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Columbia anniversary: Nasa managers struggled with telling crew of danger | World news | guardian.co.uk
Columbia anniversary: Nasa
managers struggled with
telling crew of danger
A decade after the space shuttle broke apart on
re-entry over Texas, project manager reveals
agency's agonising discussions
Hot gases seeped into the wing as Columbia
attempted re-entry, triggering an explosion that
killed all seven astronauts. Photograph: Nasa/
Getty Images
Nasa managers discussed their obligation to inform the Columbia space shuttle crew of damage to the craft and the risks of returning it
to Earth just days before it blew apart over Texas
in 2003, a former project leader has revealed. Speaking candidly to mark the 10th anniversary
of the disaster that almost ended the agency's
manned spaceflight programme, former shuttle
project manager Wayne Hale revealed the depths
of the moral debate that took place in Houston
after the orbiter was struck by falling insulation foam on its launch from Florida 16 days earlier. Hale wrote on his blog that he was told by Jon Harpold, then Nasa's director of mission
operations: "You know, there is nothing we can
do about damage to the thermal protection
system. If it has been damaged it's probably
better not to know. I think the crew would
rather not know. "Don't you think it would be better for them to
have a happy successful flight and die
unexpectedly during entry than to stay on orbit,
knowing that there was nothing to be done, until
the air ran out?" At the time, Hale stressed, Harpold's words were
purely hypothetical because the space agency's
engineers were working on what he called "the
wrong problem". They were looking at whether
the briefcase-sized piece of foam, which knocked
a hole in the leading edge of the orbiter's left wing, had instead damaged the softer thermal
protection tiles on the wing's underside. After showing the astronauts in orbit a video of
the foam strike and discussing with them what
they thought they knew, mission managers
concluded that it was a non-issue and posed no
threat to the crew's safe return. They were proved wrong when hot gases
seeped into the wing as Columbia attempted re-
entry to Earth's atmosphere and caused the
17,5000mph explosion that sent chunks of the
spacecraft raining down over eastern Texas. Although the circumstances of the tragedy have
been well documented, and Hale insists there
was "never any debate about what to tell the
crew", his revelation brings new insight to the
mindset of some Nasa employees at the time. The agency was heavily criticised by the report
of the Columbia accident investigation board,
published six months after the explosion, for "a
culture of complacency" that led to the cutting of
corners and the legitimate concerns of low-level
employees being ignored. It was established that junior engineers had asked eight times for
military satellite images to be studied to
determine damage to the shuttle but were
rebuffed by superiors. Hale, now retired from Nasa after serving as flight
director for 40 of the shuttle programme's 135
missions, said he did not agree with his
manager's assessment that nothing could have
been done for the astronauts. "We would have pulled out all the stops. There
would have been no stone left unturned. We
would have had the entire nation working on it,"
he said, even though he realised such efforts
would probably have been futile. On his personal blog, he writes: "If there were
some magical way to find out Columbia's status, a
week after launch it was too late. The best case
scenario, which had virtually no chance of
succeeding, would only have worked if action
had been taken on the second or third day of the flight; by the sixth day it was too late." The three surviving shuttles, Endeavour,
Discovery and Atlantis, were grounded for two
and a half years after the disaster. For every
mission after their 2005 return to flight until the
fleet's eventual retirement in 2011, Nasa always
kept another orbiter in an advanced state of readiness for a launch-on-need rescue mission. The seven astronauts who died aboard Columbia
were honoured Friday morning at a ceremony at
Florida's Kennedy Space Center, attended by
mission commander Rick Husband's widow
Evelyn and family members of the other victims. Nasa officials also paid tribute to the seven
shuttle astronauts who perished in the 1986
Challenger disaster and the three killed in the
1967 Apollo 1 launchpad fire, and acknowledged
the agency's failings a decade ago. "The accident wasn't caused by a single event or
a single person but by a series of technical and
cultural missteps stemming all the way back to
the first shuttle launch in 1981," said Bill
Gerstenmaier, associate administrator for human
exploration and operations. "We continued to lose foam on many missions
and this reinforced the idea that all was well. We
did not stay hungry and we didn't deeply
analyse the implications of foam being released at
precisely the wrong moment. "We need to stay vigilant and recognise that
even the smallest potential flaw can become a big
problem. Even small problems can serve as major
failures."
