Pakistan air force superiority over Indian air force in all wars?

[pakman786]

I have seen videos on YouTube that show the dominance of Pakistan air force over the iaf. In the war of 1965 Pakistan shot down 119 Indian jets while losing 28 of their own. Even in other wars such as the Russia afghan war Pakistan shot down 7 Russian jets while losing none of their own. Or the y kippur war when Pakistan shot down Israeli jets while losing none of their own. Is the air force the strongest military branch in the country? And does anyone know if these statistics are true?

 

[yyetttt]

yup all the facts are true of paf doing this and that . don't let indians get you down.

 

[shuntmaster]

Wars are not numbers games, like in video games, the guy who shoots most wins. Wars are about achieving objectives. In terms of achieving the objective assigned to it in the 3 indo-pak wars, IAF did quite well. The main objective was always ground support for the army and destroying vital or strategic enemy installations and not enemy air-craft kills. In this sense, IAF conducted more air sorties then PAF.

 

[killerx]

Pakistan air force is the best trained pilots and air force may not have the best fighter jet but we were the aces on the equipment we had and 1965 1971 was to era of dog fights now it mostly in BVR fights Pakistan ha recently have acquired the BVR F16B52 and JF17 thunder and mirage and also perform BVR fights but Pakistan air force focus most on dog fights training and now also in BVR fights in Pakistan and India still even with new advance BVR jets if there is to be war in future the fights between the two air forces most fighters will come to dog fights for sure and PAF has remarkable history in dog fights with India and other countries and the statistics are true no and PAF has proven it self in many battles

 

[AUz]

To the OP :

Yes PAF did thrash IAF in past wars , specially 65'. But IAF recovered and today they are stronger but not invincible like USAF or Russian Air Force would be. Next war between India and Pakistan isn't happening because it would take ALOT of guts for India to attack Pakistan and Indians certainly didn't have enough guts during previous stand offs..Forget about the future because now we are way stronger as compared 2001/02 ... Indians certainly won't like to see Indian civilization turning into clouds of red smoke and hence they won't go all out against Pakistan.

Mods please close the thread now.

 

[RazPaK]

Pakistan air force is the best trained pilots and air force may not have the best fighter jet but we were the aces on the equipment we had and 1965 1971 was to era of dog fights now it mostly in BVR fights Pakistan ha recently have acquired the BVR F16B52 and JF17 thunder and mirage and also perform BVR fights but Pakistan air force focus most on dog fights training and now also in BVR fights in Pakistan and India still even with new advance BVR jets if there is to be war in future the fights between the two air forces most fighters will come to dog fights for sure and PAF has remarkable history in dog fights with India and other countries and the statistics are true no and PAF has proven it self in many battles

I agree. In terms of dog fighting Pakistan is far superior.

 

[Agnostic_Indian]

To the OP :

Yes PAF did thrash IAF in past wars , specially 65'. But IAF recovered and today they are stronger but not invincible like USAF or Russian Air Force would be. Next war between India and Pakistan isn't happening because it would take ALOT of guts for India to attack Pakistan and Indians certainly didn't have enough guts during previous stand offs..Forget about the future because now we are way stronger as compared 2001/02 ... Indians certainly won't like to see Indian civilization turning into clouds of red smoke and hence they won't go all out against Pakistan.

Mods please close the thread now.

it's not that we are afraid to retaliate..military solution was just one of the options we had on table,we choose diplomatic ways and pretty much exposed you to the world..so we win with out firing bullets..war is a last option for any country which is lead by people with some brain.

 

[Windjammer]

The figure for the Soviet/Afghan kills is inaccurate, there were at least 12 confirmed kills while other sources put it as high as 16.

 

[killerx]

Pakistan air force have proven greatly its self in dog fights and let India try to come close for BVR flight with PAF jets

 

[Windjammer]

Here is a little gem from PAF's proud traditions.

On 23 October 1973, PAF pilot Flt. Lt. M. Hatif on deputation to Egyptian Air Force (EAF) was flying a EAF MiG-21 in a defensive combat air patrol (CAP) over Egypt when he was vectored towards an intruding Israeli Air Force (IDF/AF) F-4 Phantom. In the ensuing dogfight, Flt. Lt. M. Hatif shot down the Israeli Phantom.

