Pak submarine "PNS Ghazi" disaster in 1971 remains a mystery

[Devil Soul]

Pak submarine disaster in 1971 remains a mystery
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By Monitoring Desk
December 06, 2016
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NEW DELHI: The sinking of PNS Ghazi during the Indo-Pak war of 1971 has long been an unsolved mystery. With Karan Johar sharing the first poster of his movie, The Ghazi attack (India’s first war-at-sea film that is based on the mysterious sinking of PNS Ghazi) the other day, the debate on what caused the blast on board the Pakistani vessel has been renewed, reports foreign media.

On December 5, 1971, a few local fishermen visited India’s Eastern Naval Command with pieces of wreckage and reported the presence of a large oil slick in the area. As a result of the investigation, it turned out to be a sunken the over 300-foot long submarine — The Ghazi. Formerly USS Diablo, PNS Ghazi had been built during World War II. Leased out to Pakistan, it had been renamed Ghazi.

South Asia’s first submarine, PNS Ghazi was Pakistan’s only submarine with a capacity to travel over 11000 nautical miles to reach Bay of Bengal and undertake operations on India’s eastern coast. How it met destruction, there are differing accounts. It is claimed by Indian navy that Ghazi was lured into a trap by Vice-Admiral Krishnan, the Commanding Flag Officer of the Eastern Naval Command, by letting Ghazi believe that INS Vikrant, the Indian aircraft carrier, was in the area near Vizag, by sailing out INS Rajput, an ageing WWII destroyer already due in Vishakapatnam for decommissioning. INS Rajput pretended to be INS Vikrant, sailed out of the Vizag harbour and generated heavy wireless traffic, leading the PNS Ghazi to believe that it had received the right intel about the aircraft carrier.

As he hoped, PNS Ghazi prowled perilously close to the Indian coast, searching for its elusive quarry.

On the night of December 3-4, 1971, an explosion tore through the PNS Ghazi, blowing open its bow, crumpling the hull and cracking open the water-tight compartments. Seawater rushed in, drowning the crew as the submarine crashed to the seabed. On December 6, three days after the sinking of the PNS Ghazi, INS launched its first airstrike.

So, what exactly caused the blast on PNS Ghazi? This is where the debate arises. Indian Navy claims the submarine was destroyed by depth charges fired by its ship INS Rajput. Pakistani authorities say the submarine sank because of either an internal explosion or accidental blast of mines that the submarine itself was laying around Vizag harbour.

According to the Indian Navy:

At 00:14 on 4 December 1971, INS Rajput’s sonar room reported what sounded like a submarine changing depth, about half mile ahead. Captain Inder Singh ordered a sharp turn and immediately fired two depth charges from the the ship’s Mk.IV DCTs. Less than a minute later, at 00:15, a massive underwater explosion shook the destroyer. The crewmen of INS Rajput were unsure what had happened; some sailors briefly thought their destroyer had been torpedoed due to the force of the explosion. Lookouts on INS Rajput saw what was possibly an oil slick in the area. Singh felt certain he had sunk a Pakistani submarine and relayed this to Vice Admiral Krishnan at Vizag. Several minutes later, Vice Admiral Krishnan was informed that a beach patrolman in Vizag had also heard a huge explosion at 00:15.

INS Rajput then departed the area and proceed to join up with the INS Vikrant battle group. After sunrise, local fishermen saw an oil slick and some floating debris in the area. Included in the debris was an unused submariner life vest labelled “USS DIABLO”.

According to the Pakistani Navy:

PNS Ghazi commenced laying a small minefield east of the Vishakapatnam harbor mouth on the overnight of 2-3 December 1971. Then at daybreak on 3 December, it headed out to deeper water to search for the INS Vikrant battle group. Not finding it, PNS Ghazi returned to the Vishakapatnam harbor mouth area at sunset to resume laying the minefield. As the lights ashore were blacked out, PNS Ghazi may have misjudged her position and doubled back into her own minefield around midnight; about 10-15 minutes before the INS Rajput depth charging. Thus, it was the accidental detonation of its own mines that destroyed the Ghazi and not INS Rajput‘s depth charges.

