and military establishment remains elusive about the precise nature of Pakistan’s involvement in the said alliance, within Pakistan’s political circles, questions are already being raised about the feasibility of becoming a part of an alliance which is explicitly seeking to “isolate” Iran, making Iran a self-inflicted wound for Pakistan.
Its latest manifestation came when the upper-house of the parliament recently raised this question and went on to impress on the government to recall former Pakistan Army chief Raheel Sharif in response to burgeoning anti-Iranian sentiments, blowing the Arab world into parts as the latest schism between Saudi Arab and Qatar has emphatically established.
The internal schism and Pakistan’s response to it have once again exposed the direction-less foreign policy as well as Pakistan’s inability to steer a sound course in a power-struggle that involves not only Saudi Arabi and Qatar, but also Iran, and to a considerable extent, Israel as well.
That is to say, the roots of Saudia-Qatar bi-lateral tussle goes a lot deeper than mere accusations of sponsoring terrorism. The fact that Saudi Arabia was led to impose sanctions on Iran in the aftermath of Qatar’s official news agency showing Qatari emir’s pro-Iran speech signifies how the former is building strategic momentum, involving Washington, in the region to force countries like Qatar to narrow down the focus of their relations with Iran. Indeed, Saudi Arabia is building on the anti-Iran momentum that Donald Trump had built during his campaign as presidential candidate and has, since then, carried on as the president, reaching its culmination in his “isolationist speech” during the US-Arab summit recently held in Saudi Arabia.
In this context, the crucial question Pakistan is facing is: could Saudi Arabia be led to put similar sort of pressure on Pakistan to force it to redefine its relation both with Iran and Qatar?
Pakistan has deep ties with Qatar, ties that extend to the ruling families of both countries. Besides it, there are two major aspects of bi-lateral relations.
Pakistan is currently importing Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from Qatar. This import is a result of an agreement, signed in February 2016, according to which Pakistan is to import at least 35 million tons of LNG in 15 years at the rate of 13.35% of Brent crude oil.
Besides it, Qatar’s religious involvement is not insignificant as well. According to Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior report for 2013-2014 regarding madrassas receiving foreign money, 21 out of a total of 39 were funded from Qatar, seven from Dubai, three from Saudi Arabia, one from Bahrain and one from Hong Kong. Interestingly, the report did not mention numerous mosques that were financed from Saudi Arabia and play the same role as madrassas.
Not only is it limiting Pakistan’s options with regard to adopting a course whereby it can maintain a balance between the rival factions within the ‘Sunni coalition” and between the “Sunni-Shia” groups, but also forcing upon Pakistan a scenario whereby it can least flex its ‘CPEC muscle’ to redefine its relations with countries like Iran and Afghanistan, who have expressed their willingness to be a part of CPEC and BRI but have so far stopped short of making strong commitments—a situation that can partly be attributed to Pakistan’s inability to chart out a rational and independent course of action.
This situation is further rooted in the fact that, in the words of Pakistan’s famous author Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan have never told the common man the real story about their strategic bond with Riyadh and their responsibility in the relationship which is one of the reasons why the common perception of the Kingdom is that of a country exporting radicalism and terrorism to Pakistan and South Asia.”
Therefore, the crucial question for Pakistan is of how to manage itself out of the crisis it has found itself in the middle of? Merely maintaining a “neutral” stance is meaningless and likely to add more complexity to the foreign policy conundrum, for Pakistan’s participation in the Saudi led IMA implies in unambiguous terms Pakistan’s pro-Saudia strategic orientation—something that countries like Iran and Qatar are absolutely aware of.
This has to be changed if Pakistan wants to utilise its CPEC clout to better its regional standing as the hub of economics and trade to and from China and West Asia.
Salman Rafi Sheikh is an independent journalist based in Pakistan. His areas of interest include politics of terrorism, global war on terror, ethno-national conflicts, foreign policies of major powers, application and consequences.
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/06/11/pakistans-foreign-policy-dilemma-keeps-getting-complicated/
Salman Rafi, June 11, 2017
A pentagon report has claimed that China is seeking to build military bases in Pakistan as part of its global military expansion, seeking to translate its economic resources into strategic outposts in the Indian Ocean.
While China has officially rejected this report, there is no gainsaying that China, as the leaked original plan of China-Pakistan-Economic Corridor (CPEC) shows, is gradually expanding its presence and influence in countries that have tapped into Beijing’s billion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
However, notwithstanding what China is planning or not planning to do, for countries like Pakistan CPEC presents an opportunity that they want to use to improve their regional standing. However, at the same time, an absence of coherent and clear foreign policy is turning this opportunity into a liability and hindering, rather than enabling, Pakistan’s outreach to its neighbours such as Afghanistan and Iran.