PAF vs IAF - Naseeb.com

 

[shuntmaster]

1965 INDIA PAKISTAN AIR OPERATIONS

A critical look at the 1965 operations

Air Chief Marshal P C Lal at the National Security Lecture 1973 at the USI.​

Early in 1965, Pakistan attacked us in Kutch, in Western India. The attack caught the armed forces unawares. The Army took the field without any prior planning or preparation. Its reaction was fast but there was no joint Army-Air Force plan, and all that the Air Force could do was to provide logistic support with light aircraft. The possibility of tactical support was considered after the fighting began. It was then realised that our bases were so far from the battle zone that our aircraft would have to operate at extreme range with reduced weapon loads while Pakistani aircraft could dominate the entire combat area from bases close by. Given time, we could also have improvised an airfield or two In or near Kutch, but the fighting ended before that. The incident was soon defused but, apparently, not before It had encouraged Pakistan in the belief that the time had come to settle the Kashmir dispute by force of arms.

Then In August and September 1965 came the second Kashmir War. It began with skirmishes in the valley by so-called freedom fighters, in reality agents of Pakistan. These were followed, towards the end of August, by an all-out attack by Pakistani armour in the Chamb area of Jammu province, with the obvious objective of cutting the Jammu-Srinagar highway. Our Army, working under the restrictions of the Cease Fire agreement, was lightly equipped in that sector and though it fought valiantly, its AMX tanks were no match for the more .powerful Pakistani Pattons. While there was some hope of the Army holding the Pakistani.attack on its own, there was no talk of bringing the Air Force Into the conflict. But on 1st September, with the Pakistanis pressing forward from Jaurian, General Chaudhuri, the Army Chief, was compelled to ask for air support.

There had been no prior joint planning for such an eventuality. Air Marshal Arjan Singh, the Air Chief, had on his own alerted the air bases in the Punjab. When the call came, a force of fighter bombers from Pathankot mounted a strike on the Pakistanis within minutes of being ordered to do so. It was a touch-and-go affair, because the demand for air support came late in the afternoon and the strike had to be mounted in an area with which our pilots were not familiar. With only a few minutes of daylight left, they could have missed the battle zone or attacked the wrong targets. Fortunately they did neither and so helped to bring the Pakistani force to a halt.

At this point, it is interesting to consider in somewhat greater detail why there was no prior planning.of Army -Air operations even though, as General Chaudhari said In his 1971 National Security Lecture, he expected the Pakistanis to attack In Kashmir after the Kutch Incident. Basically, I think. It was because he and his commanders.were wedded to the idea that military operations were principally an Army affair and that the other services could only operate on the fringe, as it were, with an occasional bonus from the Air Force. This was compounded by a big-brother attitude towards the Air Force which led to its being treated with a certain amount of indulgence but prevented it being accepted as a vital and equal partner in war. Matters were further complicated by the belief that If the Indian Air Force took part In the fighting then the Pakistani Air Force would do likewise, thus Increasing the likelihood of a general war between the two countries instead of a localised conflict in J & K. There was a good deal of truth in this, of course, but this was a possibility from which there was no escape. Indeed, this was a possibility that could not be ignored for Pakistan had already been warned that any attack on Jammu and Kashmir would be treated as an attack on India. With a political direction as clear as that on the record, it was incumbent on the Chiefs of Staff to have their plans ready for such a contingency. The fact that they did not is indicative of the thinking at the time.

The events In the Chamb-Jaurlan sector leading to the call for air support took matters out of the Army's hands. At that stage the Government had to decide whether to enlarge the area of conflict, and it did so without hesitation. That, indeed, appeared to be the only way to divert Pakistani forces from the vulnerable Jammu-Srinagar highway, the loss of which would have jeopardised the defence of the Valley. With the decision to fight Pakistan outside J & K, the Army had to move up forces from peace time stations, some from the Deccan and further south, and formulate an operational plan at short notice.

During the five days that elapsed between the Government decision and the date set for Implementing it, there was some discussion of how the Army and the Air Force should operate. On the Army side, the notion persisted that it would fight on its own, with the Air Force providing an occasional bonus; and in the Air Force, where I was Vice-Chief, we thought of fighting mainly an air war against the PAF and what we considered to be strategic targets, assigning relatively low priority to support the Army. Separate plans were hastily drawn up by each Service with no Joint consultation worth the name. And again, no tasks were envisaged for the Navy.

