Pak Tribesmen Moving Against Militants

[batmannow]

Pak Tribesmen Moving Against Militants
October 13, 2008
Associated Press

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan - Pakistani tribesmen are raising armies to battle al-Qaida and Taliban militants close to the Afghan border - a movement encouraged by the military and hailed as a sign its offensive there is succeeding.

The often ramshackle forces lend force to the campaign in the lawless and mountainous region, but analysts question their effectiveness against a well-armed, well-trained and increasingly brutal insurgency.

The extremists are increasingly targeting the militias, an indication they believe them to be a threat.

On Sunday, two tribesman were killed during an army-backed offensive against insurgents in the Bajur tribal region. Government official Jamil Khan said helicopter gunships shelled militants' bunkers, killing at least 10 people. Fifteen more suspected militants were killed in separate clashes, he said.

On Friday, Oct. 10, a suicide bomber killed more than 50 tribesman gathering to form an army. Eight pro-government tribesmen have been beheaded in recent days.

By encouraging the private armies, or "lashkars," the government is exploiting local resentment against foreign and Pakistani extremists in the area, considered a likely hiding place for Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaida leaders.

"These Taliban call themselves Muslims, but they have been involved in all kinds of crimes," said Malik Mohmmand Habib, a leader of the Salarzai tribe, one of the largest of at least five tribes who have formed lashkars in recent weeks. "We want them out of our area."

Habib claims up to 15,000 men in his lashkar. Similar figures have been given by other leaders of private armies but those claims could not be independently verified. Analysts caution tribesman are likely exaggerating, perhaps by as much as 50 percent.

The lashkars have drawn comparisons with government-backed militia in Iraq - the so-called awakening councils - that have been credited with beating back the insurgency there.

But the lashkars are less organized and the tribesman use their own, often aging, weapons. The government does not admit to funding the armies, but analysts suspect the leaders at least receive money.

It is also unclear how much front-line fighting lashkars are involved in. They have been photographed on patrol with military units and have reportedly been involved in several clashes, but their main task appears to be holding areas cleared of insurgents by the army.

Army spokesman Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas praised the formation of the armies, but gave few details of how they operate.

Shuja Nawaz, a prominent Pakistani security analyst, said the tribesmen were rising up because they were genuinely unhappy with the presence of the militants, but stressed the government must quickly build roads, schools and undertake other development projects there to cement the successes.

"It is a continuation of the British colonial tradition of paying off the tribes," said Nawaz, adding that historically such deals to buy loyalty often broke down.

Militants in the border region are blamed for surging violence against U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, leading to fears the war there is unwinnable seven years after the Taliban was ousted.

They are also behind an increasingly virulent campaign of suicide attacks on Western, civilian and military targets within Pakistan that threatens to destabilize the nuclear-armed country.

Pakistan's broadly secular, pro-U.S. government is trying to channel public anger at those attacks, including the Sept. 20 blast at the Marriott hotel, into support for its anti-terror fight.

Seeking to overcome a common perception that the fight is America's war, the government often holds up the emergence of the tribal armies as proof that locals are behind the campaign.

That task has become increasingly complicated by suspected U.S. missile strikes within Pakistani territory that are believed to have killed more than 100 people, mostly alleged militants.

The latest barrage, reported Sunday, in Pakistan's northwest killed five people, none were believed to be foreign al-Qaida fighters, officials said.

Some fear the lashkars could become a problem in the future with the private armies turning on each other or on the state itself.

"You are creating a very polarized society that doesn't auger well for the stability of the area," said Rustam Shah Mohmand, former ambassador to Afghanistan and political commentator. "I think this leads to a very, very confusing situation as far as law and order is concerned."

Since last year, the militants have taken over large swaths of the tribal region, a 10,425 square mile patch of rugged land where the government has never had much control.

Responding to U.S. pressure, the army launched a major offensive in early August in Bajur agency, where it claims to have killed more than 1,000 militants.

Despite that operation, U.S. officials and others in region allege that elements within Pakistan's army and spy agency are supporting the militants, in part because they believe the country's strategic interests are best served by an unstable Afghanistan.

