why we negotiated with these low life suckerz in the first place, is beyond me. we could have easily wiped the floor with these loosers, numerically they hardly pose a threat.
Will Fata’s truce succeed?
By Zeenia Satti
ISLAMABAD’S well-intentioned truce with the militants in the NWFP and Fata is headed for an inevitable crash. Prime Minister Syed Raza Gilani’s assertion that, unlike the past, the current truce would hold because it is carried out by an elected government is a shallow, state-centric approach to a complex problem with interstate dimensions.
The problem of militancy in the NWFP is not of Pakistan’s own making. Therefore, Pakistan does not have the strategic capacity to curb it unilaterally. It is a direct consequence of General Tommy Franks and Rumsfeld’s strategic vision called Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). After 9/11, when the Pentagon was devising its strategy for OEF, which was ostensibly based on an examination of the enemy’s current situation and the history of military operations in Afghanistan, its generals were clearly aware of the fact that Fata and adjacent areas in Pakistan could harbour an enduring insurgency against Kabul.
An elaborately planned infrastructure was laid for the purpose from 1979-89 in Pakistan’s areas bordering Afghanistan with the collaboration of the Central Intelligence Agency which had provided sanctuary to the Afghan insurgents against the Soviets. Later, it functioned as an organisational base for the Taliban.
Many families in Fata have their members in the Afghan Taliban party. The intent of the OEF mission was to decimate the Al Qaeda as well as the Taliban, instead of overthrowing the latter. That is why hundreds of Taliban were massacred while in custody as prisoners of war after they surrendered to the Northern Alliance and General Franks’ forces in Nov 2001.
A commander’s job is to assess his enemies’ strength and weakness at both political (strategic) and military (tactical) levels and devise his plan accordingly. Given the cross-border strategic assets of the Pakhtun Taliban, General Franks should have demanded that Pakistan seal its border with Afghanistan prior to the launching of OEF and should have helped the Pakistan Army monitor the border with the help of the latest technology in addition to traditional check posts.
The argument that the border cannot be sealed because of the terrain is untenable. Present-day technology allows the fencing of the mountainous Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Given what 9/11 portends for the US, allocating a budget for UAV monitoring of the sealed border was a strategic necessity. History will debate as to why General Franks and Rumsfeld did not devise a Pakistan-Afghanistan border control strategy prior to commencing OEF.
As a direct consequence of this oversight, instead of decimating terrorism in Afghanistan, an expanded regional version of it has been created and Pakistan has been engulfed in it. We now have the following situation. Having pushed the Taliban into Pakistan instead of destroying them, the US does not want to negotiate peace with them. Washington is relying on the Pakistan military to serve Pentagon as its regional extension and decimate the Taliban for it. Given the support structure that has traditionally operated for the Taliban in Fata and the NWFP, Pakistan’s war on the Afghan Taliban has zero local support within the NWFP. America’s bad publicity in Iraq has turned this lack of support into violent hostility over time.
Because the Pakistan military itself propelled the Taliban in Kabul, its soldiers are psychologically reluctant to engage in mass killing of the latter. The last time the soldiers’ reluctance based upon cultural norms was pushed to the wall by a foreign force in the region was in Meerut in 1856-57. It became the genesis of a widespread mutiny in the Indian army against the British East India Company in 1857, ending its direct rule.
The Al Qaeda, we are told, is in Fata. Although
this claim was denied by Musharraf prior to the February election and has no other source as its origin than the US military intelligence, Fata’s socio-political environment renders this assertion plausible.
US refusal to negotiate with even the anti-Al Qaeda Taliban has fostered a strategic alliance between the Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
Given this ground reality, Pakistan’s peace deal with the Fata militants and the latter’s pledge to expel foreign militants is toothless because the control of the entire gamut of violence lies with the US that is convinced that the fountainhead of the Afghan insurgency and international terrorism is inside Fata. The US cannot comb Fata in a house-to-house search to satisfy itself of the veracity of Fata militants’ pledge to Islamabad.
Due to force protection considerations, the US and Nato have preferred aerial bombardment to engagement at ground troop level which is a requirement for combating insurgencies. This is the reason they are producing a high rate of civilian casualties and losing the battles in Afghanistan. This is also the reason they are increasingly looking to the Pakistan Army to do their work for them.
Because the Afghan insurgency is decentralised, the US has no high-profile target for bombing. If Islamabad withdraws forces from Fata without including the US in the peace plan, Fata becomes America’s target serving a dual purpose; a showing for the new commander General Petraeus and a boost for the John McCain election campaign. Unless engaged in a peace-making process right now, General Petraeus would be driven to extensive bombardment of Fata. Should he do so, the peace deal will blow up in Gilani’s face, making his government look too effete to walk the talk once again, after it met a similar fate in the matter of restoration of law in the country.
Therefore, it is vital that the matter of peace be handled with the involvement of the US. Seizing the opportunity provided by Nato’s strategic vision statement of April 3 in Bucharest which prioritised political measures for Afghanistan, Islamabad should launch a diplomatic campaign in all 40 ISAF states, seeking multilateral commitment to its peace plan. The plan should involve General Dan McNeil, General Petraeus and Hamid Karzai, in addition to the Taliban and Fata militants.
Taliban who are not allied with the Al Qaeda are no threat to the US or Europe. Taliban’s political ideology is the mirror image of the ideology of the House of Saud, Washington’s long-standing ally. The main goal of collaboration for peace should be the capturing of the Al Qaeda leadership. Pakistan should seek a multilateral politico-military effort for this objective. Due to the upcoming US and Afghan elections, a change of US military command and European weariness with the Afghan war, the international environment for seeking such cooperation is propitious.
The writer is an independent consultant and analyst of energy geopolitics based in Washington DC
zeenia.satti@yahoo.com
DAWN - Opinion; May 21, 2008