Please note that In 1965, the higher defence organisation was functioning and the Chiefs of Staff Committee met regularly under the chairmanship of General Chaudhuri. Officers In positions of authority had read and studied and taught the procedures for inter-service co- operation. It was not realised, however, that even when the general drill is known, each particular task still requires a great deal of preparatory work, that the persons taking part need to be trained for It, that supporting facilities have to be arranged for In advance, and this has to be done for every contingency that can be envisaged. Flexibility in battle Is gained only through long and arduous preparation.

That we discovered when we entered Pakistan. Soon the Army found that it could not fight entirely on its own, for the PAF was constantly harassing It. The Army needed air defence and tactical support but no detailed arrangements-had been made for either. The Air Force was willing to help and it did all it could but in the absence of joint plans, large gaps remained in the air cover in the combat zone. Neither did the air operations, through which we hoped to immobilize the PAF and reduce Pakistan's ability to make war, achieve much for we had no well thought out target system for the purpose. Having had some responsibility for all this, I must confess that the air war became a somewhat hit- and-miss affair, that depended heavily on finding targets of opportunity for its success. The aircrew performed magnificently, doing all that was expected of them and more; had there been a coherent joint war plan, we would have derived much fuller benefit from their courage and sacrifice.

Our advance Into Pakistan caught the Pakistani forces by surprise. I Imagine they had not thought the Indian Government and Armed Forces capable of swift decisions and speedy action. The initial successes of our Army were soon checked by stiff resistance, a notable feature of which was the close co-operation between the Pakistani Army and Air Force. The two of them had obviously done their homework well. for our jawans reported that the PAF were quick to appear whenever the Pakistani ground forces were In difficulties, and gave them most effective support. This was the more remarkable because unlike our set-up. In which all three Service Chiefs and their Headquarters were based at Delhi, the Pakistani Air Chief was located at Peshawar, the Army Chief at Islamabad, near Rawalpindi, and the Naval Chief at Karachi. The fact that their forces managed to work well together speaks well for their mutual understanding, which is more Important than physical proximity. Furthermore, since Pakistan had been the one to start the fighting In J & K, it Is to be presumed that Its Service Chiefs had given some thought to the possibility of a more widespread conflict and prepared for It accordingly.

Despite Its preparations, however, Pakistan failed to make any inroads In J & K and just about held its own elsewhere. We advanced up to the Ichhogil canal. West Pakistan's first line of defence, and towards Slalkot. Pakistani forces came into Indian territory around Gadra Road in Rajasthan. Except for a single PAF attack on an Indian Air Force base near Calcutta, there was no fighting In the east. Our Navy had no operational tasks but suffered a sea-borne attack at Dwarka In the west. The. fighting was brought to a halt by 22nd September, the Army having been engaged In combat for nearly a month and a half and the Air Force for 22 days. At the turn of the year came the Tashkent agreement, negotiated by our then Prime Minister, the late Mr Lal Bahadur Shastri.

In retrospect, it is clear that the 1965 war was successful as a defensive action, for it managed to preserve the status quo In Kashmir, but the operations In the Punjab and Rajasthan were Inconclusive. We failed to make a real dent In Pakistan's forces, both on the ground and in the air. The Navy being far removed from Kashmir took no part In the fighting.

With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see what part the higher defence organisation played in the 1965 war. Frankly, I do not think It made any significant contribution. I say this after careful thought, knowing that one of our distinguished Army Chiefs, General J N Chaudhuri, was then Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Even at the risk of his displeasure, I must say that he failed to get the organisation working as It should have done. The General himself admits as much, without meaning to. In the published version of the National Security lectures that he delivered in this institution In 1971. He said In those lectures that he saw the Kutch incident as a prelude to an attack by Pakistan in Jammu. and Kashmir, and he therefore began the Army's preparations well in advance. He omits to mention that the Air Force and the Navy were kept in the dark about this. He goes on to say that he often discussed the threat with the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister and that, once in a while, he took the Air Chief along with him. The impression conveyed Is that he looked upon the Impending conflict as an Army affair, in which the use of the Air Force would be Incidental. To my mind, this reflects an attitude long prevalent in the Army, and only recently dissipated, to the effect that Its larger size and greater age gave It a commanding superiority over the other services and Invested It with the sole right to decide how wars should be fought. I may be reading too much Into a single statement, but to me It is axiomatic that effective co-operation between the Services can grow only out of mutual trust and full understanding of each others capabilities and limitations. I think that was lacking In 1965.