Over the years, the mystery surrounding the sinking of PNS Ghazi has endured. Today, the submarine lies embedded in the Vizag seabed about 1.5 nautical miles from the breakwaters. Close to the harbour channel, the spot has been marked on navigational maps to help ships avoid the wreck.

Vice Admiral (retd) G M Hiranandani (whose book, Transition to Triumph, gives a detailed history of the Indian Navy) says, “The truth about the Ghazi, which remains on what the submarine community calls the ‘eternal parole’, lies somewhere between the Indian and Pakistani versions of the sinking but no one knows exactly where.”

 

[Shinigami]

The sinking of the Pakistani submarine Ghazi represents one of the most important events in the history of naval warfare. It not only brings out the difficulties and complexities of Anti-Submarine warfare in reality but also illustrates the brilliant planning, strategy and execution of events by the Indian Navy to put an end to the significant and strategic threat posed by this deadly submarine.

In 1963,the US Government approved the transfer of a Tench class submarine, the USS Diablo to the Pakistan Navy on a four-year lease. After an extensive overhaul and conversion to "Fleet Snorkel" configuration, the transfer took place on 1 June 1964.The submarine was renamed "PNS Ghazi"(SS 479) and arrived in Karachi in September 1964.The Ghazi carried 28 21 inch torpedoes and had an incredible range of 11000 miles which meant that she could stay at sea for more than a month at a stretch. With the Ghazi, the Pakistan navy enjoyed a clear advantage over the Indian Navy, which did not operate submarines as yet.

PNS Ghazi in 1965 War

The Ghazi was deployed by the Pakistan Navy for operations during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. In September 1965, PNS Ghazi was deployed off the Bombay coast with specific orders to attack only the heavier units of the Indian Navy. On 9 September at 1230 hrs, the Indian Navy frigate INS Beas picked up a sonar contact and carried out an attack but the contact was lost soon afterwards. On 11 September, one Alize aircraft flew directly over the Ghazi when she was snorkeling and failed to detect her. Ghazi returned to Karachi to rectify her defective ECM equipment and resumed patrol on 15 September. On 17 September, the Indian Navy sent out 5 escorts to search an area of 5000 square miles in the southern approaches to Bombay and picked up several sonar contacts, which were attacked. However, the Ghazi was unaware of such attacks and hence was assumed to be nowhere near that area. Though the Ghazi in reality caused no damage to the Indian Navy during the war, her 'Record of Service' indicated that she had fired 4 torpedoes on an Indian Type 41 AA frigate, the INS Brahmaputra on 22 September and "heard" 3 hits. Ghazi returned to Karachi on 23 September, where her Captain was undeservingly decorated for having "sunk" the Indian frigate Brahmaputra. However in reality, the Brahmaputra had faced no such attacks and had to be paraded along with other ships of her class to satisfy the media. After the cease-fire, foreign naval attaches from New Delhi were invited onboard the Brahmaputra in Bombay to show that the ship was still afloat and fighting fit. The Indian navy had to wait another 6 years for its revenge!

Thereafter Ghazi's primary role was the ASW training of Pakistan's surface fleet flotilla and the training of submarine personnel to man the new Daphne class submarines being acquired from France. In the end of 1967,the Pakistan Navy applied to the US to renew Ghazi's lease, which was duly approved. During 1966 and 1968, Ghazi's material state deteriorated and arrangements were made to overhaul the submarine in Turkey. After a short refit in Karachi to make the submarine sea-worthy enough, Ghazi sailed for Turkey on 6 March 1968 and arrived back in Karachi on 2 April 1970. Ghazi was also given the capability to carry mines by modifying her torpedo tubes during her overhaul in Turkey.

PNS Ghazi quietly sailed out of Karachi on 14 November 1971 under the command of Cdr Zaffar Mohammed Khan prior to the second Indo-Pakistan war for it's allocated patrol area in the Bay of Bengal. One of the objectives of the Ghazi was to locate and damage or sink the Indian Navy carrier INS Vikrant.

The Pakistan navy had to extend it's sphere of operations into Bay of Bengal due to increased Indian naval activity around East Pakistan and the Ghazi was the only one with the range and endurance which could do that.


