Dealing with the Taliban
It seems that we are in a no win situation vis-a-vis taliban probelm. I don't see any real solution in hand. The following article in today's Dawn may be of interest to fellow members. Mr Najmuddin Sheikh was foriegn secretary in Benazirs governmnet.
By Najmuddin A. Shaikh
WHAT should one make of the fact that a New York Times story accusing the ISI of ââ¬Åencouragingââ¬Â the Taliban ââ¬Åif not sponsoring themââ¬Â appeared 10 days after the director of US National Intelligence, John Negroponte, in a congressional appearance, said: ââ¬ÅMany of our most important interests intersect in Pakistan, where the Taliban and Al Qaeda maintain critical sanctuariesââ¬Â?
He said, ââ¬ÅPakistan is our partner in the war on terror and has captured several Al Qaeda leaders. However, it is also a major source of Islamic extremism. Eliminating the safe haven that the Taliban and other extremists have found in Pakistanââ¬â¢s tribal areas is not sufficient to end the insurgency in Afghanistan but it is necessary.ââ¬Â
It comes three days after the new US defence secretary, Robert Gates, visited Afghanistan and while acknowledging that Pakistan was a ââ¬Åstrong American ally in the war on terrorââ¬Â, maintained there was a ââ¬Åproblemââ¬Â in Pakistanââ¬â¢s border areas, that ââ¬ÅAl Qaeda networksââ¬Â were ââ¬Åoperating on the Pakistan sideââ¬Â. He said that the US needed to ââ¬Åwork with Pakistanââ¬Â so that violence and attacks from within its borders could be lessened.
It comes after reporters accompanying Gates to Afghanistan received a briefing from the local US commander, Lt. Gen Eikenberry stating that in Afghanistan the number of suicide attacks had increased from 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006, remotely detonated bombings more than doubled from 783 to 1,677, and armed attacks nearly tripled from 1,558 to 4,542.
It comes after the Afghan put out a video recording of a captured Taliban spokesman known as Mohammad Hanif stating that Mulla Omar was based in Quetta under the protection of the ISI.
The timing is important because Carlotta Gall, the author of the story, also wrote another one that was put on the website on the same day by the same newspaper detailing the hooliganism to which she and her photographer were subjected by persons she believed were Pakistani intelligence agents.
For many in the West and indeed elsewhere in the world a physical assault on a woman journalist would perhaps be regarded as more damning of Pakistan than the material contained in the story itself. But for the purpose of the point being made here, it is apparent from the second article that Ms Gall had completed all the interviews and the research for the story in Quetta by December 19, the day on which she was assaulted and presumably made to leave.
It is also likely that she informed her publishers and US officials of what had transpired and what had prompted the assault. Why then did this story appear only one month after Ms Gall had left the scene so to speak? Was it because even the notoriously independent New York Times can sometimes be persuaded to hold back a story so that the maximum impact could be ensured at a later date?
Perhaps I am being unfair to Ms Gall. Perhaps she was really continuing her research in Islamabad and in Afghanistan or in the archives from which she probably retrieved the information that in September last Gen Jones the then supreme commander of Nato forces had told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Quetta ââ¬Åremained the headquarters of the Talibanââ¬Â.
Perhaps she was interviewing our minister of state for information, Tariq Azeem, who denied that the Taliban leadership is based in Quetta and said that if there are Taliban in Quetta they are few and ââ¬Åyou can count them on your fingersââ¬Â.
Whatever the motivation or the reason for the delayed publication of this story there is no doubt that it provided colourful if anecdotal corroboration for the charges laid by American officials and largely undid whatever little comfort the commander of Nato forces, Gen David Richards, had provided by acknowledging Pakistanââ¬â¢s role in the elimination of Taliban leader Osmani and in the reduction in violence that had been noted in Afghanistan at least by this Nato commander.
We should note in this context that the UN teamââ¬â¢s report on Afghanistan late last year held maladministration and corruption largely responsible for the mess in which Afghanistan finds itself. We should note that alongside Negroponteââ¬â¢s testimony there was also testimony by Gen Michael Maples of the Defence Intelligence Agency who pointed out that ââ¬ÅNearly five years after the Talibanââ¬â¢s fall, many Afghans expected the situation to be better by now and are beginning to blame President (Hamid) Karzai for the lack of greater progress.ââ¬Â
We should also note that the video confession of the captured Taliban spokesman can hardly carry any weight when he is not put before the international media and asked to answer their questions, the more so when a Christian Science Monitor reporter recalls that the same man had denied to him in an earlier interview that Mulla Omar was in Pakistan.