 

[Kasrkin]

But the lashkars are less organized and the tribesman use their own, often aging, weapons. The government does not admit to funding the armies, but analysts suspect the leaders at least receive money.

Their weapons looked fine to me and at par with the militants, but I think its obvious their tactics will be lacking as will their combat experince. But all that is likely to change once the clashes get underway.

Also I think it would be a good idea to send squads of SSG dressed as tribesmen along with these Lashkars to help call in air strikes or artillary fire and coordinate with the armed forces. Also to lead from the front, inspire confidence in these relativily untested men and act as body guards to these Lashkar commanders at the same time being seen as a symbol of respect and token of appreciation from the Pakistan Army. That is the sort of thing US Army Rangers are trained for, after all...

 

[S-2]

"That is the sort of thing US Army Rangers are trained for, after all..."

Actually it isn't. U.S. Army Ranger battalions are assault light infantry designed to seize and hold key targets. I've never seen a ranger battalion out of uniform.

Perhaps U.S. Army Special Forces are what you're thinking of but, while your idea is sound, I'd encourage your SSG to operate IN UNIFORM at the ostensible hand of these tribal leaders.

"...their main task appears to be holding areas cleared of insurgents by the army."

and this would be an appropriate mission given their skill-sets and armament.

"Shuja Nawaz, a prominent Pakistani security analyst... stressed the government must quickly build roads, schools and undertake other development projects there to cement the successes"

Having cleared and determined to hold, it would be great if P.A. engineer companies not directly engaged in support of army forces doing battle would begin the rudimentary but visible work that might show these tribes the GoP's commitment to their improvement. It doesn't take much yet needs to be immediately on the heels of military success.

However, these laskars bear very little relationship to the al-anbar tribes in functional objectives nor does the currently unfolding process compare even remotely to "the awakening". The context is entirely different.

Brig. Gen. H.R. McMaster's 3rd Armored Cav Regt. is credited with opening the so-called "awakening" in Tal Afar, Iraq. What's relevant to now was his insistance that kinetics and kindness go hand-in-hand. Like it or not, security MUST be present to assure the good work of doctors, engineers, and construction teams. This was present in Iraq and is less so in Afghanistan owing to the paucity of troops. Good projects are started, even completed, and then torn down after ISAF forces move on and ANA/ANP prove incapable of exerting the GoA's writ.

The bad guys must be whacked. The re-construction teams must come. The security must stay.

Oh! In Iraq, there was a fairly hefty quid pro quo applied too. Tribes were held responsible for the good order of their areas. Bio-metrics were used to identify and record base data on participating "awakening" members in the event that they were participants by day and guerrillas by night.

Finally, we see now the reluctance of the al-Maliki gov't to integrate these sunni warriors into the Iraqi nat'l army. This indicates, whatever the shia regime in Iraq may think, that sunnis wish to be integrated into the political process and become stakeholders in Iraq. That may change depending on the Iraqi gov't. It also shows that it's the Americans that sunni Iraqis currently look to as fair arbiters and partners, not the nat'l gov't. No doubt that if the shia gov't of Iraq doesn't integrate these men into viable roles in their nation they'll go back out on the warpath. Understandable too.

I'm unsure that those objectives prevail for the Pashtu tribes along the border. Too, success here could easily encourage and empower further aspirations of autonomy by these tribes.

IMHO, the relationship must ultimately change to where these people are integrated as full citizens under one law with the rest of Pakistan. They must bear all the rights and responsibilities of citizenship like those of the rest of the nation. Ultimately, tribal culture or otherwise, only legitimate law enforcement institutions can bear arms and enforce the state's writ.

It is also the best way for Pakistan to establish a de facto "Durand Line" along desired locations while defining the geographical limits of it's sovereign control. In some respects, final resolution of the Afghan-Pakistan border might entail a race between two nations- Afghanistan pushing east while Pakistan pushes west. Given Afghanistan's continuing lassitude, this is not a race that Pakistan should lose.

 

[Kasrkin]

LOL, right ofcourse, how embarrassing, my bad! I was thinking about the Green Berets, dunno why I wrote Rangers...

