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By Amir Mir
ISLAMABAD - A Pakistani court has acquitted a key al-Qaeda operative and an alleged plotter of the November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks in a murder case, with witnesses withdrawing their testimony, likely in fear of reprisals.
Major (retired) Haroon Ashiq, also known as Abu Khattab, is a former Special Service Group (SSG) commando of the Pakistan Army who became a Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) trainer after he left the forces in 2000. He was charged with killing Dr Abdul Saboor
Malik, the administrator of the Sheikh Zayed Hospital in Lahore, but acquitted on March 11 due to a lack of substantial evidence after both prosecution witnesses retracted their testimonies.
Malik was gunned down on January 16, 2009 near his residence in the Model Town area of Lahore. The police had blamed Haroon for the murder because of Saboo's ties with the Ahmadiyah minority community, which is detested by al-Qaeda and Taliban.
Haroon is a close associate of Lashkar-e-Toiba's chief operational commander, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, who is currently being tried by a Pakistani court for allegedly masterminding the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008 which killed 172 people.
Haroon had left the LeT in 2003 over differences with Lakhvi, joining commander Ilyas Kashmiri, the amir of the Harkatul Jehadul Islami (HuJI) a few years later. He was arrested in 2009 for the murder of Major General (retired) Amir Faisal Alvi, the first general officer commanding of the elite Special Service Group, on the orders of Kashmiri, but subsequently acquitted.
Alvi had led several successful military operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in the tribal belt of South Waziristan, including the 2004 Angoor Ada operation in North Waziristan where many Arab and Chechen militants were killed or arrested and turned over to the Americans. Major Gen Alvi was shot dead in Islamabad on November 19, 2008 while driving his car.
The police blamed Kashmiri for the murder, alleging that Haroon was the shooter. A 12-page charge sheet submitted against Haroon in an anti-terrorism court in Rawalpindi stated that Alvi was killed to avenge the role he had played in the fight against al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in the tribal areas of Pakistan.
The charge-sheet prepared by the Koral police station in Rawalpindi said Haroon and two others - Nawaz Khan and Ashfaq Ahmed - were involved in the assassination. It also said Kashmiri had already been named by the intelligence agencies for involvement in the October 2008 kidnapping for ransom of Satish Anand, a Karachi-based renowned Hindu film producer and distributor.
After Satish Anand was rescued in April 2009 and the kidnappers arrested, it transpired during subsequent interrogations that Haroon was involved in the murder of Alvi. According to the murder charge sheet, on the day of the assassination, the three accused - Haroon, Ashfaq and Nawaz - followed Alvi when he left his residence in the Bharia Town area of Rawalpindi and killed him along with his driver.
Haroon's subsequent disclosures during police custody about the links and the activities of Ilyas Kashmiri sent a chill of fear down the spine of his interrogators. Haroon was commissioned in the army in 1987. However, he sought premature retirement in 2001.
Hailing from the Bhimbar district of the Pakistani-Administered Kashmir, Major Haroon was a resident of the Taj Bagh locality in Harbanspura, Lahore. In 2000, when an army officer, Haroon along with his younger brother (Captain Khurram Ashiq, also an army officer), met Commander Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and eventually joined Lashkar-e-Toiba.
He soon became a trainer of the LeT fighters who were dispatched to the Indian-administered Jammu & Kashmir to wage "jihad" against the Indian security forces. However, he had to leave the LeT in December 2003 after developing differences with commander Lakhvi.
Haroon's younger brother, Khurram, was an assault commander of the elite anti-terrorist Zarrar Company of the Special Service Group of the Pakistan Army. The Ashiq family was Salafi and the brothers worshipped Ibn Taymiyyah and Syed Qutb, two presiding saints of al-Qaeda who are the principal inspirations for the type of Islamic ideology pursued by the terror group's current leader, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Asia Times Online's slain Bureau Chief Syed Saleem Shahzad, who was kidnapped and murdered in May 2011, wrote in his book Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11 that for Khurram, faith came before country.
Shahzad noted that while on a United Nations mission in Sierra Leone, Khurram built a mosque and a madrassa in Sierra Leone, despite the opposition of his commander, Brigadier Ahmad Shuja Pasha, later chief of the ISI (p 85). Both brothers (Haroon and Khurram) had joined the LeT, but had soon realized that the LeT was just an extension of Pakistan's armed forces. (p 86).
In December 2006, Haroon and Khurram went to Wana in South Waziristan where they met Pakistani Taliban commander Mullah Nazir. They later traveled to Miramshah in North Waziristan, met with Kashmiri and finally joined hands with him.