In any case, the Air Force and Navy, not having been alerted about the possibility of another war over Kashmir, no inter-service contingency plans were drawn up, nor was any course of action agreed upon with the Air Force in the event of Its being called out to support the Army. This mental block against consultation and joint planning continued right through the phase of guerrilla activity and was only partly removed when Pakistani armour threatened to cut the Jammu-Srinagar highway. It was at that critical stage, on 1st September 1965, that the Air Force was asked for air support, which It gave at short notice. Complaints from our forward troops about the limited extent of air cover in the war that followed were well-founded, for in the absence of precise plans the Air Force had simply maintained Its normal forces at its bases in the Punjab and In (Jammu and Kashmir. To do Its job properly, some redeployment of squadrons and of logistic and communication facilities should have been effected before the commencement of hostilities. Had the joint planners been able to do their work In advance, I am certain more positive results would have been achieved In 1965. However, apart from preserving the status quo in Kashmir, the 1965 war was valuable for the many practical lessons it taught us In the conduct of operations from the highest level to combat in the field. In the years that followed these lessons were absorbed and applied.

----------------------
There are conflicting claims by either side on this issue. Pakistani sources suggest that Indian losses were in the range of 59–110 and Pakistani losses were around 18–43. Recent works have, however, attempted to move beyond the raw statistics of the number of losses each side incurred, arguing that in terms of aircraft lost to sorties flown, the Indian Air Force's attrition rate (1.5%) was lower than the Pakistani attrition rate (1.82%). Arguably this indicates that had the war continued, the PAF would have found it increasingly difficult to sustain operations at the same level.Nevertheless, a similar argument can be made about the IAF also, although it did have a significant size advantage that might have proved telling if the war had been prolonged.
Another factor which makes it difficult to determine the outcome of the 1965 air war is the issue of aircraft lost in the air in air-to-air combat or to ground fire as opposed to aircraft lost on the ground due to bombing. Indian sources claimed that a large number of Indian aircraft losses occurred on the ground during the attacks on Kalaikkunda and Pathankot—up to 60 per cent by some accounts
Results of Air Combat: Indian sources have claimed that India lost 24 aircraft in air-to-air combat and ground-to-air fire, while PAF lost 37 aircraft in air-to-air combat. Air Commodore Jasjit Singh of India claimed that Pakistan ended the war having depleted 17 percent of its front line strength, while India's losses amounted to less than 10 percent. Moreover, the loss rate had begun to even out, and it has been estimated that another three week's fighting would have seen the Pakistani losses rising to 33 percent and India's losses totalling 15 percent

 

[Guest01]

Bhaiya please give me a clue. Pakistani Army is verified to be consisting of marde-monims. One can kill 10 baniya hindus. Pakistani Air Force is consisting of jungi-jaanbaazs and parinda-e-aaftaabs. They can easily mow down the slow and coward hindu pilots. Pakistani Nay is consisting of jaanbaz - tairaaqs and having jazbaa-e-qasim. They can blow potty out of the dark skinned hindu castist weak naval officers and men.

Then how come Pakistan has suffered all defeats at the hands of India? How come that Niazi sahab was signing a certainly letter of surrender of some 90,000 (about Ninety Thousand Men Only). Also a Pakistani submarine is lying at Vizag I guess. I think called Gazni (not the hit movie) or some scary name like that. I think estimated over 100 found peace lying there on the ocean floor.

Can someone also check youtube to please tell why Pakistan actually got disintegrated and surrendered and lost the wars? Major disconnect I must say. Very confusing stuff!!

 

[pakman786]

Bhaiya please give me a clue. Pakistani Army is verified to be consisting of marde-monims. One can kill 10 baniya hindus. Pakistani Air Force is consisting of jungi-jaanbaazs and parinda-e-aaftaabs. They can easily mow down the slow and coward hindu pilots. Pakistani Nay is consisting of jaanbaz - tairaaqs and having jazbaa-e-qasim. They can blow potty out of the dark skinned hindu castist weak naval officers and men.

