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Pakistan is Learning the Wrong Lesson: Tactical Nuclear Weapons in South Asia

FalconsForPeace

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The renowned philosopher, George Santayana, said, “Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.” Pakistan is repeating the US decision to deploy tactical nuclear weapons during the Cold War and which has limited applicability in South Asian. NATO’s perceived military inferiority against the Soviet Union is often cited to justify Pakistan’s pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons against the conventionally superior India.

By deploying tactical nuclear weapons, the United States’ goal was to deter any conventional attack by the Soviet Union on Western Europe. The United States also wanted to prevent any European conflict from developing into a full fledge nuclear war between the two superpowers. These weapons proved to be useless militarily and most of them were withdrawn from Europe in 1991. The United States’ strategists learned that nuclear use at the tactical level would lead to a strategic response and an uncontrollable escalation. Pakistan, however, has embraced this discarded strategy by testing the short-range ballistic missile, the Nasr (Hatf IX) on April 19, 2011 and has repeated tests four times since then. India, on the other hand, has tested a short-range ballistic missile on July 21, 2011.

In response to cross-border terrorism, allegedly supported by Pakistan, the Indian army developed a “Cold Start Doctrine” in 2004. This doctrine is based on rapid, limited conventional military operations against terrorist organizations in Pakistan. It calls for quick penetration into Pakistan in response to cross-border terrorist strikes and the seizing of territory to negotiate the end of a terrorist attack on Indian soil. Empirical developments since 2004 show that India has not implemented this doctrine. Indian officials and policymakers have either denied the existence of this doctrine or have not endorsed this adventurous strategy. A classified document released by WikiLeaks dated February 16, 2010 revealed that Tim Roemer, then US Ambassador to India, described Cold Start as “a mixture of myth and reality.” He further argued, “While the army may remain committed to the goals of the doctrine, political support is less clear.” India did not apply Cold Start in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai attack, which calls into question the political will for this doctrine.

Cold Start is designed to punish Pakistan in a limited military operation without triggering a nuclear response. However, one can never be sure whether Pakistan will refrain from using nuclear weapons. To counter the potential for limited Indian intrusions along the line of this doctrine, Pakistan has begun to develop Nasr under the rubric of “full spectrum deterrence.” In the 2008 Mumbai attack, however, India was deterred from initiating cross-border retaliation without the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on Pakistan’s side. Pakistan’s strategic weapons were enough to deter India. During the Cold War what deterred the Soviet Union from attacking NATO countries was not the possession of tactical nuclear weapons but the risk of escalation to the strategic level once tactical weapons were used.

Pakistan seems to imply that actions at the tactical or operational level have no strategic implications and a limited nuclear war will not escalate into a full fledge nuclear war. India threatens massive retaliation against the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Shyam Saran, former foreign secretary and the current Chairman of India’s National Security Advisory Board said that if India is attacked with nuclear weapons “it will engage in nuclear retaliation which is massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary. The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical is irrelevant from Indian perspective.”

The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons may lead to loosening the highly centralized command and control mechanism. Battlefield nuclear weapons require local commanders to have authority and capability to arm and launch nuclear weapons. This raises the risk of unauthorized use during a crisis or inadvertent escalation during a conventional conflict by a local commander of a nuclear-armed unit who might feel it necessary to use the weapons in order to avoid defeat. A positive sign is that Pakistan has not deployed the weapons in forward positions yet and has not delegated the authority to local commanders.

The idea of using nuclear weapons at the operational level on Pakistani soil will cause significant civilian causalities due to the dense population along the Indian and Pakistan border. This will also have a damaging effect on Pakistan’s own military forces and render the land uninhabitable. In 1955 NATO conducted a military exercise to test its ability to defend West Germany by employing nuclear weapons. The results estimated that 1.3 millions Germans would have died, 3.5 millions would have been seriously injured and a large territory would have become uninhabitable.