The story starts

The trap is set

The deployment of the Ghazi to the Bay of Bengal was revealed to the Indian Navy when a signal addressed to the naval authorities in Chittagong in East Pakistan was intercepted requesting information on a special grade of lubrication oil that was used only by submarines and minesweepers. As minesweepers and the Daphne class submarines did not have the range to operate in the Bay of Bengal, it was assumed that the submarine Ghazi was stalking the Vikrant.

Pakistan declared a state of emergency on 24 November 1971. At that time, Vice Admiral N.Krishnan was the Flag officer Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Navy's eastern Naval Command. From his point of view, it was pretty clear that Pakistan would have deployed the Ghazi in the Bay of Bengal and a part of the pre-emptive strike was an attempt to sink the carrier Vikrant. A part of his plan to counter this awesome contingency was to put in as any deceptive measures as possible. He had already sailed the Fleet away from Madras on November 13 to a secret location known as "Port X-Ray" and was very uneasy in his mind on 24 November being certain that the "Hunter had arrived." Having sailed the fleet away to safety,

the major task was to deceive the enemy into thinking that the Vikrant was where she was not and lure the Ghazi to where the Indian Navy would attack her. In Vishakapatnam, more rations were ordered from the contractors to whom it was obvious that this meant that the fleet was present there in Vishakapatnam. Having no doubt that spies existed, the C-in-C was banking on bazaar rumors being picked up by them and being relayed to Pakistan. Special pains were taken to inform the various fishing communities in and around the coastal city of Vishakapatnam to act as special "lookouts" and this meant explaining to them about oil slicks, what a submarine looked like and how to identify telltale evidence etc. Though Vice Admiral Krishnan was not worried about air-attacks, he did not tell anyone that his main cause of worry was the possible mining of harbor entrances and attacks on ships by the Ghazi. The threat from the Ghazi was a considerable one. Apart from the lethal advantage at a pre-emptive stage, the Vikrant's position would be known once she started deploying her aircraft in the vicinity of East Pakistan.

Vice Admiral N.Krishnan, the flag officer C-in-C of the Indian Navy's Eastern Naval command.He is credited with much of the planning of the brilliant deceptive measures used to lure the Ghazi to it's doom.



The Indian Navy decided to use the old destroyer INS Rajput as a decoy to try and decieve the Pakistanis into believing that the Vikrant was somewhere in or around Vishakapatnam. The Rajput was sailed to proceed about 160 miles off Vishakapatnam and was given a large number of signals with instructions that she should clear the same from the sea. Heavy wireless traffic is one means for the enemy to suspect the wherabouts of a large ship in the area. The Indian Navy intentionally breached security by making an unclassified signal in the form of a private Telegram allegedly from one of Vikrant's sailor's asking about the welfare of his mother who was "seriously ill". Later on, it was revealed that the Indian Navy's deception plan worked only too well!



The bait is taken


The Ghazi was 400 miles off Bombay on November 16,off Ceylon on November 19 and entered the Bay of Bengal on November 20,1971.She started looking for the Vikrant on November 23 off Madras but was not aware that she was 10 days too late and the Vikrant was actually somewhere near the Andaman islands. Vice Admiral Krishnan sent for Lt.Inder Singh, the Commanding officer of the Rajput for detailed briefing at about 1600 hrs on December 1st and told him that a Pakistani submarine had been sighted off Ceylon and was absolutely certain that the submarine would be somewhere around Madras/Vishakaptanm. He made it clear that once Rajput had completed refueling, she must leave the harbor with all navigational aids switched off. Once clear of the harbor, he had to assume that an enemy submarine was in the vicinity. He was told that if the deception plan had worked, the Ghazi would be prowling about, looking for the Vikrant and in the darkness, she may mistake one of the merchantmen for the carrier and have a go or could be laying a mine-field.

