Obama and His Commanders

[fatman17]

Posted January 23, 2009

Obama and His Commanders

Now we're into one of the most fascinating parts of the new Obama Administration, President Barack Obama's relationship with America's military commanders. How successful will he be in working with these people, and in carrying out the shift away from the old Bush/Cheney priorities?

Next week, Obama goes to the Pentagon, for a a meeting in the highly secure "Tank" with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While he's keeping Defense Secretary Bob Gates on, we don't yet know how many, if any, of the individual service chiefs -- Navy, Marines, Army, Air Force -- Obama intends to retain after their terms end. Nor do we know what his plans are for the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Navy Admiral Mike Mullen. Nor do we yet know what he wants to do with the current chiefs of the US Armed Forces' international commands.


We do know that Obama already met, on Wednesday, with one general whose job looks secure for now, Central Command chief David Petraeus, as well as JCS chief Admiral Mullen, Defense Secretary Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Obama's national security advisor, former Marine Corps commandant and NATO commander Jim Jones.

After that meeting, Obama said: "I asked the military leadership to engage in additional planning necessary to execute a responsible military drawdown from Iraq."

If things hold together in Iraq -- and that's a big if, dependent on factional factors inside the country and America's ability to engage Iran -- Obama's goal of withdrawing combat troops from the country in 16 months is very do-able.

Of course, Obama is planning a surge in troubled Afghanistan to coincide with the Iraq drawdown.

Petraeus, subject of a memorable MoveOn.org ad as "General Betray-us" (done by a one-time colleague of mine), appears key to all of this. The Iraq commander during the surge is now the head of US Central Command, which covers both the Iraq and Afghan Wars, and has in its "area of responsibility" Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. In other words, a lot of the hot spots in the news. Although Central Command's official headquarters is in Florida, its regional headquarters is in Qatar, just like Al Jazeera, the powerful Arab TV network.

A top Republican operator, a John McCain man who admires Petraeus, told me this the week before Obama's inauguration: "Now America's smartest general and America's smartest politician get to work together."

For all the blood-and-guts hero worship of Petraeus on the far right, he's actually a very political general. At the dawn of his career, upon his graduation from West Point, he married the daughter of the Military Academy's commanding general. His approach around the Iraq surge was at least as political as it was military, playing the various Iraqi factions against one another and for the US and even engaging with Iran on its interests in quelling the violence.

Petraeus arrived in Washington on the night of Obama's inauguration, having just concluded a lengthy tour of the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia, during which he consulted with the leaders of the various former Soviet republics and with top Russian figures.

For all the single-minded nature of conventional media focus, Iraq and Afghanistan are part of multiplex challenges involving Pakistan, India, the overall Middle East, and Russia.

And for all the surrounding complexity, what is needed is clarity. Iraq became a spiraling obsession for the Bush/Cheney Administration. Afghanistan, where the objectives should have been clear (to thoroughly disrupt Al Qaeda and deny it that base of operations), became the latest unfinished Attention Deficit Disorder operation for a White House pursuing the illusory glitter of its own dark dream.


Now Afghanistan -- the "good, neglected war," as Democrats have typed it -- requires clarity and realism. Lacking that invites quagmire. What is the overall goal in Afghanistan? Nation-building in a far-flung failed state which has successfully resisted outsiders for centuries, not least the British and Soviet empires? Or the original post-9/11 objectives?

That's something that Obama, with various civilian and military leaders, including Petraeus, needs to be very clear about.

In the meantime, Obama wants to stabilize the situation, something increasingly difficult because of Pakistan. The US has long relied on supply lines through increasingly unstable Pakistan, a longtime haven for Al Qaeda and Taliban cadre after they were chased out of Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11. There have been recent closures of those lines, in the legendary Khyber Pass and elsewhere, due to Islamic jihadist attacks. Peshawar, the longtime regional capital, is increasingly unstable.

In the wake of his pre-inaugural travels, Petraeus thinks that new supply lines have been secured.


The U.S. has struck deals with Russia and neighboring countries allowing it to transport supplies to American troops in Afghanistan through their territory, the head of U.S. Central Command said Tuesday. Most supplies for U.S. and NATO troops must first pass through northern Pakistan via the Arabian Sea port of Karachi, a treacherous route sometimes closed because of attacks by Islamist militants.

But it's probably not that easy, not that that was easy. Moscow will probably want more concessions. In fact, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev has just been re-tracking Petraeus's steps in Central Asia.

