BanglaBhoot
RETIRED TTA
- Joined
- Apr 8, 2007
- Messages
- 8,839
- Reaction score
- 5
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- Location
By HAIDER ALI HUSSEIN MULLICK
FEB. 23, 2014
WASHINGTON — Last week, a Pakistani Taliban commander reported the execution of 23 Pakistani frontier troops held hostage; two weeks ago, a suicide bomber killed nine Shiite Muslims in Peshawar. In response, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government has conducted retaliatory airstrikes but has only suspended, not abandoned, its foolhardy strategy for peace: keep trying to talk the Pakistani Taliban into disarming, in exchange for halting military operations against them.
These peace talks will fail. They are an effort to surrender, and they ignore what most Pakistanis want: to regain control of their country from this deadly insurgency.
So Mr. Sharif should end the talks definitively and have the army mount a strong land offensive to drive the Pakistani Taliban out of their mountainous stronghold south of Peshawar once the snows melt this spring. It is there that the group poses the greatest risk toPakistan’s people, and to America’s supply line to Afghanistan. The United States should help the army prepare.
In the last decade, the Pakistani Taliban and associated groups, operating from the northwest, have terrified much of Pakistan. They have killed more than 18,000 civilians, including more than 2,000 Shiites and 5,500 police officers and soldiers. A sense of siege prevails west of the Indus River, even though that area is garrisoned by Pakistan’s military.
Much of the problem can be laid at the feet of Pakistan’s leaders. For decades, with government acquiescence, Pakistan’s military and its intelligence agency have used radical Islamist groups to foment insurgencies in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The groups recruit and train ideologues and fighters; raise funds; run seminaries and businesses; broadcast hatred of their political and religious enemies; and get hospital treatment when they are wounded. The military’s original goal was to counter Indian regional influence, but the cost to Pakistanis has been the failure of their state. Now the extremists increasingly target the very military that armed and encouraged them.
In other words, Pakistan’s luck has run out. You can sway an insurgent to fight “injustice” in a neighboring country like India, but once his leaders feel they have impunity, you can’t stop them from acting independently or exploiting local grievances. These days, as much as the Pakistani Taliban hate Indians and Americans, they hate other Pakistanis more. Acting in tandem with Al Qaeda, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba and other lethal groups, the Pakistani Taliban has slaughtered Shiites, Christians, Indians, Americans, Afghans and polio prevention workers, often with the state looking the other way.
Pakistan’s decade-long response has been based on a fallacy: that the military could target “bad” insurgents (those fighting Pakistan’s army and citizenry), while it worked with “good” ones (those fighting India). In reality, the two types are increasingly indistinguishable and have killed a great many times more Pakistanis than Indians. For example, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, also has supported anti-Shiite death squads. And the Haqqani network, which has fought Indian influence in Afghanistan, has also helped Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban kill Pakistanis.
Last year, a poll conducted by the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project found that 93 percent of Pakistanis said terrorism was a big problem, while only 45 percent worried that much about Indian influence in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, peace efforts have kept chasing the dream of compromise. In 2004, 2006 and 2008, Pakistan’s army signed deals that gave insurgents territory, amnesty, reparations, exemption from constitutional rules — along with time to rearm, regroup and resume their attacks. The record of mayhem, which has included attacks on major military headquarters, has left one mediator defending the current talks with this logic: “If America, with all its might, couldn’t win in Afghanistan, how can we win against the Pakistani Taliban? They have scores of suicide bombers. We must negotiate.”
But that is nonsense. Of course Pakistan’s army can’t expect to win the war by simply killing enough of the enemy. It must also focus on winning over the local populace by assuring their safety. But the army showed in 2009 that it could do this: After the Taliban seized the peaceful Swat Valley and proceeded to behead policemen, flog women and keep girls like Malala Yousafzai from attending school, the army swept in. Aided by new training and tactics, and with an infusion of American dollars and equipment, the troops took back the area and then kept control of it — a first for them since 9/11. And most of the two million displaced residents returned home.
Today, most Pakistanis want to apply the “Swat Valley model” to North Waziristan, the nerve center of the Pakistani Taliban. Prime Minister Sharif, in a Jan. 29 speech defending negotiations, admitted as much. “I know if the state today decides to use force to eliminate the terrorists, the entire nation will support it,” he said.
What he should have added was that peace talks would make the most sense after Pakistan’s troops took the area from the insurgents. Today, the Taliban demand nothing less than blanket immunity, a return of prisoners, the exit of all Pakistani troops, an end to American drone strikes, the abandonment of secular education and the severance of ties between the United States and Pakistan. Defeating them in battle might allow Pakistan to demand, instead, that the Taliban accept the rule of law.
That outcome would benefit the United States. We need Pakistan as a strategic ally, and we need both its stability and a good working relationship with its leaders to help keep its 100 or so nuclear warheads from falling into terrorist hands. Nevertheless, our relationship has been strained for decades by mutual distrust — largely traceable, on the American side, to Pakistan’s reluctance to directly confront the dangerous partners it has coddled for so long.