More tactical nuclear weapons in Pakistan also increase safety and security problems. The safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program has been a major concern in the international community in the wake of terrorist organizations operating in the country. Political instability and terrorist attacks on the military installations, including army headquarters in Rawalpindi, a naval base in Karachi, and an air base in Kamra with inside support, have exacerbated these concerns.

Tactical nuclear weapons carry the risk of preemptive strikes. During the Cold War the Soviet Union monitored all the nuclear sites in West Germany. Any movements on those sites including preparations to launch nuclear weapons, mating of warheads to missiles and uploading would have prompted the Soviet Union to strike preemptively. There was a strong temptation to destroy the weapons before they were launched. In the case of India and Pakistan the short flight times of ballistic missiles exacerbate these tensions by sharply reducing decision-making time for leaders during a crisis.

The Indians and the Pakistanis have a practice of using their missiles for both conventional and nuclear weapons, which further increases the risk of misperception and unintended escalation. The real lessons to be learned from the Cold War experience is not to develop tactical nuclear weapons but to imitate the US and USSR’s experience about enhancing strategic stability by increasing transparency and using diplomacy to alleviate an arms race. The lesson of the Cold War is not to rely on nuclear weapons, but to find ways to reduce reliance on tactical nuclear weapons and place a crises stability mechanism and a confidence building mechanism in South Asia. Both Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif have a lot to learn from Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev about negotiating over their differences. But so far, each leader seems focused on placating their myopic bases.

Pakistan is Learning the Wrong Lesson: Tactical Nuclear Weapons in South Asia
 
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I wonder how many renowned experts are there!

Well this writing piece misses few critical facts and reaches incorrect conclusion. US and Soviets engaged in talks AFTER building Nuclear weapons and achieving Nuclear parity. US did not dismantle its tactical nukes until AFTER collapse of Soviet Union. Author also has no clue of 'Strategic Forces Command Structure'. Field commanders do not have authority and can not fire nukes even if they want to... There are sufficient safety barriers in place to prevent accidental or rogue launch, it's a nuke after all.

The massive response theory from India meets second strike capability of Pakistan. 'MAD' conditions have been met so it is like 'we all are doomed so don't do it'

Apparently one has to bash Pakistan to get the essay published in international fora; author knew it well!
 
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It's very simple. Despite all the rhetoric, Pakistan is in its full right to deploy tactical weapons if another country blackmails through mass conventional war. War means war whether conducted conventionally or by other means. It's a matter of finding the right measure of response to unwanted aggression. In fact, it's a deterrent. Thankfully, the tactical weapons suffice in this regard. Like some have already pointed out, these weapons are tactical in nature and comprised of stringent safety layers. These weapons can only be used in the absolute worst case scenario.

As for the rest of the article, a lot of hypothetical unproven theories.
 
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The tac-nukes would further destabilise India-Pak relationship.
Hatf IX (Nasr) can deliver a sub-kiloton nuclear warhead over a range of 60 km, supposedly entered service in 2013 and is believed to be fully integrated into Pakistan’s C3I (command, control, communications and intelligence).With this Pakistan has signaled a nuclear doctrine and also an early use policy while India still has a no first use policy.
The only reason why Pakistan wants tac-nukes is because it is the weaker power in the India-Pakistan dyad as Pakistan faces significant conventional asymmetries.
What one must understand is that these tac nukes lower the nuclear threshold by blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear war.
It's very simple. Despite all the rhetoric, Pakistan is in its full right to deploy tactical weapons if another country blackmails through mass conventional war. War means war whether conducted conventionally or by other means. It's a matter of finding the right measure of response to unwanted aggression. In fact, it's a deterrent. Thankfully, the tactical weapons suffice in this regard. Like some have already pointed out, these weapons are tactical in nature and comprised of stringent safety layers. These weapons can only be used in the absolute worst case scenario.