P.S. Good thinking and all but I dont see how SSG would be any help in reconstruction or even holding lines. Thats not their job and thats not what they specialize in. I had more of an aggressive approch in mind, whereby the Lashkars could be used to protect the flanks or plug holes or routes in the Durrand line or between agencies that the militants might use to escape from or attack the larger conventional Pakistan Forces and their operations...

 

[S-2]

The traditional quid pro quo between the tribes and the GoP never entailed this condition. The circumstance has compelled the nat'l army to the field within your borders. As such, the conditions demand as much professionalism as possible in very difficult terrain. With SSG assistance or not, I think you ask too much of these lashkars and, in doing, misuse their best asset- local and intimate knowledge.

Clear the areas in which they live and allow them to reassert local control over their domains. This will be hard. "flanks" or "plug[ging] holes" implies something of a linear battlefield but it's nothing of the kind and trained taliban/A.Q. will ALWAYS find a way through. The terrain facilitates such movement.

But if the tribes stay home and defend their locales now to where, ultimately, would the taliban/A.Q. go beside Afghanistan? Without support in the border villages and with the P.A. hounding them they'll have to leave the nation altogether or move to the interior of Punjab and Sindh. I don't think they'd do so. My guess is those miscreants in FATAland/NWFP will cross into Afghanistan and take their chances with ISAF before moving into the depths of a suddenly very unfriendly Pakistan.

This objective is possible in NWFP and FATA. How matters ultimately proceed further south in Quetta/Baluchistan may be another matter. Wide open and very empty spaces there.

 

[su-47]

Their weapons looked fine to me and at par with the militants, but I think its obvious their tactics will be lacking as will their combat experince. But all that is likely to change once the clashes get underway.

Maybe PA should offer them better training. It'll enable them to hold thier own against the taliban till PA support arrives, and also will raise their morale if they are given professional training.

 

[batmannow]

Maybe PA should offer them better training. It'll enable them to hold thier own against the taliban till PA support arrives, and also will raise their morale if they are given professional training.

they are trained , and the war is thier culture, already they have the capabilty to hold on but, yes they need supplies of weapons, and daily life goods.

 

[su-47]

they are trained , and the war is thier culture, already they have the capabilty to hold on but, yes they need supplies of weapons, and daily life goods.

their training is unlikely to be as effective as proper military training. many of these lashkars are civilians who know how to handle a rifle and have an aggressive instinct, but that does not make them effective in combat.

for them to fight taliban successfully, they shouldnt be as good as the taliban. they should be better. the lashkars should be able to inflict horrendous casualities on the taliban, to a level where the taliban are getting their @sses whooped in afghanistan by NATO and in Pakistan by the PA and lashkars. for that they'll need better training, equipment and support from the PA.

The PA should also give a few of these lashkars communication equipment and teach them to operate them so that they can call for reinforcements and artillery and air support when they do encounter the taliban

 

[Kasrkin]

The traditional quid pro quo between the tribes and the GoP never entailed this condition. The circumstance has compelled the nat'l army to the field within your borders. As such, the conditions demand as much professionalism as possible in very difficult terrain. With SSG assistance or not, I think you ask too much of these lashkars and, in doing, misuse their best asset- local and intimate knowledge.

I do not deny that they should be used to assert and cement some kind of control over the recaptured territories, but at the same time I feel their "local and intimate knowledge" of the terrain/tracks is exactly the sort of thing that will help us protect vulnerable flanks or plug holes that might otherwise not be so apparent to the newly arrived regular formations in times of active combat operations.

My gut feeling tells me they should be used in a more proactive way; open combat is one way to reinforce their hate and resentment toward towards the Taliban and Al-Qaeda as opposed to sitting around once the Army has rumbled through their villages. Also these guys are/will not be as easy to supervise as you might think, that is why I prefer a more hands on approach with Military Intelligence managing the whole affair through our SSG boys, who as far as I can tell, have a certain amount of experience in operating alongside, training and directing irregular military outfits. Active operations and coordination with the Army will only forge bonds of ‘comradeship’ that will go a long way in turning these people into assets for Pakistan and stabilizing the region.

