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PAF J-10C News, Updates and Discussion

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When and where?
So going back to WS-10B thrust.
It's 70kn dry and 144kn wet?
Compared to F-16 engine. The dry thrust is lower than F-16 but wet is much higher.
Don't know if ots good or bad.

EDIT :
Just read wiki ( Yeah I know).
TWR of F-16 is still better than J-10C.
Despite J-10c having a more powerful engine, the aircraft also happens to ne heavier than Eff Soola.
 
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Appreciate the sources for posterity. Let's try to unpack this:
E-3G proving itself in the recent Syrian conflict:




- is OLD ??? :cuckoo:
Yes, it is old. Just because it was used relatively recently to maximize its ageing shelf-life (since '70s) doesn't make the claim invalid. After all, the last unit manufactured dates back to 1992. Indeed, USAF all but admitted it when they announced the "aging" E-3s are due for replacement by the newer E-7 Wedgetail platform. I'm puzzled as to why you seem perplexed by this when you went on to address its replacement potential subsequently, even citing an article by RUSI on the subject.

It looks like you missed some of the links embedded in my statements in my previous post. I am fully aware of your TOP LINK because I felt that you are confusing J-10C with J-20 when you originally claimed that E3G is having difficulty tracking J-10C from unspecified distance(s) which is unlikely:

"RSIP allow detection of targets about 10 times smaller than non-RSIP AWACS radars, including cruise missiles. Range Resolution improve by 6 times, with a 70 - 100 % increase in Detection Range, and much better Range, Altitude and Azimuth accuracy. RSIP radars are able to see targets with a 0.5 m radar cross section at 300 n.mi. or more. The modification include a new Pulse-compressed waveform, two new adaptive signature processors, and better electronic countermeasures proofing."

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/293774906_Airborne_early_warning_acquires_new_targets
I'll skip the bit about J-10/J-20 and its radar deflecting properties since I don't think anyone can confidently lay claim to RAM/detection capabilities from either side unless one's directly involved with their respective defense departments. Even then, I'm firmly of the believe that: the people who know won't reveal anything and the people who don't, will claim otherwise. That said, I have to point out that citing a 2008 article from an academic standpoint is intellectually flimsy. Most academics agree that research papers are only relevant within a period of a decade as the science would've progressed beyond recognition since.

Do you expect K. S. Wilsbach to be sincere with you? This man could be spreading disinformation on purpose.
Why yes, it's quite believable actually.

The quote was lifted from an interview conducted by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, which is an incredible trove of information made available to the public by the think-tank, ostensibly to formulate informed policies for office-holders. The part that raises eyebrows is that in a span of <6mths, Wilsbach somewhat walked back on his initial statements on how it's (J-20s) "not anything to lose a lot of sleep over". Seems quite a chore if he wanted to spread disinformation when he could've dismissed its capabilities initially.

China developed its first airborne EW solutions in the 1980s.

Both US and China had a measure of each other in the domain of EW not long ago:


J-10C can do all that can still be tracked from over 300 miles away. :tup:
But you don't seem to have trust issues here when citing an unknown source in this article, by Minnie Chan (of all people)...

F-35 can be detected very easily now? :stop: Do you understand the difference between EARLY WARNING and TRACKING? You might receive EARLY WARNING within the first island chain when F-35 are used there. And there is a good chance that Chinese systems deployed in the first island chain are taken out in the process. I explained to you HOW this is possible in my previous post but you are back to square one on this one.

- Israel used its F-35 to infiltrate Iran to [simulate] strikes on desired targets in an unannounced drill as noted in here and here. ----(A)

- USAF used an F-35 to strike at desired targets in a sector of Syria in 2020 where Russian air defense systems such as S-300 and S-400 were active as noted in here. Both Syrian and Russian air defense systems could not detect the F-35 and counter it. ----(B)

- Israel used its F-35 to conduct strikes on desired targets in a well-protected sector of Syria as noted in here. These strikes also caught Syrian and Russian air defenses in the region by surprise. ----(C)

Just look at what an Iranian Brigadier General has to say about Russian air defense systems:

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This is rare admittance from an Iranian military official.
Again, not delving deep into the specifics of stealth but do consider this for a moment: China is neither Iran nor Syria.

The operative word of today's war being informationized warfare (IW).