It's unclear how salvageable the situation is inside Pakistan, where US missile strikes against jihadists have begun again under the Obama Administration. In fact, it was Obama himself who first publicly called for such strikes, in 2007. Which ironically prompted criticism of Obama by then frontrunner Hillary Clinton, John McCain, and some in the Bush/Cheney Administration.

Perhaps a more explicit deal can be done with Iran to help with supplies and with stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan.

With all the demonization of Iran, something that its wild-eyed President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made easier, it's easy to forget that, like Russia, Iran helped the US bring down the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after 9/11.

Besides, after the US toppled Saddam, one might even say that Iran owes the US a favor for making it a bigger regional power than it would ever otherwise have been.

Sardonic humor aside, watching Obama work with Petraeus and his other commanders is going to be quite fascinating.


You can check things out during the day on my site, New West Notes ... New West Notes

 

[S-2]

I'll be interested to see what develops in our command structure. We've experienced the first post OIF wave of commanders and it'll be interesting to see the possible names of regional and component commanders. Some will certainly change and there'll be signals sent by those changes and subsequent promotions felt all down the chain-of-command.

Never served but neither did Clinton. I don't anticipate the issues, though, that Clinton faced. Certainly, no "Where were you during Vietnam?" questions. Those are moot given B.O's age.

He's terribly liberal and there's a decided culture that he's about to experience up close. It'll be very telling his choices but Petraeus is, as indicated, a lock.

The "surge" isn't a strategy. There's no strategy behind troop reinforcements. There wasn't in Iraq either. How and where these men are used will define our intent. We're fighting a holding action while we try to raise forth the ANA to some modicum of competence and unscrew this abysmal mess of an Afghan gov't.

Sadly, the U.N./N.A.T.O./I.S.A.F haven't set a good example. We've done a piss-poor job of reconciling differences of all types-political objectives, means and ends, narcotics, negotiations with the taliban. Lots of mixed signals and incoherance that's cut the afghan gov't slack to wallow instead of demanding accountability.

Too sovereign too soon with too little right to such privilege. There's talk about Obama and the commanders and Obama and Pakistan but I'll be equally interested to see what evolves of Obama and Karzai.

Good article, hoss!

 

[waraich66]

Sadly, the U.N./N.A.T.O./I.S.A.F haven't set a good example. We've done a piss-poor job of reconciling differences of all types-political objectives, means and ends, narcotics, negotiations with the taliban. Lots of mixed signals and incoherance that's cut the afghan gov't slack to wallow instead of demanding accountability


Real obstackles are still ahead .Dont be so sad

No doubt Iran helped US against Saddam and Talaban but now satuation is different ,US has to plan their strategy from zero level.

All neighbours Iran,China and Russia and new central asian states are looking for promising deals.PA also not looking very much intresting in WOT due to oppisition in public.


Your new leader is energetic and smart but need time to understand game plan.but now you are running out of time.

 

[fatman17]

Good article, hoss!

now how the heck did you know that i am a fan of Bonanza!

anyway, i was watching a news show (BBC it was) where they were discussing US Foreign Policy, and one of the panelist's (american) made a interesting comment.

"some where in the state department building there is a board with the heading "US Foreign Policy" and it then describes the "core values" of this policy. this dosnt change at all, democratic or republican admn. only the "Tone" and the "Execution" differs from admn to admn."

So this tells me barring his "terrible liberalism" things should remain pretty much the same under BO! having said that the "neo-liberals" could still have the last word!

 

[S-2]

"So this tells me barring his "terrible liberalism" things should remain pretty much the same under BO!"

PREDATOR still flies. No change there but then B.O. didn't indicate anything otherwise during the campaign.

I believe that B.O. will increase focus in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I believe, though, that GWB was already doing the same so this, too, will actually only be a continuation.

There will be noticable changes on the ground and, I suspect, a few in relations between each other.

 

[fatman17]

"So this tells me barring his "terrible liberalism" things should remain pretty much the same under BO!"

PREDATOR still flies. No change there but then B.O. didn't indicate anything otherwise during the campaign.

I believe that B.O. will increase focus in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I believe, though, that GWB was already doing the same so this, too, will actually only be a continuation.

There will be noticable changes on the ground and, I suspect, a few in relations between each other.

I would tend to agree!

interesting article headed:

Obama's carefully framed deciet is instrusive by N.Chomsky dosnt bode well for the muslim world.

 

[S-2]

"things remain the same"

Does that mean matters deteriorating at the same continuous rate as before?

What's up with the Chomsky article? You know that as a confirmed neo-con my mullahs have issued a fatwa against reading his stuff. I'm disappointed.

I'll need to seek special dispensation and no neo-con has ever asked for it. It'll take a catholic to break the ice there I guess.

 

[RedBaron]

...
The "surge" isn't a strategy. There's no strategy behind troop reinforcements. There wasn't in Iraq either. How and where these men are used will define our intent. We're fighting a holding action while we try to raise forth the ANA to some modicum of competence and unscrew this abysmal mess of an Afghan gov't.
...

IMHO the mess will take a good 25 years to unscew if not more. The only precedent for a task of this magnitude is probably reconstruction of post-WWII Germany.
Even there, I feel the US had a much simpler task.
- The Nazis were either dead, in prison, in Siberia or had fled to South America, not hiding in the countryside waiting for the Allied forces to depart.
- The Allies had plenty of boots on the ground to man the new frontier with the Commies
- Ruhr valley coal mines/steel factories were in reasonably good shape
- Ch. Konrad Adeneur's gov't was stable and, with the help of the highly educated German workforce, was able to nurture Germany's economy back to health with Allied support
- the Marshall Plan helped all of Western Europe to boost industrial production by 35% within 5 years.

Afghanistan:
- no massive Allied presence
- does not have a stable federal gov't. There's no organized opposition party, so it's either Karzai's corrupt gov't or the Taliban.
- no Ruhr valley coal mines or steel factories or skilled workforce
- Taliban at the doorsteps of Kabul again

A US troop surge may stem the bleeding temporarily but will only act as life-support. Once switched off, the patient still dies. One long-term option could be UN involvement: UN blue-berets to provide security in the entire country, UNHCR and UNICEF to provide humanitarian assistance while everyone chips in whatever they can towards a "Marshall Plan" for Afghanistan. It still does not address the governance issue, but does make other countries stakeholders in the process within the framework of the UN. We should not treat Afghanistan as America's war- AQ is everyone's enemy and so is the Taliban by association. What do you guys think?

 

[fatman17]

Obama's Team Stumbling Into Afghanistan Trap
In the book, America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy, which is an April-May 2008 rolling conversation between former national security advisers Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft with Washington Post national security columnist David Ignatius, Brzezinski says this:

I think it was too bad that we cut off International Military Education and Training (IMET) for so many years [with Pakistan]. We didn't have the opportunity to train these younger officers. We have a specific problem, which is the Pashtun area and the frontier area, the sanctuary for Al-Qaeda. We have to deal with it, but we have to be very prudent so as not to galvanize Pakistani politics into irrational anti-Americanism, some of the makings of which are already underway.

To the extent that we have to act, we should act discreetly and avoid publicizing what happens. My guess is if we do that, the Pakistanis in power will see their interest is also in not publicizing it. But if we start boasting, as we are lately, we will make it increasingly impossible for any Pakistani government to accept our actions.

Public emotions will surface. The army may be resentful. And then the consequences are unpredictable. We can probably handle the problem in Afghanistan for quite a while, since we still have some residual sympathy from the help we gave the Afghans against the Soviets. But if the turmoil in Afghanistan spills over into Pakistan, I think we'll be faced with an altogether unmanageable situation. Unmanageable if we get more involved and bogged down, and unmanageable if we abruptly terminate and leave. (empasis added)

So I would say prudence, prudence, prudence over again, and let the Pakistanis sort out their problems. Stop lecturing them on democracy, and be sensitive to their historical geopolitical interests. And emphasize that they have a kind of friend in Afghanistan, which gives them strategic depth vis-a-vis India. But at the same time, we should be careful not to make the Afghans think they're going to be the satellites of Pakistan, which is a difficult game.

Beyond that I simply don't advocate any political activism regarding Pakistan itself. (pp. 107-108)


I think that Brzezinski's impressions of Afghanistan were accurate in April-May 2008 and prescient today. There probably was some residual sympathy among the population for the U.S. -- but that now seems to be gone or has dramatically withered.

Former Bush administration State Department Policy Planning deputy director Kori Schake said as much in her contribution to a 5-part snapshot titled "How Not to Lose Afghanistan" that appeared in the New York Times today.

Schake, who used to advise both the Rudy Guiliani and John McCain presidential campaigns but was in my view a closeted realist in those camps, wrote:

More American troops isn't enough to succeed in Afghanistan. What else needs doing depends on why you think the Taliban have gained ground in the past 18 months.

Is it because we have too few troops to hold areas that have been cleared of Taliban influence? Is it because Afghans are fundamentally sympathetic to Taliban aims? Or are Afghans so downtrodden from the terror and distrustful of American staying power they won't stand up and help?


Schake is asking exactly the right question -- which many advising Obama seem to not be investigating vigorously. Why are the Taliban succeeding so dramatically in the assessments of Afghans? And what has happened to the residual support that Brzezinski hoped would hold us over?

Unless we get that question right, Kori Schake is absolutely right that throwing more troops into the situation is wrong-headed and potentially counterproductive.

The Obama connected contributors to this piece offer depressingly dim visions of what a US policy course towards Afghanistan should be comprised of.

First, Brookings scholar and Obama transition team figure Bruce Riedel advocates in his contribution to the New York Times Afghanistan roundtable more troops and more roads -- but mostly more troops. He barely touches anything beyond a troops-focused lens through which to approach Afghan stability.

Second, Center for A New American Security Senior Fellow John Nagl, famous for the understudy role he held working with General David Petraeus on counter-insurgency thinking and who is rumored to be among potential successors to Kurt Campbell and Michele Flournoy at CNAS (who are both becoming senior Obama administration officials), thinks we need to see force deployments upwards of 600,000 to make a real counter-insurgency effort work in Afghanistan.

Nagl and the entire CNAS team are deeply wired into Obama Land -- and his primary focus in dealing with Afghanistan is militarily oriented -- first a pumping up of US and NATO forces and a huge buildup of Afghanistan's military. Virtually nothing else discussed.

The strongest critic of this approach, embraced by Obama's advisers, is Andrew Exum, a soldier who served in Afghanistan in the US Army between 2002 and 2004. Exum is the author of This Man's Army: A Soldier's Story from the Frontlines of the War on Terrorism and edits the counter-insurgency blog Abu Muqawama.

Exum suggests that the absence of a coherent, multi-faceted strategy for stabilizing Afghanistan is quickly dooming the operation in the guts, minds, and hearts of European allies. He notes that few of our forces speak Dari or Pashto, which is undermining the effectiveness of our counter-insurgency efforts. And he says that given current trends, anything that might look like success in the long run may cost several thousand more American lives and another trillion dollars added to our long term bills. He appropriately asks whether the cost of that kind of "succeess" is worth it.

I would add that that would not be something I could ever define as "success."

Kori Schake rejects the notion that more troops would be effective without attaching a benchmarkable plan to bolster governance in the country. She argues that poppy farms aren't expanding in the conflict zones but rather in the areas of the country that are stable but corruption-ridden.

Schake seems reluctant to endorse any deal-making with the Taliban, which my colleague and Second World author Parag Khanna says will be necessary particularly given the Taliban's deep social roots in Pashtun and Punjabi realities.

Khanna suggests the boldest vision for approaching Afghanistan: a focus on cross-border military management between Pakistan and Afghanistan which seems highly unlikely to me at this time -- but at least is an interesting and novel suggestion. More importantly, Khanna appropriately depicts this as a double bubble problem. If one squeezes militants on one side of the border without dealing with the other, they'll simply balloon to the less vigorously secured region.

Khanna states that we need provisional reconstruction on both sides of the border -- with particular emphasis on hospitals, schools, roads and power generators. And he says we need the active support of the Chinese, Arabs and Turks in making any stabilization plan work.

Parag Khanna and Kori Schake -- neither of whom is excessively close to the Obama team (though I just learned that Khanna did play a role under Riedel on South Asia policy) -- seem to have the most interesting and compelling analyses and prescriptions of the Afghanistan problem.

Obama is running on a path in his stated Afghanistan policy that has very high risks for his presidency and for the nation. We need a new Bonn Conference -- of the sort that former US Ambassador to the United Nations Zalmay Khalilzad and former Presidential Envoy James Dobbins pulled off which brought together the various powerful kingpins in the region -- those allied with us and those not.

Dobbins has stated that the Afghan reconstruction and stabilization effort was the most comparatively under-resourced of all such US foreign policy efforts since before the Marshall Plan, and thus the challenge of a similar approach when trust has been eroded and America so badly underperformed makes the problem much worse today than in 2002.

But throwing more troops into this mess is the kind of mistake that the previous administration would make -- and Obama needs to show that he has learned something of those mistakes we are not trying to move beyond.

-- Steve Clemons is Senior Fellow and Director of the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation and publishes the popular political blog, The Washington Note