Columbia anniversary: Nasa
managers struggled with
telling crew of danger
A decade after the space shuttle broke apart on
re-entry over Texas, project manager reveals
agency's agonising discussions
Hot gases seeped into the wing as Columbia
attempted re-entry, triggering an explosion that
killed all seven astronauts. Photograph: Nasa/
Getty Images
Nasa managers discussed their obligation to inform the Columbia space shuttle crew of damage to the craft and the risks of returning it
to Earth just days before it blew apart over Texas
in 2003, a former project leader has revealed. Speaking candidly to mark the 10th anniversary
of the disaster that almost ended the agency's
manned spaceflight programme, former shuttle
project manager Wayne Hale revealed the depths
of the moral debate that took place in Houston
after the orbiter was struck by falling insulation foam on its launch from Florida 16 days earlier. Hale wrote on his blog that he was told by Jon Harpold, then Nasa's director of mission
operations: "You know, there is nothing we can
do about damage to the thermal protection
system. If it has been damaged it's probably
better not to know. I think the crew would
rather not know. "Don't you think it would be better for them to
have a happy successful flight and die
unexpectedly during entry than to stay on orbit,
knowing that there was nothing to be done, until
the air ran out?" At the time, Hale stressed, Harpold's words were
purely hypothetical because the space agency's
engineers were working on what he called "the
wrong problem". They were looking at whether
the briefcase-sized piece of foam, which knocked
a hole in the leading edge of the orbiter's left wing, had instead damaged the softer thermal
protection tiles on the wing's underside. After showing the astronauts in orbit a video of
the foam strike and discussing with them what
they thought they knew, mission managers
concluded that it was a non-issue and posed no
threat to the crew's safe return. They were proved wrong when hot gases
seeped into the wing as Columbia attempted re-
entry to Earth's atmosphere and caused the
17,5000mph explosion that sent chunks of the
spacecraft raining down over eastern Texas. Although the circumstances of the tragedy have
been well documented, and Hale insists there
was "never any debate about what to tell the
crew", his revelation brings new insight to the
mindset of some Nasa employees at the time. The agency was heavily criticised by the report
of the Columbia accident investigation board,
published six months after the explosion, for "a
culture of complacency" that led to the cutting of
corners and the legitimate concerns of low-level
employees being ignored. It was established that junior engineers had asked eight times for
military satellite images to be studied to
determine damage to the shuttle but were
rebuffed by superiors. Hale, now retired from Nasa after serving as flight
director for 40 of the shuttle programme's 135
missions, said he did not agree with his
manager's assessment that nothing could have
been done for the astronauts. "We would have pulled out all the stops. There
would have been no stone left unturned. We
would have had the entire nation working on it,"
he said, even though he realised such efforts
would probably have been futile. On his personal blog, he writes: "If there were
some magical way to find out Columbia's status, a
week after launch it was too late. The best case
scenario, which had virtually no chance of
succeeding, would only have worked if action
had been taken on the second or third day of the flight; by the sixth day it was too late." The three surviving shuttles, Endeavour,
Discovery and Atlantis, were grounded for two
and a half years after the disaster. For every
mission after their 2005 return to flight until the
fleet's eventual retirement in 2011, Nasa always
kept another orbiter in an advanced state of readiness for a launch-on-need rescue mission. The seven astronauts who died aboard Columbia
were honoured Friday morning at a ceremony at
Florida's Kennedy Space Center, attended by
mission commander Rick Husband's widow
Evelyn and family members of the other victims. Nasa officials also paid tribute to the seven
shuttle astronauts who perished in the 1986
Challenger disaster and the three killed in the
1967 Apollo 1 launchpad fire, and acknowledged
the agency's failings a decade ago. "The accident wasn't caused by a single event or
a single person but by a series of technical and
cultural missteps stemming all the way back to
the first shuttle launch in 1981," said Bill
Gerstenmaier, associate administrator for human
exploration and operations. "We continued to lose foam on many missions
and this reinforced the idea that all was well. We
did not stay hungry and we didn't deeply
analyse the implications of foam being released at
precisely the wrong moment. "We need to stay vigilant and recognise that
even the smallest potential flaw can become a big
problem. Even small problems can serve as major
failures."