Essentially, it's insufficient to simply conclude that a single BMD failure be attributed to the entirety of said weapons system. These systems are capable of being hooked up to a slew of other equipment to provide a better battlefield awareness i.e. sensor fusion. In fact, systems integration is a reason why US rescinded terms of F35 support from Turkey (a NATO member) when the latter chose the S400 over it: "Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air-defence system threatens its acquisition of the F-35 aircraft and its involvement in the F-35’s production programme." Should Turkey be allowed to purchase and integrate both S-400 with the JSF's Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL), you can be sure the IT systems within the F35s will be compromised in Russia's hands. US DoD knew this and was right to be alarmed.

I also noticed how defense enthusiasts have been overtly critical of Russian systems since the start of the war when the reality is anything but - S-400s have proven their worth recently over Ukraine. Granted, S-400s weren't facing F35s unlike Iranians/Syrians but Ukraine is also heavily assisted by NATO-lite capabilities + intelligence network from Musk's Starlink.

Speaking of satellites, here's an example of China's (1) Jilin (2) monitoring F22s/missiles (3). This is also an essential step in the kill-chain for identifying USN carriers btw. IF all else fails, there's always HUMINT/IMINT monitoring the whereabouts of US assets because China has a legion of bodies to throw at anyway. That's not even discussing drones harvesting intelligence but I digress.

I have seen it all in this forum. Iranians claim to detect and shoot down F-35. Russians claim to detect and shoot down F-35. Chinese claim to detect and shoot down F-35. Every Tom, Dick and Harry claims to detect and shoot down F-35. Let's see if the rhetoric match claims made on a forum.

:)

THEY / THEM tell you this in supposedly classified debriefings?

The B-2 is one of the most game-changing aircraft ever built and one of the most cost-effective. It has a 172-foot wingspan, 20 feet wider than the Boeing 767 airliner, but unlike the 767, the B-2 has the radar signature of an insect—an amazing technical and manufacturing feat. Beyond the ability to use its low observability to penetrate enemy air defenses, the combination of the B-2’s large payload and precision delivery means its cost per effect is dramatically better than past or present power projection alternatives.

During World War II it took a thousand B-17 or B-24 bombers with 10,000 men and 9,000 weapons to attack a single target. Today the B-2 can attack 80 separate targets thousands of miles away with precision weapons in a single mission in a single day using two people. An aircraft carrier battle group with thousands of people, taking weeks of positioning time from thousands of miles away, and dozens of fighter-attack flights, can potentially achieve the same effects, but not with the same level of stealth, and at multiple orders of magnitude more cost both in terms of dollars and personnel.



B-2A is called into action on an as-needed basis, and it takes just two B-2A to produce battlefield effects on par with a strike package involving up to 75 aircraft in a conventional war otherwise.

During Allied Force, the air war over Serbia, six B-2s conducted 45 sorties out of 9,211 Air Force fighter and bomber sorties in the entire war—less than a half of one percent—but they struck 33 percent of the targets in the first eight weeks of combat.

Yugoslavian air defenses were modeled to counter stealthy aircraft in view of Operation Desert Storm but B-2A degraded them to the point of being utterly useless - Yugoslavian air defenses were able to shoot down only 2 aircraft in the entire war (F-117 = 1; F-16 = 1). B-2A delivered significant blows to Yugoslavian air defenses in opening phase of the war and made it much safer for the other aircraft to operate over the country by extension.

When B-2A are flying above, all those JUICY radar systems among other things shall be granted their last rites.

It still makes sense for US to produce a new bomber which would allow USAF to retire both B-1B and B-2A and bring something much more advanced to the table with the option to mass produce it. This is how things roll in life. Good things are eventually replaced by even BETTER things.
Again, not sure about the stealth capabilities of the B-2 to form an opinion but wouldn't the downing of the F-117, one of the stealthiest jet available back then (1999), in a highly contested environment rife with jamming interference by the hands of Serbs' S-125, be telling enough that F35s today wouldn't be able to operate freely in the WestPac during an event of a hot war?

Baghdad was one of the most protected cities in the world in 1991, but:


I get it. Good defenses can instill confidence in Public but being over-confident is foolish.