Due to the total blackout and navigational hazards, the submarine may even make the mistake of surfacing. The Rajput was supposed to be out of the harbor as soon as possible and along the way, it could drop a few depth charges at random. The Rajput sailed out on 2 December and returned to Vishakapatnam on 3 December and again sailed out with a pilot on board, just before the midnight of 3/4 December and on clearing the harbor, proceeded along the narrow entrance channel. When the ship was halfway in the channel, it suddenly occurred to the Captain that "What if the Pakistani submarine was waiting outside the harbor and torpedoes us as we disembark the pilot who was on board, at the Outer Channel Buoy?" He immediately ordered to stop engines and disembarked the pilot. He slowly increased speed to maximum by the time he reached the Outer channel buoy. Shortly after clearing the Outer channel buoy at about midnight 3/4 December, a sonar contact was obtained. The starboard lookout reported a disturbance of water, fine on the starboard bow. The captain rightly assumed that it must be a submarine diving and fired 2 depth charges at that position and proceeded. At exactly 0015 hrs two tremendous and simultaneous explosions were heard by the Coast battery, which reported it to the maritime operations room. The explosions shattered quite a few windowpanes around the coast. The Rajput got a heavy jolt after the deafening blasts. Several thousand people who were waiting to hear the Prime Minister's broadcast to the nation also heard the explosions and many came out thinking that it was an earthquake. In the early hours of 4th December 1971,the Command diving team was rushed to the spot to commence detailed investigations. Fishermen also reported some oil patches and flotsam as per the Navy's arrangement with them. The divers confirmed the presence of a submerged object at a depth of about 150 feet of water. Several floating objects and debris, all of them with American markings were picked up and though Vice Admiral Krishnan told the Chief of Naval staff that he was personally convinced that they had bagged the Ghazi, he demanded more 'ocular proof’. By 5 December, divers had identified the submerged object from the silhouette and other characteristics and confirmed without a shell of a doubt that the sunken object was none other than the wreck of the PNS Ghazi. On the 3rd day, a diver managed to open the conning tower hatch and one dead body was recovered. It took a phenomenal amount of courage to enter this hellhole with rotten flesh all around the divers in the darkness. It was also quite a job to clear the bloated dead bodies from the hatch to make an entrance. The Hydrographic correction book of the PNS Ghazi and one sheet of paper with the official seal of the Commanding Officer of the Ghazi were recovered and all the evidence was flown to New Delhi, the next morning. Thereafter, the news of the sinking hit headlines and congratulations were being poured in from all over.

Source: https://defence.pk/threads/how-inidan-navy-sunk-pns-ghazi.71027/#ixzz4S35jITtX

 

[Danish saleem]

A Picture of Ghazi Wreckage on sea bed.

 

[I S I]

More bollywood propaganda.

The sinking of the Pakistani submarine Ghazi represents one of the most important events in the history of naval warfare. It not only brings out the difficulties and complexities of Anti-Submarine warfare in reality but also illustrates the brilliant planning, strategy and execution of events by the Indian Navy to put an end to the significant and strategic threat posed by this deadly submarine.

In 1963,the US Government approved the transfer of a Tench class submarine, the USS Diablo to the Pakistan Navy on a four-year lease. After an extensive overhaul and conversion to "Fleet Snorkel" configuration, the transfer took place on 1 June 1964.The submarine was renamed "PNS Ghazi"(SS 479) and arrived in Karachi in September 1964.The Ghazi carried 28 21 inch torpedoes and had an incredible range of 11000 miles which meant that she could stay at sea for more than a month at a stretch. With the Ghazi, the Pakistan navy enjoyed a clear advantage over the Indian Navy, which did not operate submarines as yet.

PNS Ghazi in 1965 War

The Ghazi was deployed by the Pakistan Navy for operations during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. In September 1965, PNS Ghazi was deployed off the Bombay coast with specific orders to attack only the heavier units of the Indian Navy. On 9 September at 1230 hrs, the Indian Navy frigate INS Beas picked up a sonar contact and carried out an attack but the contact was lost soon afterwards. On 11 September, one Alize aircraft flew directly over the Ghazi when she was snorkeling and failed to detect her. Ghazi returned to Karachi to rectify her defective ECM equipment and resumed patrol on 15 September. On 17 September, the Indian Navy sent out 5 escorts to search an area of 5000 square miles in the southern approaches to Bombay and picked up several sonar contacts, which were attacked. However, the Ghazi was unaware of such attacks and hence was assumed to be nowhere near that area. Though the Ghazi in reality caused no damage to the Indian Navy during the war, her 'Record of Service' indicated that she had fired 4 torpedoes on an Indian Type 41 AA frigate, the INS Brahmaputra on 22 September and "heard" 3 hits. Ghazi returned to Karachi on 23 September, where her Captain was undeservingly decorated for having "sunk" the Indian frigate Brahmaputra. However in reality, the Brahmaputra had faced no such attacks and had to be paraded along with other ships of her class to satisfy the media. After the cease-fire, foreign naval attaches from New Delhi were invited onboard the Brahmaputra in Bombay to show that the ship was still afloat and fighting fit. The Indian navy had to wait another 6 years for its revenge!

