Pakistan government will seek to exploit Taliban fractures by prolonging peace talks while army prepares offensive
IHS Jane's Intelligence Weekly
07 May 2014
Pakistan Army soldiers patrol in Ditta Kheil, North Waziristan, on 7 March 2011. The Pakistan Army resumed shelling and air strikes against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militant strongholds in North and South Waziristan on 9 April 2014. Source: PA
Key Points
The Pakistan government has been engaged in peace talks with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan since early this year, but the talks have yielded no results.
The Pakistan Army resumed shelling and air strikes against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militant strongholds in North and South Waziristan on 9 April. The resumption of attacks came in response to the killing of security forces personnel in two improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in Bobar in South Waziristan, a few days earlier. These military operations indicate that the army perceives the ongoing peace negotiations between the TTP and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government as unlikely to secure a meaningful and lasting ceasefire. IHS sources close to the prime minister indicate that the talks are a ploy to buy more time in order for the government to stabilise the country's economy, while also giving the army more time to prepare for an offensive.
The army, in contrast to its earlier reluctance, has been increasingly keen to launch an operation in North Waziristan against the TTP. Several factors have contributed to the army's changed stance, according to IHS sources. First, the high number of casualties suffered by the armed forces over the past five years (more than 15,000, according to the army's own estimates) have engendered a desire for retribution among the army's officer class. An assessment of strategic priorities carried out under the previous army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani and the current chief, General Raheel Sharif, has been to some extent successful in realigning the army's priorities from focusing on India to the threat of domestic terrorism.
Second, after setbacks in earlier operations in South Waziristan in 2002 and 2007, the success of the army's tactics in flushing out the TTP from the Swat district of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa in 2009 has restored the army's confidence that it would not become bogged down in a protracted counter-insurgency in North Waziristan. Finally, the intermediary groups used by the military as back channels to the TTP have failed to dilute the militants' uncompromising stance. For instance, IHS sources indicate that Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) has for a long time maintained contacts with the Haqqani network, in order to use them as proxies in Afghanistan and as a back channel to negotiate with militant groups such as the TTP. However, recently, the ISI has reportedly become convinced that the group has consistently double-crossed them and supported the TTP's agenda.
Army reaches for political support
However, while the army is ready militarily to launch an offensive in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), it is also likely to make a conscious decision to co-opt the civil government, in order to receive political support for its initiative. There is a perception within the military that previous governments did not take ownership of military initiatives, therefore leaving the military exposed to public criticism. As a result, the army has so far quietly supported Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's efforts to forge a peace deal with the TTP. At the same time, it has made clear to both the government and the TTP that it would not accept a peace deal that envisaged a withdrawal of state forces from the FATA, as demanded by the TTP, or a deal that would release large numbers of incarcerated TTP militants.
The current situation presents particular difficulties for Sharif as well. The prime minister, whose PML-N emerged victorious from last year's elections, has declared his priority as being the economy and overcoming Pakistan's crippling energy shortage. Sharif has focused his efforts on developing Punjab, his home province and power base, as well as the largest province in the country, in the hope that economic development there would not only be a vote catcher for him but would also trigger development across the country. Sharif and his younger brother Shahbaz, who is the chief minister of Punjab, believe that the only obstacle to development would be an increase in attacks by the TTP in Punjab. The province has remained relatively less affected by terrorism compared to the provinces of Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa, which are all severely affected.
To this end, Nawaz Sharif has advocated peace negotiations with the TTP, even though such talks are unlikely to be successful, as the TTP does not recognise the country's constitution or current system of governance. The government negotiators are also likely to seek to exploit factional differences within the TTP. The Mehsud tribe, who make up the bulk of the TTP's fighters, have been unhappy with the elevation of Maulana Qazi Fazlullah as the head of the TTP following the killing of Hakimullah Mehsud in in a US unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strike November 2013. IHS sources have reported considerable infighting among the various factions that constitute the TTP since then. The government is therefore attempting to offer the Mehsud tribesmen better terms to split them from the rest of the TTP.
