Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and the bin Laden raid

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ref:Afghan Journal | Analysis & Opinion | Reuters.com

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Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and the bin Laden raidMay 15, 2011 04:50 BST
inShare.nuclear deterrent | Osama bin Laden | Pakistan | U.S. Special Forces

In conducting a raid deep inside Pakistan to take out Osama bin Laden, the United States pushed the boundaries of military operations, inter-state ties and international law, all of which are the subject of a raging debate in the region and beyond.

One of the less talked-about issues is that the boots-on-ground operation by the U.S. Special Forces also blows a hole in a long-held argument that states which have nuclear weapons, legitimately or otherwise, face a lower chance of a foreign strike or invasion than those without them. Thus the United States didn’t think twice before going into Afghanistan within weeks of the September 11 attacks or striking against Libya now because there was no nuclear threat lurking at the back of the mind. Even Iraq was a tempting target because it was not known to have a well-established nuclear arsenal although the whole point of the invasion was that it had weapons of mass destruction. That only turned out to be untrue.

And conversely there is a belief that the United States or some of the other Western powers wouldn’t take on North Korea because of the nuclear weapons it holds. It is simply too dangerous and even in the case of Iran those who favour action say the time to do it is now while it is still developing the weapons, not when it has completed the programme.

But the May 2 raid in a compound in a Pakistani garrison town tests that logic and shows the limits of nuclear deterrence, as Elbridge Colby, who served recently in the office of the U.S. Defense Secretary on START negotiations wrote in Real Clear World’s Compass blog. Pakistan has a powerful nuclear arsenal, growing at a rate that will make it the fourth-largest in a decade behind only the United States, Russia and China. It has the delivery systems, both missiles and aircraft, to fire these weapons and a huge professional army to support the nuclear programme. Yet all that nuclear infrastructure did not stop the United States from breaching its air space, inserting soldiers in the ground right under the Pakistani military’s nose, hunting down bin Laden and his associates in the house and flying away with his corpse. All without Islamabad’s consent, according to the version put out by both sides.

Things could have spun out of control, the Pakistani military could have engaged the Special Forces with unpredictable results. The air force according to reports did scramble its fighters, so there was always the chance of a fight. Yet, as Colby says, it is striking – and a lesson for others – that America seemed willing to take its chances against a nuclear-armed power. It shows that nuclear weapons do not provide blanket protection.

“Countries that have nuclear weapons can still be confronted and operated against without escalation to nuclear use, particularly when the objective pursued is limited and discriminate, and especially when that objective is connected to a truly vital national interest,” he writes.

In Pakistan’s case, of course realistically speaking, there was no chance it would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons against the United States and that must have been factored into U.S. President Barack Obama’s calculations as he took the decision to proceed with the operation, Colby says.

 

[foxhound]

ref:Nuclear pre-emption after Geronimo – The Express Tribune

Nuclear pre-emption after Geronimo By Zahir Kazmi
Published: May 13, 2011

The writer is a master’s student at the Strategic and Nuclear Studies Department of the National Defence University, Islamabad
In 2008, five of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (Nato) top military officers and strategists presented a radical manifesto to the Pentagon. They urged the West to be ready to resort to a pre-emptive nuclear attack to halt the ‘imminent’ spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Guardian reported on January 22, 2008. These officers stressed that the first use of nuclear weapons must remain in the quiver of escalation as the ultimate instrument to prevent the use of WMD. Owing to the sensitivity of the doctrine, nothing credible appeared on the issue afterwards.

Can Operation Geronimo serve as an ominous example and as a precedent for a scenario suggested at the Pentagon in 2008? How plausible are the recent Indian army and air chiefs’ assertions that they could replicate the American raid deep inside Pakistan to kill Osama bin Laden? In the extreme event of a pre-emptive strike, can Pakistan defend itself? These questions may sound paranoid but do arise if the implications of Operation Geronimo are stretched to the limit. The success of the raid may, mistakenly, embolden others to think that they could get away with something similar. That said, Pakistan’s foreign office and the GHQ have warned India of catastrophic consequences if it takes American action as a rule and ‘miscalculates’ Pakistan’s response. America was cautioned not to repeat such unilateralism. Let’s try to unfold the possibility of nuclear first-use and Pakistan’s capability.

We have one historic example which shows that nuclear installations are only destroyed in raids once the targeted country’s programme is in infancy and the aggressor is 100 per cent sure that there will be no credible retaliation. Let’s take the US first. If it had any wish to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear capability, it would have done so in the early 1980s. But Washington could not afford to attack for two reasons. One, it needed Pakistan in the so-called jihad against the erstwhile Soviet Union. Two, it wasn’t sure how many bombs Pakistan had.

America won’t pre-empt for three reasons. First, its relations with Pakistan are on the rocks but have not nose-dived. Second, Pakistan doesn’t constitute a proliferation concern and finally, it remains their major non-Nato ‘ally’.