Thereafter Ghazi's primary role was the ASW training of Pakistan's surface fleet flotilla and the training of submarine personnel to man the new Daphne class submarines being acquired from France. In the end of 1967,the Pakistan Navy applied to the US to renew Ghazi's lease, which was duly approved. During 1966 and 1968, Ghazi's material state deteriorated and arrangements were made to overhaul the submarine in Turkey. After a short refit in Karachi to make the submarine sea-worthy enough, Ghazi sailed for Turkey on 6 March 1968 and arrived back in Karachi on 2 April 1970. Ghazi was also given the capability to carry mines by modifying her torpedo tubes during her overhaul in Turkey.

PNS Ghazi quietly sailed out of Karachi on 14 November 1971 under the command of Cdr Zaffar Mohammed Khan prior to the second Indo-Pakistan war for it's allocated patrol area in the Bay of Bengal. One of the objectives of the Ghazi was to locate and damage or sink the Indian Navy carrier INS Vikrant.

The Pakistan navy had to extend it's sphere of operations into Bay of Bengal due to increased Indian naval activity around East Pakistan and the Ghazi was the only one with the range and endurance which could do that.


The story starts

The trap is set

The deployment of the Ghazi to the Bay of Bengal was revealed to the Indian Navy when a signal addressed to the naval authorities in Chittagong in East Pakistan was intercepted requesting information on a special grade of lubrication oil that was used only by submarines and minesweepers. As minesweepers and the Daphne class submarines did not have the range to operate in the Bay of Bengal, it was assumed that the submarine Ghazi was stalking the Vikrant.

Pakistan declared a state of emergency on 24 November 1971. At that time, Vice Admiral N.Krishnan was the Flag officer Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Navy's eastern Naval Command. From his point of view, it was pretty clear that Pakistan would have deployed the Ghazi in the Bay of Bengal and a part of the pre-emptive strike was an attempt to sink the carrier Vikrant. A part of his plan to counter this awesome contingency was to put in as any deceptive measures as possible. He had already sailed the Fleet away from Madras on November 13 to a secret location known as "Port X-Ray" and was very uneasy in his mind on 24 November being certain that the "Hunter had arrived." Having sailed the fleet away to safety,

the major task was to deceive the enemy into thinking that the Vikrant was where she was not and lure the Ghazi to where the Indian Navy would attack her. In Vishakapatnam, more rations were ordered from the contractors to whom it was obvious that this meant that the fleet was present there in Vishakapatnam. Having no doubt that spies existed, the C-in-C was banking on bazaar rumors being picked up by them and being relayed to Pakistan. Special pains were taken to inform the various fishing communities in and around the coastal city of Vishakapatnam to act as special "lookouts" and this meant explaining to them about oil slicks, what a submarine looked like and how to identify telltale evidence etc. Though Vice Admiral Krishnan was not worried about air-attacks, he did not tell anyone that his main cause of worry was the possible mining of harbor entrances and attacks on ships by the Ghazi. The threat from the Ghazi was a considerable one. Apart from the lethal advantage at a pre-emptive stage, the Vikrant's position would be known once she started deploying her aircraft in the vicinity of East Pakistan.

Vice Admiral N.Krishnan, the flag officer C-in-C of the Indian Navy's Eastern Naval command.He is credited with much of the planning of the brilliant deceptive measures used to lure the Ghazi to it's doom.



The Indian Navy decided to use the old destroyer INS Rajput as a decoy to try and decieve the Pakistanis into believing that the Vikrant was somewhere in or around Vishakapatnam. The Rajput was sailed to proceed about 160 miles off Vishakapatnam and was given a large number of signals with instructions that she should clear the same from the sea. Heavy wireless traffic is one means for the enemy to suspect the wherabouts of a large ship in the area. The Indian Navy intentionally breached security by making an unclassified signal in the form of a private Telegram allegedly from one of Vikrant's sailor's asking about the welfare of his mother who was "seriously ill". Later on, it was revealed that the Indian Navy's deception plan worked only too well!