As it is we already have a perfect garrison force explicitly recruited from there tribal areas called the Frontier Corps (FC). They will be perfectly suited for occupying, reinforcing, and facilitating reconstruction of recaptured villages and outposts. These guys, since part of a proper military force can at least be expected not to switch sides if the militants decide to mount a substantial counter-attack once the Army has left and the locals see the momentum shifting. With the new rearming programs the FC is undergoing, they will have a substantial military footprint to keep the peace and their local origins will only help them so.

And another point you raised that I wanted to get back to; I don’t think it’s a particularly good idea if the Special Forces are to assist the tribes in uniform because it all as to do with the mentality of those people and that region. Men in uniform do, trust me, give off an aura of strangeness and peculiarity which further encourages the local psyche to think of them as outsiders, alien and therefore untrustworthy. This much amplified in a closely knit tribal society. The Khaki ‘shalwar Kamiz’ uniform of the Frontier Core designed to resemble the local outfit is one thing, but proper camouflaged military uniformed operatives, with their ranks and all that apparent, operating in the middle of tribal laskhar; maybe even seen as leading it by some won’t be such a good idea. It will make it hard for them to do their job the way it’s supposed to be done; silently and effectively. Because you see the tribesmen are not like us, they won’t go like “wow look a squad of Army commandos”, its better if most of them just see a dozen heavily armed guys helping them out, speaking in local accents and see that they obviously know what they are doing. The Laskhar commanders will obviously know, but as a voluntary and relatively diverse force, locally friendly operatives will give the impression of our men just trying to help out like everyone else as opposed to “who do those guys think they are strutting around in our land with those big guns.”
I realize the above argument concerns rather subtle and can be argued not very relevant aspects of the war, but I feel in the long run and the larger picture these things matter.

their training is unlikely to be as effective as proper military training. many of these lashkars are civilians who know how to handle a rifle and have an aggressive instinct, but that does not make them effective in combat.

for them to fight taliban successfully, they shouldnt be as good as the taliban. they should be better. the lashkars should be able to inflict horrendous casualities on the taliban, to a level where the taliban are getting their @sses whooped in afghanistan by NATO and in Pakistan by the PA and lashkars. for that they'll need better training, equipment and support from the PA.

The PA should also give a few of these lashkars communication equipment and teach them to operate them so that they can call for reinforcements and artillery and air support when they do encounter the taliban

That’s a good plan but I still rather our SSG handle all the sensitive communication and air-strike and in-direct fire systems, like done in the Soviet-Afghan war. The Lashkars are just tribesmen after all, we can’t let this thing turn into a civil war even if we are propping one side; we need to keep a cap on things. The Laskhars are still not that much of a big deal to clash or confront the Taliban across the board on their own, in fact the only reason they rose is because of our recent military endeavors. We should use them to their advantages, in a way that their combat prowess will improve as will their loyalty to us. Training them is not such a good idea; given how the laskhars are organized and their temperament, but showing them how it’s done through dressed up commandos or intelligence personal is another thing. I don’t want to use the term ‘cannon fodder’ but I feel it’s best if at the moment if we don’t put too much at stake through them. Given the mistakes we made in the past, we need to tread carefully and give priority to our relationship with the laskhars and those who raise them and make sure they are put to good use but don’t put too much on the line with them just yet.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

I would have to agree with S-2 here - we don't want to turn the Lashkar's into a second Army. They are best utilized as community defense, wherein they prevent the militants from finding safe haven through sympathetic Tribemen or intimidation in their respective areas of influence. Communication with the PA/PAF for support in case of heavy militant assaults on the communities would be fine, but they really should not used for the major military operations unless those operations coincide with areas under their Tribal jurisdiction.

Rather than embed MI or SF's with the Lashkar's, it would be better to start investing in and regularizing stabilized agencies as part of mainstream Pakistan - pay and train the members of the Lashkar, but do so by creating institutions such as local police forces, judges, administrators etc.

 

[S-2]

"I feel their "local and intimate knowledge" of the terrain/tracks is exactly the sort of thing that will help us protect vulnerable flanks or plug holes that might otherwise not be so apparent to the newly arrived regular formations in times of active combat operations."

