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Operation Barbarossa

third eye

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I shall briefly endeavor to highlight one of the most well fought & decisive campaigns of WW 2. A campaign unparalleled for its boldness, magnitude , area of operations and decisive actions both by the Germans & Soviets.

A campaign the kind never possible again for mechanised forces . A learning in logistics, air cover, tactics, application of resources and so much more.



Operation Barbarossa ( named after a red bearded German (Frederick Barbarossa) crusading monarch of the 12th century )was the name given to Nazi Germany’s invasion of Russia on June 22nd 1941. Barbarossa the largest military attack of World War Two and was to have appalling consequences for the Russian people.

Operation Barbarossa was based on a massive attack based on blitzkrieg. Hitler had said of such an attack that "when the attack on Russia starts the world will hold its breath.'

It was here, in the vast struggle between the two dictatorships, that the German army was defeated and the outcome of World War Two was decided in favour of the Allied powers - the British Empire, the United States and the USSR. The cost to the Soviet Union was an estimated 27 million dead.

Background

After the outbreak of war in 1939 came the added fear of Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe, while Germany was fighting the British Empire and France in the west. All of these factors contributed to the decision taken by Hitler in July 1940, after the German defeat of France, to plan for an all-out assault on the Soviet Union.

The date of 22 June was late for starting a campaign over such a vast area, but German commanders were confident that the Soviet armed forces were primitive, and that the Soviet people were waiting for liberation. Victory was expected by the early autumn.

Not until December 1940, however, did Hitler make a final decision to go ahead with what became known as Operation Barbarossa. The original date, set for May 1941, had to be revised to complete the vast preparations for the attack - following other German attacks on Yugoslavia and Greece in April.

By this point German combat effectiveness had reached its apogee; in training, doctrine, and fighting ability, the forces invading Russia represented the finest army to fight in the twentieth century.

The Plan

Three army groups attacked Russia on June 22nd 1941. Army Group North, led by von Leeb, Army Group Centre, commanded by von Bock and Army Group South commanded by von Rundstedt.

OPERATION-BARBAROSSA.jpg



 
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I have certain reservations about the content of the text, some inaccuracies if you will. But I will hold them off for until you have finished posting the entire article.
 
Opposing forces :
Germany :

1. Army Group North led by Von Leeb:
Totalled 20 divisions and Luftflotte I
2. Army Group Centre led by Von Bock : Totalled 51 divisions and Luftflotte II
3. Army Group South Led by Von Rundsted: 40 divisions; 14 Rumanian divisions; Hungarian Army Corps and Luftflotte IV.



Soviet Russia

Russia was defended by four army units. Though Russia had a large army, the purges had wiped out a considerable part of the army’s senior commanders.

1. The Baltic Special Military District led by Kuznetsov faced Army Group North : 26 Divisions including 6 armoured ones.
2. The Western Special Military District led by Pavlov faced Army Group Centre :36 divisions including 10 armoured ones.
3. The Kiev Special Military District led by Kirponos faced Army Group South: 56 divisions including 16 armoured divisions
4. The Odessa Special Military District led by Tyulenev also faced Army Group South: 14 divisions including 2 armoured divisions.

In total, Germany amassed 117 army divisions for the attack excluding Rumanian and Hungarian units.

Russia amassed 132 army divisions for the defence of the ‘motherland’, including 34 armoured divisions.



I have certain reservations about the content of the text, some inaccuracies if you will. But I will hold them off for until you have finished posting the entire article.


Its not an article really, some info from memory , old books & some from the net.

We could discuss this as we go along.
 
Well in a matter of time ,the way events are going in Ukraine, I will not be surprised if NATO attempts a nuclear barbarossa.

@vostok
 
Action :

The attack started at 03.00, Sunday morning June 22nd 1941. In total the Germans and her allies used 3 million soldiers, 3580 tanks, 7184 artillery guns, 1830 planes and 750,000 horses.

The initial attacks involved numbers never seen before – and the success rate must have even taken Hitler by surprise even if Hitler had proclaimed: 'We have only to kick in the front door and the whole rotten Russian edifice will come tumbling down.'

In Barbarossa’s opening month, German armies bit deep into Soviet territory; panzer armies encircled large Soviet forces at Minsk and Smolensk, while armored spearheads reached two-thirds of the distance to Moscow and Leningrad. But already German logistics were unraveling, while a series of Soviet counterattacks stalled the advance. In September the Germans got enough supplies forward to renew their drives; the results were the encirclement battles of Kiev in September and Bryansk-Vyazma in October, each netting 600,000 prisoners.

By Day 17 of the attack, 300,000 Russians had been captured, 2,500 tanks, 1,400 artillery guns and 250 aircraft captured or destroyed. This was only in the territory attacked by Army Group Centre. To any military observer, the Russian Army was on the verge of a total collapse and Moscow seemed destined to fall.

In fact, the German advance had been so fast that it had compromised the whole army’s supply and communication lines. The Army Group Centre paused on the Desna but it was still thought that it was only catching its breath before moving inexorably on. However, it was now that the German army was compromised by its own leader – Hitler.

He ordered that the Army Group Centre’s Panzer Group led by Guderian should move south-east on to Kiev. 1 Panzer Group was also ordered north. This took away from the Centre group two of its most potent fighting forces. Guderian was very angered by this order but Hitler had always proved himself right in the war, so why argue with the Führer? Who, in fact, had the courage to oppose Hitler?

Hitler had recognised that his most difficult decision was what to do after his forces had broken through the Stalin Line – move north, south or continue east?

The mechanised sweeps north and south had the same massive success as the initial assault on June 22nd. Masses of Russian prisoners were captured and vast quantities of Russian equipment was destroyed. But the orders of Hitler had one dire effect – loss of time. The delay was such that the impact of the winter occurred before the Germans had reached the objectives set by Hitler. Very few in the German Army were equipped to cope with the cold and the army, so used to advancing, found itself very much affected by the freezing temperatures. A war of movement as seen so much in June/July 1941 became an attack blighted by freezing weather that would hinder any army let alone one so ill-prepared for such weather conditions.

Soviet Response

The attack came as a complete surprise to the leader of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin. Despite repeated intelligence warnings, which included the precise day and hour of Germany's incipient assault, Stalin remained convinced that Hitler would not risk an eastern war as long as the British Empire remained undefeated. It has been argued that Stalin in fact planned a pre-emptive attack on Germany for the early summer of 1941, and was then thrown off-balance by the German invasion.

Stalin did not want to risk war, though he hoped to profit from the German-British struggle if he could. In the event, the shock of attack almost unhinged the Soviet state, and by the autumn German forces had destroyed most of the Red Army and the Russian air force, surrounded and besieged Leningrad - where over one million people died of starvation and cold - and were approaching the outskirts of Moscow.

The Red Army had sufficient reserves to stop the German army from completing the rout in December 1941, but the following summer German offensives launched far to the south of Moscow, to seize the rich oilfields of the Caucasus and to cut the Volga shipping route, created further chaos.

Hitler hoped that German forces would capture the oil and sweep on through the Middle East to meet up with Axis forces in Egypt. The Volga was to be blocked at Stalingrad, after which German forces could wheel northwards to outflank Moscow and the Soviet line.

The southern attack failed at Stalingrad. After weeks of chaotic retreats and easy German victories, the Red Army solidified its defence and against all the odds clung on to the battered city. In November 1942 Operation Uranus was launched by the Soviets, and the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad was encircled.

Some historians have seen this as the turning point of the war. But not until the Red Army had decisively defeated German forces in the more favourable summer weather of 1943 did the tide really turn.

The Battle of Kursk in July 1943 was one of the greatest set-piece battles in military history. The Red Army withstood a massive German assault, and then counter-attacked. For two years Soviet forces pushed the German army back into Germany, until in May 1945 Soviet forces accepted the surrender of the relic of Hitler's army in Berlin.
 
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Well in a matter of time ,the way events are going in Ukraine, I will not be surprised if NATO attempts a nuclear barbarossa.

@vostok
I doubt, they have less chance today in a nuclear war than Hitler had in 1941 or Napoleon in 1812. It is suicidal.
 
Action :

The attack started at 03.00, Sunday morning June 22nd 1941. In total the Germans and her allies used 3 million soldiers, 3580 tanks, 7184 artillery guns, 1830 planes and 750,000 horses.

The initial attacks involved numbers never seen before – and the success rate must have even taken Hitler by surprise even if Hitler had proclaimed: 'We have only to kick in the front door and the whole rotten Russian edifice will come tumbling down.'

In Barbarossa’s opening month, German armies bit deep into Soviet territory; panzer armies encircled large Soviet forces at Minsk and Smolensk, while armored spearheads reached two-thirds of the distance to Moscow and Leningrad. But already German logistics were unraveling, while a series of Soviet counterattacks stalled the advance. In September the Germans got enough supplies forward to renew their drives; the results were the encirclement battles of Kiev in September and Bryansk-Vyazma in October, each netting 600,000 prisoners.

By Day 17 of the attack, 300,000 Russians had been captured, 2,500 tanks, 1,400 artillery guns and 250 aircraft captured or destroyed. This was only in the territory attacked by Army Group Centre. To any military observer, the Russian Army was on the verge of a total collapse and Moscow seemed destined to fall.

In fact, the German advance had been so fast that it had compromised the whole army’s supply and communication lines. The Army Group Centre paused on the Desna but it was still thought that it was only catching its breath before moving inexorably on. However, it was now that the German army was compromised by its own leader – Hitler.

He ordered that the Army Group Centre’s Panzer Group led by should move south-east on to Kiev. 1 Panzer Group was also ordered north. This took away from the Centre group two of its most potent fighting forces. Guderian was very angered by this order but Hitler had always proved himself right in the war, so why argue with the Führer? Who, in fact, had the courage to oppose Hitler?

Hitler had recognised that his most difficult decision was what to do after his forces had broken through the Stalin Line – move north, south or continue east?

The mechanised sweeps north and south had the same massive success as the initial assault on June 22nd. Masses of Russian prisoners were captured and vast quantities of Russian equipment was destroyed. But the orders of Hitler had one dire effect – loss of time. The delay was such that the impact of the winter occurred before the Germans had reached the objectives set by Hitler. Very few in the German Army were equipped to cope with the cold and the army, so used to advancing, found itself very much affected by the freezing temperatures. A war of movement as seen so much in June/July 1941 became an attack blighted by freezing weather that would hinder any army let alone one so ill-prepared for such weather conditions.

Soviet Response

The attack came as a complete surprise to the leader of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin. Despite repeated intelligence warnings, which included the precise day and hour of Germany's incipient assault, Stalin remained convinced that Hitler would not risk an eastern war as long as the British Empire remained undefeated. It has been argued that Stalin in fact planned a pre-emptive attack on Germany for the early summer of 1941, and was then thrown off-balance by the German invasion.

Stalin did not want to risk war, though he hoped to profit from the German-British struggle if he could. In the event, the shock of attack almost unhinged the Soviet state, and by the autumn German forces had destroyed most of the Red Army and the Russian air force, surrounded and besieged Leningrad - where over one million people died of starvation and cold - and were approaching the outskirts of Moscow.

The Red Army had sufficient reserves to stop the German army from completing the rout in December 1941, but the following summer German offensives launched far to the south of Moscow, to seize the rich oilfields of the Caucasus and to cut the Volga shipping route, created further chaos.

Hitler hoped that German forces would capture the oil and sweep on through the Middle East to meet up with Axis forces in Egypt. The Volga was to be blocked at Stalingrad, after which German forces could wheel northwards to outflank Moscow and the Soviet line.

The southern attack failed at Stalingrad. After weeks of chaotic retreats and easy German victories, the Red Army solidified its defence and against all the odds clung on to the battered city. In November 1942 Operation Uranus was launched by the Soviets, and the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad was encircled.

Some historians have seen this as the turning point of the war. But not until the Red Army had decisively defeated German forces in the more favourable summer weather of 1943 did the tide really turn.

The Battle of Kursk in July 1943 was one of the greatest set-piece battles in military history. The Red Army withstood a massive German assault, and then counter-attacked. For two years Soviet forces pushed the German army back into Germany, until in May 1945 Soviet forces accepted the surrender of the relic of Hitler's army in Berlin.
i. Unternehmen Barbarossa 'officially' ended in October, 1941 and Tyfun was launched instead in October, spearheaded by the 2 Panzergruppe(later 2 Panzer Armee).
ii. Stalingrad was part of Fall Blau (Case Blue)
iii. Kursk was Fall Zitadelle - Case Citadel

That said too much blame is poured on Hitler, and so is too much credit. The OKH(Oberkommando des Heeres) had considerable freedom of action, especially upto late 1943, and most of the strategic decisions of Hitler were well placed.

Also the tide turned pretty much after Tyfun(Typhoon or Moscow offensive) failed. Russia had made sure that the Germans would have to fight a war of attrition, one that it could never win. It was only a matter of time. Stupid Russian tactical mistakes and German tactical expertise helped prolong the war considerably. Otherwise while the Ersatzheer (German Reserve Army) of Gen. Fromm could turn out 60,000 men monthly (only), the Russians alone were adding about 300,000. As for equipment, less said the better. The German armed forces were always outnumbered by more tanks and more aircraft. On the Eastern Front it was terrible. Unbelievable Russian mishandling enabled thousands of tanks and aircraft to be captured in the initial months alone!

Most importantly the German offensive was not hampered by Hitler, it was hampered by the War Ministry and the OKH (Halder, Zietzler). The German defence instead was damaged by Hitler.

Also both the countries had plans to invade each other long back. Germany had similar contingency plans even before Hitler came to power. Also Zhukov himself submitted a STAVKA plan for May 15, 1942 for a possible pre-emptive strike at East Prussia and further West. Make no mistake, Stalin would have attacked Hitler had he not done so. And Hitler also wished to pounce on the Russians as soon as he had the chance.
 
The Germans had serious deficiencies. They severely underestimated their opponent; their logistical preparations were grossly inadequate for the campaign; and German industrial preparations for a sustained war had yet to begin. But the greatest mistake that the Germans made was to come as conquerors, not as liberators–they were determined to enslave the Slavic population and exterminate the Jews. Thus, from the beginning, the war in the East became an ideological struggle, waged with a ruthlessness and mercilessness not seen in Europe since the Mongols.

The Red Army had sufficient reserves to stop the German army from completing the rout in December 1941, but the following summer German offensives launched far to the south of Moscow, to seize the rich oilfields of the Caucasus and to cut the Volga shipping route, created further chaos.

Hitler hoped that German forces would capture the oil and sweep on through the Middle East to meet up with Axis forces in Egypt. The Volga was to be blocked at Stalingrad, after which German forces could wheel northwards to outflank Moscow and the Soviet line.

The southern attack failed at Stalingrad. After weeks of chaotic retreats and easy German victories, the Red Army solidified its defence and against all the odds clung on to the battered city. In November 1942 Operation Uranus was launched by the Soviets, and the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad was encircled.

Some historians have seen this as the turning point of the war. But not until the Red Army had decisively defeated German forces in the more favourable summer weather of 1943 did the tide really turn.

OperationBarbarossa2.JPG
 
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@third eye , @AUSTERLITZ


Let me ask you a question, sirs, do you think it would have been strategically and tactically possible for the Wermacht to have succeeded in Operation Barbarossa ? What do you think needed to happen in order for this to happen?

Thanks.
 
@third eye , @AUSTERLITZ


Let me ask you a question, sirs, do you think it would have been strategically and tactically possible for the Wermacht to have succeeded in Operation Barbarossa ? What do you think needed to happen in order for this to happen?

Thanks.

Answer likely .no.Main reason logistics.Germans simply couldn't sustain offensive operations with the infrastructure and fuel supplies .

It could have succeeded if -

1.Logistics preparations had been more extensive and begun earlier and not hindered by inter factional rivalry between nazi party labour leaders in charge of the transportation network.

2.Japan had attacked russia simultaneously from the east preventing transfer of forces west that shored up the moscow front at a crucial hour.

3.If germans could have prevented the transfer of soviet industry from the ukraine and west russia beyond the urals..once this was accomplished..german chances in the long war were unsustainable as soviets both had far superior manpower,both logistics and nature on their side,had moral upper hand due to fighting for their families on home soil,plus now industry and the oil from the caucasus to run their war machine.

Another lesser cause was if german industry had performed to full capacity and undergone total industrial mobilization which it did only late 1943.Geramny lost teh war not because it didn't have factories to build tanks,guns and airplanes but because those europewide factories were grossly underutilized by the nazi party clique.

Add to this gross underestimation of soviet strength ,industrial capacity and resolve.
Finally intelligence failure-german intelligence had recorded 180 soviet divisions as soviet strength..while real strength was 300.And soviets subsequently mobilized nearly another 300 after 250 were wiped out.The germans didn't even know t-34 existed.

Tactically the northern group served no real great purpose plodding through forested marshy terrain.The leningrad drive was strategically of minor importance.
 
@third eye , @AUSTERLITZ


Let me ask you a question, sirs, do you think it would have been strategically and tactically possible for the Wermacht to have succeeded in Operation Barbarossa ? What do you think needed to happen in order for this to happen?

Thanks.

Among the first principles of war is ' Selection and maintenance of aim'. Implying thereby that what tha attacker wants should be clear to him.Before firing the first round the end state should have been war gamed and made clear along with possible options to the enemy.

If the ' worst case ' option is acceptable to the attacker then he should press on.

Hitler & the Wehrmacht failed here. The reasons were many - not all were tactical or logistical . Personalities mattered - on both sides.

Germans shifted their aims as they went along. They could not have succeeded for a number of reasons , Austerlitz has covered them.

It was an over kill all along. Besides they did not consider what American war production could do , how the Atlantic could be crosses at will by large convoys carrying logistics.

The Germans simply stretched themselves too thin, considered Soviets to be a push over & the weather did the rest.
 
Last time i was on this forum, taking to @Mighty Caty, I said i would do a thread on Operation Barbarossa but then I didnt because i was nursing a broken wrist. I think now i would post a detailed account of Barbarossa on this thread.
@AUSTERLITZ I am sure you can contribute more than me on Barbarossa so plz join in...
 

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