The bait is taken


The Ghazi was 400 miles off Bombay on November 16,off Ceylon on November 19 and entered the Bay of Bengal on November 20,1971.She started looking for the Vikrant on November 23 off Madras but was not aware that she was 10 days too late and the Vikrant was actually somewhere near the Andaman islands. Vice Admiral Krishnan sent for Lt.Inder Singh, the Commanding officer of the Rajput for detailed briefing at about 1600 hrs on December 1st and told him that a Pakistani submarine had been sighted off Ceylon and was absolutely certain that the submarine would be somewhere around Madras/Vishakaptanm. He made it clear that once Rajput had completed refueling, she must leave the harbor with all navigational aids switched off. Once clear of the harbor, he had to assume that an enemy submarine was in the vicinity. He was told that if the deception plan had worked, the Ghazi would be prowling about, looking for the Vikrant and in the darkness, she may mistake one of the merchantmen for the carrier and have a go or could be laying a mine-field.

Due to the total blackout and navigational hazards, the submarine may even make the mistake of surfacing. The Rajput was supposed to be out of the harbor as soon as possible and along the way, it could drop a few depth charges at random. The Rajput sailed out on 2 December and returned to Vishakapatnam on 3 December and again sailed out with a pilot on board, just before the midnight of 3/4 December and on clearing the harbor, proceeded along the narrow entrance channel. When the ship was halfway in the channel, it suddenly occurred to the Captain that "What if the Pakistani submarine was waiting outside the harbor and torpedoes us as we disembark the pilot who was on board, at the Outer Channel Buoy?" He immediately ordered to stop engines and disembarked the pilot. He slowly increased speed to maximum by the time he reached the Outer channel buoy. Shortly after clearing the Outer channel buoy at about midnight 3/4 December, a sonar contact was obtained. The starboard lookout reported a disturbance of water, fine on the starboard bow. The captain rightly assumed that it must be a submarine diving and fired 2 depth charges at that position and proceeded. At exactly 0015 hrs two tremendous and simultaneous explosions were heard by the Coast battery, which reported it to the maritime operations room. The explosions shattered quite a few windowpanes around the coast. The Rajput got a heavy jolt after the deafening blasts. Several thousand people who were waiting to hear the Prime Minister's broadcast to the nation also heard the explosions and many came out thinking that it was an earthquake. In the early hours of 4th December 1971,the Command diving team was rushed to the spot to commence detailed investigations. Fishermen also reported some oil patches and flotsam as per the Navy's arrangement with them. The divers confirmed the presence of a submerged object at a depth of about 150 feet of water. Several floating objects and debris, all of them with American markings were picked up and though Vice Admiral Krishnan told the Chief of Naval staff that he was personally convinced that they had bagged the Ghazi, he demanded more 'ocular proof’. By 5 December, divers had identified the submerged object from the silhouette and other characteristics and confirmed without a shell of a doubt that the sunken object was none other than the wreck of the PNS Ghazi. On the 3rd day, a diver managed to open the conning tower hatch and one dead body was recovered. It took a phenomenal amount of courage to enter this hellhole with rotten flesh all around the divers in the darkness. It was also quite a job to clear the bloated dead bodies from the hatch to make an entrance. The Hydrographic correction book of the PNS Ghazi and one sheet of paper with the official seal of the Commanding Officer of the Ghazi were recovered and all the evidence was flown to New Delhi, the next morning. Thereafter, the news of the sinking hit headlines and congratulations were being poured in from all over.

Source: https://defence.pk/threads/how-inidan-navy-sunk-pns-ghazi.71027/#ixzz4S35jITtX

Nice fairy tale as a script for next Karan Johar's flick.

 

[Areesh]

Indian navy hunted PNS ghazi so successfully that it even hunted all the documents related to its destruction in its own record.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...ani-submarine-in-1971/articleshow/5919209.cms

 

[I S I]

Btw is Koran Johar trying to achieve loyalty certificate by RSS? Lol so desperate.

 

[Tom M]

Sunk or accident. But at the end of the day 92 families lost there loved ones. Sad.