As for the rest of the article, a lot of hypothetical unproven theories.
To a keyboard warrior like you its easy to say that tac-nukes should be used, only if you were to face its consequences would it be hammered into you that tac-nukes 're not a solution but a bigger gargantuan problem.
 
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Read this many times , get over it one thing is so pathetic for many to understand over and over again specially Indians to understand how can you attack a nation and may it be limited or full scale in reality there is nothing that is limited a attack is a attack and you think that Pakistan won't respond please wake up and hope for peace rather then war because it won't be pretty for both nations.
 
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The tac-nukes would further destabilise India-Pak relationship.
Hatf IX (Nasr) can deliver a sub-kiloton nuclear warhead over a range of 60 km, supposedly entered service in 2013 and is believed to be fully integrated into Pakistan’s C3I (command, control, communications and intelligence).With this Pakistan has signaled a nuclear doctrine and also an early use policy while India still has a no first use policy.
The only reason why Pakistan wants tac-nukes is because it is the weaker power in the India-Pakistan dyad as Pakistan faces significant conventional asymmetries.
What one must understand is that these tac nukes lower the nuclear threshold by blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear war.

To a keyboard warrior like you its easy to say that tac-nukes should be used, only if you were to face its consequences would it be hammered into you that tac-nukes 're not a solution but a bigger gargantuan problem.

the most absurd terminology or policy is "no first use", between two unfriendly countries both cannot adhere to this policy otherwise whats the point of acquiring nuclear technology. In fact, while we at it why dont we sign a no first use policy on conventional weapons also since both weapon kill. Or is conventional war is considered a good war and US can kill millions in Iraq and Afghanistan but since US was using conventional weapons it fine.
 
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the most absurd terminology or policy is "no first use", between two unfriendly countries both cannot adhere to this policy otherwise whats the point of acquiring nuclear technology. In fact, while we at it why dont we sign a no first use policy on conventional weapons also since both weapon kill. Or is conventional war is considered a good war and US can kill millions in Iraq and Afghanistan but since US was using conventional weapons it fine.
Did I say conventional wars 're better???
I've yet to understand why the so called super powers and their satellite countries keep on wasting money and energy on something that is a figment of their imagination, pretty much like they made up a story where Saddam would 've attacked NY with his newly acquired weapons and ergo they attacked Iraq.
And if its about India and Pakistan's nuclear policies then I think Pak harbors a wrong notion that tac-nukes 've no strategic implications and a limited nuclear war will not escalate into a full fledge nuclear war.Explain just how did they conclude that?? or is it that the consequences of such a "limited" war doesnt matter to ppl in PA?
 
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Your tacticle nukes are not going to help you. With a 60 KM range the NASR missile will not be able to reach any major Indian city like Delhi, Mumbai etc. Most likely you will end up nuking and Indian Army column in your own territory. IF this happens whther you use strategic or tacticle nuke India will respond with massive second strike which will do utmost damage to Pakistan.

The concept of MAD does not apply to India - Pakistan because of our large area. Sure India will suffer in a nuclear war but we can bounce back but due to smaller area of Pakistan it will be difficult for Pakistan to survive a nuclear war
 
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India's nuclear doctrine is very clear, any attack on India or Indian assets using a WMD will result in a very sharp and massive retaliation. So better Pakistan does a massive nuclear strike instead of a small one because the result of the is well known
 
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the most absurd terminology or policy is "no first use", between two unfriendly countries both cannot adhere to this policy otherwise whats the point of acquiring nuclear technology. In fact, while we at it why dont we sign a no first use policy on conventional weapons also since both weapon kill. Or is conventional war is considered a good war and US can kill millions in Iraq and Afghanistan but since US was using conventional weapons it fine.
Comparing Conventional weapons with Nuclear one?....
 
