Nehru sought US assistance during 1962 Indo-China war Nehru sought

[anant_s]

Nehru sought US assistance during 1962 Indo-China war
Washington, Oct 14, 2015, (PTI)

Former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had sought American assistance and wrote to the then US president John F Kennedy to provide India jet fighters to stem the Chinese tide of aggression during the 1962 Sino-India war, according to a new book.

The main objective of Mao Zedong, the founding father of the People's Republic of China, to attack India in 1962 was to "humiliate" Nehru who was emerging as a leader of the third world, it said.

"India's implementation of the Forward Policy served as a major provocation to China in September 1962," Bruce Riedel, a former CIA official, wrote the book titled 'JFK's Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA and the Sino-Indian War'.

"Mao's focus was on Nehru, but a defeat of India would also be a setback for two of Mao's enemies: (Nikita) Khrushchev and Kennedy," Riedel wrote.

As India was losing its territory to China fast and suffering heavy casualty, Nehru in a letter to Kennedy in November 1962 said India needed "air transport and jet fighters to stem the Chinese tide of aggression."

"A lot more effort, both from us and from our friends will be required."

Nehru wrote another letter to Kennedy in quick succession, Riedel writes.
This letter written by Nehru in a state of panicky was hand delivered by the then Indian Ambassador to the US B K Nehru to Kennedy on November 19.

According to Riedel, on October 8 the Chinese Foreign Minister informed the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing that a massive attack by Beijing was eminent.

"Because the Soviets were engaged in their own high-stakes gamble in Cuba, Moscow did not discourage the Chinese, despite Khrushchev’s close relationship with Nehru," he said in the book.

"“At the same time defeating India would answer the question Kennedy had raised in his 1959 speech in the Senate about which country, democratic India or communist China, was poised to win the race for great power status in Asia. For Mao the conflict with India provided a surrogate for his rivalry with Moscow and with Washington," Riedel wrote in his book.

"On October 28, 1962, the day before Nehru asked for American military help, the US Ambassador in Pakistan, Walter McConaughy met with the then Pakistani ruler Ayub Khan.
"The Ambassador urged him to send assurances to Nehru that Pakistan would not take advantage of India’s war with China," he wrote.

In response Khan proposed that "the Americans and Pakistanis work together to to seek the surrender of Indian territory just as Chinese were grabbing land".

This the US considered as "blackmail", Riedel said.

Galbraith immediately sent an "alarming telegram" to Washington and Karachi "asking for God’s sake that hey keep Kashmir out" of any American message to Pakistan, Riedel said in the book, adding that Washington sided immediately with Galbraith on Kashmir.
At the advice of the US, Nehru then wrote a letter to Ayub Khan.

"Pakistan was clearly capable of initiating war with India, but decided in 1962 not to take advantage of India’s vulnerability," Riedel writes.

According to Riedel, the Americans played a decisive role in forestalling a Pakistani attack on India.

"Kennedy’s message to Ayub Khan, reinforced by similar message from Prime Minister Macmillan, left little in doubt that the United States and the United Kingdom would view a Pakistani move against India as a hostile and aggressive action inconsistent with the SEATO and CENTO Treaties. The Americans told Pakistan that the Chinese attack was the most dangerous move made by Mao since 1950 and that they intended to respond decisively," he wrote.

Riedel, a well-known American expert of South Asia and advisors to four successive US presidents including Barack Obama, is a senior fellow and director of the Brookings Intelligence Project.

"Nehru was thus asking Kennedy to join the war against China by partnering in an air war to defeat the PLA (Peoples Liberation Army of China). It was a momentous request that the Indian Prime Minister was making. Just a decade after American forces had reached a cease-fire with the Chinese Community Forces in Korea, India was asking JFK to join a new war against Community China," Riedel wrote in his book.

Ahead of Nehru's letter, the then US Ambassador to India Galbraith sent a telegram to the White House giving the President an advance notice that such a request was coming from Nehru.

In the letter, Nehru asked for 12 squadrons of US air forces, Riedel told the Washington audience during the preview of the book at an event organised by the Brookings Institute – a top American think-tank – yesterday.

"A minimum of 12 squadrons of supersonic all weather fighters are essential. We have no modern radar cover in the country. The United States Air Force personnel will have to man these fighters and radar installations while our personnel are being trained," Nehru wrote in the letter, which has been quoted by Riedel in the book.

In addition, Nehru also requested "two squadron of B-47 Bombers" to strike in Tibet, the author says quoting the letter.

In the letter, Nehru assured Kennedy that these bombers would not be used against Pakistan, but only for "resistance against the Chinese".

The stakes were "not merely the survival of India", Nehru told Kennedy "but the survival of free and independent Governments in the whole of this subcontinent or in Asia".