In 2007, Khurram went to Afghanistan's Helmand province to fight against Western forces and eventually lost his life in March 2007 while fighting alongside the Afghan Taliban. Saleem Shahzad writes in his book that the 26/11 terrorist attacks that killed 166 people in Mumbai and brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war were scripted by officers from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and approved by al-Qaeda commanders.
Carried out by a group of LeT terrorists who were allegedly trained in Pakistan, the Mumbai episode was actually the revival of an old plan by the ISI to distract the Pakistan Army from the Waziristan tribal region and focus on fighting India instead. This nearly succeeded as the Indo-Pak tensions soared following the 26/11 attacks.
Saleem Shahzad wrote:
With Ilyas Kashmiri's immense expertise on Indian operations, he stunned al-Qaeda leaders with the suggestion that expanding the war theatre was the only way to overcome the present impasse. He suggested conducting an operation in India massive enough to bring India and Pakistan to war and with that all proposed operations against al-Qaeda would be brought to a grinding halt. Al-Qaeda excitedly approved the proposal. Kashmiri then handed over the plan to a very able former Army Major Haroon Ashiq, who was also a former LeT commander who was still very close with Zakiur Rahman Lakhvi. Major Haroon knew about a plan by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence that had been in the pipelines for several months with the official policy to drop it as it was to have been a low-profile routine proxy operation in India through LeT. Major Haroon Ashiq, with the help of Ilyas Kashmiri's men in India, hijacked the ISI plan and turned it into the devastating attacks that shook Mumbai on November 26, 2008 and brought Pakistan and India to the brink of a war."
As an al-Qaeda operative, Major Haroon enjoyed strong contacts inside the Pakistan Army. Saleem Shahzad writes in his book:
Major Haroon developed a silencer for the AK-47. This became an essential component of al-Qaeda's special guerrilla operations. He then visited China to procure night-vision glasses. The biggest task was to clear them through customs in Pakistan, Haroon called on his friend Captain Farooq, who was President [Pervez] Musharraf's security officer. Farooq went to the airport in the president's official car and received Haroon at the immigration counter. In the presence of Farooq, nobody dared touch Haroon's luggage, and the night-vision glasses arrived in Pakistan without any hassle
. (p. 88).
Saleem Shahzad further disclosed that al-Qaeda targeted NATO supplies through Haroon in 2008:
"Major Haroon Ashiq travelled through North Waziristan to Karachi. When night fell, he stayed in army messes in the countryside. Being an ex-army officer he was allowed that facility. He spoke English and Urdu with an unmistakable military accent' (p. 92). He took revenge on Major General Amir Faisal Alvi because the latter had killed a lot of al-Qaeda men - including Abdur Rehman Kennedy - as leader of a Pakistan Army assault on Angoor Adda in North Waziristan. Haroon ambushed Alvi in Islamabad jumping out of his car and killing Alvi with his army revolver' (p 93).
Major Haroon's interrogation officer in Adiala jail of Rawalpindi told Saleem Shahzad that he had started admiring his prisoner. During the interrogation, he admitted to killing Major General Alvi with the help of a man named Major Basit from Karachi.
According to Haroon's own police confession, he was told by Ilyas Kashmiri in early 2008 that the militants were facing financial problems and were in dire need of funds. Kashmiri tasked him with raising funds by kidnapping affluent people living in urban areas. Satish Anand subsequently became the first influential person to be abducted from Karachi. Haroon's interrogators say Ilyas Kashmiri also reportedly paid Rs125,000 to Haroon for killing Alvi.
Despite the revelations from his interrogation, when produced before the court, Haroon retracted his confession. At the next stage, most witnesses and complainants withdrew their testimony against him. Subsequently, a special judge of an Anti-Terrorism Court in Rawalpindi, Raja Ikhlaq Hussain, acquitted Haroon, Nawaz and Ashfaq, again over lack of evidence.
Haroon is not the only al-Qaeda operative to have been acquitted by a Pakistani court for these reasons. The courts have failed to convict a single terrorist during the last three years over the dozens of high-profile terror attacks in Rawalpindi and Islamabad between 2007 and 2010. These attacks mainly targeted the security forces and killed over 200 people.
According to available statistics, of the two dozen cases of suicide attacks targeting the security and law enforcement agencies in and around these cities during last three years, the conviction rate remains zero.
This dire statistic not only affects the resolve of the security forces in fighting terrorism, but also undermines any respect for the judiciary. However, the judicial circles in Rawalpindi blame both the police and the intelligence agencies for the high acquittal rate, asking how can a judge convict without evidence or witnesses?