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Well it does make one point very clear that Pak & India are living on the edge .If India keeps on pushing things where it will not be possible for Pak to coupe with then this is bound to happened .regarding casualties i think one has to see war at any theater will result weather use of Nuke or not .Its just impact factor of Nukes (immediate) but this war will not be limited to Ind Pak border by my point of view bcas there are more then few sites all accross India which Pak wants to take out .As if we get doomed India should be pushed to annhilation as well with nothing left of both .More collateral damage for India .I guess its not some thing of tactics at the end of day this is the only option left .
 
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The renowned philosopher, George Santayana, said, “Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.” Pakistan is repeating the US decision to deploy tactical nuclear weapons during the Cold War and which has limited applicability in South Asian. NATO’s perceived military inferiority against the Soviet Union is often cited to justify Pakistan’s pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons against the conventionally superior India.

By deploying tactical nuclear weapons, the United States’ goal was to deter any conventional attack by the Soviet Union on Western Europe. The United States also wanted to prevent any European conflict from developing into a full fledge nuclear war between the two superpowers. These weapons proved to be useless militarily and most of them were withdrawn from Europe in 1991. The United States’ strategists learned that nuclear use at the tactical level would lead to a strategic response and an uncontrollable escalation. Pakistan, however, has embraced this discarded strategy by testing the short-range ballistic missile, the Nasr (Hatf IX) on April 19, 2011 and has repeated tests four times since then. India, on the other hand, has tested a short-range ballistic missile on July 21, 2011.

In response to cross-border terrorism, allegedly supported by Pakistan, the Indian army developed a “Cold Start Doctrine” in 2004. This doctrine is based on rapid, limited conventional military operations against terrorist organizations in Pakistan. It calls for quick penetration into Pakistan in response to cross-border terrorist strikes and the seizing of territory to negotiate the end of a terrorist attack on Indian soil. Empirical developments since 2004 show that India has not implemented this doctrine. Indian officials and policymakers have either denied the existence of this doctrine or have not endorsed this adventurous strategy. A classified document released by WikiLeaks dated February 16, 2010 revealed that Tim Roemer, then US Ambassador to India, described Cold Start as “a mixture of myth and reality.” He further argued, “While the army may remain committed to the goals of the doctrine, political support is less clear.” India did not apply Cold Start in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai attack, which calls into question the political will for this doctrine.

Cold Start is designed to punish Pakistan in a limited military operation without triggering a nuclear response. However, one can never be sure whether Pakistan will refrain from using nuclear weapons. To counter the potential for limited Indian intrusions along the line of this doctrine, Pakistan has begun to develop Nasr under the rubric of “full spectrum deterrence.” In the 2008 Mumbai attack, however, India was deterred from initiating cross-border retaliation without the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on Pakistan’s side. Pakistan’s strategic weapons were enough to deter India. During the Cold War what deterred the Soviet Union from attacking NATO countries was not the possession of tactical nuclear weapons but the risk of escalation to the strategic level once tactical weapons were used.

Pakistan seems to imply that actions at the tactical or operational level have no strategic implications and a limited nuclear war will not escalate into a full fledge nuclear war. India threatens massive retaliation against the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Shyam Saran, former foreign secretary and the current Chairman of India’s National Security Advisory Board said that if India is attacked with nuclear weapons “it will engage in nuclear retaliation which is massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary. The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical is irrelevant from Indian perspective.”

The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons may lead to loosening the highly centralized command and control mechanism. Battlefield nuclear weapons require local commanders to have authority and capability to arm and launch nuclear weapons. This raises the risk of unauthorized use during a crisis or inadvertent escalation during a conventional conflict by a local commander of a nuclear-armed unit who might feel it necessary to use the weapons in order to avoid defeat. A positive sign is that Pakistan has not deployed the weapons in forward positions yet and has not delegated the authority to local commanders.

The idea of using nuclear weapons at the operational level on Pakistani soil will cause significant civilian causalities due to the dense population along the Indian and Pakistan border. This will also have a damaging effect on Pakistan’s own military forces and render the land uninhabitable. In 1955 NATO conducted a military exercise to test its ability to defend West Germany by employing nuclear weapons. The results estimated that 1.3 millions Germans would have died, 3.5 millions would have been seriously injured and a large territory would have become uninhabitable.