If the strategy works, it will also affect foreign militants based in the FATA. Most of the Arab, Central Asian, Western, and Uighur foreign fighters are based in North Waziristan and a government deal with the Mehsuds, who are dominant in that Tribal Agency, is likely to include an agreement for them to either be handed over to the government or driven out from their safe havens. IHS monitoring of jihadist social media indicates that this is an increasing concern for these militants. Many are contemplating joining the fighting in Syria, and some have indeed reached Syria, although there is no reliable estimate of how many have actually been successful. Other foreign fighters would also be drawn back to Afghanistan to fight with the Afghan Taliban in what is likely to be a protracted civil war after the withdrawal of international forces in December. But it is increasingly questionable whether these fighters would be welcomed by the Afghan Taliban, who have been rebranding themselves over the past few years as a pro-Afghan nationalist force. Central Asian militants may seek to return to their home countries, but the most likely scenario is that these fighters will be dispersed among different militant groups, seeking to fight jihad wherever they can. Pakistani sectarian groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) have already welcomed foreign fighters into their fold and so their affect on attacks within Pakistan is also likely to be greater.
FORECAST
Some of these foreign fighters will almost certainly also be diverted to India, joining Kashmir- based Islamist groups and acting as a force multiplier for these groups' capabilities. The likelihood of this occurring will raise the risk of Indian retaliation against Pakistan in the event of a major terrorist attack, on the scale of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. But IHS assesses that such retaliation is unlikely to come in the shape of a direct ground invasion of Pakistani territory. It is more likely that Indian security forces will respond through asymmetric methods, increasing attacks in Pakistan using proxy groups.
The Pakistan government's tactic of attempting to divide the militants, even if it were to succeed, will take time to implement. In the interim, the prospects for a lasting peace agreement will remain low, and it is highly likely that the militants will resume attacks on targets such as security forces, government institutions, minority communities, and Western targets in the next six months.
(1338 words)
Pakistan government will seek to exploit Taliban fractures by prolonging peace talks while army prepares offensive - IHS Jane's 360
IHS Jane's Intelligence Weekly
07 May 2014
Pakistan Army soldiers patrol in Ditta Kheil, North Waziristan, on 7 March 2011. The Pakistan Army resumed shelling and air strikes against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militant strongholds in North and South Waziristan on 9 April 2014. Source: PA
Key Points
- On 9 April, the Pakistan Army resumed shelling and air strikes against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militant strongholds in North and South Waziristan.
- The resumption of military operations also indicates that the ongoing peace negotiations between the TTP and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government are largely perceived, especially by the Army, as being unlikely to succeed in securing a meaningful and lasting ceasefire.
- Militants are likely to resume attacks on targets such as security forces, government institutions, minority communities and western targets in the next six months, while foreign fighters, worried about being caught up in a deal between the government and the TTP, will seek to transit from the Tribal Areas into other theatres, such as Afghanistan, Syria and India.
The Pakistan government has been engaged in peace talks with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan since early this year, but the talks have yielded no results.
The Pakistan Army resumed shelling and air strikes against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militant strongholds in North and South Waziristan on 9 April. The resumption of attacks came in response to the killing of security forces personnel in two improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in Bobar in South Waziristan, a few days earlier. These military operations indicate that the army perceives the ongoing peace negotiations between the TTP and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government as unlikely to secure a meaningful and lasting ceasefire. IHS sources close to the prime minister indicate that the talks are a ploy to buy more time in order for the government to stabilise the country's economy, while also giving the army more time to prepare for an offensive.
The army, in contrast to its earlier reluctance, has been increasingly keen to launch an operation in North Waziristan against the TTP. Several factors have contributed to the army's changed stance, according to IHS sources. First, the high number of casualties suffered by the armed forces over the past five years (more than 15,000, according to the army's own estimates) have engendered a desire for retribution among the army's officer class. An assessment of strategic priorities carried out under the previous army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani and the current chief, General Raheel Sharif, has been to some extent successful in realigning the army's priorities from focusing on India to the threat of domestic terrorism.