I am not sure from where you are getting the idea that terrain-hugging cruise missiles are easy to detect and shoot down. And I am not sure from where you learned that HALF of the Tomahawk cruise missiles were intercepted over Iraq in 1991. Do you have relevant data on hand? A total of 288 Tomahawk Block II were used to strike at different targets in Iraq in 1991 with 85% of this inventory producing desired results. And a total of 218 Tomahawk Block III were used to strike at different targets in Yugoslavia in 1999 with over 90% of this inventory producing desired results.

Tomahawk Block IV mask itself very well in ground clutter, is found to be very difficult to jam (rare admission from Russians in here), and can be programmed to bypass threat zones in its pathway to reach desired target. It can also be instructed to change course or to loiter for a while. The window of opportunity to detect and intercept this cruise missile becomes very small, and a volley is virtually impossible to stop in any case. The image below shows older Block III capability:

TomahawkBlockIIIKillChain.png


Russians hinted about developing the capability to jam satnav receiver but Americans solved this problem in Block V:

With the modification Block V, Tomahawk has increased capabilities, which integrate new seeker, hitting the surface targets, more than 1000 miles range, greater penetrating power, less susceptible to jamming of its seeker and communication and navigation striking the target under the GPS taken down conditions.

Latest block of Tomahawks might be tricky to shoot down...but not impossible.

550 miles/hour isn't very fast by today's standards compared to hypersonics and the HQ-16 ABM (and its multiservice variants) mounted with Type 346 (Dragon Eye) radar and HE-fragmentation warhead (detonation radius of ~35m) is designed to target terrain hugging/sea-skimming types. They're frequently compared to US' Evolved Seasparrow Missile (ESSM) or French Aster missiles with an official min. altitude of 50m. Safe to say, Tomahawks hovering at >10m elevation would be the first thing on PLA's mind when designing such systems.

I'd even argue their long range HQ-9Bs could fulfil the same objectives if need be given their confidence in deploying them on all PLAN platforms.

On any given day, up to (100 - 110) ships of the USN are found to be patrolling the oceans around the world. A total of 105 ships were active around the world as on 22-12-22 for instance; 50 were involved in various tasks while 55 were on patrol.

In case of hostilities with China, most of the active ships might be directed to the conflict zone. Assuming a mix of frigates, destroyers, cruisers, and aircraft carriers, up to 5000 VLS might be onboard and loaded, with Tomahawk Block IV + Block V as 50% of the load-out. Now add submarines to the equation. More importantly, USN has resupply-purpose ships.

China created the ASBM PSYOPS to dissuade American activities in the South China Sea (SCS) but this did not work. ASBM can be useful against a naval force that does not have credible BMD capability and CEC but USN has both.
If you think the USN alone, in peacetime conditions has a prayer's chance in conducting a hot conflict in China's backyard today then you haven't been paying attention.

No one in their right mind thinks this is possible without allies in the region. Current PLARF's estimates alone outnumbers the number of ships USN can deploy >10 to 1, even assuming all VLS are filled to max capacity. Let's not even go on about the necessity of resupply bases to conduct such an op. The author of "carrier killer" also goes further into the pacing threat.

There's a reason why US is desperately seeking a defensive alliance around the island chains yet neighbouring countries are reluctant to enter the fray. Incidentally, this brings us to your point about "psyops" because whatever China is doing, it seems to be working well in deterring effective relationships from being formed against their interests.

DF-17 has sufficient accuracy to engage an aircraft carrier. This is in line with the revelation that DF-17 has CEP of 30 m. Problem is that an American aircraft carrier is a moving target and a fast one at that, and DF-17 can miss it much like DF-21D or any ASBM. About time you learn something about hypersonic physics.

1. An HGV has to slow down during the terminal phase of its flight in order to engage a target:

The third technology involves launching a glider from a ballistic missile during its ascending phase, then piloting this device to “bounce” off the layers of the atmosphere to extend its range and change direction. This gives it a trajectory that is very complex to predict, but also leads to very high mechanical and thermal stresses on the terminal vehicle. Its range and final speed will depend on the initial thrust and then the profile of its kinetic energy degradation as it bounces off the layers of the atmosphere. As with the MaRV, the terminal velocity of the glider will be greatly reduced from the initial Mach 20, even potentially below Mach 5.