Btw is Koran Johar trying to achieve loyalty certificate by RSS? Lol so desperate.

I read that your ISPR is also producing a movie on the same incident ??

 

[S.Y.A]

http://www.sify.com/news/the-truth-...king-of-ghazi-news-columns-kfztj3bhjehsi.html


ALSO:

Warriors of the waves

By Muhammad Adil Mulki
Published: May 27, 2012


On the way to the first floor galleries of the Pakistan Maritime Museum in Karachi, one comes across a wall with names of martyrs, or Shaheeds, who died during the 1965 and 1971 wars. The list includes a section titled Ghazi, a word that refers to warriors who return victorious and alive. I wondered why Ghazis appeared on a list that was supposed to name martyrs.

A sailor on duty explained to me that it was a reference to PNS Ghazi, a Pakistan Navy submarine that had disappeared with all its men on board. Although the Pakistan Navy had named them Ghazi, fate put them on the higher pedestal of Shaheed. I went through row upon row of names, each of which represented a life cut short by war, a family denied another chance to share its joys and sorrows, the names of men who left home on a mission for the motherland and never returned.

Forty years have gone by since those 93 brave men, including their leader Commander Zafar Muhammad Khan, died as the submarine sank in the Bay of Bengal, off the Visakhapatnam coast, under mysterious circumstances at the onset of the 1971 war.

The PNS Ghazi was originally the USS Diablo, a long-range Tench class submarine commissioned by the US Navy on March 31, 1945. It served the US Navy mainly on the Atlantic side and the Caribbean Sea until it was de-commissioned on June 1, 1964, and transferred to Pakistan under an agreement. For their brilliant performance in the 1965 war, the submarine won 10 awards, including two Sitara-e-Jurat decorations.

On November 14, 1971, PNS Ghazi sailed out of Karachi harbour on a seemingly impossible mission. It was to sail past the Western Indian defences, south along enemy shores to loop around Sri Lanka and then head North to the Bay of Bengal more than 3,000 miles away from its home base.

It will forever remain a mystery exactly what objectives were contained in its Top Secret brief, to be opened only mid-mission, when the craft was deep behind enemy lines. Tempting Indian naval assets in the region, such as the aircraft carrier Vikrant, could have been on its target list. After completing its mission, the Ghazi was supposed to report to Chittagong. The then East Pakistani ports, neglected under the specious doctrine of “the defence of the East lies in the West”, were hardly even capable of handling a grand boat like the Ghazi and it’s also possible that the Ghazi was to augment the Eastern naval forces, which comprised of little more than gun boats and a few riverine crafts.

With its 11,000-mile range, designed for the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and the surprise and stealth factor of a submarine, the Ghazi was the only vessel capable of confronting the enemy in its own lair. The Ghazi reached Visakhapatnam, the headquarters of India’s Eastern Naval command, and proceeded to mine the entrance channel of the port. Had the Ghazi been able to complete this task, the entire Indian Eastern Naval fleet would have been bottled up in their own port. But that was not to be.

The answer to “What happened next?” depends largely upon where you search for it. Histories written on both sides of the border are likely to serve perceived national interests more than they serve the cause of accuracy.

GM Hiranandani, a retired vice admiral of the Indian Navy, writes in his book Transition to Triumph that the Ghazi was lured by reports indicating the presence of the Vikrant, which was actually stationed far away in safety.

Once the Ghazi took the bait, depth charges were dropped on the orders of Lt-Commander Inder Singh, the captain of the Indian destroyer INS Rajput, as the Ghazi exited the port’s channel. This resulted in the sinking of the Ghazi and Lt-Commander Singh was later decorated with the Indian gallantry award Vir Chakra.

The Pakistani version, as laid out by the Directorate of Public Relations — Pakistan Navy, is that probably due to high currents in the Bay of Bengal, the Ghazi hit a mine that it had laid down itself. Whatever the truth, the incident marked the first time a submarine sank during a war after the Second World War.

Interestingly, the Indian Government turned down requests by the US and the then-USSR to raise the submerged sub from the sea. In 2010, all records related to the sinking of the Ghazi were also reported to have been destroyed by the Indian Navy. Lt General (retd) JFR Jacob, who served as the chief of staff of the Indian Army’s Eastern Command during the 1971 war, suggested in a May 2010 article that the Ghazi had met an accidental end and the Indian Navy had nothing to do with its sinking, hence the destruction of the records. Many other heavyweights on the Indian side also share this scepticism of the Indian Navy’s official stance.

