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Pakistan flood response: When money is not enough
By Justine Fleischner
Oct 28, 2010
On a trip to Pakistan last month, I was given the opportunity to accompany a former Middle Eastern diplomat and a Pakistani provincial minister on a tour of the flood-affected area of Nowshera in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK, formerly known as NWFP, the Northwest Frontier Province), the same place visited by Angelina Jolie, UNHCR Goodwill Ambassador for refugees.
The flood waters have long since receded from this area (unlike in the southern part of the country), but the damage left in the floods wake has not only amplified the critical needs of the Pakistani people, but has also exposed the governance deficit in Pakistan at a critical moment. This piece raises questions and outlines some of the most glaring issues raised during our recent visit. The PCR Project has an upcoming report that will deal with these issues in greater depth, so what is written here simply reflects my personal impressions and preliminary analysis of the situation as it was presented to me (my first time in Pakistan as well, mind you).
The main issues discussed were:
- shortcomings in coordination and consultation at the federal, provincial, and local levels within the Pakistani government and poor external coordination with foreign donors and national and international NGOs;
- a perceived lack of a U.S. response;
- impact of the floods on militancy; and
- concern for the lack of long-term commitments made in response to the floods and skepticism in regards to U.S. foreign assistance, specifically, the Kerry-Lugar-Berman money and how it will be spent.
The Local Governance Ordinance (LGO, 2001) implemented under Musharraf created three layers of local administration at the district (zila), sub-district (tehsil), and village or union council level. Intended to improve service delivery and increase accountability at the local level, the reform was marked by unresolved tensions between the elected district nazims and the appointed district coordination officers (DCOs). In December 2009, the LGO lapsed and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani called on the four provincial governments to devise their own local governance systems. While the provincial governments replaced the elected nazims with district administrators, comprehensive local governance arrangements had not yet been formulated when the floods hit the country in July.
This local governance transition was cited as one reason the international response, coordinated through the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA, created after the 2005 earthquake), has often been problematic at the local level. Some officials I spoke with pointed out that without adequate local knowledge or needs assessments, some communities were receiving duplicative aid while others were receiving nothing at all. Recently, NGOs meeting with Gillani called on him to push for reforms in local governance, citing poor coordination and oversight of the relief effort. At the provincial level, the KPK government has criticized the NDMA for misallocating resources to areas less affected by the floods.
Through all the problems with the Pakistani government response, the U.S. has made it clear that the Pakistani government is in the lead. A recent AP article, Trying to win Pakistani trust, 1 flight at a time , highlights many of the positive aspects of this approach. But by taking this approach, the United States risks looking as if it has done very little. The idea of giving aid and not putting your name on it was a recommendation from a number of influential Pakistanis back in 2007, but during our most recent trip that sentiment seems to have changed. A number of Pakistani experts interviewed had trouble identifying concrete projects the U.S. had undertaken. While the Chinook helicopters sent by the U.S. military are helping to combat this view, it is a view held by many in Pakistan.
Another issue that was discussed was the extent to which the perceived lack of international and Pakistani government response to the floods has created an opportunity for militants and extremist groups to further entrench themselves. According to local officials in KPK, in the immediate aftermath of the floods, the impoverished Pakistanis most affected by the disaster continued to accept aid from multiple sources, regardless of whether they had received any previous assistance or where it was coming from, although the militant response seems to have been overblown.
While the response of the Pakistani government and the international community was delayed (partially as a result of the governance gap outlined above and also as a result of the precarious security situation), the response of groups such as Jama'at-ud-Da'wah (JuD) which has been blacklisted for its alleged ties to the banned militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), (an allegation JuD denies and is actively disputing at the UN and in Pakistani courts) was immediate and well coordinated through their charitable wing, the Falah-e-Insaniyat foundation (FIF). But it seems most Pakistanis do not consider JuD a militant group. (A more in-depth discussion of JuD will be addressed in our upcoming report.)
The consequences the floods will have on militancy in Pakistan will not be immediate. If communities do not receive the long-term assistance they need to rebuild their homes and livelihoods, and if injustice, human rights abuses, and economic inequality are allowed to continue unchecked, the floods will only serve to exacerbate the rate at which these conditions become unbearable.
It is the intent of the Kerry-Lugar money to better improve the lives of the Pakistani people, but the lack of connectivity and coordination amongst the various levels of the Pakistani government and the near absence of Pakistani political accountability to the poorest people in Pakistan raises the question of how the money will get to where it needs to go. How much is too much in terms of aid when you are calling on a country to reform its tax-collection system and improve transparency? What are the incentives put forth by the U.S. to make real governance reforms and what are the long-term commitments? But most importantly, how will the money be used to address the most pressing underlying political issue in Pakistan: promoting Pakistani political accountability to its own citizens.