2. An HGV cannot be controlled like a Tomahawk cruise missile mid-flight:

Hypersonic maneuvers or “bounces” generate high g-force accelerations which dictates very strict requirements for navigation systems, in particular inertial ones. Furthermore, while the ionization of the air around a hypersonic body has little impact on its detection by terrestrial or maritime radars, it can severely limit radio communications (as witnessed by the re-entry of Apollo spacecraft and the Space Shuttle), which proves problematic for external guidance using data link or even GPS. Finally, in the case of an HCM, the operation of a scramjet entails flight constraints in altitude and in profile, because the combustion chamber is optimized for temperature and air pressure conditions corresponding to a specific altitude. In general, very high altitudes are chosen (greater than 50,000 feet). If tactics dictate the need to vary the altitude of the missile, this can only be done at the cost of “deoptimization” of fuel consumption and therefore range, which can be reduced by as much as 80 percent from the theoretical optimum.


3. An HGV is not an ideal choice to engage a moving target:

Hypersonic missiles have so far been used (for example, the alleged Kinjal strikes in Ukraine) against stationary sites. If it is a question of hitting a moving target like a ship, we must add to the constraints above the problems of targeting and terminal guidance. For this type of target, the challenges related to the transmission and real-time refresh of information on a moving target still seem far from resolved. Another solution would be use a seeker. The problem with placing a seeker on the missile is that it must be located at the nose, which as noted is subject to the highest thermal stresses. In the present case, the use of a heat shield seems incompatible with that of a seeker positioned just behind, which must either emit and receive electromagnetic waves in return, or possibly work in the visual or infrared fields, which reduces its range or exposes it to the thermal phenomena already discussed at length. There are solutions for jettisonable fairings in the dense layers of the atmosphere to protect the seeker, but this jettison must be carried out once the missile has left the hypersonic range to avoid high g-force stress on the missile airframe.

Beyond the thermal constraints, remains the question of targeting to correct the trajectory of the missile. The speed of these weapons implies unmasking at very long distances compared to subsonic missiles. In addition, if the hypersonic missile flies at very high altitude, it must solve radar discrimination problems in what is commonly called sea clutter and therefore must use radar imaging processes using SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) technologies. Added to this is the identification of the target, which must be based on powerful algorithms. All these elements mean that in order to target a naval vessel, the missile must slow down and leave the hypersonic domain in the final phase, returning to “normal” supersonic speeds. However, a maneuvering supersonic missile remains a very complex target to intercept, especially if a substantial part of its flight was made at hypersonic speeds, reducing the time available for the OODA loop.



A maneuvering supersonic missile remains a very complex target to intercept but USN has solved this problem for itself to large extent. USN has conducted a large number of live-fire tests to develop its capability to intercept ASBM. These tests also show that 100% intercept rate might not be possible, so it helps to move fast like an American aircraft carrier. USN will also attempt to take out ABSM launchers with suitable munitions that might be used against it.

In light of the above, DF-17 is better suited for strikes on military bases and infrastructure. But USN is developing relevant countermeasures just in case. SM-6 Block 1B is a hypersonic multi-purpose missile and can be used to intercept HGV. Older SM-6 variants might be up to the task as well. But you will not see Americans bragging about this capability on purpose - not anytime soon.
I believe the "30m" figure is from a (2015-2017?) RAND report found here, which is an estimate used in wargaming simulations. The actual quote of their PGM capabilities is: "By 2009, another variant, the DF-15B—reportedly added an active radar seeker and a laser range finder to reach a CEP of five to ten meters."

You brought up a good point about speedy moving targets however which is why China's been pushing the envelope on a combination of datalinks between ELINT; satellite feeds and drone platforms (WZ-7/8). The window of communication during full on ionization is during the "blackout phase" where it bounces off signals between satellites to the HGV in reentry. I'm not saying it's easy...because if it were, US/Russia would've done it by now but considering their Chang'e satellite managed to land on the dark side of the moon, I'd say it's more than feasible. HGV is fairly well-understood science by now, it isn't some new ground. Afterall, US already conducted their own tests back in the 80s with the Pershing.

That said, seems China's right on track with their goals of furthering accuracy of AShBMs. This also lends credence to their recent statement about US hacking their Northwestern Polytechnical University in Xi’an, which specializes in aeronautics and space research.

DF-21D is irrelevant to a future conflict? It is very good MRBM and can be used in regional conflicts if not more. USN can do something about it but this does not suggest that others can.