Let’s assume, against conventional wisdom, that America decides to take advantage of Pakistan’s misperceived vulnerability. In the confusion following a hypothetical American strike on Pakistan’s nuclear assets or command infrastructure, Islamabad may wittingly, or unwittingly, retaliate thus, sparking a nuclear war beyond anyone’s control.

Let’s understand the possibility of Indian pre-emption. Pakistan has not formally declared its nuclear doctrine so we don’t know if it will use the nukes first. Though the nuclear facilities on both sides can generally be pinpointed, locations of actual nuclear weapons are not public. Since nuclear facilities of both India and Pakistan are vulnerable, they have a bilateral agreement not to attack these and Indians don’t bat an eyelid in exchanging the list of installations with Pakistan on January 1 every year.

Some fixed launch-sites of weapons on land can be targeted, but neither can guess the location of mobile delivery systems, which include air launched weapons and sea-based assets. Targeting the decision-makers is problematic too. We know where the nuclear decision-makers live in peacetime but it is anybody’s guess as to where they will reside in times of crisis or war. India is fast moving towards difficult-to-target submarine-based nuclear arsenal and will have assured second strike capability. After the test of slim Hatf-IX (Nasr), Pakistan may soon mutate it to develop a submarine platform. Hence, the threat of destruction will assuredly become mutual.

The history of Pakistan-India crises shows that India engages in chest-beating in moments of Pakistan’s weakness. Its air and army chiefs did so by suggesting that New Delhi retains the capability to copy the American raid in Abbottabad. Even if the capability is possible, can they be sure of starting a war without the risk of it escalating to a nuclear one?

Deterrence, like beauty, lies in the eyes of the aggressor and hubris on nuclear power is the last thing a nuclear state must exercise. No matter how many impregnable lines of defence any technology can break, the risk of a single weapon landing on the aggressors’ soil is too big to be taken. That’s probably why the radical pre-emptive strikes manifesto of Nato’s wizards fell out of favour and no one heard of it again.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 13th, 2011.
.

some interesting points raised......


Afghan Journal
Lifting the veil on conflict, culture and politics» See all analysis and opinionPakistan’s nuclear weapons and the bin Laden raid
May 15, 2011 04:50 BST
inShare.nuclear deterrent | Osama bin Laden | Pakistan | U.S. Special Forces


In conducting a raid deep inside Pakistan to take out Osama bin Laden, the United States pushed the boundaries of military operations, inter-state ties and international law, all of which are the subject of a raging debate in the region and beyond.

One of the less talked-about issues is that the boots-on-ground operation by the U.S. Special Forces also blows a hole in a long-held argument that states which have nuclear weapons, legitimately or otherwise, face a lower chance of a foreign strike or invasion than those without them. Thus the United States didn’t think twice before going into Afghanistan within weeks of the September 11 attacks or striking against Libya now because there was no nuclear threat lurking at the back of the mind. Even Iraq was a tempting target because it was not known to have a well-established nuclear arsenal although the whole point of the invasion was that it had weapons of mass destruction. That only turned out to be untrue.

And conversely there is a belief that the United States or some of the other Western powers wouldn’t take on North Korea because of the nuclear weapons it holds. It is simply too dangerous and even in the case of Iran those who favour action say the time to do it is now while it is still developing the weapons, not when it has completed the programme.

But the May 2 raid in a compound in a Pakistani garrison town tests that logic and shows the limits of nuclear deterrence, as Elbridge Colby, who served recently in the office of the U.S. Defense Secretary on START negotiations wrote in Real Clear World’s Compass blog. Pakistan has a powerful nuclear arsenal, growing at a rate that will make it the fourth-largest in a decade behind only the United States, Russia and China. It has the delivery systems, both missiles and aircraft, to fire these weapons and a huge professional army to support the nuclear programme. Yet all that nuclear infrastructure did not stop the United States from breaching its air space, inserting soldiers in the ground right under the Pakistani military’s nose, hunting down bin Laden and his associates in the house and flying away with his corpse. All without Islamabad’s consent, according to the version put out by both sides.

Things could have spun out of control, the Pakistani military could have engaged the Special Forces with unpredictable results. The air force according to reports did scramble its fighters, so there was always the chance of a fight. Yet, as Colby says, it is striking – and a lesson for others – that America seemed willing to take its chances against a nuclear-armed power. It shows that nuclear weapons do not provide blanket protection.

“Countries that have nuclear weapons can still be confronted and operated against without escalation to nuclear use, particularly when the objective pursued is limited and discriminate, and especially when that objective is connected to a truly vital national interest,” he writes.