Amir Mir is a senior Pakistani journalist and the author of several books on the subject of militant Islam and terrorism, the latest being The Bhutto murder trail: From Waziristan to GHQ.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan
ISLAMABAD - A Pakistani court has acquitted a key al-Qaeda operative and an alleged plotter of the November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks in a murder case, with witnesses withdrawing their testimony, likely in fear of reprisals.
Major (retired) Haroon Ashiq, also known as Abu Khattab, is a former Special Service Group (SSG) commando of the Pakistan Army who became a Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) trainer after he left the forces in 2000. He was charged with killing Dr Abdul Saboor
Malik, the administrator of the Sheikh Zayed Hospital in Lahore, but acquitted on March 11 due to a lack of substantial evidence after both prosecution witnesses retracted their testimonies.
Malik was gunned down on January 16, 2009 near his residence in the Model Town area of Lahore. The police had blamed Haroon for the murder because of Saboo's ties with the Ahmadiyah minority community, which is detested by al-Qaeda and Taliban.
Haroon is a close associate of Lashkar-e-Toiba's chief operational commander, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, who is currently being tried by a Pakistani court for allegedly masterminding the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008 which killed 172 people.
Haroon had left the LeT in 2003 over differences with Lakhvi, joining commander Ilyas Kashmiri, the amir of the Harkatul Jehadul Islami (HuJI) a few years later. He was arrested in 2009 for the murder of Major General (retired) Amir Faisal Alvi, the first general officer commanding of the elite Special Service Group, on the orders of Kashmiri, but subsequently acquitted.
Alvi had led several successful military operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in the tribal belt of South Waziristan, including the 2004 Angoor Ada operation in North Waziristan where many Arab and Chechen militants were killed or arrested and turned over to the Americans. Major Gen Alvi was shot dead in Islamabad on November 19, 2008 while driving his car.
The police blamed Kashmiri for the murder, alleging that Haroon was the shooter. A 12-page charge sheet submitted against Haroon in an anti-terrorism court in Rawalpindi stated that Alvi was killed to avenge the role he had played in the fight against al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in the tribal areas of Pakistan.
The charge-sheet prepared by the Koral police station in Rawalpindi said Haroon and two others - Nawaz Khan and Ashfaq Ahmed - were involved in the assassination. It also said Kashmiri had already been named by the intelligence agencies for involvement in the October 2008 kidnapping for ransom of Satish Anand, a Karachi-based renowned Hindu film producer and distributor.
After Satish Anand was rescued in April 2009 and the kidnappers arrested, it transpired during subsequent interrogations that Haroon was involved in the murder of Alvi. According to the murder charge sheet, on the day of the assassination, the three accused - Haroon, Ashfaq and Nawaz - followed Alvi when he left his residence in the Bharia Town area of Rawalpindi and killed him along with his driver.
Haroon's subsequent disclosures during police custody about the links and the activities of Ilyas Kashmiri sent a chill of fear down the spine of his interrogators. Haroon was commissioned in the army in 1987. However, he sought premature retirement in 2001.
Hailing from the Bhimbar district of the Pakistani-Administered Kashmir, Major Haroon was a resident of the Taj Bagh locality in Harbanspura, Lahore. In 2000, when an army officer, Haroon along with his younger brother (Captain Khurram Ashiq, also an army officer), met Commander Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and eventually joined Lashkar-e-Toiba.
He soon became a trainer of the LeT fighters who were dispatched to the Indian-administered Jammu & Kashmir to wage "jihad" against the Indian security forces. However, he had to leave the LeT in December 2003 after developing differences with commander Lakhvi.
Haroon's younger brother, Khurram, was an assault commander of the elite anti-terrorist Zarrar Company of the Special Service Group of the Pakistan Army. The Ashiq family was Salafi and the brothers worshipped Ibn Taymiyyah and Syed Qutb, two presiding saints of al-Qaeda who are the principal inspirations for the type of Islamic ideology pursued by the terror group's current leader, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Asia Times Online's slain Bureau Chief Syed Saleem Shahzad, who was kidnapped and murdered in May 2011, wrote in his book Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11 that for Khurram, faith came before country.
Shahzad noted that while on a United Nations mission in Sierra Leone, Khurram built a mosque and a madrassa in Sierra Leone, despite the opposition of his commander, Brigadier Ahmad Shuja Pasha, later chief of the ISI (p 85). Both brothers (Haroon and Khurram) had joined the LeT, but had soon realized that the LeT was just an extension of Pakistan's armed forces. (p 86).
In December 2006, Haroon and Khurram went to Wana in South Waziristan where they met Pakistani Taliban commander Mullah Nazir. They later traveled to Miramshah in North Waziristan, met with Kashmiri and finally joined hands with him.