I did maintain for a long time that Americans understand "rocket science" well enough and they will produce countermeasures for sophisticated ballistic missiles. PAC-3 interceptor is extensively tested and it defeated Pershing II (Storm II target) much like any other ballistic missile when it came in the "engagement envelope." Bypassing a Patriot battery is one thing, trying to engage a target that is protected by a Patriot battery is another. But THAAD provides much greater "engagement envelope" in comparison, THAAD and Patriot are interoperable.
As a sidenote: Patriots failed to defend Saudi refineries from Iranian rockets a few years back. Also, remember the North korean drones that South korea failed to shoot down a few days back? It flew around and took some photos of THAAD systems in 2017.

Facepalm. :stop: Each Ohio-class submarine was originally built to last 30 years in oceanic environment(s), and some were produced at a different point in time. But service life of each was extended to 42 years in time. USN feels the need to extend service life yet further of the oldest productions in use (5 in total)*; others are GOOD.

*A news like this comes out and you are assuming that USN is broke? Seriously dude.

You cry OLD each time but you need to realize that Americans have produced steel that is about 3 times stronger than top-of-the-line Chinese steel which Americans have access to in compliance with American IMPORT quality standards. Every country is not producing cheap disposable goods.
I hope they're at least equipped with better sonar systems than their sister Seawolf-class because the USS Connecticut incident was entirely avoidable.

Also, X import != Y export standards. Again, I'm not sure why this comes across as a foreign concept.

I like to do my own homework instead of taking any side's propaganda at face value.

Every professional military force has built C2 infrastructure to enable network-centric warfare (NCW) but level of complexity can be distinguished on following counts:

- PCW allows each platform to provide operational updates to the other through the Combat Information Center (CIC).

- NCW allows each platform to share valuable information in real-time with the other by linking radar systems and CIC across all platforms to produce a Common Operating Picture (COP).

- CEC is a step up above NCW by allowing all types of sensor systems to be linked to produce relatively rich COP with the element of Central Control (CC) that can automatically decide and assign air defense mission to individual platform.


View attachment 909022


In case of aircraft, you are looking at NCW capability much like Link 16.

Let me show you something:

benitez-6-3-19-figure-3-768x457-png.780813


F-15E and F-15EX can have NCW with each other via Link 16 but F-15E will have to depend upon F-15EX to achieve at par COP when both are deployed and used. This does not suggest that F-15E can leverage every sensor system of F-15EX to achieve at par COP but this information exchange will be limited to radar data.

F-35 can leverage every sensor system of another F-35 to produce excellent COP and reduce its footprint via MADL - this is 5th generation sensor fusion in American terms.

But the (F-35 - F-35) network level is not CEC because it must involve taking cues from other platforms to produce excellent COP for all of the platforms involved. CEC is enabled by equipment of its own which must be installed in each platform to do the needful and is tied to the NIFC-CA principle of USN.

Speaking of J-10C, do you think that it can process information at par with J-20 akin to the (F-15EX - F-15EX) network level? Or it will work with J-20 akin to the (F-15E - F-15EX) network level? Or do you think that J-10C can detect and track F-35 in real-time and provide cues to a Type 055 destroyer of PLAN to engage it from considerable distance akin to CEC?


Now you can understand following statement: "Those radar systems which can detect F-35 such as Chinese YLC-8E might not be able to track it in real time for long -- F-35 is equipped with state-of-the-art broadband EW capabilities for good reason. Combat tactics is another factor -- F-35 offers unprecedented situational awareness to the pilot who in turn will not wait for the kill chain to establish and work against him but engage and destroy valuable targets at earliest opportunity. If this is not possible then F-35 can be used to illuminate YLC-8E among other radar systems on the surface for the USN to take out with a barrage of Tomahawks. The benefits of CEC are boundless. Radar systems on the surface are vulnerable to decapitating strikes but airborne platforms like E-2D can survive with air escort. You might have faith in A2/AD systems like HQ-9 but virtually nothing could stop a volley of Tomahawks from approaching desired targets in conflicts around the world and these cruise missiles are kept up to date."

PLAN might have developed CEC of its own but I do not recall any demonstrations from PLAN to this effect.
The difficulty in understanding China's capabilities is they keep their cards close to the chest and the stuff that's publicly available is most likely approved for commercial viewing/purchase (Zhuhai airshow). Most OSINT communities outside the firewall and language barrier understands this and have come to terms with it. Equipment such as electronics even more so considering the test results are closely guarded secrets.

