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Zahir Kazmi: Normalising Pakistan
By Zahir Kazmi, Visiting Fellow for South Asia (Strategic Affairs)
In Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers, Mark Fitzpatrick argues that it is time to provide a deal that would make it a normal nuclear country—one that is responsible, internally stable and has access to advanced, dual-use nuclear and space technologies for peaceful purposes. Greater access to nuclear technology would help Pakistan overcome acute electricity shortages, which in 2014 exceed 6000 MWe. It would also satisfy Pakistan’s aspiration to membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
The nature of international relations remains transactional. What might be expected of Pakistan in return for normalisation? The conditions advanced might be regarded in Pakistan as discriminatory. Less stringent criteria were applied to India, in the pursuit of a ‘strategic benefit’ for the US.Some aspects of the proposed deal are worthy of closer examination.
Nuclear posture
Firstly, Pakistan is expected to exercise restraint in its declaratory nuclear policy by raising its threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and reversing ‘full-spectrum deterrence’ measures against India’s ‘Cold Start’ strategy, which promotes fighting conventional war without triggering a nuclear exchange.
Pakistan remains ambiguous about its nuclear-use thresholds out of concern that they could be exploited; their purpose is to prevent war and deter India from conventional incursions, and a measure of ambiguity is highly useful.
Moreover, the main problem with the proposal is that it takes nuclear weapons out of the broader context of Pakistan’s military-deterrence relationship with India. Pakistan’s short-range nuclear delivery systems augment its conventional deterrence capability, as they would target the forces trying to exploit the supposed gaps in Pakistan’s conventional operations. Previously, in the event of the failure of deterrence Pakistan would have relied on the counter value targeting of cities in an effort to defend its sovereignty.
While the Indian strategy for waging conventional war under the nuclear threshold is accepted, the Pakistani countermeasures are considered ‘at odds with responsible nuclear behaviour’. Yet Islamabad’s full-spectrum deterrence complements the ‘credible minimum deterrence’ policy and does not seek to supplant it.
Non-proliferation regime
Secondly, Pakistan is expected to lift its veto on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). This veto and the growth of Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons programme are considered contradictory to the principle of minimalism. However, neither India nor Pakistan is irrevocably committed to minimalism. Both are following progressive developmental curves, which should be allowed to reach their conclusions.
Pakistan’s minimalism has exceptions related to India only. India reserves for itself the right to expand its production of fissile material in order to compete with China. This creates a dilemma for Pakistan, which is determined to keep pace with the development of India’s force posture.
India’s pursuit of ballistic missile defence (BMD) partly explains the challenge facing Pakistan. In the past, Pakistan would require n missiles and x fissile material for its targeting requirements. But if India develops BMD, the requirements would increase exponentially. This has implications for fissile material production, delivery systems, warhead designs and nuclear doctrine.
The FMCT is an issue for Pakistan because the UN Security Council’s five permanent members maintain unilateral moratorium on fissile material production. India has been given a nuclear deal without limitations on weapons programmes. The FMCT would cap Pakistan’s modest programme and in doing so would oblige Pakistan to relinquish the hedges to its security.
Thirdly, Pakistan is expected to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Islamabad’s offer of a bilateral moratorium after the 1998 nuclear tests was rejected. Pakistan maintains that it was not the first to test nuclear weapons in South Asia and it would not be the first to resume testing. The onus of ratifying CTBT lies elsewhere.
Internal stabilisation and security
Fourthly, Pakistan is expected to counter groups that employ terrorism against India.This is based on the assumption that a ‘spectacular’ terrorist attack against India could trigger a military conflict between India and Pakistan, which would then lead to nuclear war. One could argue that this fear is overblown, because Indian decision-makers would be irrational to risk a nuclear war. Furthermore, this proposal seems rather one-sided: Pakistan too has been the target of terrorist attacks, some of which may have had Indian involvement. Pakistan’s proposal to India for a strategic restraint regime still awaits an answer. Both states should cooperate fully in fighting terrorism, including through intelligence-sharing. It should not be delayed pending Pakistan’s nuclear normalisation.
Finally, it is worth revisiting the question of how Pakistan’s difficult internal situation developed. Twice in the last thirty years Pakistan has proffered support and territorial access towards the West, which has changed the fabric of its society. A deal for normalisation is the least that it should be offered in return. India remains a threat to Pakistan and external threats are exacerbated by internal security challenges. The energy benefits that would follow nuclear normalisation will also help to secure the domestic stabilisation that we all seek; withholding them will only make the task more difficult.
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About The Author:
Zahir Kazmi-Visiting Fellow for South Asia (Strategic Affairs)Main Responsibilities: Colonel Zahir Kazmi of the Pakistan Army has been appointed as the Visiting Fellow for South Asia (Strategic Affairs) at the IISS. He is also the Senior Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA) Directorate of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division.
Background: Colonel Zahir has expertise in arms control, deterrence, non-proliferation, strategic and security issues of South Asia, including countering terrorism. He represented Pakistan as a Military Observer at the UN Mission in D. R. Congo (2003-04). He holds wide staff experience including service at the Military Operations Directorate at General Headquarters (2004-07) and the Joint Staff Headquarters (2000-09). In recognitions of Zahir’s meritorious services, Pakistan’s Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee has twice awarded him a commendation card (2014 and 2009).