By Justine Fleischner
Oct 28, 2010
On a trip to Pakistan last month, I was given the opportunity to accompany a former Middle Eastern diplomat and a Pakistani provincial minister on a tour of the flood-affected area of Nowshera in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK, formerly known as NWFP, the Northwest Frontier Province), the same place visited by Angelina Jolie, UNHCR Goodwill Ambassador for refugees.
The flood waters have long since receded from this area (unlike in the southern part of the country), but the damage left in the floods wake has not only amplified the critical needs of the Pakistani people, but has also exposed the governance deficit in Pakistan at a critical moment. This piece raises questions and outlines some of the most glaring issues raised during our recent visit. The PCR Project has an upcoming report that will deal with these issues in greater depth, so what is written here simply reflects my personal impressions and preliminary analysis of the situation as it was presented to me (my first time in Pakistan as well, mind you).
The main issues discussed were:
- shortcomings in coordination and consultation at the federal, provincial, and local levels within the Pakistani government and poor external coordination with foreign donors and national and international NGOs;
- a perceived lack of a U.S. response;
- impact of the floods on militancy; and
- concern for the lack of long-term commitments made in response to the floods and skepticism in regards to U.S. foreign assistance, specifically, the Kerry-Lugar-Berman money and how it will be spent.
The Local Governance Ordinance (LGO, 2001) implemented under Musharraf created three layers of local administration at the district (zila), sub-district (tehsil), and village or union council level. Intended to improve service delivery and increase accountability at the local level, the reform was marked by unresolved tensions between the elected district nazims and the appointed district coordination officers (DCOs). In December 2009, the LGO lapsed and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani called on the four provincial governments to devise their own local governance systems. While the provincial governments replaced the elected nazims with district administrators, comprehensive local governance arrangements had not yet been formulated when the floods hit the country in July.
This local governance transition was cited as one reason the international response, coordinated through the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA, created after the 2005 earthquake), has often been problematic at the local level. Some officials I spoke with pointed out that without adequate local knowledge or needs assessments, some communities were receiving duplicative aid while others were receiving nothing at all. Recently, NGOs meeting with Gillani called on him to push for reforms in local governance, citing poor coordination and oversight of the relief effort. At the provincial level, the KPK government has criticized the NDMA for misallocating resources to areas less affected by the floods.
Through all the problems with the Pakistani government response, the U.S. has made it clear that the Pakistani government is in the lead. A recent AP article, Trying to win Pakistani trust, 1 flight at a time , highlights many of the positive aspects of this approach. But by taking this approach, the United States risks looking as if it has done very little. The idea of giving aid and not putting your name on it was a recommendation from a number of influential Pakistanis back in 2007, but during our most recent trip that sentiment seems to have changed. A number of Pakistani experts interviewed had trouble identifying concrete projects the U.S. had undertaken. While the Chinook helicopters sent by the U.S. military are helping to combat this view, it is a view held by many in Pakistan.
Another issue that was discussed was the extent to which the perceived lack of international and Pakistani government response to the floods has created an opportunity for militants and extremist groups to further entrench themselves. According to local officials in KPK, in the immediate aftermath of the floods, the impoverished Pakistanis most affected by the disaster continued to accept aid from multiple sources, regardless of whether they had received any previous assistance or where it was coming from, although the militant response seems to have been overblown.
While the response of the Pakistani government and the international community was delayed (partially as a result of the governance gap outlined above and also as a result of the precarious security situation), the response of groups such as Jama'at-ud-Da'wah (JuD) which has been blacklisted for its alleged ties to the banned militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), (an allegation JuD denies and is actively disputing at the UN and in Pakistani courts) was immediate and well coordinated through their charitable wing, the Falah-e-Insaniyat foundation (FIF). But it seems most Pakistanis do not consider JuD a militant group. (A more in-depth discussion of JuD will be addressed in our upcoming report.)
The consequences the floods will have on militancy in Pakistan will not be immediate. If communities do not receive the long-term assistance they need to rebuild their homes and livelihoods, and if injustice, human rights abuses, and economic inequality are allowed to continue unchecked, the floods will only serve to exacerbate the rate at which these conditions become unbearable.
It is the intent of the Kerry-Lugar money to better improve the lives of the Pakistani people, but the lack of connectivity and coordination amongst the various levels of the Pakistani government and the near absence of Pakistani political accountability to the poorest people in Pakistan raises the question of how the money will get to where it needs to go. How much is too much in terms of aid when you are calling on a country to reform its tax-collection system and improve transparency? What are the incentives put forth by the U.S. to make real governance reforms and what are the long-term commitments? But most importantly, how will the money be used to address the most pressing underlying political issue in Pakistan: promoting Pakistani political accountability to its own citizens.