Then how come Pakistan has suffered all defeats at the hands of India? How come that Niazi sahab was signing a certainly letter of surrender of some 90,000 (about Ninety Thousand Men Only). Also a Pakistani submarine is lying at Vizag I guess. I think called Gazni (not the hit movie) or some scary name like that. I think estimated over 100 found peace lying there on the ocean floor.

Can someone also check youtube to please tell why Pakistan actually got disintegrated and surrendered and lost the wars? Major disconnect I must say. Very confusing stuff!!

All wars? The only war we openly surrendered was 1971. We kicked Indian anus in 1965. But indian runs to the united nations who declare a ceasefire. We would have had the victory otherwise

 

[RazPaK]

 

[Windjammer]

Understandably, as in any war, both parties will lay claim to victory, hence a neutral partyu is probably the most reliable source to judge the outcome. This is how the world media reported on the 1965 war.


SUNDAY TIMES, London, September 19, 1965.

"Pakistan has been able to gain complete command of the air by literally knocking the Indian planes out of the skies if they had not already run away.
Indian pilots are inferior to Pakistan's pilots and Indian officer's leadership has been generally deplorable. India is being soundly beaten by a nation which is outnumbered by a four and half to one in population and three to one in size of armed forces".

Peter Preston, The Guardian, London.
September 24, 1965.

"One thing I am convinced of is that Pakistan morally and even physically won the air battle against immense odds.
Although the Air Force gladly gives most credit to the Army, this is perhaps over-generous. India with roughly five times greater air power, expected an easy air superiority. Her total failure to attain it may be seen retrospectively as a vital, possibly the most vital, factor of the whole conflict.
Nur Khan is an alert, incisive man of 41, who seems even less. For six years until July he was on secondment and responsible for running Pakistan civil airline, which in a country, where now means sometime and sometime means never, is a model of efficiency. He talks without the jargon of a press relations officer. He does not quibble about figures, immediately one has confidence in what he says. His estimates proffered diffidently, but with as much photographic evidence as possible, speak for themselves. Indian and Pakistani losses, he thinks are in something like the ratio of ten to one.
"The Indians had no sense of purpose, the Pakistanis were defending their country and willingly taking greater risks. The average bomber crew flew 15 to 20 sorties. My difficulty was restraining them, not pushing them on".
" This is more than nationalistic pride. Talk to the pilots themselves, and you get the same intense story".


Patrick Seale, The Observer, London.
September 12, 1965.

"Pakistan's success in the air means that she had been able to deploy her relatively small army___ professionally among the best in Asia___ with impunity, plugging gaps in the long front in the face of each Indian thrust.
By all accounts the courage displayed by the PAF pilots is reminiscent of the bravery of the few young and dedicated pilots who saved this country from Nazi invaders in the critical Battle of Britain during the last war".


Roy Meloni, Correspondent of ABC,
September 15, 1965.

"I have been a journalist now for 20 years and want to go on record that i have never seen a more confident and victorious groups of soldiers than those fighting for Pakistan right now.
"India is claiming all out victory, i have not been able to find any trace of it. All i can see are troops, tanks and other war material rolling in a steady stream towards the front.
If the Indian Air Force is so victorious, why has it not tried to halt this flow?
The answer is that it has been knocked from the skies by Pakistani planes. These Muslims of Pakistan are natural fighters and they ask for no quarter and they give none.
In any war, such as the one going on between India and Pakistan right now, the propaganda claims on either side are likely to be startling, but if i have to take bet today, my money would be on Pakistan side.
Pakistan claims to have destroyed something like one third of the Indian Air Force, and foreign observers, who are in a position to know say that the actual kills may be even higher, but the PAF authorities are being scrupulously honest in evaluating these claims. They are crediting PAF only those killing that can be checked and verified from other sources.

Everett G Martin, General Editor, Newsweek,
September 20 1965.

"One point particularly noted by military observers is that in their first advances the Indians did not use Air power effectively to support their troops. By contrast, Pakistan, with sophisticated timing swooped in on several Indian bases and destroyed dozens of planes without any resistance from the Indians.
By the end of the week, it was clear that the Pakistanis were more than holding their own".

INDONESIAN HERALD,
September 11 1965.


"The chief of Indian Air Force could no longer ensure the safety of Indian air space. A well known Indian journalist, Frank Moraes, in a talk from All-India Radio also admitted that Indian Air Force had suffered severe losses and it was no use hiding the fact and India should be prepared for more losses.........".