The issue, however, is not about how well-documented or valid these allegations are. It is that not only do the Americans believe that the Taliban are being sheltered but more and more of them and their Nato colleagues are holding Pakistan responsible at least in part for the casualties that Nato forces are suffering in Afghanistan.
It is not realistic to assume that these casualties will cause the Americans and their more resolute allies to abandon Afghanistan. It is probable that the Democrat-dominated Congress will use its power to force a revision of the policy in Iraq but will back fully the effort to stabilise Afghanistan and this region since they, like Negroponte, believe that it is a major source of Islamic extremism.
The Americans, from their perspective, have made every effort to secure and applaud Pakistani cooperation. According to the figures that the Americans have put out, Pakistan receives, in addition to the yearly $600 million promised in foreign aid, a sum of $80 million a month for the facilities that are provided to the Americans.
They have tried to direct assistance towards the tribal areas and towards the education sector as part of their contribution to eliminate the menace of extremism. They have waived and will continue to waive the provisions of American law, albeit on the basis of an annual presidential certification that prohibits the provision of assistance to countries where there has been a military takeover. They have sought to avoid making public the concerns on the basis of which they are dissatisfied with the effort Pakistan has made against the Taliban.
We should now read the Negroponte assessment and the subsequent statements by Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as indicating that the administration may not be able to find support even within its own ranks for continuing this approach. This is a serious development and we should regard it as such.
Much more important is the question of what we who put ââ¬ÅPakistan firstââ¬Â want to do for our own well-being. If we are thinking of bringing back moderation and tolerance in Pakistanââ¬â¢s polity we have to have zero tolerance for those who preach the violent ideology of the Taliban or who risk Pakistanââ¬â¢s safety by undertaking or encouraging adventures abroad in the name of jihad.
This means that we should not tolerate the presence of any foreign Taliban fighters or recruiters on our soil. Tariq Azeem said that the number of Taliban in Quetta can be counted on oneââ¬â¢s fingers. Whatever their number they should be apprehended and deported.
Given an opportunity to refute the NYT charges in an interview with the Washington Post, Pakistan military spokesman Maj. Gen Shaukat Sultan said that ââ¬ÅWe donââ¬â¢t deny the Taliban come and go, but that is not the entire truth.ââ¬Â He said, ââ¬ÅIf 25 per cent of the problem lies on our side of the border, 75 per cent of it lies on the Afghan side.ââ¬Â
There is no denying the truth of this. It would certainly help if the Afghans were able to tackle the 75 per cent of the problem that lies on their side but they seem to be incapable of doing so. However, this does not mean that we cannot or should not make every effort to eliminate the 25 per cent on our side.
How do we do this? We must now remove from our soil the refugee camps in which the Taliban find refuge, as Gen Sultan said, when they come across the border for rest and recreation. Even if they are not sanctuaries for the Taliban we must remove them because we know that these refugees have been there since the days of Ziaul Haq and are a disturbing element in Pakistanââ¬â¢s domestic polity. They have been used in the past, and will be used in the future to reinforce reactionary and extremist trends in the country and as ââ¬Åmulesââ¬Â for narcotics trafficking. They have been and will continue to be competitors for jobs in areas of Pakistan where jobs are scarce.
We must also control movement across our border. The biometric system must stay in force and be implemented whether the Afghans like it or nor. We must not be intimidated by mob demonstrations or Afghan protests and we must extend it from Chaman to Torkham and all other border points.
We have a Pakistan Taliban problem. Gen Sultan identified Baitullah Mehsud, a Pakistani tribal, as a top Taliban leader. Mehsud is a Pakistani and therefore our problem. Given the current temper in the tribal areas it is clearly not a problem that can be solved by the use of force. Making agreements with the tribal influentials to win peace is a good idea even if some of the influentials are Taliban or Taliban supporters.
But such agreements are worthwhile only if the peace so won is used to commence the sort of political and developmental activity that can erode the Taliban base of support, and rebuild the authority of the administration and of the traditional tribal maliks and that is our declared policy.
So far there is little to show by way of political or economic activity in the tribal areas. By all accounts the only politicians that have free access to the area are representatives of the religious parties. This must change. It must be recognised that in the course of our chequered history, we have deliberately and as a matter of policy fostered fanaticism in the area. We did so successfully because plenty of resources were made available. Now we have to reverse the results of past efforts and do so even if resources are lacking. Resources, however, will be forthcoming if a coherent plan is formulated and speedily implemented.
The writer is a former foreign secretary
http://www.dawn.com/2007/01/24/op.htm