In Pakistan’s case, of course realistically speaking, there was no chance it would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons against the United States and that must have been factored into U.S. President Barack Obama’s calculations as he took the decision to proceed with the operation, Colby says.
« Previous PostNext Post »Comments19 comments so far | Comments RSSMay 15, 2011
8:53 am BSTIn 2008, five of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (Nato) top military officers and strategists presented a radical manifesto to the Pentagon. They urged the West to be ready to resort to a pre-emptive nuclear attack to halt the ‘imminent’ spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Guardian reported on January 22, 2008. These officers stressed that the first use of nuclear weapons must remain in the quiver of escalation as the ultimate instrument to prevent the use of WMD. Owing to the sensitivity of the doctrine, nothing credible appeared on the issue afterwards.
Can Operation Geronimo serve as an ominous example and as a precedent for a scenario suggested at the Pentagon in 2008? How plausible are the recent Indian army and air chiefs’ assertions that they could replicate the American raid deep inside Pakistan to kill Osama bin Laden? In the extreme event of a pre-emptive strike, can Pakistan defend itself? These questions may sound paranoid but do arise if the implications of Operation Geronimo are stretched to the limit. The success of the raid may, mistakenly, embolden others to think that they could get away with something similar. That said, Pakistan’s foreign office and the GHQ have warned India of catastrophic consequences if it takes American action as a rule and ‘miscalculates’ Pakistan’s response. America was cautioned not to repeat such unilateralism. Let’s try to unfold the possibility of nuclear first-use and Pakistan’s capability.
We have one historic example which shows that nuclear installations are only destroyed in raids once the targeted country’s programme is in infancy and the aggressor is 100 per cent sure that there will be no credible retaliation. Let’s take the US first. If it had any wish to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear capability, it would have done so in the early 1980s. But Washington could not afford to attack for two reasons. One, it needed Pakistan in the so-called jihad against the erstwhile Soviet Union. Two, it wasn’t sure how many bombs Pakistan had.
America won’t pre-empt for three reasons. First, its relations with Pakistan are on the rocks but have not nose-dived. Second, Pakistan doesn’t constitute a proliferation concern and finally, it remains their major non-Nato ‘ally’.
Let’s assume, against conventional wisdom, that America decides to take advantage of Pakistan’s misperceived vulnerability. In the confusion following a hypothetical American strike on Pakistan’s nuclear assets or command infrastructure, Islamabad may wittingly, or unwittingly, retaliate thus, sparking a nuclear war beyond anyone’s control.
Let’s understand the possibility of Indian pre-emption. Pakistan has not formally declared its nuclear doctrine so we don’t know if it will use the nukes first. Though the nuclear facilities on both sides can generally be pinpointed, locations of actual nuclear weapons are not public. Since nuclear facilities of both India and Pakistan are vulnerable, they have a bilateral agreement not to attack these and Indians don’t bat an eyelid in exchanging the list of installations with Pakistan on January 1 every year.
Some fixed launch-sites of weapons on land can be targeted, but neither can guess the location of mobile delivery systems, which include air launched weapons and sea-based assets. Targeting the decision-makers is problematic too. We know where the nuclear decision-makers live in peacetime but it is anybody’s guess as to where they will reside in times of crisis or war. India is fast moving towards difficult-to-target submarine-based nuclear arsenal and will have assured second strike capability. After the test of slim Hatf-IX (Nasr), Pakistan may soon mutate it to develop a submarine platform. Hence, the threat of destruction will assuredly become mutual.
The history of Pakistan-India crises shows that India engages in chest-beating in moments of Pakistan’s weakness. Its air and army chiefs did so by suggesting that New Delhi retains the capability to copy the American raid in Abbottabad. Even if the capability is possible, can they be sure of starting a war without the risk of it escalating to a nuclear one?
Deterrence, like beauty, lies in the eyes of the aggressor and hubris on nuclear power is the last thing a nuclear state must exercise. No matter how many impregnable lines of defence any technology can break, the risk of a single weapon landing on the aggressors’ soil is too big to be taken. That’s probably why the radical pre-emptive strikes manifesto of Nato’s wizards fell out of favour and no one heard of it again.

Nuclear pre-emption after Geronimo – The Express Tribune ar-pre-emption-after-geronimo/

Posted by zahirhkazmi | Report as abusive

 

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another readers view/points....


Well , Pakistan is a Nuclear Power. Its another thing that it was diplomatic with US until now.

First Pakistan has multiple delivery mechanism for Nuclear weapons

a) Air plane based

b) Missile based , these missiles can hit off targets
thousand and thousand of miles away

c) Cruise Missile based

d) Submarine based

Also Pakistan produces its own Fighter jets produced locally so that number will increase to 300 brand new fighter jets , not to mention the 30-40 brand new top of the line fighter jets arriving from China by 2014

The point to note about these fighters is that they are multi capability , Night/Day – Air-Air , Air to Ground missions

With that said and done lets also not forget that Pakistan Manufactures its own Frigates and Warships and has good number of ships

Pakistan is also getting Chinese AWACs (Early warning planes)

Also any Preemptive strike will also not suite well with China – who are also a World Super Power

And Recently conducted treaties between Russia and Pakistan shows a positive trend

Posted by CurruptPundit | Report as abusive