In 2007, Khurram went to Afghanistan's Helmand province to fight against Western forces and eventually lost his life in March 2007 while fighting alongside the Afghan Taliban. Saleem Shahzad writes in his book that the 26/11 terrorist attacks that killed 166 people in Mumbai and brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war were scripted by officers from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and approved by al-Qaeda commanders.
Carried out by a group of LeT terrorists who were allegedly trained in Pakistan, the Mumbai episode was actually the revival of an old plan by the ISI to distract the Pakistan Army from the Waziristan tribal region and focus on fighting India instead. This nearly succeeded as the Indo-Pak tensions soared following the 26/11 attacks.
Saleem Shahzad wrote:
With Ilyas Kashmiri's immense expertise on Indian operations, he stunned al-Qaeda leaders with the suggestion that expanding the war theatre was the only way to overcome the present impasse. He suggested conducting an operation in India massive enough to bring India and Pakistan to war and with that all proposed operations against al-Qaeda would be brought to a grinding halt. Al-Qaeda excitedly approved the proposal. Kashmiri then handed over the plan to a very able former Army Major Haroon Ashiq, who was also a former LeT commander who was still very close with Zakiur Rahman Lakhvi. Major Haroon knew about a plan by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence that had been in the pipelines for several months with the official policy to drop it as it was to have been a low-profile routine proxy operation in India through LeT. Major Haroon Ashiq, with the help of Ilyas Kashmiri's men in India, hijacked the ISI plan and turned it into the devastating attacks that shook Mumbai on November 26, 2008 and brought Pakistan and India to the brink of a war."
As an al-Qaeda operative, Major Haroon enjoyed strong contacts inside the Pakistan Army. Saleem Shahzad writes in his book:
Major Haroon developed a silencer for the AK-47. This became an essential component of al-Qaeda's special guerrilla operations. He then visited China to procure night-vision glasses. The biggest task was to clear them through customs in Pakistan, Haroon called on his friend Captain Farooq, who was President [Pervez] Musharraf's security officer. Farooq went to the airport in the president's official car and received Haroon at the immigration counter. In the presence of Farooq, nobody dared touch Haroon's luggage, and the night-vision glasses arrived in Pakistan without any hassle
. (p. 88).
Saleem Shahzad further disclosed that al-Qaeda targeted NATO supplies through Haroon in 2008:
"Major Haroon Ashiq travelled through North Waziristan to Karachi. When night fell, he stayed in army messes in the countryside. Being an ex-army officer he was allowed that facility. He spoke English and Urdu with an unmistakable military accent' (p. 92). He took revenge on Major General Amir Faisal Alvi because the latter had killed a lot of al-Qaeda men - including Abdur Rehman Kennedy - as leader of a Pakistan Army assault on Angoor Adda in North Waziristan. Haroon ambushed Alvi in Islamabad jumping out of his car and killing Alvi with his army revolver' (p 93).
Major Haroon's interrogation officer in Adiala jail of Rawalpindi told Saleem Shahzad that he had started admiring his prisoner. During the interrogation, he admitted to killing Major General Alvi with the help of a man named Major Basit from Karachi.
According to Haroon's own police confession, he was told by Ilyas Kashmiri in early 2008 that the militants were facing financial problems and were in dire need of funds. Kashmiri tasked him with raising funds by kidnapping affluent people living in urban areas. Satish Anand subsequently became the first influential person to be abducted from Karachi. Haroon's interrogators say Ilyas Kashmiri also reportedly paid Rs125,000 to Haroon for killing Alvi.
Despite the revelations from his interrogation, when produced before the court, Haroon retracted his confession. At the next stage, most witnesses and complainants withdrew their testimony against him. Subsequently, a special judge of an Anti-Terrorism Court in Rawalpindi, Raja Ikhlaq Hussain, acquitted Haroon, Nawaz and Ashfaq, again over lack of evidence.
Haroon is not the only al-Qaeda operative to have been acquitted by a Pakistani court for these reasons. The courts have failed to convict a single terrorist during the last three years over the dozens of high-profile terror attacks in Rawalpindi and Islamabad between 2007 and 2010. These attacks mainly targeted the security forces and killed over 200 people.
According to available statistics, of the two dozen cases of suicide attacks targeting the security and law enforcement agencies in and around these cities during last three years, the conviction rate remains zero.
This dire statistic not only affects the resolve of the security forces in fighting terrorism, but also undermines any respect for the judiciary. However, the judicial circles in Rawalpindi blame both the police and the intelligence agencies for the high acquittal rate, asking how can a judge convict without evidence or witnesses?
Amir Mir is a senior Pakistani journalist and the author of several books on the subject of militant Islam and terrorism, the latest being The Bhutto murder trail: From Waziristan to GHQ.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan
