Outcast no more! Rebuilding the partnership with Saudi Arabia

[The SC]

Bernard Heikal writes: Saudi Arabia is a “garden” in the middle of the fire! Conditions 5 are not difficult.

The geopolitics of the Middle East can be understood by dividing the countries of the region into those that still cling to twentieth-century ideologies and those that are more forward-leaning and have adopted a twenty-first-century outlook and policies. In the first group are Iran, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Algeria and Tunisia. These countries are committed, either explicitly or implicitly, to one of the so-called “resistance ideologies,” that is, either Islamism or Arab nationalism, in combination with anti-imperialism. They interpret the West as the enemy and present themselves as oppressed victims of a global conspiracy, often led by Zionists and Jews. In any case, its people are ruled by authoritarian regimes whose ideologies, whether secular or Islamic, adopt a different model of fascism, and misery prevails.

On the other hand, there are the Gulf states, most notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, that are welcoming the twentieth century. The “ideologies of resistance” of the twentieth century were considered futile, as they mostly produced brutalities, backwardness, and often chaos. Instead, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have adopted policies that emphasize the national interest above all else. These include rapid economic development, diversification away from oil dependence with an accelerating energy transition, easing restrictive social policies, effective but authoritarian governance, and eliminating corruption. Thus, instead of pan-Arabism or pan-Islamism and calling for the imposition of Islamic law, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are investing in strengthening nationalism and transforming their countries into major regional and global players. Riyadh, for example, is now ranked 15th among G20 countries and aims to break into the world's 10 largest economies. It wants to become a major hub in East-West relations, as well as an international center for trade, transportation, logistics, technological advancement, industrial and military production, as well as a leading destination for tourists. The Kingdom's investment in sports is part of a local renewal and revitalization process, with a focus on young people, who constitute the majority of the population. Sports, and football in particular, replace religion as the locus of national feelings and identity.

It is the push to prioritize national strategic interests that explains why Saudi Arabia is now – following the UAE’s 2020 Abraham Accords – considering normalizing relations with Israel. It is possible to envision peace with Israel, but only if it is able to provide specific guarantees, primarily American, that would benefit the Kingdom. To be clear, the majority of the Saudi population is not keen on this peace, with some in the Saudi government estimating that up to 70% belong to this group. Moreover, they estimate that 20% of them strongly oppose the agreement and that 2% may be willing to mobilize politically, perhaps even violently, to resist the agreement. One highly educated, Western-influenced Saudi told me that “the day normalization happens will be the saddest day of my life” — sentiment runs deep on this issue. Also, only if the deal is unequivocally in Saudi Arabia's national interest, can the government justify normalization with Israel to its people. It should be noted that unlike the Prime Minister of Israel or President Biden, for example, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman would take a huge personal risk by signing the peace, as President Sadat once did and later paid for with his own money. life. The Kingdom's former Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Nayef, was almost killed by a suicide bomber for much lesser reasons. As President Sadat once did, he paid with his life for it. The Kingdom's former Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Nayef, was almost killed by a suicide bomber for much lesser reasons. As President Sadat once did, he paid with his life for it. The Kingdom's former Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Nayef, was almost killed by a suicide bomber for much lesser reasons.


The Saudis made five specific demands to conclude this peace: First, they would like to be officially recognized as a strategic ally of the United States. Second, they want to conclude a security agreement - similar to the one the United States concluded with Japan - that would provide American protection against any foreign attack on the kingdom. Third, they want a safer and more stable process for purchasing advanced weapons systems from Washington since Congress has repeatedly denied them this because of, among other things, their role in the civil war in Yemen. Fourth, they want a civilian nuclear program in the Kingdom that includes uranium enrichment. But this will be under the management and supervision of the United States, and some Israeli officials appear ready to agree to this. The Saudis are interested in nuclear power generation and are also convinced that they have a large stockpile of uranium that they would like to export abroad in its enriched form. They also publicly announced that they would develop a bomb if Iran did so. Finally, they want the equivalent of a free trade agreement with the United States.

It is not clear what the Saudis will offer in exchange for all of this other than normalization with Israel. It was reported that the United States will make specific demands, the most important of which is that the Kingdom reduce the strategic relationship it is developing with China, and that Riyadh remains committed to the US dollar in oil trade. Oil remains by far the most important commodity in exchange in terms of volume and value, and thus constitutes an essential axis for maintaining the dollar as the global reserve currency. Reports indicate that the US and Saudi governments are working hard to reach an agreement by March 2024 when the US presidential campaign begins in earnest, and the president will no longer be able to give this matter his full attention.

Despite a tense start to relations between the Biden administration and Riyadh, with name-calling, insults, and threats, today the two governments are working tirelessly to reach an agreement that would lead to normalization between Riyadh and Jerusalem.

As of late October 2022 — when the Saudis cut oil production despite an urgent plea from the White House not to do so — US-Saudi relations had hit rock bottom and seemed unlikely to improve under Biden. What happened to change the course of events? One development helped lead to an important realization in the White House about the centrality of Saudi Arabia to American strategic interests in the region and beyond. This was Beijing's arrival in the Gulf as a guarantor of the Saudi-Iranian détente agreement. China for the first time played a political role in mediating the dispute between regional heavyweight actors, and was offering to use its significant economic influence over Iran to help defuse tensions. So far, the Saudi-Iranian agreement has held up. An earlier realization in Washington of the kingdom's importance arose around the time of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It has become clear to Biden that Saudi Arabia has significant power in the oil market and that having it on our side will not only help stabilize oil prices, but will also mean leverage over both Russia and China, whose economies depend on the kingdom's production. decisions.

In other words, the Biden administration has adopted an interest-first approach to foreign relations, and in doing so has moved closer to Saudi Arabia's way of doing things. A more broad view of both interests and values now prevails, so that what Saudi Arabia has been doing on behalf of women's rights, education reform and the religious sector, as well as Riyadh's attempt to end conflicts in Yemen and ease tensions with Iran, are all better appreciated in Washington. While human rights within the Kingdom remain an important concern, an exclusive focus on them means missing out on other opportunities that are squarely in the US national interest. Among these transformations are Saudi Arabia's transformation into a responsible and stable regional power with a thriving domestic economy, peace with Israel and all the benefits that will flow from that, as well as the push to prevent China from becoming a more important strategic ally of Saudi Arabia. A senior Saudi intelligence official describes the kingdom as a “garden in the middle of a fire.” It is good that the Biden administration finally realized that this park needs care. Improving the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia will lead to changes within the Kingdom that will serve America’s interests, and hopefully also serve the interests of the people of this troubled region. It is good that the Biden administration finally realized that this park needs care. Improving the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia will lead to changes within the Kingdom that will serve America’s interests, and hopefully also serve the interests of the people of this troubled region. It is good that the Biden administration finally realized that this park needs care. Improving the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia will lead to changes within the Kingdom that will serve America’s interests, and hopefully also serve the interests of the people of this troubled region.

About normalization efforts between Saudi Arabia and Israel

US State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said that officials in his country held fruitful talks with the Saudi and Israeli governments. He added, “We held fruitful talks and discussed many issues with both the Israeli government and the Saudi government.” These conversations are continuing, and I expect more to take place in the coming weeks.”

The American spokesman continued, “We have made progress on a number of issues, and I will not go into what it is, but the road ahead of us is still long and with an uncertain future, but it is an important initiative and we believe that we must continue to strive to achieve it.”

Controversy is raging today over visions that predict the possibility of normalizing relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Israeli occupation state. This article tends to prove the argument that this normalization is not possible, at least temporarily during the era of the current US President Joe Biden, although there is a deeper strategic aspect that looks at the impossibility of this normalization occurring in the longer term, except under specific conditions. Recently, talk has increased about the efforts made by the United States to normalize relations between the Kingdom and “Israel.” Rather, there was an optimistic American feeling about the possibility of this happening in the near future, that is, before the American elections in November of next year. Benjamin Netanyahu also announced, after forming his government, that normalizing relations with the Kingdom would be one of his government’s central goals, and views in “Israel” are conflicting about the conditions for this to happen, in light of the current Israeli reality. But the important question is: Does this optimistic American feeling and the declared Israeli desire reflect a reality that can be achieved, or is it just wishful thinking?

In a statement by US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken at the AIPAC conference, he considered that the occurrence of this normalization is part of American national security. The current American administration's efforts towards this normalization are not the first, as a previous attempt came in May of last year, with the Bennett-Lapid government. This attempt achieved some openness between the two countries, which was linked to the opening of Saudi airspace to Israeli civil aviation, but this was also coupled with a Saudi confirmation that this openness does not fall within any evidence of normalization or preparation for it. This American attempt was preceded by another during the administration of Donald Trump, during his conclusion of the Abraham Accords deals in 2020, in which the Kingdom insisted on a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict within the framework of the Arab Peace Treaty, which the Kingdom proposed in 2002, which stipulates resolving the conflict with the Palestinians before normalization with them. Arabs.

Although a number of media reports indicate the existence of direct commercial and security contacts between Saudi Arabia and “Israel,” there is no evidence to confirm this. Rather, the Kingdom’s acceptance of allowing Israeli aircraft to pass through its skies came within the framework of the consequences of Egypt’s surrender of the islands of Tiran and Sanafir to it, which They fall within the security considerations of the peace agreement between Egypt and “Israel”.

A quick look at the Kingdom’s conditions today, which were circulated, to achieve the normalization sought by the Biden administration. They revolve around: building a civilian nuclear reactor in the Kingdom with the help of the United States; The United States signed a joint defense agreement with the Kingdom similar to NATO, which included an American pledge to protect and defend it in the event of any attack on it. The Kingdom’s access to highly advanced technological military defense systems, which already exist among NATO members; Solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict according to the Arab Peace Initiative proposed by the Kingdom in 2002.

All of these conditions seem impossible and unachievable, at least during the Biden era. An agreement of this kind, relating to issues related to American military decisions that need to be approved by the Senate and with the approval of two-thirds, is unlikely, especially in light of the declared official American, as well as Israeli, rejection of the Kingdom’s acquisition of peaceful nuclear power and access to the advanced American military technological innovation system.

It is also considered unlikely to obtain legislative approval from the Senate related to American pledges to defend the Kingdom, which is something that the last three American administrations have sought to resolve, according to a clear strategy and practice. As for the Palestinian issue, it is impossible to achieve normalization, under the extreme right-wing government of Netanyahu, and the Kingdom’s drive to consolidate its leadership position in the region, in light of structural changes in the international system, in which the United States does not lead the political scene alone, which reduces the importance of “Israel.” “For the Kingdom within the framework of that equation.

According to a report in the American New York Times, the Saudi king confirmed during his meeting with US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan that any normalization agreement must include clear Israeli steps towards the Palestinians. The Saudi Embassy in Washington also confirmed this, stressing that normalization will not be possible unless a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is reached.

The Kingdom can return to the results of the normalization agreement between the occupying state and the United Arab Emirates, as an indicator of the feasibility of entering into a similar agreement. Despite achieving commercial gains for the United Arab Emirates, “Israel” does not have a unique commercial advantage that other commercial companies do not possess, in light of “Israel’s” lack of commitment towards the Palestinians and embarrassing the Emirati government more than once, and being forced to criticize and condemn the occupation policy towards the Palestinians.

The UAE also did not obtain F-35 aircraft, which the United States pledged as a reward for normalization. A recent opinion poll conducted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, which is close to the Israeli lobby in the United States, shows a decline in Emirati popular support for the Abraham Accords. About three-quarters of the Emiratis polled now consider normalization with the occupation government as long as it continues in Palestine to be a negative matter.