As it stands, Pakistan’s relations with all of its territorial neighbours, save China, are either hostile or far from normal. If we extend the conundrum to the Middle East, particularly the Arab world, Pakistan’s remains caught not only between the schism between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but also between Saudi Arabia and Qatar as well.
While officials from Pakistan’s foreign office continue to make up-beat claims about using the CPEC for greater regional connectivity—an idea nothing short of a potential foreign policy tool—Pakistan’s foreign policy orientation remains conspicuously devoid of application of CPEC as such. Thanks to Pakistan’s inability to chalk out an independent course of action!
Nothing perhaps better illustrates this absence that the recent rift Pakistan had had to face with Iran, which is then deeply rooted in Pakistan’s engagement with Saudia led Islamic Military Alliance (IMA), an explicitly anti-Iran coalition, comprising “Sunni world.”
While Pakistan’s civil and military establishment remains elusive about the precise nature of Pakistan’s involvement in the said alliance, within Pakistan’s political circles, questions are already being raised about the feasibility of becoming a part of an alliance which is explicitly seeking to “isolate” Iran, making Iran a self-inflicted wound for Pakistan.
Its latest manifestation came when the upper-house of the parliament recently raised this question and went on to impress on the government to recall former Pakistan Army chief Raheel Sharif in response to burgeoning anti-Iranian sentiments, blowing the Arab world into parts as the latest schism between Saudi Arab and Qatar has emphatically established.
The internal schism and Pakistan’s response to it have once again exposed the direction-less foreign policy as well as Pakistan’s inability to steer a sound course in a power-struggle that involves not only Saudi Arabi and Qatar, but also Iran, and to a considerable extent, Israel as well.
That is to say, the roots of Saudia-Qatar bi-lateral tussle goes a lot deeper than mere accusations of sponsoring terrorism. The fact that Saudi Arabia was led to impose sanctions on Iran in the aftermath of Qatar’s official news agency showing Qatari emir’s pro-Iran speech signifies how the former is building strategic momentum, involving Washington, in the region to force countries like Qatar to narrow down the focus of their relations with Iran. Indeed, Saudi Arabia is building on the anti-Iran momentum that Donald Trump had built during his campaign as presidential candidate and has, since then, carried on as the president, reaching its culmination in his “isolationist speech” during the US-Arab summit recently held in Saudi Arabia.
In this context, the crucial question Pakistan is facing is: could Saudi Arabia be led to put similar sort of pressure on Pakistan to force it to redefine its relation both with Iran and Qatar?
Pakistan has deep ties with Qatar, ties that extend to the ruling families of both countries. Besides it, there are two major aspects of bi-lateral relations.
Pakistan is currently importing Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from Qatar. This import is a result of an agreement, signed in February 2016, according to which Pakistan is to import at least 35 million tons of LNG in 15 years at the rate of 13.35% of Brent crude oil.
Besides it, Qatar’s religious involvement is not insignificant as well. According to Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior report for 2013-2014 regarding madrassas receiving foreign money, 21 out of a total of 39 were funded from Qatar, seven from Dubai, three from Saudi Arabia, one from Bahrain and one from Hong Kong. Interestingly, the report did not mention numerous mosques that were financed from Saudi Arabia and play the same role as madrassas.
Not only is it limiting Pakistan’s options with regard to adopting a course whereby it can maintain a balance between the rival factions within the ‘Sunni coalition” and between the “Sunni-Shia” groups, but also forcing upon Pakistan a scenario whereby it can least flex its ‘CPEC muscle’ to redefine its relations with countries like Iran and Afghanistan, who have expressed their willingness to be a part of CPEC and BRI but have so far stopped short of making strong commitments—a situation that can partly be attributed to Pakistan’s inability to chart out a rational and independent course of action.
This situation is further rooted in the fact that, in the words of Pakistan’s famous author Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan have never told the common man the real story about their strategic bond with Riyadh and their responsibility in the relationship which is one of the reasons why the common perception of the Kingdom is that of a country exporting radicalism and terrorism to Pakistan and South Asia.”
Therefore, the crucial question for Pakistan is of how to manage itself out of the crisis it has found itself in the middle of? Merely maintaining a “neutral” stance is meaningless and likely to add more complexity to the foreign policy conundrum, for Pakistan’s participation in the Saudi led IMA implies in unambiguous terms Pakistan’s pro-Saudia strategic orientation—something that countries like Iran and Qatar are absolutely aware of.
This has to be changed if Pakistan wants to utilise its CPEC clout to better its regional standing as the hub of economics and trade to and from China and West Asia.
Salman Rafi Sheikh is an independent journalist based in Pakistan. His areas of interest include politics of terrorism, global war on terror, ethno-national conflicts, foreign policies of major powers, application and consequences.
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/06/11/pakistans-foreign-policy-dilemma-keeps-getting-complicated/