So in preparation for a spring offensive, America should now offer Pakistan intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support, as well as humanitarian assistance for those citizens whom fighting would inevitably displace. It is an opportunity to start building trust between our two countries by helping Pakistan take on its worst internal threat, one that menaces the democracy that Pakistanis crave.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/24/opinion/pakistan-mustnt-surrender.html?_r=0
FEB. 23, 2014
WASHINGTON — Last week, a Pakistani Taliban commander reported the execution of 23 Pakistani frontier troops held hostage; two weeks ago, a suicide bomber killed nine Shiite Muslims in Peshawar. In response, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government has conducted retaliatory airstrikes but has only suspended, not abandoned, its foolhardy strategy for peace: keep trying to talk the Pakistani Taliban into disarming, in exchange for halting military operations against them.
These peace talks will fail. They are an effort to surrender, and they ignore what most Pakistanis want: to regain control of their country from this deadly insurgency.
So Mr. Sharif should end the talks definitively and have the army mount a strong land offensive to drive the Pakistani Taliban out of their mountainous stronghold south of Peshawar once the snows melt this spring. It is there that the group poses the greatest risk toPakistan’s people, and to America’s supply line to Afghanistan. The United States should help the army prepare.
In the last decade, the Pakistani Taliban and associated groups, operating from the northwest, have terrified much of Pakistan. They have killed more than 18,000 civilians, including more than 2,000 Shiites and 5,500 police officers and soldiers. A sense of siege prevails west of the Indus River, even though that area is garrisoned by Pakistan’s military.
Much of the problem can be laid at the feet of Pakistan’s leaders. For decades, with government acquiescence, Pakistan’s military and its intelligence agency have used radical Islamist groups to foment insurgencies in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The groups recruit and train ideologues and fighters; raise funds; run seminaries and businesses; broadcast hatred of their political and religious enemies; and get hospital treatment when they are wounded. The military’s original goal was to counter Indian regional influence, but the cost to Pakistanis has been the failure of their state. Now the extremists increasingly target the very military that armed and encouraged them.
In other words, Pakistan’s luck has run out. You can sway an insurgent to fight “injustice” in a neighboring country like India, but once his leaders feel they have impunity, you can’t stop them from acting independently or exploiting local grievances. These days, as much as the Pakistani Taliban hate Indians and Americans, they hate other Pakistanis more. Acting in tandem with Al Qaeda, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba and other lethal groups, the Pakistani Taliban has slaughtered Shiites, Christians, Indians, Americans, Afghans and polio prevention workers, often with the state looking the other way.
Pakistan’s decade-long response has been based on a fallacy: that the military could target “bad” insurgents (those fighting Pakistan’s army and citizenry), while it worked with “good” ones (those fighting India). In reality, the two types are increasingly indistinguishable and have killed a great many times more Pakistanis than Indians. For example, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, also has supported anti-Shiite death squads. And the Haqqani network, which has fought Indian influence in Afghanistan, has also helped Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban kill Pakistanis.
Last year, a poll conducted by the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project found that 93 percent of Pakistanis said terrorism was a big problem, while only 45 percent worried that much about Indian influence in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, peace efforts have kept chasing the dream of compromise. In 2004, 2006 and 2008, Pakistan’s army signed deals that gave insurgents territory, amnesty, reparations, exemption from constitutional rules — along with time to rearm, regroup and resume their attacks. The record of mayhem, which has included attacks on major military headquarters, has left one mediator defending the current talks with this logic: “If America, with all its might, couldn’t win in Afghanistan, how can we win against the Pakistani Taliban? They have scores of suicide bombers. We must negotiate.”
But that is nonsense. Of course Pakistan’s army can’t expect to win the war by simply killing enough of the enemy. It must also focus on winning over the local populace by assuring their safety. But the army showed in 2009 that it could do this: After the Taliban seized the peaceful Swat Valley and proceeded to behead policemen, flog women and keep girls like Malala Yousafzai from attending school, the army swept in. Aided by new training and tactics, and with an infusion of American dollars and equipment, the troops took back the area and then kept control of it — a first for them since 9/11. And most of the two million displaced residents returned home.
Today, most Pakistanis want to apply the “Swat Valley model” to North Waziristan, the nerve center of the Pakistani Taliban. Prime Minister Sharif, in a Jan. 29 speech defending negotiations, admitted as much. “I know if the state today decides to use force to eliminate the terrorists, the entire nation will support it,” he said.
What he should have added was that peace talks would make the most sense after Pakistan’s troops took the area from the insurgents. Today, the Taliban demand nothing less than blanket immunity, a return of prisoners, the exit of all Pakistani troops, an end to American drone strikes, the abandonment of secular education and the severance of ties between the United States and Pakistan. Defeating them in battle might allow Pakistan to demand, instead, that the Taliban accept the rule of law.
That outcome would benefit the United States. We need Pakistan as a strategic ally, and we need both its stability and a good working relationship with its leaders to help keep its 100 or so nuclear warheads from falling into terrorist hands. Nevertheless, our relationship has been strained for decades by mutual distrust — largely traceable, on the American side, to Pakistan’s reluctance to directly confront the dangerous partners it has coddled for so long.
So in preparation for a spring offensive, America should now offer Pakistan intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support, as well as humanitarian assistance for those citizens whom fighting would inevitably displace. It is an opportunity to start building trust between our two countries by helping Pakistan take on its worst internal threat, one that menaces the democracy that Pakistanis crave.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/24/opinion/pakistan-mustnt-surrender.html?_r=0