In the Kingdom, four-fifths of Saudi respondents considered this negative. Even if the Kingdom metaphorically desires to normalize its relationship with “Israel,” the Kingdom will not specifically choose the Biden administration to grant it this reward before the elections, as a response to its hostile policy against the Saudi Crown Prince. Various American analyzes confirm the Saudi regime’s inclination towards the Republican American administrations, especially the Trump administration, after the Democratic administrations established a state of tension with the Kingdom, starting with the Obama era and the nuclear agreement with Iran, and ending with the current Biden era.

There are a number of facts that determine the Kingdom's foreign strategies in general, and towards normalization with the occupation government, especially during the recent era. Since 2016, the Kingdom has gradually come to the conclusion that it cannot rely on its American ally, after retreating from its commitment to the security-for-oil equation and signing the nuclear agreement with Iran.

In that year, the Kingdom began to build strong relations with Russia, which culminated under the umbrella of the Shanghai Organization, and were translated into the formation of the OPEC+ group. The Kingdom also began to turn towards China, to link its economic interests with it, despite American objection.

In practical experience, America abandoned its Saudi ally, under the Republican Trump administration, in the year 2019, when the Kingdom’s oil capabilities were subjected to missile attacks, and during the right-wing war, when the United States withdrew Patriot anti-aircraft missiles, when the Kingdom was being subjected to missile attacks by the Houthis. . The American position was also considered shocking to the Kingdom, after it refused to respond to an American request to reduce oil production, by threatening the American administration to stop arming the Kingdom.

The Russian-Ukrainian war further consolidated the multi-power approach, and the status of China and Russia in the international system became clearer, which supported the validity of the aforementioned Saudi approach. Consolidating a multipolar system for a country like Saudi Arabia helps it expand its alliances and not limit it to one polar power. This explains why the Kingdom is not forced to immediately normalize its relations with “Israel,” which the Kingdom has always considered a key to reaching the United States.

Together, Saudi Arabia and Russia share the production of more than half of the OPEC+ group’s production, so Russia is considered the necessary partner for Saudi Arabia in effectively managing the global oil market. Today, China is also the Kingdom's largest trading partner in the field of oil, and Saudi exports to China are three times what are exported to the United States, and about double what they export to India and Japan, the second and third largest countries that import oil from Saudi Arabia after China. It may be that the intersection of the Kingdom’s experience between conflicts and the drain of energies in light of the right-wing war experience in particular, and within the framework of involvement in the conflicts of the Arab region in general, and the trend towards economic openness, and the ambitious plans approved by the Saudi Crown Prince for the year 2030, make the Kingdom tend towards consolidating sustainable peace. In the region, “Israel” is the only occupying power in it, which possesses nuclear and military capabilities that surpass all other countries in the region. Therefore, the Kingdom recently worked to normalize its relations with Qatar and Turkey on the one hand, and Iran, the arch-rival, on the other hand, but it has not yet accepted “Israel.”

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is reconsidering its regional political position and formulating its foreign policy within that consideration, especially since it is one of the most important emerging markets in the world. It will reshape a more flexible religious culture with global acceptance, rebuild its economy so that it does not depend in the future solely on oil production, which the Kingdom has been linked to for decades, and seek to raise its status as an independent global player, linked not only to the United States, but to all influential powers. The United States is no longer a reliable ally of the Kingdom, especially after announcing its gradual and practical withdrawal from the region, and as its ally.

However, the Kingdom is still linked to the United States for interests, most notably security and economy, and according to its plans, it needs to diversify its military sources and commercial partners, and not be satisfied with the American pole, in light of a multi-directional cooperation system. The Kingdom also needs to adjust a regional power system, in which it now sees itself as a pole alongside Iran, Turkey, and “Israel,” within which it cannot rely militarily on the United States alone. Therefore, according to this vision, “Israel” does not seem important to the Kingdom, and is not harmful to normalization with it.


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