Riedel said in the second letter Nehru was, in fact, asking Kennedy for some 350 combat aircraft and crews: 12 squadrons of fighter aircraft and crews: 12 squadron of fighter aircraft with 24 jets in each and two bomber squadrons.

"At least 10,000 personnel would be needed to staff and operate jets, provide radar support and conduct logistical support for the operation," Riedel said adding this was a substantial forces, large enough to make it a numbered air force in the American order of battle.

The British Prime Minister received a similar letter from Nehru, the American scholar writes.

Referring to the subsequent instructions passed by Kennedy to his administration, Riedel described them as the one that of a president preparing for war.

But before the US would take further steps, China announced unilateral ceasefire.
After making major advances and being in a strong position to annex entire of North East and reach as far as Kolkata, the Chinese leadership surprised the world by announcing a unilateral ceasefire fearing that both Britain and the United State were getting ready to provide material support to India in the war.

"Of course, we will never know what the specifics of American assistance to India would have been if the war continues," he wrote in the book set to be officially released in the first week of November.

"We can be reasonably certain that America, India and probably Great Britain would have been at war together with China," Riedel concludes.

The book also notes that Kennedy played a "decisive role" in "forestalling a Pakistani attack" on India, even as Islamabad then was clearly capable of initiating war with India and taking advantage of the situation – New Delhi's vulnerability.

Nehru, Riedel argues, ignored the advice of his general on the scene and instead listened to the top brass in New Delhi.

"This was a serious mistake. Having surrounded himself in New Delhi with 'courtiers' who told him 'only what his top military advisors believed he wished to hear', Nehru took their bad advice," he wrote.

Riedel writes that Mao probably finalised the decision to go to war in a meeting in Beijing on October 6, 1962 with his senior generals. Mao told them that China had defeated Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalists Imperial Japan, and the United States in Korea, he wrote.

Responding to a question, at the Brookings panel discussion, the former CIA official said, "The People’s Liberation Army was ordered to impose a 'fierce and painful' blow on India and expel India from the territory of China claimed in Kashmir west of the Johnson Line and in NEFA South of McMahon Line."

Nehru sought US assistance during 1962 Indo-China war

 

[jung41]

Dude copy paste correctly atleast

 

[anant_s]

Nehru Appeals for JFK’s Help in Fighting China
by David Coleman

While much of the world was focused on the Cuban Missile Crisis, half-way around the world two countries, with a combined total of a billion people–or about a third of the world’s population–were at war.1

India and China had been arguing about two sections of shared border for years. The disputed borders combined for a total of about 2,000 miles. In the west, the Chinese claimed territory in the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir and Western Tibet. In the East, a line drawn by the British in 1914 established a border with Tibet as a buffer state. Named after the Foreign Secretary for the British colonial government of India and the chief architect of the border, Sir Henry McMahon, it had been disputed since its creation and especially after India won its independence.

Because of the sensitivity of these letters, the Indian Government kept them classified until very recently. They weren’t available for the Foreign Relations of the United States
Often shortened to FRUS, it's the official record of U.S. foreign relations as compiled and published by the State Department's Office of the Historian." class="glossaryLink ">Foreign Relations of the United States volume [here and here].The years since had been punctuated a number of diplomatic and occasionally military disputes along the border. Various incarnations of a buffer region in the disputed territory adjacent to the northeast part of Assam were established after India’s independence, eventually becoming known as the North-East Frontier Agency, or NEFANorth-East Frontier Agency" class="glossaryLink ">NEFA. During the summer of 1962, the skirmishes were getting hotter.2

On October 20, 1962, China launched a massive offensive at several points along the NEFA border and to the west in the Ladakh area of north-east Kashmir. The offensive caught the Indian government by surprise. Caught flat-footed, the Indian military forces suffered a series of local defeats and were driven back from their forward positions.3

India was reeling. It had become obvious that they had no answer to China’s offensive. As the U.S. Ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith
U.S. Ambassador to India, 1961-1963" class="glossaryLink ">John Kenneth Galbraith, put it, the Indian government “is currently in disarray.” From the Indian perspective, it was a war going badly.4

The Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru
Prime Minister of India, 1947-1964" class="glossaryLink ">Jawaharlal Nehru, had written to Kennedy several times before.

But on November 19, 1962, he sent two letters, one shortly after the other, that went far beyond previous requests for help.

Asking for help was not something that was easy for Nehru to do. For one thing, India was a leader of the non-aligned movement. As such, it had assiduously avoided getting drawn overtly into either the Western or Soviet orbit of the Cold War. For another, there was the matter of personal pride. As the U.S. Ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, told Kennedy:

All his life he has sought to avoid being dependent upon the United States and the United Kingdom—most of his personal reluctance to ask (or thank) for aid has been based on this pride. He did not like it because it advertised what hurt his pride. Now nothing is so important to him, more personally than politically, than to maintain the semblance of this independence.5

Bolstering Indian military capabilities also risked provoking Pakistan; the long-running dispute between Pakistan and India could all-too-easily become explosive, especially if the United States provided significant military aid to India. The State Department described the Pakistanis as being in a “near hysterical state.”6

Nehru’s First Letter to JFK on November 19
Nehru wrote to Kennedy to update him on the situation. The letter was hand-delivered to the President at 4 P.M. by Braj Kumar Nehru, the Indian Ambassador to the United States and a nephew of Prime Minister Nehru.7

New Delhi, 19th November 1962

Dear Mr. President,

It is now a month since the Chinese massive attack on India started on 20th October. I think I must write to you again to acquaint you with further developments that have occurred since my letter of 29th October. Before I deal with these further developments I would like to say that we are extremely grateful to you and the Government and people of the United States of America for the practical support given to us. We particularly appreciate the speed with which the urgently needed small arms and ammunition were rushed to India.

There was a deceptive lull after the first Chinese offensive during which the Chinese mounted a serious propaganda offensive in the name of peace to get us to accept their so-called three point proposals which, shorn of their wrappings, actually constituted a demand for surrender on their terms. The Chinese tried, despite our rejection of these proposals to get various Afro-Asian countries to intercede with varying offers of mediation.

After my clear and categorical statement in Parliament on 14th November rejecting the three point proposal of Chou En-Lai, the Chinese who had made full preparations to put further military pressure on us restarted their military offensive. I am asking our Ambassador to give you a copy of a statement on the developments in the military situation during the last few days which I made in the Parliament this morning. Bomdila which was the Headquarters of our North East Frontier Agency Command, has been surrounded and the equivalent of two divisions engaged in the operations in the N.E.F.A. area are fighting difficult rearguard actions. It is not quite certain how many of them will be able to extricate themselves and Join the Corps Headquarters at Tezpur further south.

The Chinese are by and large in possession of the greater portion of the North East Frontier Agency and are poised to overrun Chushul in Ladakh. There is nothing to stop them after Chushul till they reach Leh, the Headquarters of the Ladakh province of Kashmir.

Events have moved very fast and we are facing a grim situation in our struggle for survival and in defending all that India stands for against an unscrupulous and powerful aggressor.

Our Defence experts have been discussing our detailed requirements with the technical experts in your Embassy here and have given them a full picture of the magnitude of the operations and the need for air transport and jet fighters. These are absolutely necessary to stem the Chinese tide of aggression. A lot more effort, both from us and from our friends, will be required to roll back this aggressive tide.I hope we will continue to have the support and assistance of your great country in the gigantic efforts that have to be made and sustained to deal with the unscrupulous and powerful enemy we are facing.

I am also writing to Prime Minister MacMillan to keep him informed of these developments.

With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

[View Original]

Nehru’s Second Letter to JFK on November 19
But after he sent that message, new information came in. The situation was dire. Nehru went before the Lok Sabha (the lower house of India’s parliament) to update them of the situation.8

I have to give grievous news to this House. Both Walong and Sela Ridge in N.E.F.A. have fallen to the enemy. In the Chushul area, fighting is proceeding.

In Walong, the enemy attacked on 15th/16th night. This was a two-pronged attack. The battle continued till the 17th. The enemy succeeded in shelling the air-field which was the only source of supply to our forces. On the 17th afternoon, our troops started withdrawing to defensive positions in the rear.

In the Jang area, the enemy attacked our positions on November 17. Their attack was repulsed four times. Ultimately, they attacked in greater strength and this Jang position had to be given up and our troops fell back to the main position at Sela. In the meantime, the enemy bypassed our main post by outflanking movement between Sela and Bomdila. They attacked in the early hours of 18th November and cut the road between Sela and Bomdila. The infiltrators were forced to withdraw; they formed up again and renewed the attack. The situation is somewhat confused and fighting is going on. But our command had to withdraw from Sela.

In the Chushul sector in Ladakh, heavy artillery attacks were made on Chushul air-field; and one post was attacked on the morning of November 18 and after fierce fighting, this post was overwhelmed. Part of another post, six miles east of Chushul, was also attacked. Other attacks in Chushul area were repulsed. Fighting is still going on.

This is bad news. I cannot go into further details at this stage. I should like to add that in spite of reverses suffered by us, we are determined not to give in any way and we shall fight the enemy however long it may take to repel him and drive him out of our country.

[View Original]

Galbraith gave Kennedy advance warning that Nehru was working on a new letter. It arrived in Washington around 10 P.M. It went far beyond his previous appeals for help. Contrary to the confidence and assurance Nehru struggled to project publicly, in the second letter to Kennedy, Nehru dispensed with any pretense that India had the situation in hand.7

New Delhi, 19th November 1962


Dear Mr. President,


Within a few hours of despatching my earlier message of today, the situation in the N.E.F.A. Command has deteriorated still further. Bomdila has fallen and the retreating forces from Sela have been trapped between the Sala Ridge and Bomdila. A serious threat has developed to our Digboi oil fields in Assam. With the advance of the Chinese in massive strength, the entire Brahmaputra Valley is seriously threatened and unless something is done immediately to stem the tide the whole of Assam, Tripura, Manipur and Nagaland would also pass into Chinese hands.


The Chinese have poised massive forces in the Chumbi Valley between Sikkim and Bhutan and another invasion from that direction appears imminent. Our areas further North Wont on the border with Tibet in the States of U.P., Punjab and Himachal Pradesh are also threatened. In Ladakh, as I have said in my earlier communication, Chushul is under heavy attack and shelling of the airfield at Chushul has already commenced. We have also noticed increasing air activity by the Chinese air force in Tibet.


Hitherto we have restricted our requests for assistance to essential equipment and we are most grateful for the assistance which has been so readily given to us. We did not oak for more comprehensive assistance particularly air assistance because of the wider implications of such assistance in the global context and we did not want to embarrass our friends.


The situation that has developed is, however, really desperate. We have to have more comprehensive assistance if the Chinese are to be prevented from taking over the whole of Eastern India. Any delay in this assistance reaching us will result in nothing short of a catastrophe for our country.


We have repeatedly felt the need of using air arm in support of our land forces, but have been unable to do as in the present state of our air and radar equipment we have no defence age fret retaliatory action by the Chinese.


I, therefore, request that immediately support be given to strengthen our air arm sufficiently to stem the tide of Chinese advance.


I am advised that for providing adequate air defence a minimum of 12 squadrons or supersonic all weather fighters are essential. We have no modern radar cover in the country. For this also we seek your assistance. Our needs are most immediate. The United States Air Force personnel will have to man these fighters and radar installations while our personnel are being trained. U.S. fighters and transport planes manned by U.S. personnel will be used for the present to protect our cities and installations from Chinese air attacks and to maintain our communications. We should if this is possible also like U.S. planes manned by U.S. personnel to assist the Indian Air Force in air battles with the Chinese air force over Indian areas where air action by the I.A.F. against Chinese communication lines supplies and troop concentration may lead to counter air action by the Chinese.


Any air action to be taken against the Chinese beyond the limits of our country, e.g, Tibet, will be taken by I.A.F. planes manned by Indian personnel.


Determined as we are to liberate all parts of our territory which may pass into the hands of the Chinese aggressors it is clear that sooner or later we would have to neutralise their bases and airfields by striking from the air. For this purpose I request you to consider assisting us with two Squadrons of Bombers of B-47 type. To man this indispensible arm we would like to send immediately our Pilots and Technicians for training in the United States.


The Chinese threat as it has developed involves not merely the survival of India, but the survival of free and independent Governments in the whole of this sub—Continent or in Asia. The domestic quarrels regarding small areas or territorial borders between the countries in this sub-Continent or in Asia have no relevance whatever in the context of the developing Chinese invasion. I would emphasize particularly that all the assistance or equipment given to us to meet our dire need will be used entirely for resistance against the Chinese. I have made this clear in a letter I sent to President Ayub Khan of Pakistan. I am asking our Ambassador to give you a copy of this letter.


We are confident that your great country will in this hour of our trial help us in our fight for survival and for the survival of freedom and independence in this sub-Continent as well as the rest of Asia. We on our part are determined to spare no effort until the threat posed by Chinese expansionist and aggressive militarism to freedom and independence is completely eliminated.


With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

[View Original]

For Kennedy, the decision was not whether to help, but how. Nehru’s new appeal far exceeded the scope of previous requests. In particular, the prospect of American pilots joining a war with China was not something that many in Washington seriously entertained. And many were skeptical that the Indians were positioned to make good use of any aid the American sent.

Kennedy met with his advisers on November 19 to try to devise a response. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who had served in the region during World War II, pushed for immediately sending C-130 transport planes to help the Indians with their supply lines. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was sharply critical of the nature of the Indian requests and argued that sending help was futile until they had a better sense of what kind of help would be useful. That led to the sending of a fact-finding team led by veteran diplomat Averell Harriman.

Recommended Reading
If you’re looking to explore the Sino-Indian War more deeply, here are some recommendations:

• Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975)
• Andrew Bingham Kennedy, The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)
• Steven A. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990)

Nehru Appeals for JFK's Help in the Sino-Indian War

 

[Dungeness]

Nehru Appeals for JFK’s Help in Fighting China
by David Coleman

While much of the world was focused on the Cuban Missile Crisis, half-way around the world two countries, with a combined total of a billion people–or about a third of the world’s population–were at war.1

India and China had been arguing about two sections of shared border for years. The disputed borders combined for a total of about 2,000 miles. In the west, the Chinese claimed territory in the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir and Western Tibet. In the East, a line drawn by the British in 1914 established a border with Tibet as a buffer state. Named after the Foreign Secretary for the British colonial government of India and the chief architect of the border, Sir Henry McMahon, it had been disputed since its creation and especially after India won its independence.

Because of the sensitivity of these letters, the Indian Government kept them classified until very recently. They weren’t available for the Foreign Relations of the United States
Often shortened to FRUS, it's the official record of U.S. foreign relations as compiled and published by the State Department's Office of the Historian." class="glossaryLink ">Foreign Relations of the United States volume [here and here].The years since had been punctuated a number of diplomatic and occasionally military disputes along the border. Various incarnations of a buffer region in the disputed territory adjacent to the northeast part of Assam were established after India’s independence, eventually becoming known as the North-East Frontier Agency, or NEFANorth-East Frontier Agency" class="glossaryLink ">NEFA. During the summer of 1962, the skirmishes were getting hotter.2

On October 20, 1962, China launched a massive offensive at several points along the NEFA border and to the west in the Ladakh area of north-east Kashmir. The offensive caught the Indian government by surprise. Caught flat-footed, the Indian military forces suffered a series of local defeats and were driven back from their forward positions.3

India was reeling. It had become obvious that they had no answer to China’s offensive. As the U.S. Ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith
U.S. Ambassador to India, 1961-1963" class="glossaryLink ">John Kenneth Galbraith, put it, the Indian government “is currently in disarray.” From the Indian perspective, it was a war going badly.4

The Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru
Prime Minister of India, 1947-1964" class="glossaryLink ">Jawaharlal Nehru, had written to Kennedy several times before.

But on November 19, 1962, he sent two letters, one shortly after the other, that went far beyond previous requests for help.

Asking for help was not something that was easy for Nehru to do. For one thing, India was a leader of the non-aligned movement. As such, it had assiduously avoided getting drawn overtly into either the Western or Soviet orbit of the Cold War. For another, there was the matter of personal pride. As the U.S. Ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, told Kennedy:

All his life he has sought to avoid being dependent upon the United States and the United Kingdom—most of his personal reluctance to ask (or thank) for aid has been based on this pride. He did not like it because it advertised what hurt his pride. Now nothing is so important to him, more personally than politically, than to maintain the semblance of this independence.5

Bolstering Indian military capabilities also risked provoking Pakistan; the long-running dispute between Pakistan and India could all-too-easily become explosive, especially if the United States provided significant military aid to India. The State Department described the Pakistanis as being in a “near hysterical state.”6

Nehru’s First Letter to JFK on November 19
Nehru wrote to Kennedy to update him on the situation. The letter was hand-delivered to the President at 4 P.M. by Braj Kumar Nehru, the Indian Ambassador to the United States and a nephew of Prime Minister Nehru.7

New Delhi, 19th November 1962

Dear Mr. President,

It is now a month since the Chinese massive attack on India started on 20th October. I think I must write to you again to acquaint you with further developments that have occurred since my letter of 29th October. Before I deal with these further developments I would like to say that we are extremely grateful to you and the Government and people of the United States of America for the practical support given to us. We particularly appreciate the speed with which the urgently needed small arms and ammunition were rushed to India.

There was a deceptive lull after the first Chinese offensive during which the Chinese mounted a serious propaganda offensive in the name of peace to get us to accept their so-called three point proposals which, shorn of their wrappings, actually constituted a demand for surrender on their terms. The Chinese tried, despite our rejection of these proposals to get various Afro-Asian countries to intercede with varying offers of mediation.

After my clear and categorical statement in Parliament on 14th November rejecting the three point proposal of Chou En-Lai, the Chinese who had made full preparations to put further military pressure on us restarted their military offensive. I am asking our Ambassador to give you a copy of a statement on the developments in the military situation during the last few days which I made in the Parliament this morning. Bomdila which was the Headquarters of our North East Frontier Agency Command, has been surrounded and the equivalent of two divisions engaged in the operations in the N.E.F.A. area are fighting difficult rearguard actions. It is not quite certain how many of them will be able to extricate themselves and Join the Corps Headquarters at Tezpur further south.

The Chinese are by and large in possession of the greater portion of the North East Frontier Agency and are poised to overrun Chushul in Ladakh. There is nothing to stop them after Chushul till they reach Leh, the Headquarters of the Ladakh province of Kashmir.

Events have moved very fast and we are facing a grim situation in our struggle for survival and in defending all that India stands for against an unscrupulous and powerful aggressor.

Our Defence experts have been discussing our detailed requirements with the technical experts in your Embassy here and have given them a full picture of the magnitude of the operations and the need for air transport and jet fighters. These are absolutely necessary to stem the Chinese tide of aggression. A lot more effort, both from us and from our friends, will be required to roll back this aggressive tide.I hope we will continue to have the support and assistance of your great country in the gigantic efforts that have to be made and sustained to deal with the unscrupulous and powerful enemy we are facing.

I am also writing to Prime Minister MacMillan to keep him informed of these developments.

With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

[View Original]

Nehru’s Second Letter to JFK on November 19
But after he sent that message, new information came in. The situation was dire. Nehru went before the Lok Sabha (the lower house of India’s parliament) to update them of the situation.8

I have to give grievous news to this House. Both Walong and Sela Ridge in N.E.F.A. have fallen to the enemy. In the Chushul area, fighting is proceeding.

In Walong, the enemy attacked on 15th/16th night. This was a two-pronged attack. The battle continued till the 17th. The enemy succeeded in shelling the air-field which was the only source of supply to our forces. On the 17th afternoon, our troops started withdrawing to defensive positions in the rear.

In the Jang area, the enemy attacked our positions on November 17. Their attack was repulsed four times. Ultimately, they attacked in greater strength and this Jang position had to be given up and our troops fell back to the main position at Sela. In the meantime, the enemy bypassed our main post by outflanking movement between Sela and Bomdila. They attacked in the early hours of 18th November and cut the road between Sela and Bomdila. The infiltrators were forced to withdraw; they formed up again and renewed the attack. The situation is somewhat confused and fighting is going on. But our command had to withdraw from Sela.

In the Chushul sector in Ladakh, heavy artillery attacks were made on Chushul air-field; and one post was attacked on the morning of November 18 and after fierce fighting, this post was overwhelmed. Part of another post, six miles east of Chushul, was also attacked. Other attacks in Chushul area were repulsed. Fighting is still going on.

This is bad news. I cannot go into further details at this stage. I should like to add that in spite of reverses suffered by us, we are determined not to give in any way and we shall fight the enemy however long it may take to repel him and drive him out of our country.

[View Original]

Galbraith gave Kennedy advance warning that Nehru was working on a new letter. It arrived in Washington around 10 P.M. It went far beyond his previous appeals for help. Contrary to the confidence and assurance Nehru struggled to project publicly, in the second letter to Kennedy, Nehru dispensed with any pretense that India had the situation in hand.7

New Delhi, 19th November 1962


Dear Mr. President,


Within a few hours of despatching my earlier message of today, the situation in the N.E.F.A. Command has deteriorated still further. Bomdila has fallen and the retreating forces from Sela have been trapped between the Sala Ridge and Bomdila. A serious threat has developed to our Digboi oil fields in Assam. With the advance of the Chinese in massive strength, the entire Brahmaputra Valley is seriously threatened and unless something is done immediately to stem the tide the whole of Assam, Tripura, Manipur and Nagaland would also pass into Chinese hands.


The Chinese have poised massive forces in the Chumbi Valley between Sikkim and Bhutan and another invasion from that direction appears imminent. Our areas further North Wont on the border with Tibet in the States of U.P., Punjab and Himachal Pradesh are also threatened. In Ladakh, as I have said in my earlier communication, Chushul is under heavy attack and shelling of the airfield at Chushul has already commenced. We have also noticed increasing air activity by the Chinese air force in Tibet.


Hitherto we have restricted our requests for assistance to essential equipment and we are most grateful for the assistance which has been so readily given to us. We did not oak for more comprehensive assistance particularly air assistance because of the wider implications of such assistance in the global context and we did not want to embarrass our friends.


The situation that has developed is, however, really desperate. We have to have more comprehensive assistance if the Chinese are to be prevented from taking over the whole of Eastern India. Any delay in this assistance reaching us will result in nothing short of a catastrophe for our country.


We have repeatedly felt the need of using air arm in support of our land forces, but have been unable to do as in the present state of our air and radar equipment we have no defence age fret retaliatory action by the Chinese.


I, therefore, request that immediately support be given to strengthen our air arm sufficiently to stem the tide of Chinese advance.


I am advised that for providing adequate air defence a minimum of 12 squadrons or supersonic all weather fighters are essential. We have no modern radar cover in the country. For this also we seek your assistance. Our needs are most immediate. The United States Air Force personnel will have to man these fighters and radar installations while our personnel are being trained. U.S. fighters and transport planes manned by U.S. personnel will be used for the present to protect our cities and installations from Chinese air attacks and to maintain our communications. We should if this is possible also like U.S. planes manned by U.S. personnel to assist the Indian Air Force in air battles with the Chinese air force over Indian areas where air action by the I.A.F. against Chinese communication lines supplies and troop concentration may lead to counter air action by the Chinese.


Any air action to be taken against the Chinese beyond the limits of our country, e.g, Tibet, will be taken by I.A.F. planes manned by Indian personnel.


Determined as we are to liberate all parts of our territory which may pass into the hands of the Chinese aggressors it is clear that sooner or later we would have to neutralise their bases and airfields by striking from the air. For this purpose I request you to consider assisting us with two Squadrons of Bombers of B-47 type. To man this indispensible arm we would like to send immediately our Pilots and Technicians for training in the United States.


The Chinese threat as it has developed involves not merely the survival of India, but the survival of free and independent Governments in the whole of this sub—Continent or in Asia. The domestic quarrels regarding small areas or territorial borders between the countries in this sub-Continent or in Asia have no relevance whatever in the context of the developing Chinese invasion. I would emphasize particularly that all the assistance or equipment given to us to meet our dire need will be used entirely for resistance against the Chinese. I have made this clear in a letter I sent to President Ayub Khan of Pakistan. I am asking our Ambassador to give you a copy of this letter.


We are confident that your great country will in this hour of our trial help us in our fight for survival and for the survival of freedom and independence in this sub-Continent as well as the rest of Asia. We on our part are determined to spare no effort until the threat posed by Chinese expansionist and aggressive militarism to freedom and independence is completely eliminated.


With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

[View Original]

For Kennedy, the decision was not whether to help, but how. Nehru’s new appeal far exceeded the scope of previous requests. In particular, the prospect of American pilots joining a war with China was not something that many in Washington seriously entertained. And many were skeptical that the Indians were positioned to make good use of any aid the American sent.

Kennedy met with his advisers on November 19 to try to devise a response. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who had served in the region during World War II, pushed for immediately sending C-130 transport planes to help the Indians with their supply lines. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was sharply critical of the nature of the Indian requests and argued that sending help was futile until they had a better sense of what kind of help would be useful. That led to the sending of a fact-finding team led by veteran diplomat Averell Harriman.

Recommended Reading
If you’re looking to explore the Sino-Indian War more deeply, here are some recommendations:

• Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975)
• Andrew Bingham Kennedy, The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)
• Steven A. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990)

Nehru Appeals for JFK's Help in the Sino-Indian War

Heard about the letters Nehru wrote to JFK, but it is the first time to read them in full. I can feel the desperation of Nehru then. Just wondering how many Indian people know about it?

 

[anant_s]

now i have 2 questions here:

1. Pandit Nehru asking for US help first is a bit baffling as one it goes against very founding principle of NAM and two India's closeness to Soviet Union? What actually conspired this move?
2. US foreign policy in entire Cold war era was containment of spread of communism. now as the story tells, even if US administration had not agreed for supply of supply of hardware on such large scale, even diplomatic efforts could have meant a lot. that didn't come. later India leaned towards USSR, and it took nearly half a century for situation to change. Is it a case of missed opportunity for US policy or whether US was not hoping for Indian Democracy to survive in long run.

@AUSTERLITZ @scorpionx

 

[Dungeness]

now i have 2 questions here:

1. Pandit Nehru asking for US help first is a bit baffling as one it goes against very founding principle of NAM and two India's closeness to Soviet Union? What actually conspired this move?
2. US foreign policy in entire Cold war era was containment of spread of communism. now as the story tells, even if US administration had not agreed for supply of supply of hardware on such large scale, even diplomatic efforts could have meant a lot. that didn't come. later India leaned towards USSR, and it took nearly half a century for situation to change. Is it a case of missed opportunity for US policy or whether US was not hoping for Indian Democracy to survive in long run.

@AUSTERLITZ @scorpionx

@Joe Shearer What is your opinion on this? You have extensive knowledge about 1962 war.

 

[dy1022]

What a sad story, I'm gonna cry after reading these!!!

 

[Dungeness]

To OP, I think this is a very touchy subject for Indian members to talk about. Has "Henderson-Brooks Report" been declassified by Indian Government yet?

 

[shree835]

Jawaharlal Nehru was suppose to be killed well before MK Gandhi.... He gave a big loss to India....He managed to settled politics as family business in India.

 

[Argon Prime]

What's new??

 

[Joe Shearer]

@Joe Shearer What is your opinion on this? You have extensive knowledge about 1962 war.

Dear Sir,

In 1962, a lot of Nehru's principles were damaged beyond repair. He himself died shortly afterwards, embittered and defeated, worn out by the turn in public sympathy against him, and for once in his life, no longer the darling of the masses that he was earlier.

One of the things to remember is that the USSR did not then play nearly as important a role in the thinking and calculations of the Indian establishment as it did in subsequent years, rising to a peak in 1971, eroding swiftly during perestroika and glasnost, and proceeding fitfully ever since. It did not come to India to ask for Russian help suddenly. Another factor is that while all were aware that China and Russia, (the PRC and the USSR, accurately), had clashed on the Amur border, no one was confident about the extent of the disagreement, or of what practical result it might have in the real world.

Counting on the USSR was a suspect move, in short.

What, you may be wondering, was the counter-attraction of the US? At that time, the US was very well represented in India diplomatically. The Ambassador was the famous economist, Galbraith, who had been the President's teacher earlier. In May of 1962, he got Jackie Kennedy to come to India, and she swept all before her. The combination of the hugely respected professor and the Queen of Camelot was a heady and irresistible mixture, if we were to take the current trend of dwelling lovingly on personal and trivial detail about famous personalities.

There were practical reasons also. Thanks to the excesses of successive very bad defence ministers, the Indian Army, which had fought gallantly in Africa and in Italy, and had stood its ground against the Japanese, was in very low spirits. Its leadership was completely demoralised; a weak COAS had paid the price, and officers felt the doom and despair all around. For some reason, perhaps connected to the debacle on ground level, a belief grew that finally it was air power that could salvage the situation.

Briefly, this was the background to the first question.

I could not understand the second question very well.

Jawaharlal Nehru was suppose to be killed well before MK Gandhi.... He gave a big loss to India....He managed to settled politics as family business in India.

Our trouble is that we get uneducated comments of this kind.

Pathetic.

 

[Virk1]

They could have asked the help of any insignificant nation alongside USA as Indian army didn't even had winter clothing apart from vintage ww2 weapons.

 

[Argon Prime]

Our trouble is that we get uneducated comments of this kind.

Pathetic.

What's wrong in that comment??Nehru's actions (along with that of Menon) were directly behind the steady erosion of moral from the rank and file of the Indian Army,which resulted into the erosion of the unit cohesion of the formations,which in turn ultimately led to the 1962 debacle,which was totally avoidable if the likes of John Dalvi and Sam Manekshaw are to be believed.So I ask you again,what's so much offensive or factually incorrect that you find in his comment??

They could have asked the help of any insignificant nation alongside USA as Indian army don't even had winter clothing apart from vintage ww2 weapons.

True!!The bulk of the soldiers were armed with SMLEs,with a mere 100-150 rounds per rifleman!!Because even the .303 rounds were in short supply due to the faulty policies taken by the Nehru and Menon duo!!

 

[Dungeness]

Dear Sir,

In 1962, a lot of Nehru's principles were damaged beyond repair. He himself died shortly afterwards, embittered and defeated, worn out by the turn in public sympathy against him, and for once in his life, no longer the darling of the masses that he was earlier.

One of the things to remember is that the USSR did not then play nearly as important a role in the thinking and calculations of the Indian establishment as it did in subsequent years, rising to a peak in 1971, eroding swiftly during perestroika and glasnost, and proceeding fitfully ever since. It did not come to India to ask for Russian help suddenly. Another factor is that while all were aware that China and Russia, (the PRC and the USSR, accurately), had clashed on the Amur border, no one was confident about the extent of the disagreement, or of what practical result it might have in the real world.

Counting on the USSR was a suspect move, in short.

What, you may be wondering, was the counter-attraction of the US? At that time, the US was very well represented in India diplomatically. The Ambassador was the famous economist, Galbraith, who had been the President's teacher earlier. In May of 1962, he got Jackie Kennedy to come to India, and she swept all before her. The combination of the hugely respected professor and the Queen of Camelot was a heady and irresistible mixture, if we were to take the current trend of dwelling lovingly on personal and trivial detail about famous personalities.

There were practical reasons also. Thanks to the excesses of successive very bad defence ministers, the Indian Army, which had fought gallantly in Africa and in Italy, and had stood its ground against the Japanese, was in very low spirits. Its leadership was completely demoralised; a weak COAS had paid the price, and officers felt the doom and despair all around. For some reason, perhaps connected to the debacle on ground level, a belief grew that finally it was air power that could salvage the situation.

Briefly, this was the background to the first question.

I could not understand the second question very well.




Our trouble is that we get uneducated comments of this kind.

Pathetic.

I guess the OP 's second question is had US helped at Nehru's request, India would have been in US camp 50 years earlier instead in USSR's camp, therefore, India could be a total different state of affair today. By the way, Amur conflict between USSR and China happened in 1969, so it was not a factor at that time. USSR was just too busy with the missiles crisis.

Thanks!

 

[Virk1]

What's wrong in that comment??Nehru's actions (along with that of Menon) were directly behind the steady erosion of moral from the rank and file of the Indian Army,which resulted into the erosion of the unit cohesion of the formations,which in turn ultimately led to the 1962 debacle,which was totally avoidable if the likes of John Dalvi and Sam Manekshaw are to be believed.So I ask you again,what's so much offensive or factually incorrect that you find in his comment??



True!!The bulk of the soldiers were armed with SMLEs,with a mere 100-150 rounds per rifleman!!Because even the .303 rounds were in short supply due to the faulty policies taken by the Nehru and Menon duo!!

I even saw .303 pics with IA in 1965 war along with few SLR.