"local" knowledge means probably within 10km radius of their homes. Not very far. "intimate" means they know the families and single men in that radius. Entry of somebody(s) new should stand out like a sore thumb and be immediately squashed without welcome, discussion, treaty, negotiation, etc by those local enough to identify the difference.

The lashkars will not have to go afield to find battle nor should they. With each kilometer distant from their homes they become less of an asset based upon "local and intimate" knowledge and, instead, more of a largely armed and uncontrolled vigilante. Moreover, they are now moving into and through the areas of other tribes. Potential source of unneeded friction that compels the army to arbitrate at the expense of battling the true culprits of this unpleasantness. Finally, these men look terribly like those being fought. Confusing for my western eyes and, I'd bet, a bit confusing for a P.A. commander too. Help them out and make the army's hard work a bit easier.

Not to go in circles about this but I hope that they stay near home.

As to the disturbing presence of uniformed men of the P.A. (SSG) within these villages, I'm hopeful that this will change. Perhaps SSG by virtue of their training aren't the appropriate choice. I don't know. I do know that this mission would be exactly what U.S. Army Special forces would do, though. Security and re-construction assistance provided by uniformed members will be tangible but so, too, the expanding writ of the GoP. These men must have the skills to integrate seamlessly with the tribal leaders, PROTECT THEM, and insidiously steer their communities further into the fold and not assist the perpetuation of separateness that so prevails when one is "autonomous".

It's a problem now in Iraq with the Kurdish Regional Government. That's the ultimate manifestation where this separateness is formalized and even governed. Pakistan's circumstances have not yet evolved to this extreme and I hope does not in the future.

I'd prefer to see it go the other way. Ultimately, all weapons but those of the police, F.C. and P.A. must go away to have a secure nation.

 

[TOPGUN]

Its about time the tribesman help us in the fight against these bastards and cowards !!!!!!!!

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Its about time the tribesman help us in the fight against these bastards and cowards !!!!!!!!

They are helping us because the militants pose a threat overshadowing everything else - both directly and through the damage resulting from PA ops.against the militants.

We need to get them to support us when there is no danger, i.e. positive reinforcement - otherwise when the militant threat is gone, the social and political stagnation that drove some to militancy will result in some other destabilizing activities down the road.

IMO The GoP has to look dramatically beyond current constitutional structures - create a separate province out of FATA, or two even, since they are more conservative than the rest of the country and want to retain autonomy, but start giving them the political and administrative institutions that allow for people to participate in how the community is run. Create that vested interest in maintaining peace and stability through development scheme and economic linkages and opportunities.

 

[Kasrkin]

"local" knowledge means probably within 10km radius of their homes. Not very far. "intimate" means they know the families and single men in that radius. Entry of somebody(s) new should stand out like a sore thumb and be immediately squashed without welcome, discussion, treaty, negotiation, etc by those local enough to identify the difference.

The lashkars will not have to go afield to find battle nor should they. With each kilometer distant from their homes they become less of an asset based upon "local and intimate" knowledge and, instead, more of a largely armed and uncontrolled vigilante. Moreover, they are now moving into and through the areas of other tribes. Potential source of unneeded friction that compels the army to arbitrate at the expense of battling the true culprits of this unpleasantness. Finally, these men look terribly like those being fought. Confusing for my western eyes and, I'd bet, a bit confusing for a P.A. commander too. Help them out and make the army's hard work a bit easier.

Well these Laskhars are organized by Tribes, and volunteers from all over the tribe sign up as opposed to from just one large extended family or village. These tribes occupy large stretches of territory, even most of the Agency in many cases. All these technical complications can be worked up by a dedicated military department like the MI and teams can be organized accordingly and so forth...
But I can see not many people are inclined to favour my point view, so I guess majority must be right.
Cheers.

 

[S-2]

"I guess majority must be right."

Not necessarily. Consensus is less important than revealing the full range of issues. Your comment about the extended reach of these tribes has relevance. The question I'd pose as an outsider is whether these tribal leaders further delegate authority into village elders or is their network of informal control more centralized?