Second, after setbacks in earlier operations in South Waziristan in 2002 and 2007, the success of the army's tactics in flushing out the TTP from the Swat district of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa in 2009 has restored the army's confidence that it would not become bogged down in a protracted counter-insurgency in North Waziristan. Finally, the intermediary groups used by the military as back channels to the TTP have failed to dilute the militants' uncompromising stance. For instance, IHS sources indicate that Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) has for a long time maintained contacts with the Haqqani network, in order to use them as proxies in Afghanistan and as a back channel to negotiate with militant groups such as the TTP. However, recently, the ISI has reportedly become convinced that the group has consistently double-crossed them and supported the TTP's agenda.
Army reaches for political support
However, while the army is ready militarily to launch an offensive in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), it is also likely to make a conscious decision to co-opt the civil government, in order to receive political support for its initiative. There is a perception within the military that previous governments did not take ownership of military initiatives, therefore leaving the military exposed to public criticism. As a result, the army has so far quietly supported Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's efforts to forge a peace deal with the TTP. At the same time, it has made clear to both the government and the TTP that it would not accept a peace deal that envisaged a withdrawal of state forces from the FATA, as demanded by the TTP, or a deal that would release large numbers of incarcerated TTP militants.
The current situation presents particular difficulties for Sharif as well. The prime minister, whose PML-N emerged victorious from last year's elections, has declared his priority as being the economy and overcoming Pakistan's crippling energy shortage. Sharif has focused his efforts on developing Punjab, his home province and power base, as well as the largest province in the country, in the hope that economic development there would not only be a vote catcher for him but would also trigger development across the country. Sharif and his younger brother Shahbaz, who is the chief minister of Punjab, believe that the only obstacle to development would be an increase in attacks by the TTP in Punjab. The province has remained relatively less affected by terrorism compared to the provinces of Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa, which are all severely affected.
To this end, Nawaz Sharif has advocated peace negotiations with the TTP, even though such talks are unlikely to be successful, as the TTP does not recognise the country's constitution or current system of governance. The government negotiators are also likely to seek to exploit factional differences within the TTP. The Mehsud tribe, who make up the bulk of the TTP's fighters, have been unhappy with the elevation of Maulana Qazi Fazlullah as the head of the TTP following the killing of Hakimullah Mehsud in in a US unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strike November 2013. IHS sources have reported considerable infighting among the various factions that constitute the TTP since then. The government is therefore attempting to offer the Mehsud tribesmen better terms to split them from the rest of the TTP.
If the strategy works, it will also affect foreign militants based in the FATA. Most of the Arab, Central Asian, Western, and Uighur foreign fighters are based in North Waziristan and a government deal with the Mehsuds, who are dominant in that Tribal Agency, is likely to include an agreement for them to either be handed over to the government or driven out from their safe havens. IHS monitoring of jihadist social media indicates that this is an increasing concern for these militants. Many are contemplating joining the fighting in Syria, and some have indeed reached Syria, although there is no reliable estimate of how many have actually been successful. Other foreign fighters would also be drawn back to Afghanistan to fight with the Afghan Taliban in what is likely to be a protracted civil war after the withdrawal of international forces in December. But it is increasingly questionable whether these fighters would be welcomed by the Afghan Taliban, who have been rebranding themselves over the past few years as a pro-Afghan nationalist force. Central Asian militants may seek to return to their home countries, but the most likely scenario is that these fighters will be dispersed among different militant groups, seeking to fight jihad wherever they can. Pakistani sectarian groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) have already welcomed foreign fighters into their fold and so their affect on attacks within Pakistan is also likely to be greater.
FORECAST
Some of these foreign fighters will almost certainly also be diverted to India, joining Kashmir- based Islamist groups and acting as a force multiplier for these groups' capabilities. The likelihood of this occurring will raise the risk of Indian retaliation against Pakistan in the event of a major terrorist attack, on the scale of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. But IHS assesses that such retaliation is unlikely to come in the shape of a direct ground invasion of Pakistani territory. It is more likely that Indian security forces will respond through asymmetric methods, increasing attacks in Pakistan using proxy groups.
The Pakistan government's tactic of attempting to divide the militants, even if it were to succeed, will take time to implement. In the interim, the prospects for a lasting peace agreement will remain low, and it is highly likely that the militants will resume attacks on targets such as security forces, government institutions, minority communities, and Western targets in the next six months.
(1338 words)
Pakistan government will seek to exploit Taliban fractures by prolonging peace talks while army prepares offensive - IHS Jane's 360