Colonel Zahir is a graduate of the Command and Staff College, Quetta (2001) and the Combat Training Centre in Malaysia (1997). He has been an instructor at the School of Infantry and Tactics, Quetta (1993-96) and at the Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul (1996-98).
By Zahir Kazmi, Visiting Fellow for South Asia (Strategic Affairs)
In Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers, Mark Fitzpatrick argues that it is time to provide a deal that would make it a normal nuclear country—one that is responsible, internally stable and has access to advanced, dual-use nuclear and space technologies for peaceful purposes. Greater access to nuclear technology would help Pakistan overcome acute electricity shortages, which in 2014 exceed 6000 MWe. It would also satisfy Pakistan’s aspiration to membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
The nature of international relations remains transactional. What might be expected of Pakistan in return for normalisation? The conditions advanced might be regarded in Pakistan as discriminatory. Less stringent criteria were applied to India, in the pursuit of a ‘strategic benefit’ for the US.Some aspects of the proposed deal are worthy of closer examination.
Nuclear posture
Firstly, Pakistan is expected to exercise restraint in its declaratory nuclear policy by raising its threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and reversing ‘full-spectrum deterrence’ measures against India’s ‘Cold Start’ strategy, which promotes fighting conventional war without triggering a nuclear exchange.
Pakistan remains ambiguous about its nuclear-use thresholds out of concern that they could be exploited; their purpose is to prevent war and deter India from conventional incursions, and a measure of ambiguity is highly useful.
Moreover, the main problem with the proposal is that it takes nuclear weapons out of the broader context of Pakistan’s military-deterrence relationship with India. Pakistan’s short-range nuclear delivery systems augment its conventional deterrence capability, as they would target the forces trying to exploit the supposed gaps in Pakistan’s conventional operations. Previously, in the event of the failure of deterrence Pakistan would have relied on the counter value targeting of cities in an effort to defend its sovereignty.
While the Indian strategy for waging conventional war under the nuclear threshold is accepted, the Pakistani countermeasures are considered ‘at odds with responsible nuclear behaviour’. Yet Islamabad’s full-spectrum deterrence complements the ‘credible minimum deterrence’ policy and does not seek to supplant it.
Non-proliferation regime
Secondly, Pakistan is expected to lift its veto on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). This veto and the growth of Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons programme are considered contradictory to the principle of minimalism. However, neither India nor Pakistan is irrevocably committed to minimalism. Both are following progressive developmental curves, which should be allowed to reach their conclusions.
Pakistan’s minimalism has exceptions related to India only. India reserves for itself the right to expand its production of fissile material in order to compete with China. This creates a dilemma for Pakistan, which is determined to keep pace with the development of India’s force posture.
India’s pursuit of ballistic missile defence (BMD) partly explains the challenge facing Pakistan. In the past, Pakistan would require n missiles and x fissile material for its targeting requirements. But if India develops BMD, the requirements would increase exponentially. This has implications for fissile material production, delivery systems, warhead designs and nuclear doctrine.
The FMCT is an issue for Pakistan because the UN Security Council’s five permanent members maintain unilateral moratorium on fissile material production. India has been given a nuclear deal without limitations on weapons programmes. The FMCT would cap Pakistan’s modest programme and in doing so would oblige Pakistan to relinquish the hedges to its security.
Thirdly, Pakistan is expected to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Islamabad’s offer of a bilateral moratorium after the 1998 nuclear tests was rejected. Pakistan maintains that it was not the first to test nuclear weapons in South Asia and it would not be the first to resume testing. The onus of ratifying CTBT lies elsewhere.
Internal stabilisation and security
Fourthly, Pakistan is expected to counter groups that employ terrorism against India.This is based on the assumption that a ‘spectacular’ terrorist attack against India could trigger a military conflict between India and Pakistan, which would then lead to nuclear war. One could argue that this fear is overblown, because Indian decision-makers would be irrational to risk a nuclear war. Furthermore, this proposal seems rather one-sided: Pakistan too has been the target of terrorist attacks, some of which may have had Indian involvement. Pakistan’s proposal to India for a strategic restraint regime still awaits an answer. Both states should cooperate fully in fighting terrorism, including through intelligence-sharing. It should not be delayed pending Pakistan’s nuclear normalisation.
Finally, it is worth revisiting the question of how Pakistan’s difficult internal situation developed. Twice in the last thirty years Pakistan has proffered support and territorial access towards the West, which has changed the fabric of its society. A deal for normalisation is the least that it should be offered in return. India remains a threat to Pakistan and external threats are exacerbated by internal security challenges. The energy benefits that would follow nuclear normalisation will also help to secure the domestic stabilisation that we all seek; withholding them will only make the task more difficult.
===========================================
About The Author:
Zahir Kazmi-Visiting Fellow for South Asia (Strategic Affairs)
Background: Colonel Zahir has expertise in arms control, deterrence, non-proliferation, strategic and security issues of South Asia, including countering terrorism. He represented Pakistan as a Military Observer at the UN Mission in D. R. Congo (2003-04). He holds wide staff experience including service at the Military Operations Directorate at General Headquarters (2004-07) and the Joint Staff Headquarters (2000-09). In recognitions of Zahir’s meritorious services, Pakistan’s Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee has twice awarded him a commendation card (2014 and 2009).
Colonel Zahir is a graduate of the Command and Staff College, Quetta (2001) and the Combat Training Centre in Malaysia (1997). He has been an instructor at the School of Infantry and Tactics, Quetta (1993-96) and at the Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul (1996-98).