To gain an independent opinion, I got in touch with the veteran USS Diablo crew who had served on the boat before it became PNS Ghazi. They had studied sonar pictures and sketches of the sunken vessel and believed that an explosion in the Forward Torpedo Room (FTR) destroyed the Ghazi. This view is also shared by Indian journalist Sandeep Unnithan, who specialises in military and strategic analysis.

Underwater video footage obtained by divers also shows jagged portions of the FTR jutting outwards, adding credence to the internal explosion theory.

Hours after the Indian government officially announced the sinking of the Ghazi on December 9, 1971 (almost ten days after the actual event), a Pakistani submarine PNS Hangor engaged in a death-defying duel with two anti-submarine vessels of the Indian navy which were sent to find and destroy it. Hangor, literally meaning “Shark” in Bengali, certainly had a bite worth its nickname. It not only managed to evade its hunters, it also sunk the INS Khukri and damaged the INS Kirpan. This was the first time after World War II that a submarine claimed a confirmed kill.

A few days after the Ghazi’s destruction, Indian divers opened up the vessel and entered it to recover whatever valuable information they could. They salvaged some objects, a few of which are displayed at an Indian war-time museum nearby. Unnithan wrote that the divers also came across some bodies, among them a sailor who “had in his pocket a poignant letter written in Urdu to his fiancé: ‘I do not know if you will ever read this, but we are here separated by thousands of miles of sea…’”

Forty years later, as I stood in a museum those very thousands of miles away, I wondered which sailor it was among these countless names who had written the letter.

Those men wrote a tale of bravery across the waters of the Indian Ocean and paid the highest price for it. Even four decades on, their courage and efforts must not be forgotten.

Their last resting place reminds me of Rupert Brooke, an English poet who volunteered for service in the navy during the First World War and wrote a poem titled “The Soldier”:

If I should die, think only this of me:

That there’s some corner of a foreign field

That is forever England. There shall be

In that rich earth, a richer dust concealed;

Rupert Brooke died on duty and was buried in Greece — a foreign land. The poem would be a fitting tribute to the 93 Pakistanis who, like Brooke, died on another land while serving their own.

Published in The Express Tribune, Sunday Magazine, May 27th, 2012.
http://tribune.com.pk/story/383024/warriors-of-the-waves/

 

[Shinigami]

More bollywood propaganda.


Nice fairy tale as a script for next Karan Johar's flick.

so its just a coincidence that ghazi "malfunctioned" in the area that rajput was dumping depth charges?

 

[I S I]

so its just a coincidence that ghazi "malfunctioned" in the area that rajput was dumping depth charges?

Yeah it's just a conincidence that Ghazi accidently fell in to it's own mines.

 

[S.Y.A]

More on Ghazi:

The only information on the subject from an independent source comes from an Egyptian naval officer serving at that time on an Egyptian submarine under refit in the harbor. He has confirmed the occurrence of a powerful explosion in the vicinity of the harbor late at night. There were no naval ships, as reported by this officer, outside the harbor at that time and it was not until about an hour after the explosion that two Indian naval ships were observed leaving harbor.
Source: pg 6
http://ussseaowl.com/PDFFolder/Newsletter12-2007.pdf

 

[Areesh]

Btw is Koran Johar trying to achieve loyalty certificate by RSS? Lol so desperate.

Trying to prove his patriotism after doing a movie with Fawad Khan.

 

[Shinigami]

Yeah it's just a conincidence that Ghazi accidently fell in to it's own mines.

if so then
pakistani crew are grossly incompetent
OR
american subs are worthless

 

[I S I]

if so then
pakistani crew are grossly incompetent
OR
american subs are worthless

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/INS_Sindhurakshak_(S63)

"an accident or inadvertent mishandling of ammunition was the cause of the explosions"

LOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOL height of inexperienced ch...yapa

 

[Shinigami]

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/INS_Sindhurakshak_(S63)

LOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOL

so you are comparing a fire that happened to a docked sub with an "accident" that happened exactly where depth charges were thrown? brilliant