More tactical nuclear weapons in Pakistan also increase safety and security problems. The safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program has been a major concern in the international community in the wake of terrorist organizations operating in the country. Political instability and terrorist attacks on the military installations, including army headquarters in Rawalpindi, a naval base in Karachi, and an air base in Kamra with inside support, have exacerbated these concerns.

Tactical nuclear weapons carry the risk of preemptive strikes. During the Cold War the Soviet Union monitored all the nuclear sites in West Germany. Any movements on those sites including preparations to launch nuclear weapons, mating of warheads to missiles and uploading would have prompted the Soviet Union to strike preemptively. There was a strong temptation to destroy the weapons before they were launched. In the case of India and Pakistan the short flight times of ballistic missiles exacerbate these tensions by sharply reducing decision-making time for leaders during a crisis.

The Indians and the Pakistanis have a practice of using their missiles for both conventional and nuclear weapons, which further increases the risk of misperception and unintended escalation. The real lessons to be learned from the Cold War experience is not to develop tactical nuclear weapons but to imitate the US and USSR’s experience about enhancing strategic stability by increasing transparency and using diplomacy to alleviate an arms race. The lesson of the Cold War is not to rely on nuclear weapons, but to find ways to reduce reliance on tactical nuclear weapons and place a crises stability mechanism and a confidence building mechanism in South Asia. Both Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif have a lot to learn from Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev about negotiating over their differences. But so far, each leader seems focused on placating their myopic bases.

Pakistan is Learning the Wrong Lesson: Tactical Nuclear Weapons in South Asia
We need to develop a warhead not nuclear still equally destructive.
 
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We need to develop a warhead not nuclear still equally destructive.

exactly..India took the same approach of USA when we bought CBU-105..a couple of CBU-105s will result far better than a tac nuke.

in fact,few of these are far better and logical choice than these nukes..but then again,availability might be an issue.but not for Pakistan I guess.test showed one CBU-105 could destroy or atleast cripple an entire tank battalion.proper use of these would lead to massacre..

one problem with these weapons is,it'd require a large concentration of tanks/support vehicles/soldiers..
 
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It must be understood that use of tactical nuclear weapons would lead to a strategic response and an uncontrollable escalation. Inevitably a counter force attack with tactical nukes will graduate to a counter value response which will be disastrous.

Pakistan seems to imply that actions at the tactical or operational level have no strategic implications and a limited nuclear war will not escalate into a full fledged nuclear war. This is patently misplaced thinking. India’s nuclear doctrine envisions massive counter value retaliation against the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical is irrelevant from the Indian perspective.

Additionally, it is clear that Pakistan would use its tactical nukes only as a last resort while facing an adverse situation that can lead to its defeat. That means employing tactical nuclear weapons when Indian combat groups are 40-50 km within Pakistani territory. That would be disastrous for Pakistan as entire geographical areas within Pakistan would become uninhabitable for decades due to nuclear radiation and fallout.

In a nutshell, employing tactical nuclear weapons is a dangerous strategy that would backfire on Pakistan as it would not only destroy parts of Pakistan itself by its own nukes, but result in massive counter-city retaliation by India, destroying Pakistan’s industrial assets, dams, airfields, power grids, cities, nuclear plants, Command and Control centers and so on. In fact it would be a first strike scenario as employment of counter force tactical nukes cannot be termed as a nuclear first strike since they would be restricted in nature to specific sectors within Pakistan only.

Needless to say a first strike triggered by the use of a tactical nuclear weapon would have devastating consequences on Pakistan as all nuclear Command and Control centers would have been destroyed before there is time to react.

So what of tactical nuclear missiles? It’s a doctrine fraught with immense danger to Pakistan itself!
 
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