I think it's reasonable to extol the capabilities of the US with their widely publicised data without casting doubt on others. You don't necessarily have to believe in China but I think it's similarly dishonest to doubt them considering the lack of data available.

PLAN has yet to show that it can shoot down an ASBM let alone CEC. When PLAN will demonstrate these experiments much like USN then WE can talk.
They conducted an anti-ballistic missile test last June iirc.

See above and tell me.

J-20 has relatively different shaping than F-35 and its effects are pointed out at length in following link:


And what about J-20 RAM application? How capable it is?

I could find following:

In this article, a multifunctional and tunable radar absorber which can achieve dynamical modulation of absorbing frequency, bandwidth, and amplitude is presented. Such a tunable radar absorber is composed of a graphene capacitor layer and an active metasurface layer. By controlling the impedance characteristic of each layer through the external bias voltages, the absorber not only can achieve the ultrawideband electromagnetic (EM) absorbing performance, but also can be switched to a narrowband absorption mode, and its absorption amplitude can be further adjusted at each of the above operation modes. Both simulated and experimental results have demonstrated that the −10-dB reflection bandwidth ranging from 3.55 to 19.6 GHz can be realized, and the average reflection amplitude can be dynamically tuned between −3.8 and −11.5 dB. In addition, by changing the bias voltages, the absorber can also, respectively, switch its −10 dB reflection bandwidth to 3.5−11.1 GHz and 10.9−18.9 GHz, where the larger dynamic range of amplitude modulation is obtained. The equivalent circuit model is employed to explain the tunable absorption mechanism by analyzing the impedance matching characteristics. This hybrid design approach can effectively expand the EM reconfigurable functionalities of the current tunable absorber, which may further open a novel way of the graphene application in microwave frequencies.


This RAM application allows J-20 to deflect and absorb radar waves across frequency bands ranging from S to Ku.

View attachment 909023

J-20 seems to be a well-equipped jet fighter and posit a significant threat to any adversary in theory but China is still learning the craft and you are expecting too much from your FIRST attempt at creating a VLO aircraft. You seem to have no clue about American advances in stealthy applications and technologies.

Yes, I am aware of USAF using F-35 to simulate RCS of J-20 - this is the LOGICAL on its part. F-35 allows USAF to simulate RCS of upcoming J-35 as well. What you see in this case is the advantage of having a significant headstart in the domain of stealth sciences.
The radar scattering simulation has been thrown around quite a lot in miltech communities, evidently for good reasons in the absence of accurate data. However, I caution taking the study authoritatively given its limitations in modelling w/o involving 3D scanning of their aerodynamic flight profiles. Every nook and cranny missed could potentially return a higher/lower signal and that's not even considering the RAM used, as you rightly pointed out.

A common view of the Su-57 for instance, is its incredibly high radar cross-section (RCS) relative to the other 3 stealth fighters (F22/F35/J20). The figures often quoted are 0.1m² - 1.0m² (comparable to a "clean" Super Hornet apparently) according to Sukhoi's patent but similarly, research on F22 also yielded the same results with spikes above those [at 0° front to 85° to 180° back maximum of 5m² & 275°] and other angles reflecting less than those [between 30°-60° degrees and 300°-330° less than 0.01m²]. We haven't even begun discussing inlet profiles and thrust nozzles that may further affect the stealth returns.

On the subject of RAM, there's been numerous speculation that China first got its hands on a piece of F-117 wreckage in Serbia and again, during the hunt for Osama with the tail wreckage of a modified stealth Black Hawk helo used for the op (thanks to Pakistan's assistance :laugh:). While metallurgy advancements certainly require a high degree of expertise, surely it isn't an impossible feat to catch up with the US?
 
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So going back to WS-10B thrust.
It's 70kn dry and 144kn wet?
Compared to F-16 engine. The dry thrust is lower than F-16 but wet is much higher.
Don't know if ots good or bad.

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Just read wiki ( Yeah I know).
TWR of F-16 is still better than J-10C.
Despite J-10c having a more powerful engine, the aircraft also happens to ne heavier than Eff Soola.
It's 90kN dry and 144kN with afterburner, and wikipedia is trash.
 
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